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“Here and there one still finds traces of the idea that relations between states are exclusively 
the business of governments”, a Dutch newspaper editor wrote in the summer of 1961. The 
author considered this a rather archaic take on international relations. “Surely”, he 
proceeded, “in the middle of the twentieth century we must have reached the point where 
the private citizen can no longer be denied the right to make contact with others should he 
consider this useful, even at the international level.”1 The editorial was part of a heated 
discussion in the Dutch press, which had been triggered by a speech delivered at the Dutch 
Chamber of Commerce in London by the Director General of KLM Dutch Royal Airlines: Ernst 
van der Beugel.2  
Ernst van der Beugel (1918-2004) was a kind of modern Renaissance man who carved 
out a unique position for himself through a kaleidoscopic career that made him an influential 
figure not just in the Netherlands but internationally, in particular within the Cold War 
Atlantic Community. Born into a Jewish family during the final year of the First World War, 
Van der Beugel grew up in Amsterdam during the run-up to the Second World War. Instead of 
following in the footsteps of this father, an international investment banker with social-
democratic leanings, Van der Beugel decided to pursue a career as a civil servant once the 
war had ended. As such, he came to play a central role in the implementation of the Marshall 
Plan in the Netherlands and in the international negotiations related to the European 
Recovery Program. In this context, Van der Beugel developed an impressive career at the 
cross-roads of international political, military and economic policy as the protégé of Hans Max 
Hirschfeld, the most powerful civil servant in the Netherlands at the time. In the process, he 
also developed a close emotional attachment to the United States as well as a diverse and 
expansive transatlantic social network bridging the public and private spheres in the 
Netherlands, Europe and across the Atlantic. Even so, it was above all a strong belief in 
realpolitik fed by his experiences of the run-up to the Second World War, in particular the 
Munich agreement of 1938 and the lessons concerning the importance of power relations 
that he took from these experiences and applied to the new Cold War context, that motivated 
van der Beugel’s Atlanticist inclinations - eventually turning him into one of the “founding 
fathers of Dutch Atlanticism.”3  
 Van der Beugel’s Marshall Plan years were followed by top positions in the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs – where he was one of the main policy advisors with regards to European 
and transatlantic policy of Foreign ministers Stikker, Beyen and Luns and Prime Minister 
                                                            
1 “Particulier in Statenverkeer”, De Rotterdammer, July 21, 1961 (translation mine).  
2 Parts of this introduction also appeared in: Albertine Bloemendal, “Between Dinner Table and Formal Diplomacy: 
Ernst van der Beugel as an Unofficial Diplomat for an Atlantic Community”, New Global Studies, 8:1 (2014): 103-119. 
3 Thomas Gijswijt, “De Trans-Atlantische elite en de Nederlandse Buitenlandse Politiek sinds 1945”, in Bezinning op 
het Buitenland: Het Nederlandse buitenlands beleid in een onzekere wereld, eds. Hellema et al. (Den Haag: 
Clingendael, 2011), 36 (translation mine). 
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Drees. He participated in the negotiations leading up to the Rome Treaty and served as 
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs responsible for European integration in the third Drees 
Cabinet (13 October 1956 - 22 December 1958). While this may all make for an interesting 
career in itself – which has been documented, for example, in Ralph Dingemans’ 2008 portrait 
of Ernst van der Beugel4 – this dissertation argues that what makes Ernst van der Beugel a 
particularly interesting figure is in fact what happened after he left the Dutch government in 
1959 to join KLM Dutch Royal Airlines.  
While Van der Beugel’s transition to the private sector may at first sight appear as a 
fundamental break with his career as a diplomat, reality proved to be more complex. The end 
of Ernst Van der Beugel’s official career at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not mean the 
end of his role in transatlantic relations. Instead, his experience as a formal diplomat served 
as a kind of springboard to a more diffuse and free-form approach to transatlantic diplomacy 
as a private citizen – built on an intricate mosaic of activities in many different spheres 
including the worlds of government, politics, business, finance, military circles, academia, 
think tanks, philanthropic organizations and unofficial transnational elite networks, 
particularly within the Atlantic Community. 
Whereas a great deal of his post-1959 transatlantic endeavors took place behind the 
scenes, Van der Beugel did not hesitate to use his public position either. To illustrate, in his 
speech at the Dutch chamber of commerce in London referred to at the beginning of this 
introduction, Van der Beugel had publicly beseeched the British to join the process of 
European integration in order to create a more healthy (read: ‘more Atlanticist’) balance of 
power in Europe by thwarting the Gaullist dream to dominate the continent, arguing that ‘the 
Netherlands’ would very much applaud this.5 In the process, he rather bluntly criticized 
Gaullist France and scolded the Germans. The incident drew quite some attention in the 
Dutch press and the debate that followed raised interesting questions, like: What was – or 
ought to be – the role of a private citizen in foreign affairs? Who was Van der Beugel to speak 
for ‘the Netherlands’? Was he just a mouthpiece of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs? 
And, if not, who did he speak for and who or what did he represent? But also: What would be 
the consequences? How did this unofficial endeavor relate to formal diplomatic relations?6  
These were very relevant questions, especially since over the course of the 20th century 
advances in communication and transportation had enabled private citizens to play an 
unprecedented role in the conduct of international relations, thus considerably changing the 
diplomatic playing field. As Joe Johnson and Maureen Berman already noted in their 1977 
book Unofficial Diplomats: “private citizens can now to a degree never before true inform 
                                                            
4 Ralph Dingemans, “‘De zon ging op en de wind was gunstig’: Ernst Hans van der Beugel (1918-2004)”, in In dienst 
van Buitenlandse Zaken. Achttien Portretten van ambtenaren en diplomaten in de twintigste eeuw, eds. Bert van der 
Zwan, Bob de Graaff en Duco Hellema (Amsterdam: Boom, 2008), 157-173.  
5 See: “Openhartige rede drs. v.d. Beugel: Fransen willen Britten niet in de E.E.G.”, Telegraaf, July 21, 1961; 
“Particulier in Statenverkeer”, Rotterdammer, July 25, 1961; “KLM-directeur wekt Engeland op toe te treden tot 
E.E.G”, De Tijd/Maasbode, July 21, 1961; “KLM-president pleit in Londen voor Bonn”, De Waarheid, July 21, 1961. 
6 See: “Moedig”, De Gelderlander, July 25, 1961; “Particulier in Statenverkeer”, Rotterdammer, July 25, 1961; 
“Vrijmoedig comentaar”, De Tijd, July 21, 1961; “Vlucht in de politiek”, Volkskrant, July 21, 1961.  
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themselves on the foreign policies of their own and other governments, visit and entertain 
the leaders of foreign governments, suggest new policy positions or probe for changes in 
policy during those meetings, bring back feelers for policy changes, and then publicize the 
results of those meetings to large numbers of people in the news media.” As a result “an 
increasing proportion of international interaction bypasses, complements, or supplements 
traditional bilateral procedures.” Johnson and Berman dubbed the range of private 
international relations ‘unofficial diplomacy’, referring specifically to “individuals and groups 
who have contact with private citizens or government officials from other countries as well as 
with their own government.”7 These developments were also visible in Cold War transatlantic 
relations, leaving a considerable impact on the diplomatic playing field.  
Ernst van der Beugel, the Atlantic Elite and the Unofficial “Atlantic Community” 
The post-war period witnessed a great intensification in transatlantic cooperation, often 
illustrated by the Marshall Plan, the creation of the Organization for European Economic 
Cooperation (OEEC), and the establishment of NATO – developments which were 
accompanied with talk of a nascent ‘Atlantic Community’. The term ‘Atlantic Community’ was 
used frequently during the Cold War and meant different things to different people.8 During 
the 1950’s some Atlanticists even advocated the creation of a formal Atlantic Community that 
would politically and economically integrate the North Atlantic area. While organizations like 
NATO and associated institutions like the OECD and GATT played an important role in 
formalizing the post-war transatlantic relationship, a formal Atlantic Community never 
materialized. Atlanticism, however, was never restricted to these formal intergovernmental 
organizations.9  
Rather, as a new generation of scholars has started to uncover, the post-war period 
witnessed the proliferation of many private individuals and groups promoting close 
                                                            
7 Maureen Berman and Joseph Johnson, Unofficial Diplomats (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), 3-5. 
8 The phrase “Atlantic Community” was first coined in 1916 by the American philosopher journalist Walter Lippmann, 
but the view it reflected was rooted in 19th century ideas of shared cultural affinities and dreams of Anglo-Saxon 
confederation and the unity of the English speaking peoples. During and right after the Second World War, the initial 
Atlantic alliance of the United States and Britain broadened to include Western Europe and the popularization of an 
Atlantic Community became a joint transatlantic effort, considered crucial in the light of the emerging Cold War. See: 
Ronald Steel, “Walter Lippmann and the Invention of the Atlantic Community” in European Community, Atlantic 
Community?, eds. Aubourg, Scott-Smith and Bossuat (Paris: Soleb, 2008), 28-36; Lara C. Silver, “The Political Use of 
Metaphor in the Construction of the Atlantic Community” in European Community, Atlantic Community?, eds. 
Aubourg, Scott-Smith and Bossuat (Paris: Soleb, 2008) 60-73; Ronald Steel, “How Europe became Atlantic: Walter 
Lippmann and the New Geography of the Atlantic Community”, in Defining the Atlantic Community: Culture, 
Intellectuals, and Politics in the Mid-Twentieth Century, ed. Marco Mariano (New York: Routledge, 2010), 13-27; 
Interjeet Parmar,“Anglo-American Elites in the Interwar Years: Idealism and Power in the Intellectual Roots of 
Chatham House and the Council on Foreign Relations,” International Relations, 16:1 (2002), 53-75; Sebastiaan Reyn, 
“Atlantis Lost: The American Experience with De Gaulle, 1958-1969” (Ph.D. dissertation, Leiden University, 2007), 29, 
107-192. 
9 See: Geir Lundestad, The United States and Western Europe since 1945: From ‘Empire’ by Invitation to Transatlantic 
Drift (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 77; David W. Ellwood, “From the Marshall Plan to Atlanticism: 
Communication Strategies and Geopolitical Narratives”, in European Community, Atlantic Community?, eds. Aubourg, 
Bossuat and Scott-Smith (Paris: Soleb, 2008), 54. 
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transatlantic cooperation, including the international Movement for Atlantic Union, which 
was represented through the Atlantic Union Committee, the Atlantic Citizen’s Congress (ACC), 
and the Declaration of Atlantic Unity group (DAU) and pursued an Atlantic federation based 
on the ideas set out by the American journalist and Atlantic federalist Clarance Streit in his 
popular 1939 book “Union Now”.  Other prominent Atlanticist NGO’s included the Atlantic 
Treaty Association (ATA), which counted fifteen national member groups; the NATO 
Parliamentarians conference, the American Council on NATO, the Congress of European-
American Associates, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the Bilderberg Meetings 
and the Atlantic Institute.10  
While most of these private organizations tended to pursue their own agenda’s many of 
them had close ties with formal diplomatic and foreign policy establishments.  After all, as 
multiple scholars have pointed out, a crucial characteristic of Cold War transatlantic relations 
was the existence of a highly integrated Atlantic elite, which consisted not only of formal 
government representatives but also included bankers and businessmen, philanthropists, 
union leaders, journalists and academics, or in the words of Giles Scott-Smith: “the loose 
collection of policy intellectuals and influentials dedicated to maintaining close transatlantic 
relations from dinner table to diplomacy and everywhere in between.”11   
Kenneth Weisbrode has pointed out that it was no “historical accident” that these 
private organizations and meeting places proliferated in the mid-1950s and 1960s. During this 
period diplomacy started to grow more accustomed to the presence of the mass media while 
bureaucracies became more complex, creating a need for “alternative, ‘unofficial’ purveyors 
of elite consensus and continuity.” Weisbrode emphasizes that the role of these private 
organizations and meeting places was “something more subtle and powerful than their 
ostensible roles as policy talking shops and cheerleaders.” Instead, “they were at once 
alternative spaces for policymaking and policy planning as well as important catalysts and 
incubators of political consensus among a diversifying and increasingly contentious bevy of 
leaders.”12  The networks, think tanks, foundations, exchange programs and other private 
organizations that linked this transatlantic elite were just as much part of the transatlantic 
fabric as NATO itself. As Thomas Gijswijt has demonstrated, “at times they even succeeded 
where NATO, to a certain degree failed; e.g. in building a consultation infrastructure that 
                                                            
10 On the unofficial dimension of Cold War transatlantic relations see: David Ellwood, “What Winning Stories Teach” 
in Defining the Atlantic Community: Culture, Intellectuals, and Politics in the Mid-Twentieth Century, ed. Marco 
Mariano (New York: Routledge, 2010); Valérie Aubourg, “Creating the Texture of the Atlantic Community”, in 
European Community, Atlantic Community?, eds. Aubourg, Bossuat and Scott-Smith (Paris: Soleb, 2008), 390-415; 
Kenneth Weisbrode, The Atlantic Century: Four Centuries of Extraordinary Diplomats who Forged America’s Vital 
Alliance with Europe (Cambridge: Da Capo Press, 2009), 165-170. 
11 Giles Scott-Smith, “Ghosts in the Machine? Ernst van der Beugel, the Transatlantic Elite, and the ‘New’ Diplomatic 
History” (Oratie, Leiden, 2009). On the Atlantic elite see also: Thomas Gijswijt, “Beyond NATO: Transatlantic Elite 
Networks and the Atlantic Alliance”, in Transforming NATO in the Cold War: Challenges Beyond Deterrence in the 
1960s, eds. A. Wenger et al. (London: Routledge, 2007), 50; Kees van der Pijl, The Making of an Atlantic Ruling Class 
(London: Verso, 1984); Geir Lundestad, The United States and Western Europe since 1945: From “Empire” by 
Invitation to Transatlantic Drift (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 66. 
12 Kenneth Weisbrode, The Atlantic Century, 168. 
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went beyond purely military and strategic issues.”13 Thus, in the absence of formal 
transatlantic political structures the unofficial dimension of transatlantic relations only gained 
in importance.  
Furthermore, among the transatlantic elite – many of whom had worked together on 
projects such as the Marshall Plan or the creation of NATO followed by common ventures in 
pursuit of Atlantic unity and cooperation – a sense of shared values, experiences and interests 
developed (especially in the context of the Cold War), which created an almost tangible sense 
of Atlantic community; a sense of community which they in turn tried to spread and foster, 
either individually or through transnational Atlanticist networks and NGO’s.14 Throughout his 
career, Ernst van der Beugel moved as a spider through this intricate web of formal and 
informal transatlantic relations – first as an official government representative and from 1959 
onwards through positions in almost all the different spheres represented among the Atlantic 
elite.  
After close cooperation with the private sector during the Marshall Plan, Van der Beugel 
eventually entered the business world through KLM Dutch Royal airlines in 1959; first as vice-
president and between June 1961 and January 1963 as its president. He also mingled with 
captains of industry on the boards of governors of a varied collection of European and 
American corporations, including Merck, Sharp & Dohme, the Xerox corporation, Estel, the 
Diebold Group, Petrofina and General Electric.15  Next to that, he occupied significant 
positions in the financial sector, for example on the supervisory boards of S.G. Warburg, Bank 
Mees & Hope and ABN.   
In 1960 Van der Beugel consolidated his position among the Atlantic elite through his 
appointment as Honorary Secretary General of the Bilderberg meetings  – one of the main 
informal meeting places of the unofficial Atlantic elite.16 He would occupy this position until 
1980, serving in the words of Henry Kissinger as the ‘glue’ that kept the network together.17 
In addition, he served on the boards of private international relations councils including the 
Ditchley Foundation, the Eisenhower Exchange Fellowship, the Paris based Atlantic Institute 
and the Dutch Association for Foreign Affairs. What’s more, between 1973 and 1985 Van der 
Beugel served as the chairman of the prestigious London based International Institute for 
                                                            
13 Gijswijt, “Beyond NATO”, 50.  
14 Ibid.; Weisbrode, The Atlantic Century, 13, 72; Valérie Aubourg, “Problems of Transmission: The Atlantic 
Community and the Successor Generation as Seen by US Philantrophy, 1960s-1970s”, in Atlantic, Euratlantic or 
Europe-America?, eds. Valérie Aubourg and Giles Scott-Smith (Paris: Soleb, 2011), 416-443.  
15 For a complete list see appendix A: Directorships E.H. van der Beugel. 
16 On the Bilderberg Meetings see: Thomas Gijswijt, “Uniting the West: the Bilderberg Group, the Cold War and 
European integration, 1952-1966” (PhD diss., Heidelberg University, 2007); Ingeborg Philipsen, Diplomacy with 
Ambiguity: the Bilderberg Organization 1952-1977 (PhD diss., Københavns Universitet, 2009); Ian Richardson, Andrew 
Kakabadse and Nada Kakabadse, Bilderberg People: Elite Power and Consensus in World Affairs (London/New York: 
Routledge, 2011); Valérie Aubourg, “Organizing Atlanticism: The Bilderberg Group and the Atlantic Institute 1952-
63,”  in The Cultural Cold War in Western Europe 1945-1960 , eds Giles Scott-Smith and Hans Krabbendam (London: 
Frank Cass Publishers, 2003); Hugh Wilford, “The CIA, the British Left, and the Cold War: Calling the Tune?”, in The 
Cultural Cold War in Western Europe 1945-1960 , eds Giles Scott-Smith and Hans Krabbendam (London: Frank Cass 
Pubilshers, 2003), 225-261. 
17 H.A. Kissinger, interview with the author, 4 January 2012. 
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Strategic Studies (IISS).  Meanwhile, he also maintained close ties with the ‘Big Three’ 
American private philanthropic organizations: the Ford, Rockefeller and the Carnegie 
Foundations, which financed many of the Atlantic NGO’s and their unofficial transatlantic 
activities.18 
After writing a dissertation on European integration as a concern of American foreign 
policy, Van der Beugel also entered academia in 1966 as professor of Western Cooperation 
after the Second World War at Leiden University. As such, he did not only share his 
knowledge within the university’s ivory towers but also came to manifest himself as a public 
intellectual who avidly contributed to the public debate on international affairs and who was 
regularly consulted as an expert on European and transatlantic relations by businessmen, 
journalists and government representatives alike.  Through his activities in all these different 
spheres he developed an illustrious network that provided access to the likes of Henry 
Kissinger, David Rockefeller and Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands.  
While personal interests including social status, financial gain and a certain dose of 
vanity should not be disregarded, Van der Beugel was also driven by diplomatic goals, and in 
pursuit of these goals he continued to play a role on the transatlantic diplomatic playing field 
as a member of the Atlantic elite.  Thus, Ernst van der Beugel is a good example of the kind of 
‘unofficial diplomat’ described by Johnson (who himself served for many years as the U.S. 
Honorary Secretary General of the Bilderberg Meetings) and Berman. Even so the history of 
his private diplomatic endeavors – while recognized by some historians – has not been 
thoroughly studied and thus remains cloaked in mystery.19 He has been described as a 
“natural networker”, an “artist in the field of human relations”20, and a “one man pressure 
group; someone who brings everyone in contact with everyone while functioning as the 
central linkman.” In his book on Dutch power structures, journalist Joris van den Berg also 
described Van der Beugel as a “master-plotter on the power map of the Netherlands” and 
applied the Dutch soccer term ‘aangever’ to illuminate his political role, referring to the 
soccer player who provides the crucial assist that enables a team member to score a goal.21 
Another observer has compared Van der Beugel’s activities to the role of an 18th century 
French woman holding a salon.22 While these are telling descriptions, they only scratch the 
                                                            
18 On the role of foundations see: Interjeet Parmar, Foundations of the American Century: the Ford, Carnegie, & 
Rockefeller Foundations in the Rise of American Power (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012); Volker R. 
Berghahn, “The Ford Foundation and the Forging of the Atlantic Community after World War II”, in European 
Community, Atlantic Community?, eds. Aubourg, Bossuat and Scott-Smith (Paris: Soleb, 2008) 92-112; Valérie 
Aubourg, “Problems of Transmission”, 416-443; Volker R. Berghahn, America and the Intellectual Cold Wars in Europe 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001). 
19 Ernst van der Beugel does pop up in some studies involving post-1959 Dutch-American relations, see for example: 
Kim van der Wijngaart, Bondgenootschap onder Spanning: Nederlands-Amerikaanse Betrekkingen, 1969-1976 
(Hilversum: Verloren, 2011); Gijswijt, “De Transatlantische Elite”; Giles Scott-Smith and David Snyder, “’A Test of 
Sentiments’: Civil Aviation, Alliance Politics, and the KLM Challenge in Dutch-American Relations”, Diplomatic History 
37:5 (2013).  
20  C.L. Patijn to V. Halberstadt, 14 January 1998, file 1, C.L. Patijn Papers, National Archives the Hague (NAH) 
(translation mine). 
21 Joris van den Berg, De Anatomie van Nederland (Amsterdam: de Bezige Bij, 1967), 172-174 (translation mine). 
22 Jérôme Heldering, “Afscheid van een tijdperk”, NRC Handelsblad, October 14, 2004, p. 9 (translation mine).  
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surface of his activities and no in depth study on Van der Beugel’s role in transatlantic affairs 
including both the official and unofficial realms of diplomacy has been done. A lack of 
appreciation for the unofficial realm and its actors is not only visible with regards to the 
historical treatment of Ernst van der Beugel. The historiography of Dutch diplomacy and 
diplomats generally lacks in depth studies of the unofficial realm of foreign policy and the 
informal activities of private diplomatic actors in it.23 This is remarkable, especially since a 
small country like the Netherlands might actually be able to profit disproportionally from 
building strong personal relationships through informal networks and a leading role in 
unofficial circuits like the Bilderberg meetings, which – in the absence of considerable hard 
power – might enable them to punch somewhat ‘above their weight’ in the diplomatic arena.  
Meanwhile, the changes in the diplomatic landscape described above, in particular the 
proliferation of non-state actors and the importance of the unofficial realm, are only 
increasing in relevance and are having serious implications for the ways in which diplomacy is 
to be carried out – also today. In its 2010 strategic report Attached to the World: on the 
Anchoring and Strategy of Dutch Foreign Policy, the Dutch Scientific Council for Government 
Policy (WRR) emphasized that the first step towards an effective Dutch foreign policy within 
the current international context is “to be aware and acknowledge that we live in a hybrid 
world (…) in which the worlds of state politics and non-state networks exist next to each 
other” and that this situation demands new approaches to foreign policy.  While originally 
Dutch diplomacy was focused on ‘directing’, in the new hybrid world cooperation with non-
state actors is crucial requiring a new emphasis on ‘facilitating’ and ‘connecting’. In the hybrid 
world of state and non-state actors, the authors would like to see the Netherlands at the 
center of significant networks arguing that “the more prominent its position in the network (a 
large number of contacts, the appreciation of other actors), the greater its capacity to acquire 
knowledge and services from other actors, to regulate the transmission of information and 
products within the network, and to determine agendas and frame debates.”24  
The wakeup call provided by the WRR report aimed at the foreign policy arena is also 
relevant to academia. While the diplomatic playing field has dramatically changed, especially 
with regards to “how and where diplomacy is done, as well as in who is seen to be engaging in 
diplomacy”, and despite developments in global and transnational history, many diplomatic 
historians – not just in the Netherlands – still look at diplomacy and diplomatic relations 
                                                            
23 Some shorter pieces do focus on the unofficial dimension. See for example: Giles Scott-Smith, “A Dutch Dartmouth: 
Ernst van Eeghen’s Private Campaign to Defuse the Euromissiles Crisis”, New Global Studies 8:1 (2014); Thomas 
Gijswijt, “The Bilderberg Group and Dutch-American Relations”, in NL-USA: Four Centuries of Dutch-American 
Relations, eds. Krabbendam, van Minnen and Scott-Smith (Amsterdam: Boom: 2009), 808-818; Gijswijt, “De 
Transatlantische Elite”. An example of a more in depth-study concerning a private citizen on the diplomatic playing 
field is: Wouter Meijer, Ze zijn gék geworden in Den Haag: Willem Oltmans en de kwestie Nieuw Guinea (Amsterdam: 
Elsevier, 2009).  
24 Ben Knapen et al, Attached to the world: On the Anchoring and Strategy of Dutch Foreign Policy (Amsterdam: 
Amsterdam University Press, 2011), 11.  
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through a classical Westphalian lens.25 The result is a blind spot with regards to the unofficial 
realm of diplomatic relations, which in fact has become increasingly important over the 
course of the 20th century – and which was already present long before that.26 As this 
dissertation will demonstrate, the hybrid world – consisting of an official and an unofficial 
realm – described in the WRR report already existed during the Cold War. That this required a 
different attitude towards diplomacy was something that Ernst van der Beugel already 
anticipated half a century ago. ‘Facilitating’ and ‘connecting’ were two of his key trademarks, 
although his activities also went beyond this. Nevertheless, diplomatic historians have been 
slow to adapt their state-based analytical frames to the changing diplomatic arena.27 This is 
not to say that this state-centered historiography has not been of fundamental importance. 
Its authors are the ‘giants’ on whose metaphorical shoulders this research will stand. They 
have laid a critical foundation on which we can now build to expand our understanding of the 
diplomatic process by adding more in depth explorations of the unofficial sphere in an 
attempt to provide a more holistic understanding of diplomacy in a globalized world. Because, 
as Geoffrey Allen Pigman has argued, “if the idea of diplomacy is to remain useful, the 
profusion of types of actor and venue implies that our understanding of what diplomacy is 
and who does it needs to be broadened accordingly.”28  
Towards a New Diplomatic History  
Important steps in this direction have recently been taken by historians leading the way 
towards a New Diplomatic History (NDH) that seeks to add new layers of investigation by 
focusing on the informal or unofficial realm of diplomacy.29  This includes “reassessing the 
role and identities of those involved in the diplomatic realm, and how the distinctions 
between official state diplomats and non-state actors have become blurred” through “a 
                                                            
25 Geoffrey Allan Pigman, Contemporary Diplomacy: Representation and Communication in a Globalized World 
(Cambridge: Polity, 2010), 22. On relevant developments in global and transnational history see: Akira Iriye, Global 
and Transnational History: Past, Present and Future (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013).  
26 See: Keith Hamilton and Richard Langhorne, The Practice of Diplomacy: Its evolution, theory and administration 
(London/New York: Routledge, 2011), 229; Kenneth Weisbrode, Old Diplomacy Revisited: A Study in the Modern 
History of Diplomatic Transformations (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014), 16-17; Important in this context is also 
the inherent social nature of the diplomatic profession, which admits no clear demarcation between private and 
official life (as Weisbrode for example also points out). For the role of the private realm in diplomacy in premodern 
history see: Maurits Ebben and Louis Sicking, “Nieuwe diplomatieke geschiedenis van de premoderne tijd: een 
inleiding”, Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis, 127:4 (2014), 541-552.  
27 In the context of post-war transatlantic relations, see for example the following key textbooks: David Ryan, The 
United States and Europe in the Twentieth Century (London and New York: Routledge, 2003); Jussi M. Hanhimäki, 
Benedikt Schopenborn and Barabara Zanchetta, Transatlantic Relations Since 1945: an Introduction (London and New 
York: Routledge, 2012); Geir Lundestad, The United States and Western Europe since 1945. While Lundestad clearly 
recognizes the importance of unofficial elite networks and meeting places like the Bilderberg Meetings, his book does 
not fully integrate this dimension of the diplomatic process in his own study. The overall approach is state-centered 
and mostly focused on the outcomes of the diplomatic process.  
28 Pigman, Contemporary Diplomacy, 23.  
29 Giles Scott-Smith, “Private Diplomacy, Making the Citizen Visible”, New Global Studies 8:1 (2014), 2. 
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‘broadening’ and a ‘deepening’ of diplomatic studies: a widening of its field of interest, and a 
focusing of its attention on the individual, the particular and the ephemeral.”30  
While diplomatic history has acknowledged the informal activities of formal diplomats 
as well as the role of Track-Two diplomacy, which pays attention to informal efforts aimed at 
conflict resolution in tandem with formal negotiations, NDH scholars perceive the informal 
realm as worthy of investigation in its own right, allowing for the possibility of “a kind of 
Derridean rejection of the orthodox dualism that privileges the state over the non-state.”31  
While NDH seeks to do away with the rigidity of the distinction between state and non-state 
actors, this does not mean that it deems the study of nation-states irrelevant or tries to 
supplant more traditional methods of international diplomatic scholarship. Instead, “it 
attempts to enrich this scholarship by an approach that is more transnational than 
international in that more attention is given to the role of individuals and non-governmental 
organizations in diplomatic practice who are often bypassed in the more orthodox study of 
diplomatic interaction and who cannot be bound by orthodox understandings of the ‘national 
interest’ or national identity” claiming that their stories need to be featured more 
prominently, as do historical analyses of their modus operandi.32  
Thus, New Diplomatic History calls for more in depth explorations and analyses of the 
process and machinery of diplomacy as opposed to a preoccupation with its outcomes. NDH 
scholars recognize “that where their subjects sit in and out of officialdom is important, but 
generally less important, than what they do and how and why they do it.”33  Thus, as the very 
nature of diplomatic practice and the role (and the very notion) of the diplomat is being 
transformed in an ever-more dynamic global context, they “try to re-conceptualize the 
concept of ‘diplomacy’ and ‘the diplomat’ by questioning the traditional limitation of 
regarding them as no more than representatives of governments attending official meetings”. 
As a consequence, it touches upon the very identity and meaning of diplomacy itself and how 
it changed through the 20th century and attempts to sketch the broader playing field of 
‘diplomacy’ that developed during this period. As Scott-Smith puts it: “Once the frame of 
‘diplomacy’ is altered, so the kinds of actors who become visible change with it.”34 So, who 
then is a diplomat within this new diplomatic framework? Kenneth Weisbrode, one of the 
trailblazers of NDH provides the following definition:  
[T]he history of diplomats focuses on people who perform diplomatic roles, which 
means anyone who imparts to himself or herself the role of intermediary for 
reasons beyond his or her own individual interests. They need not serve or 
                                                            
30 Kenneth Weisbrode, “The Task Ahead”, September 20, 2012, http://newdiplomatichistory.org/the-task-ahead/.  
31 Scott-Smith, “Private Diplomacy”, 6; For an overview of recent scholarship on ‘Track Two Diplomacy, see: Peter 
Jones, Track Two Diplomacy in Theory and Practice (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015).  
32 Scott-Smith, “Private Diplomacy”, 2; Kenneth Weisbrode, “The New Diplomatic History: An Open Letter to the 
Membership of SHAFR”, December 2008, taken offline, but still accessible through the Internet Archive: 
https://web.archive.org/web/20110820101715/http://www.shafr.org/passport/2008/december/Weisbrode.pdf. 
33 Kenneth Weisbrode, “The Task Ahead”. See also: Pigman, Contemporary Diplomacy, 208.  
34 Scott-Smith, “Making the Citizen Visible”, 3. 
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represent states, although many do. They must, however, serve a set of interests, a 
cause or collective unit above and beyond themselves, and which in some way 
involves the crossing of borders and the inter-relationship of political entities.35  
It is this ‘functional’ or ‘operational’ definition of ‘the diplomat’ emphasizing not so much the 
position of a diplomatic actor in or out of officialdom, but rather the performance of a 
‘diplomatic role’ that this study will build on. In doing so, it will, however, like Johnson and 
Berman did, still distinguish between ‘formal’ or ‘official’ diplomats on the one hand – 
referring to those individuals formally representing a nation state, and ‘unofficial’ or 
‘informal’ diplomats on the other hand, who may also be referred to as ‘private’ or 
‘independent’ diplomats, ‘diplomatic entrepreneurs’ or ‘diplomats without portfolio.’36 When 
Ernst van der Beugel exchanged the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the private sector, 
he became one of these unofficial diplomats, operating specifically in the context of Cold War 
transatlantic diplomacy.  
Research Question 
While traditional approaches to diplomatic history have prevented an in depth study of Ernst 
van der Beugel’s transatlantic role through both official and unofficial diplomatic networks, 
this dissertation will contribute to this new brand of scholarship by answering the following 
research question: How does New Diplomatic History offer a different appreciation of Ernst 
van der Beugel’s role in transatlantic diplomacy compared to traditional state-centered 
diplomatic narratives? In order to answer this research question, this dissertation will analyze 
Ernst van der Beugel’s role in Cold War transatlantic affairs with a focus on the continuation 
of his diplomatic role as a private citizen, guided by the following subquestions: What did Van 
der Beugel’s ‘diplomatic role’ entail – what was his modus operandi – and what enabled the 
continuation of this role in transatlantic diplomacy as a private citizen? What motivated Ernst 
van der Beugel’s transatlantic activities and what was the set of interests, the cause or 
collective unit above and beyond himself that Ernst van der Beugel represented as a private 
diplomat?37 But also: how did Van der Beugel perceive his own post-1959 role in transatlantic 
relations and how did his unofficial transatlantic activities relate to formal diplomacy?  
To properly assess Ernst van der Beugel’s ‘diplomatic role’ as a private citizen three case 
studies have been selected based on the three perceived challenges to the Atlantic 
Community that preoccupied Ernst van der Beugel the most: the Gaullist challenge during the 
1960s, the problem of maintaining transatlantic strength in a time of détente, the breakdown 
of the Cold War consensus and the democratization of foreign policy during the late 1960’s 
                                                            
35 Weisbrode, “The Task Ahead”. 
36 See: Giles Scott-Smith ed., “Who is a Diplomat? Diplomatic and Policy Entrepreneurs in the Global Age”, New 
Global Studies 8:1 (2014); Linda Fritzinger, Diplomat without Portfolio: Valentine Chirol, His Life and ‘The Times’ 
(London/New York: Tauris, 2006); Carne Ross, Independent Diplomat: Dispatches from an Unaccountable Elite 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007).  
37 Weisbrode, “The Task Ahead”. 
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and the early 1970s, and the long-term challenge of transmitting the Atlanticist mindset to 
the next generation that had not lived through the same formative experiences as the 
generation that had been ‘present at the creation’ of the Atlantic Community. Together these 
case studies give an overview of the nature, diversity and scope of Ernst van der Beugel’s 
unofficial diplomatic endeavors. In line with NDH the focus will be on the process and 
machinery of diplomacy rather than on its outcomes in the more traditional forms of treaties 
or policy papers. The diplomatic goals pursued by Ernst van der Beugel and his peers tended 
to be more subtle and fundamental, often not so much focused on immediate decisions, but 
rather on such things as creating a favorable atmosphere for transatlantic cooperation by 
fostering close personal relationships, mutual understanding and an ‘Atlantic mindset’, thus 
strengthening the social and intellectual fabric of the Atlantic Community and laying the 
groundwork for the realization of more concrete and short term goals. 
A re-appreciation of Van der Beugel’s role in transatlantic affairs focusing on the 
continuation of his ‘diplomatic role’ as a private citizen through the lens of New Diplomatic 
History also requires a re-evaluation of the pre-1959 period, including the development of his 
views and network during his career with the Dutch government. After all, while it tends to be 
obvious what an official diplomat ought to represent, namely his or her nation state – while 
executing the policy set out by the nation’s leadership – this is not necessarily as obvious in 
the case of private actors. As independent agents they can set out their own course, based on 
their own convictions. Hence, in order to understand an unofficial diplomat’s position on the 
diplomatic playing field it becomes more important to explore the personal convictions and 
motivations of these private actors in the diplomatic arena. In addition, if Van der Beugel’s 
role in the diplomatic process was not solely determined by his official ties to a nation-state, 
this also begs the question: what other factors enabled him to continue to play a role in 
transatlantic diplomacy once these formal ties to the nation state had been severed? A 
reassessment of Van der Beugel’s pre-1959 career in the light of his later role as a private 
actor will also help to answer this question.  
While Ernst van der Beugel clearly plays a central role in this narrative, this study 
intends to move beyond the individual and to approach Van der Beugel’s multifaceted career 
as a window upon the world in which he operated, offering valuable insights about the Cold 
War transatlantic elite and the informal dimensions of transatlantic diplomacy. By following 
an individual like Ernst van der Beugel through his activities within this transatlantic web we 
can gain a better understanding of how it functioned; about the ways in which the Atlanticist 
elite tried to foster, manage, and sustain a Cold War Atlantic Community and how these 
transnational elite-networks enabled a private individual like Ernst van der Beugel to function 
as an unofficial diplomat in pursuit of transatlantic unity based on common values and 
interests as well as a common threat. 38    
                                                            
38 While there was no official “Atlantic Community”, Ernst van der Beugel and many other members of the Atlantic 
elite in particular did perceive themselves as part of an Atlantic Community. Thus, like Aubourg and Scott-Smith, I will 
approach the ‘Atlantic Community’ concept based on the following assumptions: “that the Atlantic Community, as a 
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Why such a perspective is crucial to gain a better understanding of the role of the 
unofficial dimension in Cold War transatlantic diplomacy may become clear by looking at a 
study from a state-centered perspective that nevertheless acknowledges Ernst van der 
Beugel’s unofficial role in the transatlantic diplomatic process, namely Kim van der 
Wijngaart’s excellent book on Dutch-American relations during the 1970’s “Bondgenootschap 
onder Spanning”. Van der Wijngaart does a terrific job of incorporating Ernst van der Beugel’s 
unofficial role within a state-centered framework. But, by looking at Van der Beugel from this 
perspective, his activities may come across as an incidental guest role on the diplomatic stage 
by one individual who once belonged to the diplomatic establishment. When we flip the 
perspective, however, as this dissertation attempts to do, it becomes clear that Ernst van der 
Beugel’s activities were not just incidents, but part of a continuous and concerted effort by 
members of the unofficial transatlantic elite to partake in the multidimensional management 
of the transatlantic relationship; that these individuals were not playing an incidental guest 
role on the transatlantic stage, but were part of the diplomatic troupe, of the very social 
fabric of transatlantic diplomacy – and that they did not need to work in tandem with nation-
states to contribute to and partake in the transatlantic diplomatic process. These unofficial 
actors do not necessarily execute tasks given to them by nation states, but often follow their 
own diplomatic agendas, based on their own initiative – at times in cooperation with a nation 
state, but also independently.  These things only become clear when we change the 
perspective, when we approach the diplomatic process not from the perspective of the state, 
but through the eyes of the unofficial diplomat. This is what this dissertation intends to do.  
While many studies on the Atlantic Community  have focused on American conceptions 
of the transatlantic relationship often linked to the construction of an unofficial American 
‘empire’, this dissertation will offer insight into the perspective and agency of a European 
Atlanticist in his attempts to foster and defend Atlantic unity under strong American 
leadership, thus further complicating more simplistic conceptions of Europeans passively 
undergoing American hegemony without playing an active part in the process themselves in 
pursuit of their own perceived national and transnational interests.39 Thus, as Ernst van der 
                                                                                                                                                             
regional notion, was a product of the representations and imagination of individuals and groups in the sense of 
Benedict Anderson’s ‘imagined communities’, and of the communication and discursive strategies of particular 
actors; that it was rooted in and produced by specific political contexts and expressed a distinctive political 
representation of the world; and that it performed a legitimizing function for institutions, political movements, and 
asymmetric power relations operating within the transatlantic relationship.” Valérie Aubourg and Giles Scott-Smith, 
“The Transatlantic Imaginary: Constructing the Atlantic Community during the early Cold War”, in European 
Community, Atlantic Community? eds. Aubourg, Bossuat and Scott-Smith (Paris: Soleb, 2008), 14. Next to 
approaching the ‘Atlantic Community’ as ‘imagined community’, I will describe the constellation of formal and 
informal transatlantic organizations and networks described in this introduction as the embodiment of an “unofficial 
Atlantic Community”.  
39 See: Geir Lundestand, “Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe 1945-1952”, Journal of Peace 
Research 23:3 (1988), 262-277. Geir Lundestad was one of the first historians to complicate this image in the late 
1980s. As Mary Nolan put it: “America was hegemonic, but Western Europe consented; it was, to borrow Geir 
Lundestad’s phrase, ‘an empire by invitation,’ or perhaps more accurately, by invitations from national elites that 
were accepted by the population with varying degrees of enthusiasm.” Mary Nolan, The Transatlantic Century: 
Europe and America, 1890-2010 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 205. Nevertheless, discussions of 
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Beugel guides us through both the public and the private spheres of half a century of 
transatlantic relations we can gain access to the unofficial dimensions of the Atlantic 
Community from a European perspective; to a world that still remains for a great part veiled 
in obscurity, but which was nevertheless an integral part of post-war transatlantic diplomacy.  
Sources  
Once the importance of the private and unofficial realm within the diplomatic process is 
recognized, it also becomes crucial to expand archival research beyond the formal 
government archives. Consequently, while the traditional sources of diplomatic history 
derived from government archives including formal diplomatic correspondence, telephone 
conversation transcripts and internal notes of Foreign Ministries as well as other government 
agencies have certainly not been neglected, the majority of primary sources analyzed for this 
dissertation have been derived from private archives – including privately owned documents, 
which have not been officially released to the public at large from the personal collections of 
Ernst van der Beugel, Henry Kissinger and David Rockefeller.  
In addition to an analysis of relevant literature and archives, this study has also made 
use of oral history sources. Ernst van der Beugel himself participated in multiple oral history 
projects, including three interviews kept by the Truman Library concerning the Marshall 
Plan.40 By far the most important oral history project that has been used for this research, 
however, is the result of an extensive series of interviews with Ernst van der Beugel set up by 
Albert Kersten in the early 1990s, which resulted in over a thousand pages of material on Van 
der Beugel’s life and career.   
The use of oral history always involves risks.41 Consequently, the author has tried to 
build her argumentation as much as possible on written primary sources. In chapter one, 
however, the use of oral history is relatively heavy due to a lack of alternative sources 
concerning Van der Beugel’s childhood and upbringing. What is most important about this 
period, however, is Ernst van der Beugel’s memory of this period, which allows us to 
understand how he interpreted these experiences, and how his interpretation of these 
experiences impacted his views.  That is exactly what the oral history captures.   
                                                                                                                                                             
transatlantic relations still remain quite one-dimensional and the role, agency and initiative of Europeans in Cold War 
transatlantic relations remains understudied.  
40 In 1964 van der Beugel participated in an oral history project by Philip C. Brooks and in 1970 he participated in 
another oral history project for the Truman Library conducted by Theodore A. Wilson.  
41 It is important to be aware of the fact that oral history never presents a direct gateway to the past, making it more 
prone to factual errors.  For starters, oral history depends on the memory of individuals, which tends to be flawed as 
people forget things or generate false memories. Interviewees may also have their own reasons and  interests to 
present the story in a distorted way on purpose. In addition, oral history does not only depend on the interpretation 
of actual events, but it is also the result of a specific interaction between interviewer and interviewee at a specific 
moment in time, which may also color the answers that are generated. For a more comprehensive discussion on the 
challenges and complexities uniquely related to doing oral history research see: Robert Perks and Alistair Thomson, 
eds., The Oral History Reader (New York and London: Routledge, 1998); Lynn Abrahams, Oral History Theory (New 
York: Routledge, 2016).  
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In addition, the author has conducted interviews with a selection of individuals who 
knew Ernst van der Beugel well, including former diplomat and Secretary of the High 
Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community Max Kohnstamm, former U.S. Secretary 
of State Henry Kissinger, former NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, former 
Dutch Prime Minister Piet de Jong, former Dutch CHU politician and Minister of Development 
Assistance Berend Jan Udink, former Dutch Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Ben Knapen, 
the Dutch journalist and political commentator Jérôme Heldring, former KLM President Sergio 
Orlandini, the former Dutch diplomat Rob van Schaik and the Dutch historian Professor Henk 
Wesseling as well as Ernst van der Beugel’s daughter Aukelien van Hoytema – van der Beugel 
and his second wife, Nelletje van der Beugel-Schas who, prior to their marriage, served as a 
secretary for the Bilderberg Meetings. While there are some references to these interviews in 
the chapters that follow, they have mainly been used as a source of background information 
for the author.   
Structure 
This dissertation consists of seven chapters, which are more or less chronologically 
structured, even though the last three chapters, containing the three case studies, have a 
somewhat more thematic character.  
The first chapter introduces the reader to Ernst van der Beugel and the milieu in which 
he grew up. It deals with Van der Beugel’s childhood, his student years during the 1930’s and 
his survival as a Jewish youngster during the Second World War. A key element in this chapter 
is Van der Beugel’s experience of the run-up to the Second World War – including the Munich 
agreement, an event Van der Beugel himself referred to as ‘the great mistake of the West’. 
These events made a huge impact on Van der Beugel and his later approach to foreign policy 
as was the case for many members of his generation.  
The Second chapter, “Present at the Creation”, focuses on the beginning of Van der 
Beugel’s career for the Dutch government, his first trip to the United States and his role in the 
Marshall Plan. By doing so, this chapter covers a decisive formative period not only in the 
career of Ernst van der Beugel and the development of his Atlanticist sympathies, but in the 
development of a transatlantic mindset and social fabric in a more general sense by 
demonstrating how the Marshall Plan – in which the American and European governments 
closely cooperated with business and industry, labor unions, defense circles and a diverse 
collection of other ‘experts’ – served as a catalyst for public-private cooperation in the United 
States, in Europe and on a transatlantic level. Close cooperation during the Marshall Plan 
years produced many transatlantic relationships that would form the nucleus of a 
transatlantic social network tied together by shared experiences, hopes, fears and goals. In 
this unique context on the crossroads of the public and private spheres at the cutting edge of 
international strategic and economic policy, Ernst van der Beugel developed into a key player 
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and expert with access to a complex web of public and private networks woven across the 
Atlantic during the post-war reconstruction of Europe.  
While the second chapter emphasizes the post-war Marshall Plan context in which Ernst 
van der Beugel was active and the public-private structures and social networks that 
developed during this period, the third chapter focuses more specifically on the development 
of Ernst van der Beugel’s political ideas, in particular with regards to the process of European 
integration and the transatlantic relationship. It covers the entire period of Van der Beugel’s 
career with the Dutch government both as a civil servant and as State Secretary by focusing 
on the debates that unfolded during this period, his experience in the negotiations that led to 
the Rome Treaty and his effort to include England in the process of European integration – an 
effort that he would not abandon even after leaving formal diplomacy. It was also in this 
context that Van der Beugel as an official government representative was directly confronted 
with the power exercised by unofficial actors behind the scenes of transatlantic diplomacy, 
leaving a lasting impression on him. By the time he left the Dutch government his Atlanticist 
ideas had mostly crystalized – as had his fear for Gaullist challenges to an Atlantic oriented 
Europe.  
Chapter four describes Van der Beugel’s transition from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
to the private sector as he joined KLM Dutch Royal Airlines. It emphasizes the continuity of 
Van der Beugel’s transatlantic activities as a private citizen and attempts to identify some of 
the key factors that motivated and enabled this transition. It also introduces the three case 
studies that make up the remaining chapters, each of which focuses on another perceived 
challenge to the Atlantic Community and the ways in which Ernst van der Beugel endeavored 
to counter these challenges through his private diplomatic endeavors. Thus, chapter 5 focuses 
on the Gaullist challenge during the 1960s, chapter 6 deals with the problem of maintaining 
transatlantic strength in a time of détente and the democratization of foreign policy during 
the 1970s, while chapter 7 deals with the more long-term challenge of the ‘successor 
generation’. Together these chapters will shed light on the nature of Van der Beugel’s 
unofficial transatlantic activities, on the ideas behind these activities and the relationship 




1.“The Great Mistake of the West” 
“Those who have not experienced the 1930’s, during which my student generation witnessed 
the horrifying consequences of the lack of will-power and strength in the West, which brought 
the Second World War upon us, who have never experienced the simplicity of purpose of the 
Second World War, nor the joy of recovery and integration of the Western world, will 
approach the fundamental problems of international politics differently.”1  
 
A key component of New Diplomatic History is not just to reassess the role, but also the 
identity of ‘the diplomat’, for example by examining the development of the cultural, political 
and social contexts of those involved in the diplomatic realm and the networks to which they 
belong. It also means we need to take the private life – including the milieu and significant 
formative experiences – of these actors into account.  As the above cited quotation 
demonstrates, Ernst van der Beugel clearly perceived his experience of the 1930s, followed by 
the Second World War, the liberation of Europe and Western cooperation as key formative 
experiences that profoundly influenced his post-war approach to international relations. 
Moreover, he seems to suggest that these experiences left a deep impact not just on him 
personally, but on an entire generation. This idea will largely be confirmed throughout the 
following chapters, as allusions to these experiences will resurface over and over again.  It will 
furthermore become clear that the shared memory of these key moments in transatlantic 
history had a transnational appeal and left marks in the diplomatic arena as well. These 
shared experiences not only helped to foster strong transatlantic bonds among the 
generation that shared them, but also created a significant divide between this generation 
and the generation that followed; a generation whose formative years were not marked by 
world war, liberation, reconstruction and Western cooperation, but rather by the Vietnam 
War and Watergate, causing a very different appreciation of the transatlantic relationship and 
the values it embodied. This had clear repercussions for transatlantic diplomacy as it caused 
the challenge of the “successor generation”, which will be described in more detail in chapter 
7.  
Since these memories play such a fundamental role throughout the narrative that 
follows – both on a personal level in understanding what made Ernst van der Beugel ‘tick’ as a 
diplomat as well as in the development of the Atlantic elite and transatlantic diplomacy more 
generally – it is useful to take a closer look at the nature of these experiences, which will also 
help to gain a better understanding of the environment in which Ernst van der Beugel came of 
age and the foundations of his social network. While this chapter will mainly focus on the 
1930’s and the war years, the following chapter will concentrate on the period of 
reconstruction and the development of post-war Western cooperation.  
                                                            




Youth and Student Years 
The First World War still raged through Europe when Ernst van der Beugel was born on 
February 2, 1918 as the second child of Theodor Max van der Beugel and Sophia van Praag. 
Theodor van der Beugel was a self-made man. While born the son of a hairdresser, costume 
specialist and make-up artist who worked behind the scenes of Dutch theater, he had become 
a rising star on the firmament of the international banking world. As the daughter of the 
deputy director of a large textile wholesaler, Sophia van Praag was not born into the upper 
class either. They got married in the summer of 1913 and their first child, a daughter they 
named Ina, was born in December 1914. Born roughly three years later, Ernst would be the 
last addition to the family.  
As a reorganizer of bankrupt businesses, Theodor Max van der Beugel had made it to 
senior partner of Labouchère & Co – one of the most eminent banking houses in Amsterdam 
which he had established together with Henri Labouchère. In practice, Van der Beugel ran the 
place, while Henri Labouchère, a real ‘country gentleman’, contributed the illustrious name. 
Theodor van der Beugel travelled an awful lot and had an exceptional cosmopolitan 
orientation for his time.2  His network of friends and colleagues was tightly woven into the 
cobweb of transatlantic financial structures. He closely cooperated with the Warburg bank in 
London, Lazard in Paris and Chase in New York and was widely acknowledged as a member of 
the international haute finance.  
While the Great War left its marks on the Netherlands despite the country’s official 
neutrality, Ernst’s childhood battles had more to do with his social background.3 He spent his 
elementary school days at the Hagendoornschool, an upper class private school where he had 
a “horrible” time. Except for his friend Ynso Scholten, the later minister of Justice, he did not 
have many close friends.4 Because his father had made an enormous jump on the socio-
economic ladder Ernst was regarded as nouveau riche. Children’s parties at the school were 
extremely selective and as a result of his modest roots Ernst did not fit in. To make matters 
worse, his parents divorced in 1926. While they did so in a very civilized way – without 
fighting – this was still a deed that was very uncommon during those days. Ernst was the only 
child in his class with divorced parents.5  
Theodor van der Beugel remarried immediately after the separation, while Ernst stayed 
behind in the family house in Amsterdam with his mother until his mother remarried four 
years later. Even so, Ernst’s father was never really out of the picture. He made sure that 
Sophia and the children could keep the same standard of living as before the divorce and he 
remained deeply involved in the upbringing of Ernst and his sister Ina. In the process, he bent 
over backwards to stay in close touch no matter where he was. He would travel long 
distances just to be able to spend his Sunday afternoon with his children and assisted them 
                                                            
2 EvdB/Kersten Oral History Interview, file 61-66, Ernst van der Beugel Papers (hereafter “EvdB”), NAH, p.3.  
3 On the complexities of Dutch ‘neutrality’ in practice during the First World War see: Wim Klinkert, Samuël Kruizinga 
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4 Ibid., p. 24. 
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with arithmetic problems over the telephone from Paris.6  Throughout his life, Theodor van 
der Beugel would remain a dominant presence in the life of his son who greatly admired him.7  
With four Jewish grandparents, Ernst van der Beugel was of full Jewish descent, but his 
parents were not religious practitioners. “As far as anything of our Jewish identity trickled 
through in our upbringing, it was on the Day of Atonement – Jom Kippur: then we did not go 
to school, but stayed at home,” Ina van der Beugel recalled. “If we don’t do this’, our mother 
said, ‘it may cause people to think that we are ashamed of being Jewish.’ But she never got to 
explain to us, what Jom Kippur actually meant. Those things I had to look up later on in the 
book of rabbi Soetendorp.”8 Even so, the Van der Beugels were not free of certain Jewish 
atavisms. With few exceptions the families of both of Ernst’s parents exclusively tended to 
marry ethnic Jews and Friday nights remained special – not so much in a religious sense, but 
usually people did come over for dinner.9  
While anti-Semitism was not yet as venomous during those days as it would become 
later on, during Ernst’s childhood Amsterdam was not particularly free of “emotional and 
social discrimination” against its Jewish population either. Many social and recreational clubs, 
like rowing club De Hoop and tennis club Festina did not accept Jewish members. The same 
was true for an association of Amsterdam’s economic and cultural elite called De Groote Club. 
For Theodor van der Beugel, however, they were willing to make an exception. A man of his 
stature was welcome to join the Club despite his Jewish background. Theodor, however, 
refused. “If I cannot come in through the front door, I will not enter through the back door 
either,” he proclaimed. Ernst regarded his father as a remarkable man with “a very 
pronounced sense of justice and injustice.” He was emotionally sensitive, highly principled 
and he possessed a strong sense of discipline. He was not the sort of man who took the easy 
way out.10  
During the summer, Theodor van der Beugel took his children to Austria for the 
Salzburger Festspiele with its magnificent operas, plays and concerts. They also spent 
numerous holidays in Chenonceaux, France, where Theodor owned a second house about 
two hundred meters from the grand castle to which the little town in the Loire Valley owned 
its renown. When they visited the Château de Chenonceau and Ernst or his sister mentioned 
how incredible it was that the building had been constructed in 1521 and how pretty it was, 
Theodor would remark: “very pretty indeed – if you stood on the right side.” He knew from 
experience that wealth was not something one could take for granted and rarely missed an 
opportunity to point this out to his children. Every now and then he also took Ernst and Ina to 
one of Amsterdam’s poorest neighborhoods. Once there, he would address them from a 
                                                            
6 Ina van der Beugel, “Zeer persoonlijke herinneringen van Ina van der Beugel”, (private, 1990-1992), Private 
collection Aukelien van Hoytema-van der Beugel (hereafter “AHB”), p. 10. Ina van der Beugel recalls that her father 
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7 See for example: EvdB/Kersten Oral History Interview, pp. 4,6.  
8 Ina van der Beugel, “Zeer persoonlijke herinneringen”, p. 47 (translation mine).  
9 EvdB/Kersten Oral History Interview, pp. 15-16, 153.  
10 EvdB/Kesten Oral History Interview, pp. 7-8, 10, 22, 911 (translation mine).  
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sagging sidewalk, saying “look, there are also children living in these circumstances”, recalled 
Ina van der Beugel. “We had no idea, though, what ‘these circumstances’ entailed exactly. We 
just really preferred going to the Tuschinski Theater instead.”11 
Ernst’s father was not a typical banker. Despite the enormous jump he had made on the 
socio-economic ladder, he consistently voted for the Social Democratic Labor Party (SDAP) – 
something that “simply did not happen within Amsterdam’s haute finance circles.”12 He also 
read the socialist newspaper Het Volk, which had a clear emphasis on social justice.13 He was 
emotionally interested in the matters of his time and gave money to causes he supported like 
the Amsterdamsche Kunstkring voor Allen, which tried to make the enjoyment of art possible 
for lower middle class and working class people by organizing concerts, lectures and exhibits 
with entrance fees depending on a person’s ability to pay – a typical SDAP form of cultural 
policy. According to Ernst van der Beugel, these things made his father unique, but also lonely 
at times. While Theodor van der Beugel “strongly believed in accepting the consequences of 
one’s ideals,” Ernst observed that, at the same time, “you could not imagine somebody 
whose lifestyle differed so much from the lifestyle of the average social democrat.” 14 The 
complex relationship between Theodor’s social-democratic ideals and his luxurious lifestyle 
might best be illustrated by the following recollections of Ernst’s sister Ina:  
Years later, I realized that our car was a Cadillac. I simply thought that a car was a 
car and saw hardly any difference. In those days it was very common to have a 
driver. Practically everyone who owned a car also had a chauffeur who drove the 
vehicle, separated from the company by a glass window. Because of my father's 
socialist ideals that window was almost constantly turned down. The idea that it 
must have been quite painful for the driver that, as a result, the more confidential 
conversations always started with: “Turn up that window again,” apparently did 
not occur to him. Our driver was the only one in Amsterdam with a fixed day off in 
the week – an arrangement for which father was criticized by his colleagues. 
“What would be next if even drivers got a regular day off?”, they asked with 
exasperation. Drivers had enough days off when their employer stayed abroad. My 
father believed, however, that the first assertion was based on the right of the 
employee while the second assertion was based on the whim of the employer. But, 
the fact that drivers – including ours – spent entire evenings waiting just in case 
‘Mr. van der Beugel’ needed him, did not occur to him. In fact, he tended to refer 
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with great regularity to that fixed day off by saying: "oh yes, it is your day off…that 
is annoying...15 
Ernst van der Beugel seemed destined to follow in the footsteps of his father. As he put it: “If 
there was a plan, the plan was that I would study economics and join Labouchère.” With this 
prospect in mind Theodor sent him to the Openbare Handelsschool (OHS), which was the 
customary school for future economics students at the time. As opposed to his elementary 
school days, Van der Beugel had an excellent time at the OHS. It was a completely new 
environment, which lacked the pretentiousness of the Hagendoornschool which stifled social 
interaction. Here the young Ernst was not an outcast, but totally included in the company of 
his fellow students. To Ernst van der Beugel, who was undoubtedly a very social type, this 
made a huge difference. “I do not think that the desire to fit in is unusual, but in my case it is 
obviously a very distinctive characteristic,” he once remarked. “During my entire life, I have 
enjoyed the interaction with people. I’m not somebody who is easily self-contained.”16  
Advisors of Theodor van der Beugel had recommended that his son study economics at 
the University of Amsterdam, where he enrolled in the fall of 1935.17 The alternative was the 
Netherlands School of Commerce in Rotterdam, which was founded through private initiative 
with broad support from the Rotterdam business community. As opposed to Amsterdam, the 
Rotterdam school was not a university and focused more on the practical aspects of preparing 
students for a job in the business community than on academic development. By integrating 
the commerce faculty into the university in 1922, Amsterdam had chosen for a more 
academic approach.18 Theodor van der Beugel’s advisors had recommended sending Ernst to 
Amsterdam not so much because they thought the economics education was better 
compared to Rotterdam, but because they perceived it as a great advantage to study at a 
university. In addition, sociology professor Willem Bonger – a prominent social-democrat and 
the father of Frank Bonger, one of Ernst’s best friends at the OHS – had specifically 
recommended that Ernst join an elite student club called the Amsterdamse Studenten Corps 
(ASC).  
The Amsterdam student population at the time consisted of a select group of 
approximately 2500 students.19 Tuition was high, scholarships barely existed and it was 
natural that parents paid for their children’s education. With a little over 300 members, the 
ASC represented a relatively small portion of the total student community. While the ASC 
regarded itself as the embodiment of all students, its elitist character and high membership 
fees alienated many. About 60% of all students did not belong to any social club at all. At the 
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same time, the pillarization of Dutch society on the basis of worldviews and the emancipation 
of women had led to the emergence of new student associations. These new clubs drew 
mostly members from the middle class and attracted many students whose families had no 
history with the club. Since many of the professors had been ASC members themselves, the 
bond between the university and this club was still much closer than between the university 
and the other student associations. 20 
Thus, the ASC was primus inter pares among Amsterdam’s student associations and it 
was not entirely self-evident that Ernst van der Beugel would become a member of this select 
group. Just like the university itself, student club life was terra incognita for the Van der 
Beugels. The core of the ASC consisted of a rich variety of debating societies – twelve in total 
– each with its own traditions and identity. Ernst was eventually invited – one had to be 
invited – to join Breero, which he regarded as “one of the most colorful and sophisticated 
debating societies in Amsterdam.” According to the biographers of Max Kohnstamm, a four 
year older member of Breero who would become an intimate and lifelong friend of Ernst, 
“Van der Beugel was originally a bit of an outsider at Breero. At the ‘blooming’, the traditional 
recruiting session for the club, it was not beyond question whether Ernst should be invited as 
a member.” Or, as Ernst van der Beugel put it: “I sure did not owe my membership to my 
personal background.”21   
Indeed, as a first-generation student, Ernst had to find his own way into the well-
established club, where most other members followed in the footsteps of their fathers. Max 
Kohnstamm’s father had been an ASC member and his oldest brother, Dolph, even was a 
member of Breero, but the Van der Beugels did not have any history in the ASC. In addition, 
most of Ernst’s fellow students had received a classical high school education at the Vossius 
or Barlaeus gymnasium or the Amsterdam Lyceum, while Ernst had gone to the OHS, like his 
father before him. Theodor van der Beugel knew that the OHS was an excellent school, with 
outstanding teaching with regard to economics and political science as well as foreign 
languages, but since he did not have any university experience himself he “did not have the 
antennae”, according to his son, “to recognize that there were other elements” that mattered 
as well. Looking back, Van der Beugel praised the quality of the Openbare Handelsschool, but 
thought it was a “terrible pity” that he had not received a classical high school education like 
most of his university friends, including his elementary school buddy Ynso Scholten. Their high 
schools had better prepared them for a university education and they still had a choice of 
what to study once they entered the university. After finishing the OHS, economics was the 
only option while Van der Beugel’s preference would probably have gone out to studying 
history like Max Kohnstamm. 22  
When Ernst enrolled, the Amsterdam department of economic sciences counted 
approximately 250 students – almost one fourth of the economics students in the 
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Netherlands.23 The main faculty consisted of professors Nico Frijda and Theo Limperg, 
responsible for respectively political economy and business economics – the program’s two 
core mandatory subjects.24 Other courses belonging to the economics program were civil and 
commercial law, economic history, geography, and statistics. 25 The renowned social historian 
Nico Posthumus, “without doubt an impressive man,” taught economic history at the 
department. “It was a real academic community”, Ernst recalled, “which was still small.” For 
Van der Beugel, one of the great benefits of studying at a university was the fact that he was 
not restricted to studying economic subjects. Instead, he took the opportunity to enroll in 
other courses like philosophy and sociology, and – above all – he was preoccupied with the 
ASC. 26 Club life was very intense, as Van der Beugel recalled:  
In the club you saw each other more or less every day. You ate together and you 
went for a drink with each other every day. As a freshman you had to turn up for 
drinks at 6 PM, and twice a week we had beer at 11. If you did not appear they 
phoned you up. Friday night was a special evening. First the club went for a drink in 
the Carlton-corner, close to the Mint, then we ate together in the Poort van Cleef 
(now called Port van Cleve), then we went to Tuschinski’s, then back to the 
Carlton-corner and finally to the club bar.27  
At first, Max Kohnstamm frequently had to push Van der Beugel to come along for drinking 
sessions at the club. Soon, though, a strong bond developed between the two and Ernst 
became well known for his songs, jokes, party performances and knowledge of classical 
music.28 “In Breero we quickly realized that he was extremely gifted and funny”, Kohnstamm 
recalled. “He was a great lover of classical music and possessed an enormous music 
collection. During those days, students could go to concerts almost for free. Often, we went 
to his home to listen to the music we were going to hear in the music theater, before we went 
to the actual performance.”29 Joseph Luns, the future minister of Foreign Affairs and 
Secretary General of NATO, was another older ASC member. Luns recalled “many happy 
evenings spent with Ernst in and outside the club” and remembered Van der Beugel as a “very 
young student” who was “considered one of the brilliant young men of his generation. (…)  
Witty, highly intelligent, with a swift and original turn of mind and interested in more 
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problems than usual for young men, he became rapidly one of the popular students of his 
year.”30   
Looking back at his student years, Ernst van der Beugel concluded that the ASC had 
been of great importance to him.  In 1965, he even wrote an article in the Labor Party’s 
magazine Socialisme en Democratie completely devoted to the importance of these clubs. 
Since Dutch universities tend to be solely focused on transmitting academic knowledge, Van 
der Beugel regarded social clubs such as the ASC indispensable in the general education of 
university students. According to him, they focused on those elements that he considered 
essential to the full cultivation of students’ personalities while preparing them for key 
positions in society: 
In the club, being ‘smart’ does not equal a special recommendation if it does not 
come with a personality that is real. I am not aware of any other environment in 
which the instinct for true personality is so well cultivated as in the club. Next to all 
unforgettable pleasure (and there’s nothing wrong with having some fun) the true 
quality of the club for me, above all, is the instinct for what is ‘real’ and the scorn 
for what is not. In this, the ‘clubs’ are rightfully tough, and through this process 
they contribute to the cultivation of an elite.31  
Van der Beugel was convinced that the ASC had helped him to grow in his interaction with 
people. In addition, while his father’s social network should not be forgotten, Van der Beugel 
regarded his student years, “without doubt”, as the place where his own network began. 
People he got to know during this period, like Max Kohnstamm, Joseph Luns, Pieter Blaisse, 
Emile van Lennep, Hans de Koster, Antonie Knoppers and Jaap Kymmell, would cross his path 
again throughout his later career. Many of these friends would find each other again in The 
Hague, where the contribution of former Amsterdam students was relatively large after the 
Second World War.32  
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Ernst developed an “exceptionally close bond” with Max Kohnstamm. Van der Beugel: 
“We have had some wonderful years at the university. He was brilliant - absolutely brilliant - 
with a special ability, which he has always maintained, to formulate problems and to express 
emotions. He also had a very strong bond with my father.” According to Ernst, his father 
possessed an enormous empathy for youth, which “made that many of my friends, belonging 
to my generation, my university friends, had a relationship with my father in which I was not 
involved. For many of my friends my father was an extraordinary important person.”33 The 
fact that Max Kohnstamm only spoke about Theodor van der Beugel at the dinner organized 
to celebrate that Ernst had received his master’s degree, illustrates this point.  
Ernst also frequently visited the Kohnstamm family in their grand wooden house on the 
Dutch countryside in Ermelo.  The Kohnstamm home was characterized by a very intellectual 
atmosphere with a fervent debating culture. Max’s father, professor Philip Kohnstamm, was a 
physicist, pedagogue and philosopher who acquired fame as the founding father of scientific 
pedagogy and didactics in the Netherlands. He also displayed a great interest in theology. He 
was married to Anne Kessler, the daughter of a former president of the Royal Dutch Oil 
Company which later became Royal Dutch/Shell. While Royal Dutch was not as successful yet 
when her father was in charge, her mother unexpectedly became very wealthy when her 
enormous pile of previously worthless stocks turned into gold after the spectacular revival of 
the oil company in the early 20th century. Although the Kohnstamms generally lived soberly, 
their living environment was the milieu of the bourgeoisie and all its privileges. All year round 
the hospitable Kohnstamm home was frequented by guests from different signature; from 
the renowned physicist Albert Einstein to poor children from Amsterdam who came to 
recuperate on the country side. With two sons in Breero the Kohnstamm home also served as 
an important meeting point for the debating society.34  
Professor Kohnstamm was formally affiliated with a progressive-liberal political party 
called the Vrijzinnig-Democratische Bond (the Liberal-Democratic Federation), but in practice 
his social and political engagement tended to reflect the mindset of the Social Democratic 
Labor Party. He was of Jewish descent, but had embraced Christianity in 1917 when he was 42 
years old, after which he had become a member of the Barthian wing of the Dutch Reformed 
Church.35 While Ernst came from a very different background, the Kohnstamms and Van der 
Beugels could relate to each other’s social-democratic engagement as well as their concerns 
about the rise of national-socialism.  
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The Worst Years: “The idea of war is growing more familiar to us every day” 
Since his high school years at the OHS during the early 1930’s, when Adolf Hitler came to 
power in Germany, Ernst habitually discussed politics with his father. Both men had the 
impression that things were going badly wrong in Europe. They closely followed 
developments in Germany compelled by more than sheer political interest. As a fully Jewish 
family the Van der Beugels were very much aware of the existential threat posed by National 
Socialism in the 1930’s. This awareness was reinforced by the refugee problem, which 
brought large flows of Jewish immigrants from Austria and Germany to the Netherlands. Ernst 
van der Beugel experienced this development from up close since his father’s second wife 
worked for the Dutch committee that tried to accommodate Jewish refugees to the 
Netherlands in the 1930’s.36  
The Kohnstamms shared these concerns. Professor Kohnstamm had been born in Bonn, 
Germany, where many of his family members still lived. Through his German contacts, he was 
very well-informed about developments in his mother country. As a philosopher he 
acknowledged the dangers of National Socialism early on and published books on topics such 
as ‘the psychology of anti-Semitism’ and ‘national socialism as a spiritual danger.’37 He was 
also a member of the anti-fascist society Eenheid door Democratie (“Unity through 
Democracy”) and the Committee of Vigilance of anti-national-socialist intellectuals, which had 
been founded in 1936 and in which the University of Amsterdam was well represented. Ernst 
and Max did not shy away from expressing their resentment towards Hitler’s Germany either 
– sometimes in rather curious ways. Max Kohnstamm’s biographers relate that Ernst’s father 
regularly visited sanatoriums in places like Marienbad in today’s Czech Republic. When during 
the late 1930’s Max and Ernst joined him on one of these trips, they stubbornly held back 
their urine until they passed the Czech border out of rebellion towards the political situation 
in Germany “so as not to fertilize the German soil.” In compensation they gleefully threw their 
cigarette butts out of the car windows onto the German autobahn.38 
Despite the looming danger, Ernst decided not to leave the Netherlands, even though 
he had the opportunity to do so. The main reason for this decision was the close bond he 
experienced with his friends. “I did not leave,” he explained, “because I had the feeling that I 
belonged to a group of friends who thought like I did and I did not want to leave them to 
receive some kind of special treatment.”39  
The Amsterdam student club was traditionally more politically engaged than other 
Dutch student clubs. Next to the common view, which regarded feasts and partying as the 
main objectives, there was a social democratic-leaning wing interested in issues like 
unemployment and the rise of fascism. As a “progressive, avant la lettre artistic and political 
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debating society,” Breero clearly belonged to the latter. 40 While Van der Beugel was not 
extremely excited about his economics courses at the university, he shared a great fascination 
for Franklin Roosevelt and the New Deal with his friends from Breero. “We were deeply 
impressed by the dreadful situation of American society during the crisis and captivated by 
the ingenuity of the New Deal. It was the first time that Keynes was brought into practice. 
There were some individuals in Roosevelt’s entourage whose books we read in which a new 
way of handling things was discussed.” In the Netherlands, it was not easy to get one’s hands 
on this American reading material during the 1930’s. American literature was not yet part of 
the economics courses at the University of Amsterdam. Instead, Ernst’s textbooks were 
predominantly German and French with a little bit of Keynes in English. Fortunately Ernst’s 
father, who shared his son’s interest in the New Deal and who regularly visited the United 
States for business, was able to help out in providing literature from the U.S. Whereas the 
New Deal was fresh and exciting, the European climate with its traditional austerity measures 
was significantly less inspiring. While the United States were rising up out of the Great 
Depression, Ernst and his friends had the feeling that things were reaching a deadlock in 
Europe.  Overshadowing all the parties and pleasures of student life, there was always “the 
dark cloud of the 1930’s.”41 
In 1936, Max Kohnstamm was selected from a group of approximately sixty students as 
rector of the ASC senate. Club leadership rotated between the two dominant factions in the 
ASC: the ‘reds’ and the ‘whites.’  “White” stood for ‘conservative’; a group that was linked to 
the Catholic debating society Hera, which took rituals and symbolism very seriously. Max 
belonged to the ‘red’ wing, which was less formalistic, although it also followed the club’s 
‘mores’. Breero, in particular, was also “very outspoken in its resistance against national-
socialism.” Kohnstamm succeeded the ‘white’ Joseph Luns who had succeeded the ‘red’ Henk 
Bonger jr. - one of Professor Willem Bonger’s sons.42 In his inaugural speech, Kohnstamm 
stressed the importance of community and described the character of the dark clouds which 
hung ominously on the European horizon:  
Our social future is very uncertain. The idea of war is growing more familiar to us 
every day. As we await the day when we shall become involved in it with our own 
lives, we can follow the madness in South America, in Africa and in Spain. We have 
grown as familiar with race hatred and crisis as with food and drink. Every 
newspaper we open seems to bear witness to this craziness. It has permeated even 
our bookshelves, we see it in paintings and we hear it in music. Science, in which 
previous generations of students had a trust that seems to us childish, is leaving us 
completely in the lurch in the face of the threatening chaos. In a society that has 
lost all style, the rise of the hordes is threatening even the bulwarks of culture we 
had thought impregnable. In the middle of all this, are we perhaps to stand among 
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the group of cynical onlookers, recruited from every rank and class? Then where so 
many are talking we might as well maintain a decent silence. But that is not what 
our place is!43 
In 1937, with Max Kohnstamm in the lead, the ASC lustrum celebrations were used as a 
manifestation against national-socialism. Next to speeches by students and professors and a 
concert with lyrics written by the Dutch anti-fascist poet Albert Verwey, the ASC staged the 
play ‘Liluli’ by Romain Rolland in the famous Amsterdam theater Circus Carré. The subtle 
social critique of this production, which Rolland wrote primarily as a response to the 
‘infatuation of public opinion’ during the First World War, did not go unnoticed. The eminent 
Dutch modernist author, publicist and devout anti-fascist Menno ter Braak wrote an extensive 
article about the play in the Dutch newspaper Het Vaderland saying it “exceeded all other 
lustrum plays he had ever seen in importance.”44 Despite the efforts of Kohnstamm and the 
ASC Senate to add a more serious tone to the lustrum celebrations, the group that really took 
note was probably rather small.  As the Dutch historian of Amsterdam student life, Peter Jan 
Knegtmans remarked: “To his young audience, [Kohnstamm’s] serious words probably 
sounded like rumbling in the distance on a beautiful summer day. On the outside, the most 
distinctive characteristics of the club were still its formal pomposity, it’s condescension of the 
common man and its explicit and often noisy presence at any more or less official or festive 
ceremony of the Amsterdam elite.”45   
In 1938, Ernst van der Beugel was chosen as secretary of the ASC senate, causing his 
father to hesitatingly ask him whether this was really a good idea. “In those days it was 
sensible not to expose yourself too much as a Jew, he believed”, recalled Ernst’s sister Ina. 
“We thought that was ridiculous. We lived in the Netherlands. ‘If that is what you are 
thinking’, I remember myself saying, ‘you should leave for Israel right away’. That was not 
what we were thinking. My brother joined the senate, and as far as I know, it gave him 
nothing but joy.”46   
In March 1938, Ernst van der Beugel and his friends listened with tears in their eyes to 
the radio when the news came in that Germany had annexed Austria. They had read Mein 
Kampf and were well informed about Hitler’s political ideas, which they regarded as utterly 
despicable. Books like Die Revolution des Nihilismus by the ex-Nazi Herman Rauschning, and 
Edda en Thora by the Dutch protestant theologian Heiko Miscotte served as important 
sources on the attitude of the West for Ernst and his friends. 47  They talked about the 
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attitudes of France and England and the consequences of their actions for the Netherlands. 
After the Munich agreement between Hitler and Chamberlain was signed in September 1938, 
the event was discussed at length within Breero. The conclusion was that this had been a 
huge mistake. “We thought it was an abomination,” Van der Beugel recalled afterwards. After 
the annexation of Austria and the occupation of the Rhineland he regarded this as the next 
step towards war. They had assumed that at some point the English and French would stop 
Hitler. Instead, the European countries believed that they could make deals with Hitler – to 
appease him. “We were convinced that in principle you could never make a deal with Hitler”, 
said Van der Beugel.  The failure of France and England to prevent Hitler from executing his 
catastrophic plans was the great disillusion. Van der Beugel: “The way in which [the French 
and the English] behaved after 1933 was not only morally gutless, but it was also incredibly 
foolish, because it directly affected their own interests.” Van der Beugel’s worst fears seemed 
to materialize. He worried that Hitler would go on and invade the Netherlands, eventually 
establishing the control of national socialism over the entire European continent.48  
Kohnstamm and Van der Beugel were not just shocked by what happened in Munich, 
but also by the Dutch response. “We witnessed this as the absolute catastrophe, while in 98% 
of the world and in 99% of the Netherlands flags were hung out” to celebrate that peace had 
been maintained. 49 Van der Beugel experienced an intense sense of loneliness during this 
period.  
This has without any doubt greatly influenced my political thinking after the war, 
that despite the incredible pleasure of those student years, with regards to the 
world I experienced the 1930’s as the worst years – partly because of the 
loneliness. Not some kind of personal loneliness, but the loneliness of the West; 
the small minority that was completely appalled by what happened in Munich in 
1938. Almost nobody in the Netherlands was appalled. You could barely see the 
houses because of all the flags indicating celebration.50  
What stung Van der Beugel’s little band of friends especially “was the lack of 
acknowledgement of the demonic dimension of national socialism. This we experienced as 
the worst of all. And the group who understood this, who saw through this, was extremely 
small.” The loneliness described by Van der Beugel was instigated by a feeling of “we are right 
and nobody sees it. The masses don’t see it and neither do our political leaders.” Instead, Van 
der Beugel recalled, “we were confronted with all that empty talk of the Netherlands being 
the Jeanne D’Arc of the world.” Van der Beugel particularly detested the attitude of the Dutch 
government which was characterized by the “arrogance of neutralism, the idea that whatever 
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was going to happen, the Netherlands would stay out of it. Nothing was going to harm them. 
No, they were a shining example.”51   
The image Van der Beugel sketches here is, of course, a rather black and white 
caricature of the Netherlands and Dutch neutrality during the run-up to the Second World 
War.52  Even so, it is important to be aware of the fact that this was how Ernst van der Beugel 
memorized these events as these memories informed his thinking later on. For the rest of his 
life Van der Beugel would remember these experiences as a grandiose failure in the history of 
Western leadership. “The great mistake of the West,” he said, “can be found in the 1930’s. It 
was not that they did not bomb Auschwitz. It was too late by then. The West is to blame for 
the 1930’s (…) for non-intervention after the re-militarization of the Rhineland, for neglecting 
to intervene in Austria, for non-intervention in Abyssinia and for the idea that you could make 
deals with Hitler.”53 Their hope was now vested on the arsenal of democracy still standing on 
the other side of the Atlantic. As Van der Beugel would later recall: “already in this situation, 
although at that moment still unnoticed, the instinct was already present, that the only ones 
who could help us out of trouble were the Americans. It was a very strong instinct (…) that the 
Americans were in the reserve and that they had the ability to stop this absolute downfall. I 
remember that my father greatly influenced this.”54  
Theodor van der Beugel was not the only transatlantic traveler who infused Ernst with 
stories about the New World.  Shortly after the Munich catastrophe, Max Kohnstamm 
embarked on a nine-month journey through the United States. His trip was enabled by a 
scholarship of the World Council of Churches, which was established only shortly before. In 
the U.S., Kohnstamm bought a second-hand car for 150 dollars and went on a road trip to 
study the labor and industrial relations of the New Deal while sharing his experiences through 
an intensive correspondence with family and friends back home.55  
During his journey, Kohnstamm beheld from up close the profound scars that the Great 
Depression had cut in American society and was deeply impressed by the grinding poverty he 
witnessed in the South. He was particularly upset about the extreme poverty and racial 
discrimination to which the African-American population was exposed in these states. At 
times his indignation almost dripped from the pages of his letters. At the same time, he was 
also captivated by the social revolution that the United States had gone through since 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt had come to power in 1933. Here he witnessed the social-
democratic ideal of the ‘socially engineered society’ as preached by the SDAP in practice.  
Among Americans, the feeling prevailed that they were going to improve the world, that they 
could do this and that the government could play a positive role in the social life of its 
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citizens. “The new society, if anywhere, will be built here,” Kohnstamm proclaimed, thus 
further instigating the fascination with the New Deal among his friends back home.56  
For a Dutch student to visit America in those days was an extraordinary rare event. In 
fact, it was so exceptional that Kohnstamm’s entire debating society escorted him on two 
open carriages to the train station to send him off.57 Ernst closely followed Max’s adventures 
and observations from the other side of the Atlantic. Kohnstamm, in turn, also frequently 
wrote about the menacing threat of war in Europe in his letters. He shared Van der Beugel’s 
indignation concerning the Dutch attitude after the Italian attack on Albania in April 1939 and 
informed the home front about the political climate in the United States, including his 
expectations with regards to America’s response if war would in fact break out. “In the case of 
war, American hatred towards England will be insignificant,” Kohnstamm wrote on 26 
February, 1939 from a YMCA in Tennessee that was so dirty that he wrote his letters wearing 
gloves and took his showers with his clothes still on. “I increasingly have the feeling that 
America will join after approximately four months, at the very least through active weapon 
supply.”58  
Two months later the idea was born that Ernst would also travel to America to 
accompany Max during the summer months on a trip to California. Kohnstamm’s mother, 
who heard of this plan from Ernst on the phone, responded disappointed – not so much 
because this meant that Max would not come home for the summer, but because she was 
afraid the trip would lapse into ‘sightseeing’, which was clearly not supposed to be the 
objective of the journey. “I think it would be better,” Max’s father wrote in response, “if you 
could get in touch with individuals who can help facilitate Western cooperation, which seems 
to become a more urgent necessity with every week that passes (because, it is of course 
utterly unlikely that Hitler will live up to his assertion that he will henceforth only serve 
peace).”59  
While Max was in the United States, his father read the book Union Now: a Proposal for 
an Atlantic Federal Union of the Free (1939) by the Atlanticist New York Times journalist 
Clarance K. Streit, which left the professor quite impressed.  Professor Kohnstamm 
recommended Max to read the book and encouraged him to meet with Streit, arguing that “it 
is a man who knows something and who dares to think in the right direction and from good 
principle.”  Streit’s book would eventually mark the beginning of an Atlanticist movement that 
grew in popularity after the Second World War. Whether Max actually met with Streit during 
his trip does not become clear from his (published) letters, but the book certainly left a deep 
impression on him. In fact, it would plant the seeds for his ideas on a European federation 
after the Second World War.60  What does become clear, however, is that Kohnstamm 
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eventually recommended Van der Beugel not to join him on his trip to the West Coast – 
“mainly,” he wrote, “because I have the feeling that one should undergo the immense 
experience called ‘America’ not in the company of a friend, but by oneself.”61  
A journey to the United States was also part of the education Theodor van der Beugel 
had in mind for his son. Ernst’s sister Ina had studied journalism in London after which she 
had lived for two years in New York during the late 1930’s. She had her own section in the 
Dutch daily newspaper Het Handelsblad called “Under the Skyscraper” in which she shared 
her impressions of American society with her Dutch readers. According to Ernst, his father 
was “avant la lettre very much focused on the United States” and through their upbringing he 
had given his children the impression that the United States “was the country where it really 
happened.” This idea had only been confirmed by the experiences of Max Kohnstamm. While 
an internship with a befriended banker on America’s East Coast might have been the obvious 
choice – considering the career path Theodor van der Beugel envisioned for his son – this was 
not what he had in mind. Instead, he planned to send Ernst for postgraduate studies to an 
American university. First, however, Ernst needed to finish his studies in the Netherlands. 
Unfortunately, by the time he graduated it was 1941 – the war had come in between. 62  
The War Years 
While Ernst van der Beugel entered the ASC senate dressed in civilian dress in 1938, he wore 
a military uniform by the time the next senate transfer came around a year later. On August 
1939 the (still neutral) Netherlands had started its general mobilization. A week later, when 
England and France declared war to Germany, a quarter of a million Dutch soldiers – 
professionals, reservists and draftees – were called to active duty. The University of 
Amsterdam had to do without 20% of its male students. Ernst had also been called upon. As a 
student he had been exempt of the regular draft, but now the situation had become too 
serious for further delay of military training and Ernst was sent to the Dutch military academy 
in Breda. 63   
On May 10, 1940, Germany attacked the Netherlands. Five days later, the Dutch 
surrendered. With the Nazi occupation soon came the repression of the Jewish population. At 
the University of Amsterdam a numerus clausus for Jewish students was introduced. In 
September 1940, only 213 Jewish students, including Ernst van der Beugel, were allowed to 
continue their studies.  Applications of first year students of Jewish descent were not 
accepted and the selection of Jewish students that could continue their studies had to face 
many restrictions. They were not allowed in libraries, reading rooms or museums and each 
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month that screw was tightened more and more with little things, Van der Beugel recalled: 
“not allowed in the tram, not in the train, not allowed to sit on benches, not allowed into the 
movie theater, and so forth.”64  
On 26 November 1940 Ernst van der Beugel married Miekje van Bruggen, who studied 
medicine in Amsterdam and did not share Ernst’s Jewish background. They had met as 
students and “probably would not have married at such a young age if the circumstances had 
been normal.” He was 22, she 21. In consultation with Miekje’s father, they decided to get 
married on that day because they had read in the newspaper that because of Ernst’s Jewish 
background, this would soon be prohibited. The wedding ceremony took place in the Willem 
de Zwijger Church in Amsterdam and was led by Ernst’s father in law, the Dutch reformed 
reverend van Bruggen. During the service news came in from the University of Leiden where 
Professor Rudolph Cleveringa had just delivered his famous speech in which he protested 
against the resignation – forced by the German occupation authorities – of his mentor and 
colleague professor Eduard Maurits Meijers as well as other Jewish professors.  According to 
Van der Beugel, the ceremony subsequently “turned into a massive demonstration with 
hundreds of people – mostly students and acquaintances of his in laws – and ended with the 
singing of the patriotic [student song] Io Vivat in the church.”65  
Van der Beugel was able to finish his studies just before Jewish students and professors 
were completely excluded from the university. It was customary for economics students at 
the time to write their doctoral thesis based on an internship at a company of their choice.  
Despite the relatively more academic approach to economics at the University of Amsterdam, 
real academic doctoral theses about general economic problems were still extremely rare. 
Ernst’s father had arranged an internship for his son at Wilton-Feijenoord, a Dutch 
shipbuilding and repair company, where Theodor served as a member of the advisory board. 
Based on this internship, which Ernst was able to finish before the war broke out, he wrote 
his thesis about problems in the shipbuilding industry. He was able to take his exam in 
political economics before professor Frijda was forced to stop his work at the university 
because of his Jewishness in November 1940. Van der Beugel eventually graduated on July 10, 
1941. On the 28th of October 1941 the ASC senate, by now under the leadership of Ynso 
Scholten, dissolved itself as a response to the Nazi demand to ban Jews from the club.66 
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After his graduation Ernst van der Beugel started to do research for a PhD dissertation 
he planned to write about the New Deal based on literature he had already collected on the 
subject before the war. In addition, he assisted his father in law, who was the chairman of the 
Dutch Reformed congregation in Amsterdam and a leader of the resistance movement within 
the church.  Van der Beugel became part of this group, which focused mainly on the 
distribution of food coupons and false identification cards for individuals who were in hiding. 
Three or four times a week he walked for 70 minutes to the “Nieuwe Kerk” (“New Church”) to 
help with the administration of the baptized Jews.67   
In January 1942, some close friends of Ernst van der Beugel, among whom were Max 
Kohnstamm and Ynso Scholten, were arrested and sent to detention camp Amersfoort. The 
arrest was a retribution for an attack on a house of the national-socialist student front in 
Amsterdam earlier that month. They were released three months later on Hitler’s birthday – 
wrecked, broken and utterly famished. “This was our first experience with a concentration 
camp,”68 Van der Beugel recalled. Meanwhile, Ernst and Miekje lived on and off in their own 
home, where they had a hiding place for Ernst. They also spent some time in hiding at 
different addresses, mostly at acquaintances of the Kohnstamms.69                       
One early morning in 1943 Ernst and Miekje were at their own house when somebody 
knocked on their door. The visitors turned out to be two SS officers who had just completed a 
series of arrests in a resistance movement to which Ernst was connected. In the process they 
had come across his name. Since Van der Beugel had not anticipated anything unusual, he 
had not retreated to his hiding place and was apprehended right away.  At that moment 
Miekje was eight months pregnant of their first child. With both his Jewishness and the 
charges of illegal activities testifying against him, Ernst said his goodbyes after which he left 
the house convinced that he would return never again.70   
He was brought to the SS Zentralstelle für Jüdische Strafsachen where he had to walk up 
stairs whose steps were covered with human bodies as a means of intimidation. Once 
confronted with the SS-officer who was in charge of his file Van der Beugel realized that 
denial was nonsensical. Instead, he decided that his only chance of survival was to resort to a 
more unorthodox tactic. After the SS-officer asked Van der Beugel about his father in law 
being a reverend and disclosed that he was an elder in the Evangelische Kirche himself, Van 
der Beugel had found his strategy and appealed to the SS-er’s conscience by questioning and 
attacking the compatibility of the officer’s ecclesiastical role with national-socialism. When 
the conversation was over, however, the effort seemed to have been in vain as the officer 
told Van der Beugel that he would be locked up to expect deportation to camp Westerbork 
first thing in the morning.  
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“That night at 4 o’clock,” Van der Beugel recalled, “that same officer entered my prison 
cell and said: “Raus!” He opened the doors of my cell and the entrance to the building 
downstairs and put me on the street.”71 Despite the fact that he had to walk the streets of 
Amsterdam in the middle of the night with a Jewish star stitched to his clothes, which was 
strictly forbidden, Van der Beugel was able to return home safely. It would not be the last 
time that he jumped through the eye of the needle while escaping deportation.  As a result of 
his marriage with a non-Jewish woman Van der Beugel had winded up in a rather exceptional 
position. During the first years of the war, the mixed-marriage stamp in his passport had 
excluded him from the dire fate of most other Dutch Jews, the majority of whom had been 
deported to concentration camps by 1943. While almost all other exemptions were 
withdrawn as time passed, most mixed-married Jews continued to receive special 
treatment.72 In the fall of 1943, though, the law seemed to change to the detriment of Ernst 
van der Beugel as mixed married Jewish men without children would be excluded from 
requests for exemptions from 12 September onwards. Again, Ernst van der Beugel was able to 
escape deportation just in time when on 11 September, 1943 – just one day before the new 
law would become effective – his first daughter was born. Hence, Van der Beugel would 
contribute the fact that he had survived the war to the ‘mixed-marriage stamp’ in his passport 
and to the birth of his first daughter, Aukelien.73  
The start of the war had taken away the piercing feeling of loneliness that had 
overtaken Van der Beugel in the years leading up to it, “because,” he explained, “those who 
had seen it coming and those who had not came together at that very moment. At once, 
there was one common enemy.” In contrast to the loneliness of the run up to the war, Van 
der Beugel had experienced a “most incredible intensity of social and intellectual contact” 
during the war itself.  He ran from one discussion group to the next to talk about the situation 
at hand as well as the future of the post-war world – an experience he would later describe as 
a “feast of human and intellectual contact.”  The war simplified all discussions. “There was 
only one issue: how to win the war and what will happen afterwards?” Van der Beugel 
recalled. “Never again did I have such an intense contact with people.” Inspired by these lively 
conversations, and convinced that the realization of the anticipated future – the rebuilding of 
the country – would begin in The Hague, the war had put Ernst van der Beugel on a new track 
that led towards civil service. Consequently, just a couple of days after the liberation of the 
Netherlands he took an old rusty bicycle with wooden wheels and pedaled to The Hague.74  
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The international nature of his father’s work and social network made Ernst van der Beugel 
aware of a broader international context from early childhood on and endowed him with a 
broad, cosmopolitan perspective and an interest in foreign affairs. From an early age 
onwards, Van der Beugel exhibited a special interest in the United States, a fascination that 
was inspired by his father’s regular visits to the country, his sister’s stories as a New York 
journalist and Max Kohnstamm’s travels as a student. It also expressed itself in his fascination, 
shared by his college friends and nourished through American books provided by his father, 
for Roosevelt’s New Deal policies.  
The importance of personal relationships, of social bonds that blur the lines between 
the diplomat’s personal and professional life stressed by New Diplomatic History is also 
relevant in this context. After all, the foundations of Ernst van der Beugel’s social network and 
status are also rooted in the period described in this chapter. His father’s status as a member 
of the international haute finance provided access to an extensive transnational social 
network and student club life further introduced a young Van der Beugel to Dutch elite 
circles. During his student years Ernst van der Beugel also started to weave his own social 
network. The personal bonds that he developed during this period with individuals like Max 
Kohnstamm, Pieter Blaisse, Emile van Lennep, Hans de Koster, Antonie Knoppers, Jaap 
Kymmell, Ynso Scholten and Joseph Luns would not just be of personal but also of 
professional significance during his later career.75  
 Furthermore, Van der Beugel’s approach to international relations would forever be 
informed by his experience of an existential threat, appeasement, war and liberation.  The 
existential threat Ernst van der Beugel experienced as a Jewish man under the Nazi regime 
was real and immediate.  Once the war was over the fear of suppression by authoritarian rule 
again seemed to linger just around the corner in the context of the Cold War. His memory of 
the experience of the loneliness of belonging to a small group that acknowledged the threat 
of the demonic character of national socialism amidst the joy of the masses about 
appeasement at Munich, the celebration of a neutrality drenched in idealism and 
characterized by a moral superiority that looked down upon power politics, may very likely 
have strengthened Van der Beugel in his own convictions when also during the Cold War his 
ideas were not always in sync with what was popular among the public at large. He would 
forever be disgusted by idealistic rhetoric that depicted the Netherlands as the “Jeanne D’Arc 
of the world” while presenting neutrality and weakness as morally superior to taking a strong 
position against authoritarian power. In Van der Beugel’s mind, the American role in the 
liberation of Europe would stand in stark contrast with the “the great mistake of the West”: 
the failure of the European countries to stop Hitler in the 1930s. The lessons he took from 
these experiences – that power relations were fundamental; that a dangerous enemy should 
be confronted from a position of strength and that weakness, neutrality and appeasement in 
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the face of such an opponent were never acceptable – would be essential to the way in which 
he would approach international relations and defense policy for the rest of his life. It also 
demonstrated the importance of close transatlantic bonds with a powerful ally that shared 
the central values of Western civilization. Thus, these experiences will be key to 
understanding Van der Beugel’s diplomatic goals and motivations as a private diplomat later 
on. What is more, the role of the Americans in the liberation of Europe also planted the seeds 
of a deep-felt gratitude towards the United States and of an emotional bond, which – as the 
next chapter will demonstrate – would only grow stronger as a result of the American role in 






2. “Present at the Creation” 
The war years were followed by an intensive period of reconstruction during which Ernst van 
der Beugel embarked on a successful career as a civil servant in The Hague, which enabled 
him to witness the creation of post-war Western cooperation from up close. His involvement 
in the Marshall Plan from the summer of 1947 onwards set him on the transatlantic track that 
would characterize the rest of his career. The Marshall Plan years were not just important for 
the development of Ernst van der Beugel’s personal career and vision of the United States, 
but also played a crucial role in the development of transatlantic relations more generally. 
While the Marshall Plan has been extensively covered by historians, its role in the 
development of an unofficial Atlantic Community has not received the attention it deserves.1 
As this chapter will demonstrate, this period is particularly interesting from the 
perspective of New Diplomatic History.  By including the private dimension of transatlantic 
relations in our analysis it becomes clear how the European Recovery Program (ERP) came to 
serve as an important catalyst of post-war public-private cooperation, which facilitated the 
development of a tightly integrated informal transatlantic elite network of which Ernst van 
der Beugel became a significant member. The unofficial networks that developed during this 
period also helped to facilitate the continuation of Ernst van der Beugel’s transatlantic 
activities after he formally left the Dutch government in 1959.  Consequently, this chapter will 
provide a closer look not just at Ernst van der Beugel’s role in the Marshall Plan, but will also 
pay attention to the way in which the European Recovery Program was structured to gain a 
better understanding of a crucial period in the formation of the post-war Atlantic elite, the 
development of Ernst van der Beugel’s extensive and diverse transatlantic social network and 
the arena in which he received his main professional education, which prepared him for a life 
as a middle man between the public and the private spheres on the crossroads of Cold War 
international economic and security policy.  
The Marshall Plan 
During the extremely hot summer of 1947, Ernst van der Beugel – by now a promising young 
civil servant at the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs – was enjoying a vacation at his father’s 
villa in France when he received a phone call from the Dutch minister of Economic Affairs, 
Gerardus Huysmans. Shortly before, on June 5, 1947 the American Secretary of State George 
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Marshall had delivered a speech at Harvard University in which he announced that the United 
States was willing to offer an extensive aid program to war wrecked Europe on the condition 
that the European countries would work closely together. The European nations were not 
supposed to respond individually to the American offer, but were asked to draft a joint aid 
proposal. After talks with the Soviet Union broke down, the British Secretary of State Ernest 
Bevin and his French colleague Georges Bidault issued a joint communiqué on July 4, 1947 
inviting twenty-two European nations, including the Netherlands, to participate in a 
conference in Paris to formulate a European reply to the American offer.  
Minister Huysmans’s phone call related directly to this invitation. He inquired whether 
Van der Beugel was familiar with Marshall’s speech and subsequently appointed the young 
civil servant as secretary to Hans Max Hirschfeld, one of the most internationally experienced 
and authoritative Dutch civil servants of his time, who had been chosen as the leader of the 
Dutch delegation to the Paris conference. Van der Beugel would frequently recall this event 
saying that he had never met Hirschfeld before and was told to look for a “stout man with 
glasses” who would be waiting for him in the bar of the Royal Monçeau hotel in Paris.2 While 
this makes for a good story, correspondence from spring 1947 suggests otherwise. In a letter 
to Piet Sanders in April 1947, Van der Beugel wrote the following:  
I find Hirschfeld good. He has no character and no heart but he is damned realistic 
and absolutely not dogmatic. I happen to have spoken with him rather often lately 
and I appreciate him. Of course, not good in essence, but I prefer dealing with 
these kinds of very capable, realist chaps of a certain caliber than with the 
Posthuma’s and the Verzyls.3  
Ernst van der Beugel was not only familiar with Hirschfeld, but also with the precarious 
economic situation of the European countries and of the Netherlands in particular. He had 
started his career in June 1945 as the director of the Dutch bureau for the navigation of the 
Rhine at the Ministry of Transport – a job he had acquired through Flip Idenburg, Max 
Kohnstamm’s brother in law, who served as director of the Central Bureau of Statistics. The 
issue of restoring the navigation on the Rhine River, which connects the Low Countries with 
the German hinterland, was a matter of vital economic interest to the Netherlands, but 
except for the location of the Rhine – which Van der Beugel said he could recall “with some 
intellectual strain”4 – Ernst did not know “anything” about these matters. Even so, a week 
later he was in charge of the Rhine bureau – a job that familiarized him with the Rotterdam 
chamber of commerce, the ‘Rhine barons’ and Dutch shipping interests. It also gave him the 
opportunity to travel to places like Belgium, England and Germany. Traveling to Brussels and 
                                                            
2 See, for example: Philip C. Brooks, Truman Library Oral History Interview with E. H. van der Beugel (hereafter TLOHI 
– Brooks), The Hague, June 1, 1964, www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/beugel.htm; EvdB/Kersten Oral History 
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London was a real treat during this period due to the availability of numerous products of 
which war-torn Holland had been stripped bare during the war. Consequently, the delegation 
members spent a substantial period of time on quests through the streets of these cities to 
buy the shoes, bras and panty hoses that made up the shopping lists from family and friends 
back home.5  
These were great times for ambitious young men like Ernst van der Beugel. The Dutch 
government departments in The Hague offered ample opportunities to young academics who 
wanted to contribute to rebuilding the country after the war.6 After Van der Beugel had 
worked for some months as the director of the Dutch bureau for the navigation of the Rhine, 
his old college friend Pieter Blaisse offered him a job as deputy director at the Planning 
department of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, which Ernst accepted. Before he could start 
at his new job on November 12, 1945 Van der Beugel had to undergo a ‘psycho-technical 
examination’. The subsequent research report concluded that:  
Mr. van der Beugel is a perfectly reliable worker; independent, conscientious, 
persistent and with a great ability to focus. He is balanced, equipped with good 
understanding and common sense and he is very critical. His strong criticism helps 
him to discover errors in the reasoning of others and in forming a correct 
judgment, but inhibits him in his work, partly because of a lack of self-confidence, 
which, by the way, does not show in his outer appearance. His easy interaction 
with others, his strong will and other capabilities make Mr. van der Beugel 
someone who has the talent to lead.7   
The Planning department was part of the General Directorate of Trade and Industry, which 
distributed the available foreign currencies to Dutch businesses.  This was done through 
direct contact with the companies involved. If a business was in need of dollars, this was 
where they went. To Van der Beugel this was “an extremely fascinating educational 
experience. It was sheer reconstruction work. Here, the Philipses and Unilevers came to 
bargain for money with memorandums arguing for their needs.”8  Soon, Van der Beugel was 
appointed to two other jobs in addition to his position at Planning. Pieter Kuin, the Secretary-
General of the Ministry of Economic Affairs requested him to become his executive assistant 
and shortly afterwards Van der Beugel was also appointed as secretary of the Council on 
Economic Affairs, the most important subcommittee of the Dutch Council of Ministers.9 The 
president of the National Bank (Holtrop) and the director of the Central Planning Bureau 
                                                            
5 Ibid., p. 111. 
6 Ralph Dingemans, “‘De zon ging op en de wind was gunstig’: Ernst Hans van der Beugel”, in In Dienst van 
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(Tinbergen), who officially were not considered to be members, were also invited to attend 
the Economic Council meetings.  It is most likely that this is also where Van der Beugel first 
met Hirschfeld.  All in all, these events parachuted the young civil servant right into the center 
of Dutch post-war recovery affairs. During the Economic Council meetings, everything that 
concerned Dutch financial, economic and social policy was discussed. Here, Ernst van der 
Beugel experienced the cardinal problem of 1947, namely the dollar shortage which made it 
impossible to finance the necessary imports, firsthand.10  
  Like many other European countries, the Netherlands reached a state of crisis during 
the spring of 1947 due to an increasing shortage on the balance of payments. American 
products, which were indispensable for the economic recovery of the country, required too 
much of the national monetary reserves. “Looking back at that period, one can hardly realize 
how dominating and all absorbing the dollar problem was for the great majority of European 
countries,” recalled Van der Beugel. There was a palpable feeling of panic in Europe. “More 
and more as week succeeds week the whole of European life is being overshadowed by the 
great dollar shortage. The margin between recovery and collapse throughout Western Europe 
is dependent at this moment upon massive imports from the U.S.”11, The Economist reported 
in May 1947.   
In this context, the Dutch government had to make a tough decision: either they 
drastically decreased the number of imports, which would have serious consequences for the 
population’s consumption level and cause a severe backlash to the process of economic 
recovery, or they would roughly maintain their level of imports, which would lead to such a 
speedy exhaustion of monetary reserves that the Netherlands would be heading for 
bankruptcy. They did not know that help was on the way, but even so there was a vague 
sense of hope in the air inspired by the feeling that ‘something’ would happen in Washington.  
“It's very difficult to trace why this feeling existed” Van der Beugel told Philips C. Brooks 
during an oral history interview for the Truman Library in 1964:  
I think it started in a more concrete way after the proclamation of the Truman 
Doctrine, so after March – the period between March and June – there was a 
feeling that the Americans were moving into Europe. I remember very well, 
because I was a secretary to the Cabinet, that the Dutch Cabinet had to decide 
whether it should go on with its dollar imports with the terrible risk of spending 
practically the last dollars and hoping that something would happen, or simply to 
stop the thing. And then the Cabinet decided to go on, which was a very risky 
decision but they went on with the dollar import, because everybody had the 
feeling that something would happen.12 
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Thus, through his work at the Council of Economic Affairs, Ernst van der Beugel was not only 
familiar with the issues at hand, but he had also become acquainted with the gentlemen in 
charge.  Consequently, he was seen a logical addition to the Dutch delegation at the Paris 
Conference.13  
The Paris Conference 
Between July 12 and September 22, sixteen European nations gathered in Paris under British 
leadership to convey a European response to Marshall’s aid proposal. When Van der Beugel 
arrived in the city he found Hirschfeld behind a glass of cognac in Hôtel Royal Monçeau. The 
two men got along right away and would spend many long days together in Paris.14  
“Hirschfeld enjoyed the good life”, Van der Beugel recalled. “Because I knew the city well, I 
also served as Maître de Plaisir. I had to go out for dinner with him every night […] and then I 
wanted to go back to the hotel because it was hot and we had to work damn hard. But he was 
strong as a horse, so we had elaborate dinners and afterwards we went to a night club.”15  
On Saturday, July 12 at 11 A.M. the conference on European Economic Cooperation 
commenced in a most congenial atmosphere.  During the first days the ministers of the 
sixteen nations gathered in a grand ornate dining hall on the Quai d’Orsay, which resembled, 
in the words of Van der Beugel, “an almost sad reminder to the 19th century splendor of 
France.”16 Between July 12 and July 15 the ministers set up the machinery and drafted the 
guidelines for the conference, after which they handed the work over to their respective 
delegations. These delegations were in turn all represented in a newly established steering 
committee, which they referred to as the Committee for European Economic Cooperation 
(CEEC). Next to the CEEC the ministers had set up a series of technical committees focusing on 
the major areas of Europe’s economy that needed to be restored: Food and Agriculture, Iron 
and Steel, Fuel and Power and, finally, Transport. The daily management of the conference 
was transferred to an executive committee under the leadership of Sir Oliver Franks, a 
distinguished diplomat and professor of philosophy at Oxford University, who also served as 
the chair of the CEEC.  Next to the United Kingdom, the Executive Committee consisted of 
representatives from France, Italy, Norway and the Benelux.  Hoping to strengthen their 
position among the bigger powers, the Netherlands had joined forces with Belgium and 
Luxemburg and Hirschfeld represented the Benelux in the Executive Committee, thus enabling 
the Dutchman to become one of the central players of the Paris Conference.17  
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As Hirschfeld’s secretary it was one of Van der Beugel’s responsibilities to prepare 
telegrams for the Economic Council of the Dutch Cabinet in The Hague. He usually wrote the 
reports at noon while Hirschfeld took a nap at the hotel. After the telegram was ready, Van 
der Beugel shoved the draft underneath Hirschfeld’s hotel room door after which he knocked 
three times. When Hirschfeld, in turn, responded by knocking on his side of the door Van der 
Beugel knew he had Hirschfeld’s approval and the telegram was ready to be sent to The 
Hague.18   
The negotiations were long and complex. Whereas the conference had started in a most 
agreeable spirit of community and solidarity, interactions became tenser as time proceeded. 
While the conditions throughout Europe became more desperate every passing day, the spirit 
of European cooperation that the Americans had requested slowly vaporized and many of the 
conferees lapsed back into old habits bringing the different national interests back to the 
forefront. Next to the much desired dollar aid, the Netherlands had a great interest in the 
revival of the German economy and the restoration of trade with the German hinterland to 
which its economy was closely linked. The French, on the other hand, desired to dismantle 
the German industry and wanted their own economy to become the driving force behind 
Europe’s recovery.  In order to guarantee their national security the French wanted to make 
sure that Germany would never rise to its former strength again, thus causing a major clash 
between Hirschfeld and the French representative Hervé Alphand. It would certainly not be 
the last clash between the Dutch and the French that Van der Beugel would witness in the 
process of post-war reconstruction. 
The Americans had initially kept their distance to enable the Europeans to forge their 
own recovery plan, but on July 31 William Clayton, the American Undersecretary of State 
whom the New York Times dubbed the “American ambassador to Europe,”19 paid an official 
visit to the Paris conference. During the meeting Clayton stressed that the European recovery 
plan should not offer some kind of partial or temporal solution, but ought to be a 
comprehensive proposal that would help Europe all the way back on its feet again.  He also 
emphasized the fundamental importance of a conference report that would be palatable to a 
skeptical American Congress, since they would have to approve the plan.  
Without clear directions or direct leadership from the Americans at the conference, the 
participating countries all composed their own shopping lists.  “Everybody cheated like hell in 
Paris,”20 Van der Beugel recalled. The first estimates on August 20 exceeded all expectations 
and Clayton knew it was time to step in. The total shortage calculated by the Europeans for 
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Haan/Unieboek, 1987), 67.  
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the period 1948-1952 amounted to $28 billion, an amount that the Americans regarded as 
utterly unacceptable.   
On 30 August, Clayton met again with the Executive Committee. In the course of a 
three-hour meeting he explained in plain language that the conference was not meeting 
American expectations. To enhance the prospects of the European request Clayton finally 
provided some basic guidelines.  Next to lowering the total amount of the aid request, the 
participating countries had to come up with a plan that emphasized production (especially of 
coal and food) which would make it possible for Western Europe to attain economic 
independence or self-sustainability within a four year timespan during which aid 
requirements should decrease each successive year.  In addition, the Europeans had to work 
toward internal financial and monetary stabilization and were strongly encouraged to 
liberalize trade. Last, but definitely not least, Clayton made it clear that the Americans wanted 
the Europeans to create a permanent multilateral organization to promote European 
cooperation. 21  
The Europeans had not made much progress with attempts at a permanent cooperative 
effort.  On August 28, two days before the Executive Committee’s meeting with Clayton, 
Hirschfeld had written in a report to The Hague that “So far no detailed discussion has yet 
taken place at the Paris conference about the question whether a more permanent 
organization for European economic cooperation should emerge from the Marshall-plan 
consultations.”22  In addition, Marshall’s Harvard speech allusions to European cooperation 
had been very vague. The Dutch delegation felt very strongly that the ideas about European 
cooperation in the United States “were very outspoken, but not concrete at all.”23  As it 
became clear that the original conference deadline of September 1 could not be met, it was 
decided to apply the American recommendations after which the Paris report would be the 
basis for further detailed consultations with the American administration. On the occasion of 
the Paris conference, Ernst van der Beugel wrote two articles for the Dutch daily newspaper 
Het Parool, in which he described the major developments and emphasized the importance of 
American pressure on European cooperation. “Maybe”, he wrote at the end of his second 
article, “the American understanding of the problems accompanying European cooperation is 
too simple; maybe they are not sensitive enough to the great traditional and historically 
grown differences between the European countries. But”, he continued, now in bold print, “in 
essence their standpoint is correct, namely that from an economic perspective this 
impoverished continent will only have something to offer if a maximum degree of 
cooperation can be achieved.”24  
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In later years, Van der Beugel would come to perceive the 1947 Paris conference as “the 
mother conference of the structure of the West.”25  In his 1965 dissertation From Marshall 
Aid to Atlantic Partnership, he stressed how the collecting of data for a common purpose was 
an unprecedented peacetime exercise that was of great importance for the further 
development of Europe. “The affinity between these men, who worked in Paris day and night 
during the summer of 1947, formed an indispensable element for future cooperation.” This 
certainly applied to Van der Beugel himself, who developed many friendships in Paris, some 
of which would last a lifetime.  Among the friends who belonged to this latter group were the 
Belgian Count Jean-Charles Snoy et d’Oppuers, the Frenchman Robert Marjolin and the 
Englishman Eric Roll, Lord Roll of Ipsden. 26  Van der Beugel had close contact with many 
members of the other delegations, which enabled him to collect valuable information for the 
Dutch. In the process he impressed not only Hirschfeld but also Hirschfeld’s deputy, Dick 
Spierenburg. Both men were convinced that Van der Beugel’s career prospects looked very 
bright.27  
After the Conference on European Economic Cooperation was formally concluded with 
the signing of the conference report on September 22, the next step was to get the plan 
through the United States Congress. In order to facilitate this process the Truman 
administration invited Sir Oliver Franks and a small delegation of European representatives 
from the CEEC (including Hirschfeld and Van der Beugel) to Washington where they were to 
provide assistance for the defense of the aid program in Congress.28 This first trip to the 
United States would leave a deep impression on Ernst van der Beugel, as recorded in an 
extensive series of letters to his family and friends back home.  
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Christian Democratic party. Snoy would also serve a member of the Steering Committee of the Bilderberg Meetings. 
The English economist Sir Eric Roll served as a professor of Economics and Commerce before he was recruited as a 
civil servant during the Second World War, after which he came to play a key role in the Marshall Plan and in Britain’s 
unsuccessful entry into the European Economic Community in the early 1960s, after which he left civil service for the 
private sector where he became a director of the Bank of England and chairman of the merchant bankers SG 
Warburg, where Ernst van der Beugel became a director in 1964. From 1964 onwards, Roll also became intimately 
involved with the Bilderberg Meetings. He did not only serve on the Steering Committee but would also serve as 
Chairman of the Meetings between 1986 and 1989. 
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From the moment Van der Beugel boarded the Queen Mary, he felt ‘lost’ in the outrageous 
magnitude and luxury on the Cunard Line ship.  
It is the most refined luxury hotel in Europe times fourteen. It is impossible to 
describe…It is just too much, very nice, but part of times gone by. This cannot exist 
anymore...We had a simple lunch with hors d’euvre, lobster, chateaubriand, 
omelet, soufflé, fruit and coffee…All day long you can get cake, toast, tea, coffee, 
cocktail appetizers, liquor and cigarettes.29     
 
In order to facilitate informal contact, the British Foreign Office had arranged that the 
European delegation would cross the Atlantic together with a group of American members of 
Congress led by the Republican Representative Christian Herter. This so-called ‘Herter 
Committee’ consisted of 19 congressmen with diverse backgrounds, including a young 
representative from California named Richard Nixon.30  They had toured the European 
continent “to see for themselves what was happening and to assess the merits and needs of 
aiding Europe.”31 Herter, himself a committed internationalist, was already convinced that 
the European countries were in need of a comprehensive aid program. He hoped that, once 
faced with the devastation on the continent, his congressional fellow travelers would come to 
share this view. The committee’s members visited every country in Europe, except for Russia, 
Yugoslavia and Albania.32 Van der Beugel mixed with the congressmen, “but you should not 
exaggerate this contact with these Congress people,” he warned his readers back home. 
“They all say, ‘I’m so glad to meet you Mr. van der Beugel’ and pat you on your shoulder and 
five minutes later they have forgotten your face, your name, your country and your 
existence.”33 The committee members were especially interested in Hirschfeld, who had 
made a good impression on them previously in Amsterdam.34  
Together with Sir Oliver Franks, Hirschfeld spent one afternoon with the Herter 
Committee to provide an account of the Paris conference.35 Contacts between the European 
delegation and the American congressmen remained rather superficial in character and did 
not yield the hoped for results.36  A complicating factor was that the Europeans had been 
invited to Washington not to speak with members of Congress, but to help the Truman 
administration defend their aid program in Congress. As a result, “a certain degree of caution 
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in the interaction with the Congress people was commanded” and the Europeans were not 
able to get a good impression of the general mood among the congressmen. “They are most 
kind, very interested, and very impressed by the situation in Europe, but whether the man 
with whom one drinks a whisky will in fact give a passionate plea for aid to Europe in 
Congress or whether he will reveal himself as the most fierce isolationist, one cannot say,”37 
Van der Beugel concluded.   
The Queen Mary arrived in New York on Thursday, October 9. In order to experience his 
first encounter with the United States as fully as possible Van der Beugel got up at 7 AM. 
Around 9.30 AM the coast of Long Island appeared followed a bit later by the New Jersey 
coastline on the other side. Shortly after, immigration officers came aboard accompanied by 
two representatives of the British embassy in Washington who guided the passengers 
smoothly through customs. On arrival, Van der Beugel took a good look at the “unforgettable 
sight of New York.”38   
It was a bit hazy and when you sail between Brooklyn and Staten Island, all of a 
sudden you see the statue of liberty and then on your right something beautiful 
slowly emerges like a large mountain from the mist and that is the skyline of 
downtown Manhattan. Unbelievably magnificent and beautiful, not just because of 
what you see, but also because of what it makes you think of…You’ve seen the 
sight a hundred times in movies and you become aware of that especially when 
you sail closely past it. But that rising from the mist is truly one of the sights of the 
world. I will never forget it, that first time.39  
At the Cunard Line arrival hall, Hirschfeld and Van der Beugel were welcomed by Connie 
Patijn, another young Dutch official with whom Van der Beugel developed a close friendship, 
which, while not free from rivalry, would last a lifetime.40 The British had reserved seats for 
the Paris delegation in the Congressional, the train from New York to Washington DC, but 
before they boarded Patijn took Van der Beugel and Hirschfeld for a ride through New York 
that ended on the roof of the Rockefeller building with its fabulous view of the city. “First 
impression: Fantastic! Much of it was exactly as I imagined it to be. Many things even more 
magnificent”, Van der Beugel wrote in a letter to his father that evening. “I did not think in 
the categories ‘beautiful’ and ‘ugly,’ because I was too astounded.” They had ice cream on the 
roof of the Rockefeller building after which “as in a dream” they drove through Fifth Avenue, 
back to Pennsylvania Station.41  
During his first day in the U.S. it struck Van der Beugel how “the energy of the people” 
was “not being sucked away by a problem that simply does not exist here…it is completely 
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obvious that everything is available in every quantity and with incredible service and luxury. 
That is something we marvel at, but they do not.”42 When he finally got back to his hotel 
room around eleven o’clock that evening, Van der Beugel was ready to collapse. Even so, he 
wrote a letter to his family back home, which would be the first in a series of almost daily 
reports of his experiences in the United States. “I am extremely impressed by everything,” he 
wrote at the end of his first letter. “Tomorrow morning we will meet at 9.30 with the 
delegations for our first discussion...Nobody knows what to expect.”43   
The Washington Meetings 
The next morning the entire group of CEEC Europeans met in the War Manpower building of 
the U.S. State Department. During the first day at their Washington headquarters they were 
briefed about the proceedings in the U.S. capital thus far. Consultation committees set up by 
the Truman administration had already started their discussions with the European technical 
experts earlier that week. Some questions required sending additional questionnaires to the 
sixteen countries of the Paris conference. During the meetings, which had taken place in a 
most agreeable atmosphere, the Americans were well informed and not uncritical: the 
general impression was that the requests of the Paris report were still too high.44 The State 
Department, represented by Under Secretary of State Robert Lovett and his deputy Charles 
Bonesteel, coordinated the consultations with the European group.  
During the weekend Van der Beugel was able to unwind a bit. At the Wardman Park 
Hotel Ernst tried to catch up with reading the reports of the consultations. He marveled at the 
beauty of the red and golden glow of the Indian summer from his balcony. On Sunday, Louis 
Soutendijk, the financial officer at the Dutch embassy, gave Van der Beugel a tour of 
Washington followed by a cocktail party in Baltimore.45 “Life in the U.S. is truly breathtaking”, 
Van der Beugel wrote to his father. “I feel a bit like the sour aunt who really wants to say 
something unkind, but I’m unable to do so.”46   
The next day at 5 p.m. the Europeans were welcomed by Will Clayton, Robert Lovett, 
Charles Bonesteel and Marshall’s chief economic adviser Paul H. Nitze. The “friendly” and 
“pleasant” Clayton disappointed Van der Beugel, but he was deeply impressed by the 
strength and expertise of Robert Lovett, whom he described – just like Bonesteel and Nitze – 
as “a man of the very best caliber.”47  
Lovett was sympathetic to the Paris report, but also made it very clear that it would be a 
complicated task to get the aid request through Congress. The Republicans had a majority in 
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both the Senate and the House of Representatives and they were reluctant to cooperate.48 
Next to that, there would be elections the following year and there was a considerable 
amount of lobbying going on. The Truman administration would need all the help it could get 
from the European delegation to back up their case. Lovett’s message was simple: “You 
cannot charm this Congress and there is only one way to handle this and that is to give them 
facts and facts and facts. That is why you are here now. That is why your technical experts are 
getting milked; not because we are curious or critical. It is because in the end we will have to 
stand before congress to be questioned and we will need your help to stand strong.” This was 
an “excellent and realistic approach,”49 according to Van der Beugel.  As he said later: “We 
were, as a matter of fact, mobilized by the Executive to help in getting the thing through 
Congress, which was a fascinating experience.”50  
Soon a certain routine started to develop. Each day, Van der Beugel had to get up at 
7.30 to make it to his first meeting with the Dutch members of the Paris delegation at 8.30 
A.M., directly followed by a meeting of the entire European group at 9.30. A.M.51 Together 
with Eric Berthound, Robert Marjolin and Guido Colonna di Paliano, Van der Beugel had been 
appointed to a newly established coordination committee of the European delegation.52 
While the technical consultations continued, the rest of the delegation had to deal with 
general policy issues. Every day the American interdepartmental commission would provide 
the coordinating group with lists of questions, the answers being required by the chief 
delegates in their discussions with the U.S. Steering Committee in the afternoon.  
The first consultations between Europeans and Americans were devoted to an 
exploration of policy problems that arose from the Paris report. The discussions for the first 
week were divided into four main themes: 1) the general production program, 2) financial 
policy, 3) commercial policy and 4) European organization. During the subsequent week they 
hoped to “explore the balance-of-payments problem and to turn toward the general course 
of future action with respect to the program as a whole.”53 Next to the formal diplomatic 
telegrams, Van der Beugel also wrote some “highly confidential” informal reports to among 
others Dick Spierenburg, Eelco van Kleffens, Pieter Blaisse and Max Weisglas who had 
requested Van der Beugel to keep them informed.54   
By the end of the first week the European-American consultations had not made as 
much progress as hoped. They had dealt with the general production program and were half 
                                                            
48 Behrman, The Most Noble Adventure, 50-53.  
49 Letter E.H. van der Beugel, “Maandagavond”, 13 October, 1947, CmV (translation mine). 
50 TLOHI - Brooks, p 4. 
51 Next to van der Beugel and Hirscheld there were also three Dutch technical experts in Washington: Boerma 
(agriculture), Kouwenaar (timber) and Groen (oil).  
52 Letter E.H. van der Beugel, “Maandagavond”, 13 October, 1947, CmV. 
53 “Tentative Program for Conferences with CEEC Delegates”, October 14, 1947, file 20, EvdB.  
54 E.H. van der Beugel to Dick Spierenburg, 17 October 1947, file 828, Ministerie van Economische Zaken: Directoraat-
Generaal voor de Buitenlandse Economische Betrekkingen, NAH (translation mine). Spierenburg served as the 
Director-General of Foreign Economic Relations at the Ministry of Economic Affairs; Eelco van Kleffens, who had 
served as Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs during the Second World War, served as the Dutch Ambassador in 
Washington at the time; Max Weisglas was the chief of the press division at the Ministry of Economic Affairs.  
55 
 
way through financial policy. The Americans, Van der Beugel noted, “are friendly and almost 
embarrassed that they ask us so many questions. We are well prepared and they are 
enthusiastic about that, but it would all be much easier if they would expose themselves a bit 
more and if they would state more clearly what they expect and how they truly think about 
things. At the moment we cannot discern any of this.”55 The Truman administration simply 
did not know yet what it wanted itself. Even so, Van der Beugel by now regarded “the 
chances of a realization of the entire Paris Report in its original form as virtually naught.”56    
On October 24, Lovett and George Kennan met with the chief delegates to answer some 
basic questions on how the U.S. assistance would function. As usual, Hirschfeld also smuggled 
Ernst van der Beugel into this meeting. The Americans explained there was no chance 
whatsoever that Congress would vote for the full four-year plan in one go. The highest 
attainable result was the approval of the general idea combined with a yearly appropriation, 
for which they had $6.5 billion in mind, but nothing was guaranteed. “It is barely impossible 
to imagine how nervous the administration is about this Congress,” Van der Beugel noted. 
The aid would certainly not be given in dollars and the best the Europeans could hope for 
would be a mixture of dollars and goods. It would also be very hard to get the idea through 
Congress that a part of those dollars could be used for spending in other Western Hemisphere 
countries. One had to take into account, however, that “Lovett is an extremely cautious man”, 
Van der Beugel noted “who is scared to death for Congress and who does not want to make 
the Europeans too optimistic.” Lovett had shared with the delegates that he had just had 
lunch with the chairman of the House Appropriations Committee who had given him the 
advice to “put on an asbestos suit” during the hearings on Capitol Hill while leaving him with 
the friendly warning that “everything I tell you in Congress, Bill, is not personally meant.”57 
On November 4, a last meeting with the European delegation took place at the State 
department. During the meeting, Lovett tried to take away some of the European concerns. 
Even so, an “informal indication of present thinking on certain of these points” was all Lovett 
could offer.58  
In the end, the Europeans “left Washington with many open questions as to how the 
Administration’s program would be presented to Congress, what the amount to be requested 
would be, which conditions were to be attached, and how Congress would react.” 
Nevertheless, the exercise had already been “most fruitful and constructive” Van der Beugel 
would recall, because it had “brought a group of Europeans, who were going to play a major 
role in further European developments, into the closest contact with their American opposite 
numbers and with the huge problems facing the American administration in its relations to 
Congress.” The Paris delegation went back to Europe “firmly convinced of the reality of the 
words of Under Secretary Lovett, in their last meeting with him, where he said that the real 
                                                            
55 Letter E.H. van der Beugel, “Zaterdagavond”, 18 October 1947, CmV (translation mine). 
56 Letter E.H. van der Beugel, “Dinsdagavond”, 21 October 1947, CmV (translation mine).  
57 Letter E.H. van der Beugel, “Zaterdagmorgen”, 25 October, 1947, CmV (translation mine).  
58 Letter E.H. van der Beugel, “Woensdagmiddag”, 29 October, 1947. CmV (translation mine). 
56 
 
contribution of Europe could only be to abandon national beliefs and traditions in a joint 
approach to the recovery program.”59 Their fate was now in the hands of the United States 
Congress.  
The Marshall Plan: a Joint Venture between the Public and the Private Sector 
On April 3, 1948 President Harry Truman signed the Economic Cooperation Act.  The Marshall 
Plan had made it through Congress. To Ernst van der Beugel, who came to play a central role 
in the implementation of the Marshall Plan in the Netherlands, a “new diplomatic adventure” 
unfolded.60  
In its original proposal to Congress, the Truman administration had anticipated an 
organizational structure in which the coordination of the aid program would be in the hands 
of the State Department.61  During his January 8, 1948 Senate testimony, secretary Marshall 
had mentioned the need for ERP organization and its Administrator to be flexible, but he 
believed it should nevertheless “be fitted into the existing machinery of Government.” It 
would be “unfortunate” he declared, “to create an entirely new agency of foreign policy for 
this Government.”62  
In contrast, critics – including Arthur Vandenberg and Christian Herter’s Select 
Congressional Committee on Foreign Aid – preferred an approach that stressed the primacy 
of private management.63 Advocates of a corporate organization claimed that such an 
approach would “relieve the State Department of operational responsibilities for which it 
lacked experience and personnel”, that it would ensure “a large measure of operational 
flexibility, attract competent managerial talent from the private sector, and make possible a 
bipartisan administration of the recovery program. All of these advantages in turn would 
guarantee a businesslike operation and appease those in Congress who were hostile to the 
State Department.”64   
Such a corporate approach also received support from the private sector. Leaders from 
academic circles, the major trade unions and from organizations like the Council on Foreign 
Relations (CFR), the Business Advisory Council (BAC), the Committee for Economic 
Development (CED), and the National Planning Association (NPA) published briefs on behalf of 
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the program, testified before congressional committees and/or served on the Harriman 
Committee or on the Committee for the Marshall Plan to aid European Recovery. Like Herter 
and Vandenberg, they favored “corporative collaboration between private economic groups, 
including organized business and labor, and between these groups and government 
authorities in framing public policies.” The result was “something like a coordinated campaign 
mounted by an interlocking directorate of public and private figures.”65   
The post-WWII American foreign policy establishment consisted of a large network of 
influentials “connecting Wall Street, Washington, worthy foundations, and proper clubs.”66 
Since a “growing group of cultural and economic elites centered in the Northern and Eastern 
coastal regions of the United States” dominated the network, it was often referred to as the 
‘East Coast Establishment´.67  Private elite organizations such as the New York based council 
on Foreign Relations and the Rockefeller, Ford and Carnegie foundations served as its 
vanguard institutions.68 The latter ‘big three’ foundations “represented a strategic element of 
the East Coast foreign policy establishment and the core of the latter’s mindset, institutions, 
and activities, manifested by active leadership in organizations like the Council on Foreign 
Relations and the Foreign Policy Association.”69 Close ties between these private networks 
and the formal foreign policy establishment were enhanced by how individuals “frequently 
switched between public and private service.”70  
“However shady its outlines,” the ‘East Coast Establishment’ shared many assumptions. 
“The values they embodied were nurtured in prep schools, at college clubs, in the 
boardrooms of Wall Street, and at dinner parties in Washington.”71 They were 
internationalists with a cultural affinity toward Europe and the Atlantic world and belonged to 
a generation of Americans that had lived through the Great Depression, World War II, and the 
beginning of the Cold War. The lessons they took away from these experiences led to a 
common belief in the importance of remaining engaged in international affairs, especially in 
Europe. They were convinced that America’s security and economic well-being were 
irrevocably linked to events abroad.72 They understood public service as a lofty calling and 
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shared an aversion to partisan politics. Among them, “ideological fervor was frowned upon” 
whereas “pragmatism, realpolitik, moderation, and consensus were prized.”73   
It was in this spirit that on December 30, 1947 Senator Arthur Vandenberg solicited the 
advice of the private Brookings Institution on behalf of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee. "It would be helpful to have an objective study by an independent research 
agency of the highest standard," he wrote to the Institution’s president Harold G. Moulton. 
Less than four weeks later the Brookings Institution delivered a 20-page report containing 
specific recommendations for the structure, focus, and operating procedures of the Marshall 
Plan.74  
Considering the “magnitude and special character of the task to be performed”, 
involving “economic and business responsibilities the State Department was not equipped to 
assume”75, the Brookings report stated that “a new and separate agency should be created in 
the executive branch of the Government to serve as the focal point of the administration of 
the program.” This agency was to be headed by a single administrator to be appointed by the 
President with the advice and consent of the Senate. The report also encouraged the 
administrator to “set up special advisory bodies and to consult with representatives of 
industry, labor, agriculture, and with other private citizens.”76 In addition, it recommended 
exempting the agency from federal regulations, such as existing limitations on salaries, to 
make it easier to recruit talented individuals from the private sector. Similar 
recommendations had come from the Harriman Committee, the National Planning 
Association and the Committee for Economic Development. Eventually, they found their way 
into the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, thus formalizing “the pattern of public-private 
collaboration that had already taken shape around the ERP.”77 
The result was a new and independent agency called the “Economic Cooperation 
Administration” (ECA) to coordinate the European Recovery Program. The leadership of this 
organization would be entrusted to “an eminent American with an outstanding business 
background with Cabinet-level status.”78 Senator Vandenberg argued that, since the post 
required “particularly persuasive economic credentials unrelated to diplomacy” it was “the 
overriding Congressional desire that the ERP Administrator come from the outside business 
world (…) and not via the State Department.”79 On Vandenberg’s instigation, President 
                                                            
73 Isaacson and Thomas, Wise Men, 29. Parmar challenges this “apparent independence” of the East Coast 
Establishment, claiming that “the “Big 3” foundations (Ford, Rockefeller, and Carnegie) have been “intensely political 
and ideological and are steeped in market, corporate and state institutions – that they are part of the power elite of 
the United States.” See: Parmar, Foundations, 2-5.  
74 Ron Nessan and Fred Dews, August 24, 2016, “Brooking’s Role in the Marshall Plan”, accessed on August 29, 2016, 
http://www.brookings.edu/about/history/marshallplan.  
75 Hogan, The Marshall Plan, 107. 
76 The Brookings Institution, “Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate on the 
Administration of United States Aid for a European Recovery Program, January 22, 1948.” 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/About/Content/marshallplan/19480122cmtereport.pdf  
77 Hogan, The Marshall Plan, 107.  
78 Behrman, The Most Noble Adventure, 165. 
79 Quoted in: Hogan, The Marshall Plan, 108. 
59 
 
Truman appointed Paul G. Hoffman, president of the Studebaker Corporation (and a 
Republican), who had also served as one of the industry representatives on the Harriman 
Committee.  
As soon as the Economic Cooperation Act was signed into law, the American 
organizations involved in the implementation of the Marshall Plan started to weave extensive 
webs of corporative collaboration by linking up with the private sector on many levels.  They 
teamed up with leading commercial banks to arrange credit facilities and organized 
conferences with industry and farm groups to prepare programs for the shipment of goods to 
Europe. The Commerce and Agriculture departments, with their already well-established 
connections in the private sector, facilitated much of the early consultations. The ECA 
established its own Public Advisory Board, to which Paul Hoffman appointed representatives 
of business, labor, and agriculture.   
Knowing that the ECA was a temporary venture, Hoffman recruited many of ECA’s staff 
members from business circles, universities and law firms.80  “In screening, our idea was that 
the choices must reflect America,” Hoffman explained, “including government, business, 
labor, agriculture, education, etc.”81 While a number of important positions were occupied by 
professional diplomats and career public servants, individuals with corporate backgrounds 
similar to Hoffman’s were far more typical of the agency’s leadership.82  
While the ensuing “networks of corporative collaboration” started on the American side 
where the “ECA became a hub in an elaborate system of public-private power sharing”, the 
Americans also tried “to build a transnational alliance behind the ERP,” by equipping 
“participating countries with American production skills, fashion American patterns of labor-
management teamwork, and, in these and other ways, maximiz[ing] the chances for 
economic integration and social peace on the Continent.”83 This also applied to the 
Netherlands, which was soon woven into the growing transatlantic web of public-private 
linkages.  
The Dutch Organization 
Hirschfeld and Van der Beugel had started their own preparations for the implementation of 
the European Recovery Program in the Netherlands as soon as they got back from the United 
States. Hirschfeld believed there were so many sides to the ERP that its implementation did 
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not fit within any one of the existing departments.84 Like the Brookings Institution in the 
United States, he argued that the ERP was a unique venture, which needed to be approached 
in an innovative way. Consequently, he maintained that the proper coordination of the 
program demanded the leadership of a single government commissioner, assisted by an 
independent agency that could guarantee a unity of policy in The Hague, Paris and 
Washington. 85  
On January 14, 1948 the Council for Economic Affairs of the Dutch Cabinet appointed 
Hirschfeld as Government Commissioner for the European Recovery Program, which made 
him responsible for the entire administrative coordination of the Marshall Plan in the 
Netherlands. While Hirschfeld wanted the existing government departments to keep their 
specific competences,86 he also proposed to establish “a small, yet competent bureau”87 to 
coordinate the implementation of the European Recovery Program in the Netherlands. 
Hirschfeld appointed Ernst van der Beugel –“who in fact had already been carrying out the 
envisioned activities since the beginning of the Paris conference” – as its director. 88  
Due to the ERP’s interministerial character and in order to guarantee its flexibility, 
Hirschfeld believed that the envisioned agency should function directly under the Council of 
Economic Affairs of the Dutch Cabinet, as he did himself.89 While this was a rather unusual 
arrangement, the Council approved.90 According to Ernst van der Beugel, this distinct set-up 
was also influenced by the American example. 91  It gave the Bureau of the Government 
Commissioner for the ERP the freedom and flexibility Hirschfeld desired, bypassing the often 
stiff and sluggish bureaucracy.  
Meanwhile, on March 15 the Foreign Ministers of the European Marshall Plan countries 
reconvened in Paris to establish a working party for a treaty on European economic co-
operation. Ernst van der Beugel was one of the Dutch representatives in the European team 
that prepared the way for the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) on 
April 16, 1948.92 This was finally the European response to the American demand for a 
permanent European organization.  Once the OEEC was established, the American Secretary 
of Commerce W. Averell Harriman left his cabinet post to represent the ECA in Europe as 
permanent U.S Special Representative at the OEEC. In late April he set up the Office of the 
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Special Representative (OSR) in Hotel de Talleyrand in Paris. William C. Foster, the former 
president of Pressed and Welded Steel Products and former Undersecretary of Commerce, 
became his deputy.  As his chief aide and counsel he appointed the prominent Harvard Law 
professor Milton Katz, who would succeed Harriman in 1950.  
During May and June – when it became clear how the Americans would organize their 
side of the aid program – Van der Beugel set-up the executive office of the Government 
Commissioner for the ERP in some former residential apartments at the Smidswater in The 
Hague, not far from the American embassy. He recruited a group of young staff members 
from universities and the existing bureaucracy including Paul Antoine Zoetmulder, who 
became his deputy. Soon the Smidswater staff was in charge of the coordination of Dutch 
Marshall Plan policy, including the distribution of the aid assigned to the Netherlands, and 
served as the Dutch counterpart of the American assistance agencies.  To fulfill these tasks, 
Van der Beugel and his bureau stayed in close touch with all the groups involved, including 
the Dutch mission at the OEEC in Paris, the Dutch embassy in Washington DC, the ECA in 
Washington and the ECA country mission in The Hague. Hirschfeld required that all Marshall 
Plan interaction between the Dutch and the Americans would take place through either him 
or this bureau.93 Any violation of this rule would threaten the unity of policy, he warned, and 
would allow the Americans to play the different government departments against each other, 
thus turning the local ECA Mission Chief into the de facto coordinator of recovery affairs in 
the Netherlands.94  
To coordinate the work of the different government departments an Inter-
Departmental Commission for the European Recovery Program was established with 
Hirschfeld as chair and Dick Spierenburg as his deputy.  Since the Americans had decided to 
supply the aid primarily through the regular trade channels, the implementation of the 
Marshall Plan also required close cooperation with representatives from business and 
industry as well as the labor unions on the receiving end in the Netherlands.  
Public Private Linkages in the Netherlands 
From the start, Hirschfeld and Van der Beugel had maintained “very intensive contact with 
business circles and the labor unions about their participation in the Dutch organization.”95 
Hirschfeld, who possessed close ties to the business community planned to involve Dutch 
business and industry in a way in which they could be made equally responsible for meeting 
Dutch obligations towards the United States.96  
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After the major Dutch unions and employers’ organizations had expressed their mutual 
support for the European Recovery Program in the spring of 1948, Hirschfeld arranged a 
meeting with their representatives to establish a joint information center for the Marshall 
Plan. Such a center could both provide information for the business community and publicity 
for the government. The social partners showed interest in this plan and in early March they 
established the Informatiecentrum Bedrijfsleven Plan-Marshall (Business Information Center 
for the Marshall Plan). During the opening ceremony it was declared that the information 
center was founded on the understanding that the private sector was responsible for the 
production requirements, including boosting productivity.97  In addition, “to establish good 
contact with highly qualified representatives of Trade, Science, Industry, Agriculture and 
Trade Unions,”98 Hirschfeld composed a Business Advisory Council for the European Recovery 
Program, which convened for the first time on May 28, 1948.99 It started out with 16 
members from the private sector including four union representatives, three bankers, two 
industrialists, two agriculture representatives, one trade representative and one 
representative each for agriculture, shipping, trade and academia. The only labor union not 
represented was the Eenheidsvakcentrale (EVC), which was linked to the Dutch Communist 
Party, a fierce critic of the Marshall Plan.100 By meeting regularly and staying up to date on all 
developments concerning the ERP, Hirschfeld was not only able to obtain the current point of 
view of leading figures in business and industry, it also enabled him to make them feel like 
they had a stake in the success of the policies.101  
The establishment of an Advisory Council for the ERP was actually very much in tune 
with what the Americans, who composed their Public Advisory Board for the ERP around the 
same time, had in mind. In fact, soon after Hirschfeld had established his Advisory Council, 
the Americans started to encourage the aid receiving countries to do exactly that – thus 
exporting the corporate mindset via the Marshall Plan across the Atlantic. In the Netherlands, 
however, this approach was already practiced before the Americans began to push for it.102  
The Business Information Center and the Advisory Council were certainly not the only 
channels for interaction with leaders from business and industry. Since the Marshall Plan 
Bureau was in charge of the distribution of the aid in the Netherlands, business leaders were 
eager to bring their needs to the attention of the Director of the Marshall Plan bureau. In fact, 
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according to Ernst van der Beugel they were “queuing in front of the Smidswater to talk about 
their interests.” As Van der Beugel put it: “We can make things very complicated with regards 
to the Marshall Plan, but in the end the whole thing basically came down to who would get 
the dollars.”103  Eventually, many of Van der Beugel’s connections with business leaders, 
which started with professional interaction, developed into something more personal. “We 
were friends, we visited each other at home,”104 Van der Beugel explained in an oral history 
interview. This also happened with many of his diplomatic counterparts, not least the 
Americans who moved to Western Europe during the summer of 1948 to work in the ERP 
apparatus.  
Cooperation with the American Country Mission in The Hague  
On June 29, 1948 the Netherlands and the United States signed a bilateral treaty which, 
among other things, included obligations to increase productivity, to stabilize the local 
currency and exchange rates, cooperate with other countries to reduce trade barriers, bring 
out quarterly reports concerning the scope and use of received aid, and to provide the 
Americans with all information related to the implementation of the aid program.105 To 
ensure that each country operated in accordance with the Economic Cooperation Act and 
that the terms of the bilateral agreement were met, the Americans established Country 
Missions in addition to the embassies in the aid receiving countries. “Broadly speaking, the 
chiefs of the special ECA missions are responsible for representing the Administrator and the 
Special Representative in Europe in all relations with the participating governments”, an 
American memorandum explained. “The country mission chief works closely with 
government officials and private agencies responsible for preparation and execution of the 
recovery program in the country to which he is assigned.”106 Van der Beugel’s Marshall Plan 
Bureau was accountable to them. In practice, Van der Beugel noticed, this construction made 
the Country Missions “co-responsible for almost every aspect of the economic, monetary, and 
social policies of the receiving countries.”107  
The relationship between the Dutch Marshall Plan Bureau and the American ERP 
country mission was “totally different from our relations to traditional diplomatic 
representatives,” Van der Beugel noted. “It was not merely a mediating, listening and 
reporting function. On the contrary, the Americans found themselves right in the middle of 
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policy making, in spheres which infringed on national sovereignty.”108 This “newer 
diplomacy”109 as Van der Beugel called it, required a special kind of diplomat:  “individuals 
who possessed not only first-rate diplomatic qualities but at the same time an extensive 
knowledge of economics; individuals who combined wisdom and tactfulness with sufficient 
toughness and the ability to negotiate. They were the outposts of the new role of the United 
States in the world.”110  
While this situation offered many opportunities for friction, Van der Beugel was 
impressed by the “enviable American flexibility which facilitated the smooth flow of 
personnel from industry, universities, media, and trade unions to government posts and vice 
versa. Very few top functions were manned by what one could call the ‘professional civil 
servant’.”111 Many were still young, like Van der Beugel and his staff, and had decided to 
dedicate a part of their lives to helping to rebuild Europe. The fact that the Marshall Plan 
stirred the public imagination in the United States probably did not hurt in the recruiting 
process. “Their advantage was that the whole administration was brand new. They practically 
made their own rules.”112 Even so, Van der Beugel was very impressed by the great 
reluctance with which they exercised their authority.113 “They could have behaved as pro-
consuls, but they did not (…). The fundamental principle of the Marshall Plan was something 
far beyond this. It was a joint attempt, a joint venture.”114 This experience not only further 
fostered Van der Beugel’s admiration and respect for the United States, but also served as a 
catalyst for strong social bonds between the Dutch involved in this ‘joint venture’ and their 
American colleagues.  
"Although it is my impression that the Netherlands government is adept in supporting 
its own interests, all Government officers with whom I have come in personal contact (and 
that is an extensive list) have been extremely friendly and cooperative,"115 ECA Mission Chief 
Alan Valentine wrote to Hoffman after his first month in the Netherlands. In fact, Theodor van 
der Beugel, who lived in New York much of the time, developed his own personal relationship 
with Alan Valentine. The two men wrote letters to each other and Valentine even helped 
Ernst’s father with valuable introductions to influentials in Washington DC, including 
individuals from President Truman’s Council of Economic Advisors, the Department of 
Commerce and the Brookings Institution.116  
                                                            
108 Ibid. 
109 TLOHI – Price.  
110 Van der Beugel, “An Act without Peer”, 75. 
111 Ibid., 75-76. 
112 TLOHI – Wilson.  
113 See for example: EvdB/Kersten Oral History, p. 139.  
114 Van der Beugel, “An Act without Peer”, p 75. 
115 Alan Valentine to Hoffman, The Hague, August 17, 1948, box 2, Folder 600: "Administrative (misc). Netherlands 
ERP Setup, RG 469, Records of U.S. Foreign Assistance Agencies, 1948-1961, Mission to the Netherlands, Office of the 
Director Subject Files (Central Files) 1948-53, Administration Misc. – Agreements, USNA. 
116 See for example: Th. M. van der Beugel to Alan Valentine, March 30, 1949, CmV.  
65 
 
A comprehensive PR-campaign 
The fact that Congress would annually re-evaluate economic progress meant that there was a 
great deal of pressure on the aid receiving countries to show encouraging results. Hirschfeld 
was well aware of this. From the very start he had tried to keep representatives of the media 
in the loop. He distributed press releases and on 3 January 1948 (when the ERP was still under 
consideration by Congress) he called a press conference with the Dutch ministers of foreign 
and economic affairs, Van Boetzelaer and Lieftinck, to update the Dutch media on the most 
recent developments and “impressed upon them that they should really pay enough 
attention to the Marshall-dollars.”117 Before the meeting, Hirschfeld had told van Boetzelaer 
the Dutch press should “especially give an impression of the Dutch reactions with regard to 
the Marshall Plan (…) it will be necessary to publish certain things in the Dutch press so that 
they can see in America that the Dutch public is interested in the Marshall Plan, and 
preferably that they have a positive view of the program.”118  
During this press conference Hirschfeld stated that the Netherlands would “have to take 
on commitments and make sacrifices” and that they should be ready for anything. The Dutch 
communist newspaper De Waarheid reported that Hirschfeld “also acknowledged that there 
were some questions; some areas in which the terms of the Marshall Plan would come to 
stand in stark contrast with Dutch national interests, but he asked the journalists to keep 
these in the dark and to write as little as possible about them.”119 The De Waarheid reporter 
called Hirschfeld’s attempts to influence the Dutch media “Marshall demagogy” and warned 
readers that “officials have launched a campaign in all pro-American newspapers to make it 
appear as if a financial catastrophe is imminent if the American aid does not come.”120 Two 
days later De Waarheid followed this claim up by pointing out that the Catholic newspaper De 
Volkskrant was already “singing the Marshall-song with major headlines” and warned that it 
was “making Marshall-propaganda by threatening that our entire monetary system will 
collapse if the dollars stay away.”121 Indeed, with the exception of the communist newspaper, 
the press conference seemed to achieve its purpose. As one account has it, “With a certain 
sense of shared responsibility for the economic future of the Netherlands all newspapers and 
magazines devoted articles and supplements to the forthcoming Marshall aid.”122 Once the 
Marshall Plan had made it through Congress, Hirschfeld believed another “informal press-
conference” should be organized. This time “without the communist!”   
An active publicity campaign was in fact one of the obligations of the bilateral treaty 
that was signed in June 1948 and was greatly encouraged by ERC Mission Chief Alan 
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Valentine. 123  In addition to press conferences and briefings the neatly designed quarterly 
reports that Van der Beugel’s bureau provided were used to this end. Next to members of the 
government, labor unions, journalists, entrepreneurs and high officials, they were distributed 
to a diverse range of organizations, the media, libraries and others who had expressed 
interest in the recovery program.124 Hirschfeld and Van der Beugel also cooperated closely 
with the Press Office of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, run by the young economist Max 
Weisglas. Weisglas and the Smidswater bureau also regularly consulted with the Information 
Office of the ECA mission in The Hague, which ran its own publicity program.125   
During the first year, however, the American approach to publicity differed from the 
Dutch, at times causing friction between the two. “I remember there was a certain irritation 
on our side about the excessive amount of publicity we had to generate,”126 Van der Beugel 
would later recall. In the fall of 1948 the Americans told the Dutch that their publicity 
activities had so far been of a rather static character. The ECA Mission in The Hague desired a 
comprehensive “Public Relations” campaign, a concept whose meaning and application were 
still foreign in the Netherlands.127 Even so, Hirschfeld asked Weisglas to set up such a 
campaign. Based on American PR-strategies acquired through the ECA Mission and through 
study trips to the United States, the Dutch were eventually able to create a more dynamic 
campaign.128 They also intensified existing activities like welcoming ceremonies when ships 
with Marshall goods arrived, exhibitions describing the recovery program, essay contests with 
award ceremonies, the publication of explanatory brochures and speeches and press-
conferences by individuals like Hirschfeld and Van der Beugel.  
One large event that attracted a great deal of attention was the conference of the 
“Stichting van de Arbeid” on 13 January 1949. The entire program was devoted to Marshall 
aid and packed with eminent speakers, including ECA Mission Chief Alan Valentine, who 
opened the event with a distinguished audience including seven Dutch ministers, 
representatives of the socio-economic partners, senior civil servants, journalists, U.S. 
diplomats from the embassy and the ERC mission and Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands. In 
this “demonstration of friendship”, as the Volkskrant newspaper described it, “the ‘Stichting’, 
representing the Dutch nation, desired to express its gratitude towards the American people 
and their government for the aid they provide through the Marshall Plan towards the 
recovery of Europe.”129 In addition to expressing gratitude, union leader Evert Kupers 
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explained during his opening address that “the goal of this congress is to make the Dutch 
people aware of what this ERP means for our country in the first place.”130  
The second speaker was Ernst van der Beugel, described by the Volkskrant as “the 
correct type of the correct civil servant”, who gave an “astute” overview of the history and 
development of the Marshall Plan: “a speech like a government communique, but better, 
clearer.”131  Addressing Dutch suspicion towards America’s motives, Van der Beugel warned 
that “it is just as naïve to claim that Marshall’s plan is born out of American export interests as 
it is to assume that the American people and their government were solely motivated by the 
idea of playing Santa Claus.”132 The plan was a “product of generous insight and prudent 
policy”133 and had laid the foundations for a form of economic cooperation unknown in the 
history of Europe. However, he emphasized there was no room for complacency. For the 
realization of the European Recovery Program 1949 would be a critical year.134  
Over the course of the European Recovery Program, Hirschfeld and Van der Beugel tried 
to remove irritations and suspicion concerning American meddling in Europe by explaining 
the American position and by fostering a sense of trust in the American people. Eventually, 
the ECA’s Special Representative in Paris, Averell Harriman, would praise the Dutch publicity 
campaign, saying that the Dutch public was “the best informed of all concerning the Marshall 
Plan.”135 It was also in this context that Ernst van der Beugel became directly acquainted with 
the importance of public opinion in the diplomatic process. The lessons he learned here 
would serve him well in the future, as a private citizen pursuing his own public diplomacy 
campaigns. 
In the summer of 1949 the American banker Clarence E. Hunter succeeded Alan 
Valentine as ECA Mission Chief to the Netherlands. Hunter, who had served as vice-president 
of the New York Trust Company since 1928, was a member of the elite New York 
Metropolitan Club, established in 1891 by J.P. Morgan, and as treasurer of the Council on 
Foreign Relations he was a core member of America’s East Coast Establishment.136  Hunter 
was no stranger to the Netherlands either. As vice-president of the New York Trust Company 
he had been in charge of foreign trade, a position that allowed him to travel abundantly. 
Before his appointment as ECA Mission Chief he had visited the Netherlands “about twenty 
times,”137 developing close relations with Dutch financial circles.138  After his appointment 
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was made public, Adriaan Philipse, the trade council at the Dutch embassy in Washington 
D.C., wrote to Hirschfeld that “practically all Dutch bankers are writing us letters to inform us 
that he is one of their very best friends.”139 Turning 65 also meant Hunter had reached the 
age limit for his position as vice-president of the New York Trust Company. This allowed him 
to stay in the Netherlands for the remainder of the European Recovery Program.  
As with Valentine, Van der Beugel developed a very close relationship with Clarence 
Hunter. The men met very often, both professionally and socially. “I have always taken the 
position that I decline every invitation, except the ones from the Americans, but even with 
that restriction I cannot keep up”, Van der Beugel wrote to his father in the fall of 1949. “It 
will be absolutely wonderful to meet up with Hunter later, with whom I had dinner on 
Thursday, lunch on Friday and cocktails and dinner on Saturday. When I tell him ‘how very 
pleased I am’ to see him, he will probably think I am fooling him.”140  In addition to the many 
formal meetings and social gatherings that are so emblematic to the diplomatic circuit, Van 
der Beugel organized regular informal get-togethers between Clarence Hunter and Dutch 
business representatives that became known as the ‘Hunter Club’. In contrast to the more 
formal Business Advisory Council established by Hirschfeld, there were no representatives 
from the trade unions present at these meetings.141  
The ERP: Developing Transatlantic Networks 
While Ernst van der Beugel’s primary responsibility was the coordination of the Marshall Plan 
in the Netherlands, he was constantly connected to the broader ERP constellation that 
reached from Washington to Paris and from Paris to every Western-European country 
involved in the recovery program.  The European cooperation that the Americans had pressed 
for since the Plan’s announcement in June 1947 forced Ernst van der Beugel and his European 
colleagues to work closely together. In the process – beginning with the 1947 Paris 
Conference – a web of transnational linkages developed both in Europe and across the 
Atlantic.  
On a European level, this process was stimulated by the fact that Van der Beugel and his 
European colleagues became part of a unique form of “European machinery” in the OEEC in 
which they came to feel “responsible for a joint venture.”142 As the Frenchman Robert 
Marjolin, the first Secretary General of the OEEC and a lifelong friend of Ernst van der Beugel, 
later recalled: “Never in my experience, before and after the Marshall Plan, have I known an 
international team moved by such an intense desire to accomplish a joint endeavor, the 
success of which represented at that time a matter of life and death for Europe and for each 
member country, and to see that it succeeded in conditions such that each participant might 
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derive equal benefit. We were convinced that the different European countries were 
indissolubly linked in their destinies.”143 
This close cooperation not only contributed to a growing sense of internationalism and 
“additional loyalties to a broader entity than their own government”; it also laid the 
foundation for transnational relationships that went beyond formal interstate relations.144 
Van der Beugel explained the development of this social network as follows: “It starts with 
working together, but in the process another aspect kicks in, namely that you get to like each 
other personally; that you think the same about the same problems. But that isn’t even the 
most important part. The fact that a personal element of trust and affinity develops in the 
process – that is the most important.”145 Among the Europeans with whom Van der Beugel 
developed a particularly close bond during this period were Count Jean-Charles Snoy et 
d’Oppuers from Belgium, Sir Eric Roll from England, Robert Marjolin from France, Prince 
Guido Colonna di Paliano from Italy, and the group around Adenauer in Germany consisting of 
Walter Hallstein, Ludwig Erhard, Alfred Müller-Armack, Heinrich von Brentano, Herbert 
Blankenhorn and Hilger van Scherpenberg.146  “I had a very intimate relationship with these 
people,” Van der Beugel recalled. “If we ran into trouble, we telephoned each other, talked 
with each other. We also visited each other at home.”147 
While Van der Beugel claimed that nationality didn’t play an important role in this, he 
found that “this sort of contact was by far the most difficult with the French.”148 In his 
experience, “the entire club that ruled France was totally focused on France. It was an 
extremely cohesive grand école-club whose members did not speak in very flattering terms 
about foreign countries.” The only exception, Van der Beugel argued, was Robert Marjolin 
whose wife was American and “who did not have any French complexes.” In contrast, Van der 
Beugel felt “very much at home” with the Germans from Adenauer’s entourage. “I have had 
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the great advantage that in my first important contacts with the Germans I dealt with decent 
honest people”, Van der Beugel recalled: “I trusted them completely.” His experience with 
the Germans had “very strongly influenced” his attitude towards Germany for the better.149 
The same could clearly not be said about the French. A similar positive development, 
however, did occur with the Americans. Indeed, Van der Beugel frequently emphasized how 
the role and attitude of the Americans involved in the Marshall Plan played an important role 
in his growing admiration towards the United States. “The bankers and the lawyers, who 
wanted to help in those countries they felt affiliated with, where they believed they came 
from,”150 made a deep impression on him. He considered them “symptomatic for the 
inventiveness and flexibility of America’s foreign policy” and saw them as “the outposts of the 
new role of the United States in the World.”151 
Indeed, while trans-European linkages were important, Van der Beugel emphasized that 
the social network that developed during this period was above all trans-Atlantic in 
character.152 It was fostered at the bilateral level in the relationships with the staff of the 
American embassies and the ECA country missions. It was nurtured through consultations at 
the OEEC, but also through more informal social gatherings like receptions, cocktails and 
dinners in Paris, The Hague and Washington, where he got to know the other ECA Mission 
Chiefs as well as Harriman’s successor as Special Representative, Milton Katz, with whom he 
would develop a lifelong relationship.153  What is more, it was during this period that he 
became acquainted with the East Coast Establishment: “I worked with that group (…) I knew 
them all; that whole group that ruled America during that period: the Achesons, the Lovetts, 
the McCloys, you name them.”154 He not only greatly admired these men, but also felt a 
strong affiliation with their objectives.  
This unusually intense and constructive period in transatlantic history also generated a 
common bond of having been part of this ‘joint-venture’; of having worked in the same 
challenging circumstances, gone through the same experiences, and shared the same hopes, 
fears and aspirations. Even those who did not know each other personally during the days of 
the Marshall Plan, but who nevertheless shared similar experiences from this post-war period 
felt connected through its can-do spirit. Many of them would cross paths again later on – 
either in the process of European integration or through cooperation in NATO or some other, 
maybe more informal, trans-Atlantic venue.  As Van der Beugel put it: “the moment people 
see that you went through these first years together, there is something very special, very 
special.”155 
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The Marshall Plan thus generated a group of individuals from Europe and the United 
States tied together through personal bonds, shared experiences and common aspirations. 
These linkages would soon evolve into the foundation for an informal transatlantic social 
network that would “form an indispensable element for future cooperation.”156  
Hirschfeld’s Heir 
While the European Recovery Program took up the greatest chunk of Hirschfeld’s time, this 
was far from his only responsibility. As government commissioner he was involved in 
practically all major post-war international issues the Netherlands was confronted with: the 
German question, Indonesia, the Benelux and the European Recovery Program. This unusual 
accumulation of responsibilities made Hirschfeld the most powerful civil servant of post-war 
The Hague.157 It also meant that he had to delegate.  
In May 1948, Hirschfeld had appointed Van der Beugel’s close friend Max Kohnstamm as 
his deputy with regards to German Affairs. Kohnstamm had worked as Queen Wilhelmina’s 
personal secretary since the end of the war, but she had decided to abdicate in 1948. 
Kohnstamm – who had just made a study trip with a church delegation to Germany, which 
had deeply impressed him – was up for a new challenge.158 As his biographers have noted: 
“even Hirschfeld’s energy had its limits, which made him delegate the negotiations 
concerning Germany completely to his deputy Max Kohnstamm and the distribution of the 
Marshall aid to Ernst van der Beugel.”159 Overall, however, Van der Beugel played a more 
prominent role than Kohnstamm, with his own administrative apparatus that grew 
extensively over the course of the Marshall Plan. It already counted four departments by 
1950.160 Two years later it employed around 50 people.161 Besides, as opposed to Van der 
Beugel who had become the grand bureaucrat’s protégé, Kohnstamm never developed a 
close relationship with Hirschfeld. He would later say that while they were both assistants of 
Hirschfeld, Van der Beugel could be compared to a “giant” while he was just a “dwarf” in the 
Smidswater constellation.162 
Ever since Van der Beugel had been assigned to Hirschfeld during the 1947 Paris 
conference the two men had gotten along exceptionally well. Hirschfeld, who was over 
twenty years older than Van der Beugel, was not married. His life revolved around his work 
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and he regarded Ernst van der Beugel as his protégé.163 Hirschfeld biographer, Arie van der 
Zwan noted that  
Ernst van der Beugel is probably the only one for whom, later in life, Hirschfeld has 
taken down his armor; to whom he also dared to reveal some of his weaker sides. 
That was during a period in his life, following the Second World War and its 
aftermath, during which the need for personal support became too powerful for 
him. The ‘surrogate-father-son-relationship’ – the term comes from Van der 
Beugel – which developed between them, must have meant a lot to Hirschfeld.164 
Ernst van der Beugel, in turn, also greatly admired the “grand man of the Dutch 
bureaucracy.”165 “I am living im Schatten der Titanen” he wrote to his father in a 1948 letter 
describing his growing admiration for Hirschfeld.166  While Hirschfeld was not a conceptual 
thinker, he was a superb manager with a vast amount of experience who knew the civil 
service like no other.167 At the same time he was a first-class economist who tried to find “an 
equilibrium between the wisdom of the statesmen and the knowledge of the experts.”168 He 
taught Van der Beugel the ropes of international politics and introduced him to an extensive 
network of contacts in political, financial and economic circles.169 At his right hand Ernst van 
der Beugel’s career at the Smidswater truly took off. 
Meanwhile, Van der Beugel had also become a prominent presence within the Dutch 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. When in 1950 Hirschfeld left The Hague for eight months to serve 
as the first High Commissioner of the Netherlands to its former colony Indonesia, the grand 
commis was dearly missed. While Dick Spierenburg – Hirschfeld’s deputy from the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs – replaced him as Government Commissioner, the Dutch Marshall Plan 
organization was gravitating increasingly towards the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.170   
After war broke out in Korea in 1950, the Americans started to shift their emphasis from 
economic to military aid, thus adding a whole new sphere to Van der Beugel’s field of work.  
Startled by the loss of their nuclear monopoly after the Soviet Union had successfully tested 
an atomic bomb in August 1949, the Americans developed a new National Security Strategy 
(NSC-68), which emphasized the strategic importance of Western Europe for both the US and 
its allies. In fact, “the plan was so framed that the United States and Europe would jointly 
start with the build-up of their conventional forces, supplemented and assisted by nuclear 
and thermonuclear weaponry of American produce.”171  In addition, the ratification of the 
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North Atlantic Treaty in 1949, enabled the European countries to request military aid from 
the United States. To facilitate the distribution of this aid, the Americans created the Mutual 
Defense Assistance Program (MDAP), which started in January 1950. That same month, the 
Netherlands signed a bilateral agreement with the United States in which the distribution of 
military aid was regulated next to the economic aid.  
In response, the Dutch government appointed Hirschfeld as Government Commissioner 
for the Economic and Military Aid Program. During the first years of the European Recovery 
Plan it had been strictly forbidden to use the Marshall aid for military purposes. After the start 
of the Korean War, however, the American Congress began to underline the 
interconnectedness between the military and the economic aid programs by advocating that 
the ECA should also take the defense efforts of the aid receiving countries into account during 
the allocation of the Marshall aid. The underlying idea was that what had happened to Korea 
could also happen to Europe. The 1951 Mutual Defense Assistance Act eventually formalized 
the merger of economic and military aid through the Mutual Security Agency (MSA), 
functional from January 1952. In 1951 Van der Beugel’s Marshall Plan Bureau merged with 
the Bureau for the Military Aid Program. Since the economic aid under the Marshall Plan 
would formally come to an end in July 1952, it was decided that MSA would take care of 
pending cases until July 1953, after which the Foreign Operations Agency (FOA) would take 
over this responsibility. MSA and FOA would still grant aid to Western Europe, but only in 
connection with military purposes.172  
The Dutch context was also changing. During the late 1940s, the Dutch minister of 
Foreign Affairs Dirk Stikker had ordered a reorganization of his department under the 
leadership of his chief of Political Affairs Han Boon. Boon tried to use this to strengthen the 
position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding its influence over the European Recovery 
Program.  In the fall of 1949, Boon asked Van der Beugel to become the first chief of the 
newly designed Western Hemisphere division next to his Marshall Plan activities. “Since the 
relation of the Netherlands with the Western Hemisphere and in particular with the United 
States was determined for a large part by the Marshall Plan,”173 and since the Ministry 
already involved Van der Beugel and his bureau in “all matters concerning the United 
States,”174 this appeared like a logical step. While he emphasized that his work for the 
Marshall Plan would remain his chief priority, Van der Beugel – who was very eager to join the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs – happily accepted. 175  As a result of the growing emphasis on 
matters relating to security policy following the start of the Korean War, the Marshall Plan 
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Bureau had started to lean more in the direction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well.176  
Consequently, when Hans Max Hirschfeld left the Dutch government in October 1952, his 
independent Government Commissariat was dissolved. In its place a new Directorate General 
was established within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to be headed by the 34-year-old Ernst 
van der Beugel – making him, as the Volkskrant put it, “Hirschfeld’s first heir.”177  
As Director General for the Economic and Military Aid Program Van der Beugel also 
became increasingly involved in matters concerning Dutch defense policy. His responsibilities 
entailed the general administrative coordination of the American aid programs in the 
Netherlands and the coordination of all communication with the involved American 
institutions, the administrative coordination of the Dutch position in the OEEC, as well as the 
economic, military-economic and financial affairs in NATO and the European Defense 
Community. Last but not least Van der Beugel was responsible for the implementation of 
related policies designed by the Commission for Economic Affairs and the Defense Council of 
the Dutch cabinet.178 The execution of these tasks required close cooperation with the 
Ministry of Defense, all the more so because the Ministry of Defense did not have the 
bureaucratic capacity to deal with the American aid program.179 “I have often said that in 
those years I was just as much Director-General of Defense as Director-General of Foreign 
Affairs”180 Van der Beugel asserted.  With the exception of purely military-organizational 
affairs, which he had to discuss with the Chiefs of Staff, the Dutch defense minister Cees Staf 
involved Van der Beugel in practically everything that had an international character, 
including the Dutch position in NATO, the yearly exams, and the entire chunk of military 
aid.181  
Conclusion 
The Marshall Plan marks a decisive period in Ernst van der Beugel’s career. It drew him right 
into the center of Cold War transatlantic diplomacy and familiarized him with international 
politics, the processes of European integration, America’s political system and its foreign 
policy establishment. It was here – under Hirschfeld’s wings – that Ernst van der Beugel 
received his main professional education, which prepared him for a life as an informal 
transatlantic mediator at the crossroads of Cold War transatlantic diplomacy, economic and 
security policy. 
The implementation of the Economic Assistance Act of 1948 also helped to forge many 
new linkages inside the Netherlands, among the Europeans and across the Atlantic. When we 
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apply the perspective of New Diplomatic History to look beyond the role of nation states in 
this context, it becomes clear that the corporatist organizational structure that the Americans 
chose to apply to the European Recovery Program served as a strong catalyst for public-
private cooperation supported by an infrastructure of informal cooperation and consultation 
that would outlast the Marshall plan itself. Meanwhile, American pressure on European 
cooperation led to the creation of a permanent European organization in the form of the 
OEEC, which brought a group of European officials together in a unique cooperative setting. In 
addition, the close cooperation with the Americans, represented in Europe by the Office of 
the Special Representative in Paris and through the country missions and embassies in all the 
participating countries, forged many new and special bonds across the public and private 
sectors, thus paving the way for future cooperation.  
As director of the Dutch Marshall Plan bureau that was responsible for the coordination 
of the American economic and military aid programs in the Netherlands, Ernst van der Beugel 
was positioned at the very center of Dutch, European and transatlantic Marshall Plan activity. 
As a result of the multidisciplinary character of the Marshall Plan this position not only 
demanded close cooperation with the relevant government departments, but also with 
representatives from business, labor, industry, military and financial circles and the press. In 
this process Van der Beugel became the ultimate middle-man navigating between the public 
and the private, the national, the European and the transatlantic, between foreign security 
and economic policy. Through his coordination of, interaction with, and mediation between 
the different groups involved in the Marshall Plan – both private and governmental, Dutch, 
European and American – Van der Beugel was able to develop an extensive and diverse social 
network which would prove to be a valuable asset throughout his career on the diplomatic 
playing field, both as an official and as an unofficial actor. As the next chapter will 
demonstrate, this period also played a crucial role in the development of Van der Beugel’s 




3. An Atlanticist European 
While the previous chapter emphasized the post-war Marshall Plan context in which Ernst van 
der Beugel was active and the public-private linkages that developed during these years, this 
chapter will focus more specifically on the evolution of Van der Beugel’s ideas during his 
career at the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in particular with regards to the process of 
European integration and its relationship to transatlantic relations. It was during this period 
that the ideas that would drive him as an unofficial diplomat crystallized. At times they would 
also clash with formal government policy.   
Whereas official representatives of the nation state are expected to execute the formal 
policy line set out by the government, as this chapter will also demonstrate, private actors 
have more freedom to act upon their personal convictions. As a consequence, in the absence 
of a clear policy line set out by a nation state these personal convictions can offer crucial 
insight into what unofficial diplomats pursue and represent. Consequently, by focusing on the 
development of Ernst van der Beugel’s ideas during this period, we can also gain a better 
understanding of his role and position as an unofficial actor on the diplomatic playing field 
later on. At the same time, the personal convictions of official actors in the diplomatic realm 
do not necessarily square with formal policy. When we assess the private convictions of 
government representatives in relation to official policy a certain tension may reveal itself 
that provides insight into an important difference between official government 
representatives and private diplomats who are not bound by the same restrictions. As this 
chapter will demonstrate, this also applied to Ernst van der Beugel and Max Kohnstamm 
during the years in which they served as official government representatives. Eventually, both 
men threw off the yoke of formal administrative discipline by entering the transatlantic 
political-diplomatic arena in a private capacity. 
As demonstrated by the previous chapters, Ernst van der Beugel came of age through 
his experiences of the 1930’s, the Second World War and the reconstruction of Western 
Europe, all of which helped to determine his attitude towards international relations and the 
transatlantic relationship in particular. In addition, his participation in the Marshall Plan 
created a strong identification with the post-war period and the Americans with whom he 
worked closely together.1 “We experienced for the first time that a large country showed 
leadership in extremely critical circumstances,” Van der Beugel would recall decades later. 
This leadership and determination stood in stark contrast with the attitude of the major 
European countries. The appeasement at Munich in 1938 in particular had left a deep mark 
on Ernst van der Beugel, which would never really fade. One of the most basic lessons he took 
away from these experiences was that power relations were fundamental and, consequently, 
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“that an expansionistic totalitarian regime should be confronted from a position of 
strength.”2   
Central to the security of Western-Europe was also the question of Germany.3 Since its 
unification in the 19th century, this country had severely rocked the European power balance; 
it had played a central role in two devastating world wars and it was now divided between 
the rivaling powers of East and West. How could Germany be peacefully bound to the West? 
What kind of structure could safely contain Germany and safeguard the balance of power in 
Europe at the same time? To Van der Beugel, the Second World War had demonstrated that 
the only way to safeguard the European power balance was to include the United States in 
this framework. When the European countries had failed, the United States stood up as the 
backup country that could restore the power equilibrium. Now, with a new threat rising in the 
East, war-wrecked Europe depended totally on the American military guarantee. “The idea 
that we were dealing with an existential threat was an indisputable fact to me”, Van der 
Beugel maintained, “as was the idea that that threat could only be confronted with a total 
commitment of the United States in Europe” as well as “that NATO, with everything it 
encompassed, including its defense structure, was the best organization for this. And anything 
that threatened this (…) I opposed.”4  The  idea that Europe’s security in the context of the 
Cold War depended completely on the security guarantee of America’s nuclear umbrella 
would be fundamental to Van der Beugel’s vision of transatlantic relations and the 
development of his attitude towards European integration for the remainder of the Cold War. 
This conviction also determined the development of his attitude towards the process of 
European integration.  
As a result of the direct link between the Marshall Plan and the American demand for 
European cooperation, combined with the institutional structures that consequently 
developed within the Dutch government apparatus, Ernst van der Beugel came to play a 
central role in Dutch policy circles concerned with European integration.  During the 1950’s in 
particular a march of events unrolled that would be fundamental for the evolution of Van der 
Beugel’s views concerning European integration and its relationship to Atlantic cooperation.  
What is more, as Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Ernst van der Beugel also found himself 
confronted with the power of private actors in transatlantic relations – a highly relevant 
experience in the context of New Diplomatic History which left a deep and lasting impression 
on him. After all, New Diplomatic History seeks to broaden its framework of analysis not just 
by recognizing the diplomatic roles of unofficial actors, but also by including the private ideas, 
activities and networks of formal government representatives in this broader context. When 
we do so, it becomes clear that the official and unofficial spheres of transatlantic diplomacy 
do not exist in isolation from each other, but are intimately connected.  
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Historical Context: the Netherlands and the Road to Rome 
In the Netherlands, the acceptance of Marshall aid was part of a radical redefinition of Dutch 
foreign policy. The war and the German occupation had brought an end to the Dutch policy of 
neutrality. Between 1948 and 1952 a new vision on the position of the Netherlands in the 
world unfolded, characterized by an Atlanticist orientation in the security realm, based on a 
broad acceptance (though not on every point) of American hegemony, which was formalized 
by the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949. NATO would serve as the corner stone of 
Dutch security policy throughout the Cold War.5 At the same time, as a logical consequence 
of the Dutch economy’s heavy dependency on foreign trade, the Netherlands also moved 
towards an increasing participation in the process of continental European integration.6 Next 
to the general trade liberalization through the OEEC, the economic rehabilitation of Germany 
and its integration in Western Europe were of the utmost importance to the Dutch.  
Dirk Stikker, who served as Minister of Foreign Affairs between August 1948 and 
September 1952, was a passionate advocate of this approach.7 As one of the first ministers of 
Foreign Affairs with a clear interest in economic affairs, he became a key promotor of the 
liberalization of European trade and finance.8 Pressed by the United States to move the 
process of European integration forward, France had proposed the creation of a customs 
union together with Italy and the Benelux countries. The Dutch were very hesitant towards 
this continental initiative due to economic motives including fear of French protectionism. 
They preferred close cooperation with the United Kingdom, since the English shared Dutch 
views on free trade, the value of an open community and close cooperation with the United 
States. What’s more, due to their economic dependence on the German hinterland, the Dutch 
strongly favored the integration of Germany in the new economic framework. By the end of 
1950 the French walked away from the Fritalux discussions. As opposed to The Hague, Paris 
did not want to involve the United Kingdom, nor their German archenemy.9 Despite the lack 
of progress in the OEEC, Stikker believed this organization still offered the best vehicle for his 
aims. Consequently, he set up a team of experts including Ernst van der Beugel and Max 
Kohnstamm to work out a ‘Plan of Action’ along these lines that became known as the ‘Stikker 
Plan’.  The resulting blueprint proposed a sectoral liberalization of trade in the OEEC zone 
combined with the establishment of a European integration fund to enable member states 
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modernize industries faced with negative consequences from the proposed liberalization.10  
In May 1950, however, the Stikker Plan was overtaken by the more ambitious Schuman Plan.  
This plan, designed by Jean Monnet and presented by the French Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Robert Schuman, called for the establishment of a European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) that would place the French and German production of coal and steel 
under a common High Authority.11 It was this supranational element, the fact that the 
organization would not be intergovernmental in character like the OEEC – and as had been 
usual in multilateral organizations up till that moment – that made the Schuman plan 
revolutionary.12 Other Western-European countries, including the Netherlands, were also 
invited to participate, but whereas the Schuman Plan was received with great enthusiasm in 
the United States, it was not met with overall enthusiasm in the Netherlands.13 While 
Schuman had consulted Adenauer and the Americans – who had endorsed the plan – the 
Dutch had not been informed before its formal presentation at the press conference on May 
9. To the Dutch, economic integration took primacy over political integration. While the 
Schuman Plan was economic in character, its purpose was clearly political.  
Thus, the Netherlands had to come to grips with a new European reality and the Dutch 
cabinet was strongly divided on the issue. Sceptics like Prime Minister Drees and Finance 
Minister Lieftinck initially opposed the plan, while the Ministers of Economic Affairs and 
Agriculture, van den Brink and Mansholt, eagerly supported it. Foreign Minister Stikker took a 
middle position.14 In April 1950 he had declared in a speech in Rome that “if we truly want to 
develop our European cooperation, we will need to voluntary give up some of our precious 
sovereignty, thereby accepting the possibility that on matters of common interest, decisions 
will be reached with less unanimity.”15 Even so, the proposed supranational character of the 
High Authority was a bridge too far for him. In his memoires Stikker explained that he 
doubted whether the system of the High Authority would be the best possible construction, 
because he was afraid it would put off the British Labor government. In addition, Stikker 
believed the community should focus on more sectors than coal and steel and he still hoped 
for an organization – more like the OEEC – that would attract more countries.16 Even so, he 
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came to the conclusion that the plan needed to be seen as a ‘necessary evil’.17  The 
opportunity to bind West Germany to Western Europe combined with American pressure to 
accept the plan prevailed. On April 18, 1951, the Netherlands somewhat reluctantly signed 
the treaty that would bind it to the ‘little Europe’ of the new European Coal and Steel 
Community consisting of France, Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries.   
Political and Military Integration 
1950 not only brought forth the Schuman Plan, but also the Korean War, which set in motion 
a whole series of new defense initiatives in the West. Korea consolidated the idea among 
many in Western Europe and in the United States that the Soviet Union was indeed a 
totalitarian regime with expansionistic ambitions, which created the feeling of “an acute 
threat.”18 Van der Beugel, interpreted the Korean War “as the beginning of truly expansionist 
Soviet politics, which went beyond the domination of Eastern Europe”, more precisely as “the 
beginning of a planned Soviet expansion to the West.”19 The likelihood of a hot war in 
Western Europe was something Van der Beugel also discussed in correspondence with his 
father who lived in New York at the time.20 In response to the Korean War, NATO was 
transformed into an operative military organization with an American commander and 
American troops stationed in Europe. Furthermore, the emphasis of American post-war 
reconstruction aid to Europe shifted from the economic to the military sphere, as mentioned 
in the preceding chapter.  
The consolidation of the Cold War and the desire for a strong European defense also 
raised the question of West-German rearmament.21 In September 1950, only five years after 
the end of the Second World War, the American Secretary of State Dean Acheson suggested 
to grant Western-Germany NATO membership in order to rearm the country within an 
Atlantic framework. A month later, French premier René Pleven proposed a plan, again 
designed by Jean Monnet, to create a supranational European army as part of a European 
Defense Community (EDC) in which West-German military units could be integrated without 
having to form a national army.22 An additional French-Italian proposal furthermore called for 
the establishment of a European Political Community (EPC) designed to integrate the ECSC 
and the EDG within the framework of a supranational democratically organized political 
authority. Stikker opposed this proposal and advised the Dutch to reject it. He feared that it 
would relegate the Dutch priority of economic cooperation to a back burner. He also argued 
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that as long as the EDC had not yet truly materialized, there did not yet exist a “community of 
values”, which he considered necessary as a proper foundation for a political community.23 
 In September 1952, however, a new administration took office in the Netherlands. 
While Willem Drees remained prime minister, Dirk Stikker was replaced by two ministers of 
Foreign Affairs: Johan Willem Beyen and Joseph Luns. Both men were old acquaintances of 
Ernst van der Beugel.24  
Although many expected a mere continuation of Stikker’s policy under Beyen, who was 
given the European integration portfolio, the changing of the guard at the Dutch Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs heralded a major policy shift with respect to its European policy. As it turned 
out, Beyen did not oppose the idea of political integration as long as it went hand in hand 
with economic integration. Under the dictum ‘no political integration without economic 
integration’ Beyen proposed the creation of a ‘tariff community’, which should be understood 
as a first step towards a general Common Market, as a minimum requirement for Dutch 
participation in a European Political Community.25 In doing so, Beyen also abandoned 
Stikker’s sectoral approach. The realization of this plan, however, depended on the prior 
ratification of the EDC Treaty. Consequently, when in 1954 the Pleven plan was torpedoed by 
the Gaullists in the French Assemblée the establishment of a European Political Community 
linked to a Common Market seemed to be little more than a distant dream. Even so, an 
unexpected breakthrough was reached at the Messina Conference in June 1955, which 
eventually paved the way for the Rome Treaties, which would establish both EUROTOM and 
the Common Market.  
The Group of Ten 
During the early 1950s Van der Beugel enthusiastically embraced the idea of European 
integration as envisioned by the Schuman Plan. He did not only engage professionally in 
related debates through his work as a civil servant, but also tried to influence European policy 
as a civilian, active in the political arena. In 1951 he even joined a group of like-minded friends 
in pushing for a more thorough and pro-active European policy within the Dutch Labor Party, 
the Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA). He had joined the PvdA right after the party was established 
in 1946 as the result of a merger of three existing parties in which the social democrats soon 
got the upper hand. To Van der Beugel, whose father had been sympathetic to the social 
democratic cause, joining this new social-democratic party seemed like a logical step.26  
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One of the PvdA’s key domestic goals was the attempt to break with the Dutch tradition 
of pillarization: the division of Dutch society along religious or ideological lines with each 
group having its own newspapers, broadcasting organizations, sports clubs, trade unions, 
schools and political parties – a desire referred to as the doorbraak (breakthrough) in Dutch.  
By the early 1950s, however, a sense of discontent started to kick in among Van der Beugel 
and some of his social-democratic friends about the accomplishments of the doorbraak. 
What’s more, they were deeply disappointed by the PvdA’s international agenda, in particular 
its reticent stance towards the process of European integration. To their dismay the two most 
Eurosceptic ministers of the Cabinet – Prime Minister Drees and Finance Minister Lieftinck – 
were both members of the Labor Party. In the fall of 1951 a group of young social democrats, 
including Ernst van der Beugel and Max Kohnstamm, decided to list their grievances in a letter 
to the party leadership. With elections coming up in the summer of 1952, they hoped to 
awaken the party from its complacent slumber. The first ‘formal’ meeting of the Group of 
Ten, as they came to be known, took place in the fall of 1951. 
Next to Van der Beugel and Kohnstamm, the Group of Ten counted two more colleagues 
from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Conny Patijn and Jan Meijer, both worked at the 
International Organizations department. They regularly met with other young social 
democrats, most of whom worked for the government, at informal lunch get-togethers and in 
discussion groups where they talked about politics and current affairs.27 Some of the group’s 
members also met at the home of the devout pro-European PvdA minister of Agriculture, 
Sicco Mansholt. Jaap van der Lee, the Director of International Organizations at the Ministry 
of Agriculture, organized these meetings. He joined the Group of Ten together with Ivo 
Samkalden, who also worked at the Ministry of Agriculture.  They were part of the young 
vanguard of the Dutch Labor party, “bound together by their shared aggravation about the 
myopic regionalism that dominated the foreign policy of the PvdA. They were the 
internationalists of the PvdA, as opposed to their predominantly nationally oriented fellow 
party members.”28 Once they decided to turn their frustration into a force for change within 
the Labor Party, they invited three more experienced party members to join their quest in an 
attempt to give it more weight: Peter Koets, the Editor in Chief of the social-democratic 
newspaper Het Parool, Director-General of the Statistics department of the Central Bureau 
for Statistics (CBS) Flip Idenburg and the eminent economist and director of the CBS, Jan 
Tinbergen – who , like Ernst van der Beugel, had also been involved in the development of the 
Stikker Plan.29  
Aided by Van der Beugel and Kohnstamm, Conny Patijn drafted the first letter to the 
party leadership, which focused predominantly on the topic of European integration. 
Eventually two more topics which the Group desired to see on the PvdA’s party program for 
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the upcoming elections were added: Dutch policy towards Indonesia/New Guinea and the 
Dutch broadcasting system. With regards to European integration, the group called for an 
active political and military integration policy. They specified four elements in particular, 
which they considered ‘important’ for determining the right policy:  1) the relationship with 
the United States; 2) the German problem; 3) the role of England in the process of European 
integration and 4) the possibility of an Atlantic federation. It is worthwhile to take a closer 
look at these policy recommendations, because they serve as the starting point for the 
evolution of Ernst van der Beugel’s views concerning these issues, which would eventually 
develop into a more cautious position as he began to perceive a potentially dangerous 
tension between certain forms of European integration and its relationship to the broader 
transatlantic framework.  
  Firstly, with regards to the transatlantic relationship, the authors specifically believed 
that, despite their deep respect and gratitude for America’s post-war leadership, the 
European countries should be able to influence American politics. “In order to exercise 
influence on the most vital decisions Europe must be so closely integrated that it is able to 
speak with one voice,” they wrote. “This does not mean, however, that we cherish the illusion 
that Europe could function as a third block which could be neutral in the battle between the 
greatest powers. No neutrality is possible as long as the Soviet Union continues its current 
course.” European cooperation had to take place within an Atlantic framework as an equal 
talking partner in order to co-determine the course to be taken. “A common European 
military and foreign policy, managed from one point and speaking with one voice is the only 
thing that can guarantee a decisive influence on decisive moments in Washington,” they 
concluded.  
Secondly, they argued that the magnitude of the German problem and the fact that it 
could only be solved on a supra-German level made it necessary to give far-reaching powers 
to European institutions and a form of cooperation “far beyond a military treaty relationship.” 
In addition, they stated that it would be a mistake to wait for England to join a federal 
European project because England would “never want to go far enough in the direction of 
such radical solutions as will be necessary on the European continent. In the decisive years 
that lay in front of us, no leadership is to be expected from England.” Last but not least, they 
argued that “it is clear that the Atlantic Treaty shall not develop into an Atlantic federation 
any time soon. This fact combined with the English position forces the conclusion that 
European countries should seek the solution to their problems in the formation of a European 
federation as part of and in cooperation with the Atlantic Community.”  A fast process of 
European continental integration did not eliminate the possibility for an Atlantic federation, 
they emphasized, but could actually function as a stepping-stone towards it.30 Consequently, 
Atlantic ambitions should not be a reason to slow down European federalism. This explicit 
attention to the concept of an Atlantic federation can be explained by the popularity of 
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Clarance Streit’s 1939 book “Union Now: a Proposal for a Federal Union of the Democracies of 
the North Atlantic”, which had greatly influenced Max Kohnstamm’s ideas.31  
The letter’s authors met on four occasions with the party leadership to discuss their 
grievances. Van der Beugel, Kohnstamm, Tinbergen and Van der Lee were assigned to discuss 
the issue of European integration in a meeting with the party leadership – including Prime 
Minister Drees – on November 7.32 During the meeting, they once more made their case for a 
speedy federalist form of integration including a European army. The latter seemed like the 
only major sticking point, but Kohnstamm disagreed, arguing that the Ten also displayed a far 
greater appreciation for continental integration than the party leadership. Fellow party 
member Jacques de Kadt, for example, had voiced great pessimism concerning the feasibility 
of continental European integration, which he considered impossible due to the great 
differences between the European countries. “Let us, the socialist movement, seek our 
strength in being champions for the Atlantic defense; that is hard enough already,” he argued.  
Despite these exchanges the letter’s authors were not able to convince the party leadership 
of their views and “severe differences of opinion” persisted. 33  Even so, as Robin de Bruin has 
pointed out, “a side effect of the intervention by the Group of Ten was that its members had 
been able to place themselves in the spotlight.” By 1956 five of them, including Ernst van der 
Beugel, had been taken up in the PvdA’s committee on foreign affairs. 34  
Diverging Paths: the European Defense Community and the Rise of the Gaullists 
While Van der Beugel initially subscribed to the points put forward by the Group of Ten, his 
position on some of the letter’s key tenets shifted as the process of European integration 
started to gain a more concrete form in the international political-diplomatic arena. As the 
process unfolded his attitude changed particularly on the plausibility of a European army, on 
the importance of English participation and with regards to the idea that Europe should 
integrate into a continental political federation enabling it to speak with one voice so as to 
confront the United States as an ‘equal partner’. Lastly, considering the international political 
context, in particular the rising influence of the Gaullists in France, he also came to disagree 
with the desire of a fast paced integration process if this meant speedy progression into a 
direction he perceived to be perilous for the primacy of the Atlantic Community.  
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Indeed, the key to understanding Van der Beugel’s growing skepticism towards the 
process of European integration as it unfolded can be found in the clash between his 
understanding of the fundamental primacy of the Atlantic relationship in the context of the 
Cold War and the growing influence of the Gaullists on French foreign policy. The latter 
worried him because he was afraid they might want to hijack the process of European 
integration for their own purposes of re-establishing French grandeur in Western Europe at 
the expense of American hegemony, thus fundamentally disturbing the power balance on 
which he believed Western security in the context of the Cold War depended. So, whereas 
Van der Beugel agreed with many of the key principles undergirding European integration, he 
did not believe that the political circumstances in Europe allowed for their realization in a way 
that would serve the Dutch national interest, which he understood to be interwoven with the 
American security guarantee institutionalized through NATO and dependent on American 
hegemony in Western Europe.  
The first cracks in Van der Beugel’s faith in the process of European integration as it 
unfolded became visible in the context of the European Defense Community. Van der Beugel 
had considered the Pleven Plan as a bridge too far from the start, but – as he had already 
explained during one of the meetings with the PvdA leadership –  because the Americans had 
embraced it and pressed the six ECSC countries to move ahead along those lines he went 
along for pragmatic reasons.35 In the process, he reminded his audience that the European 
countries could only make sure that the U.S. Congress would continue its “generous policy” 
towards Western Europe through the way in which they chose to proceed on the path of 
European integration. “A large part of what takes place in the military arena is no longer a 
matter of national sovereignty, but is decided by what the Americans want from us,” Van der 
Beugel maintained. He conceded that he shared some of the party leadership’s practical 
objections against the EDC, “but,” he added, “what alternative do we have?”36   
The better alternative, from Van der Beugel’s perspective, was in fact NATO. Like many 
in the Dutch foreign policy establishment, Van der Beugel feared that the EDC “would boil 
down to the establishment of a European pillar within or even outside NATO, hence 
undermining American leadership, weakening the Western alliance, and consequently 
jeopardizing Dutch national security.”37 Van der Beugel would often remark, however, that 
what was desirable needed to be distinguished from what was possible and while he believed 
military integration through NATO was desirable, current circumstances did not allow the 
Netherlands to pursue this path. Already at this stage, he was in fact plus américain que les 
Américains.  
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Despite his reservations, Ernst van der Beugel did not openly speak out against the EDC. 
In order to make sure that the Americans would not turn away from Europe he went along 
with the policy in an attempt to make the best of the existing situation. Privately, however, he 
expressed serious doubts concerning its feasibility.  In a personal letter to Herman van Roijen, 
the Dutch ambassador in Washington DC, Van der Beugel confided in February 1952 that he 
blamed the Americans for creating the impression that Europe would not be defendable 
without a German army, which he regarded as “one of the most serious mistakes since 1945.” 
The defensibility of Europe did “not depend on ten or twelve German divisions, but solely on 
whether one will be covered by the American military.”38 He blamed the Americans for being 
insensitive to the German question, but also for ignoring how profoundly the fear for German 
rearmament was still alive in France.  
  To make matters worse, the political situation in France became only less favorable. 
In January 1954, the Netherlands was the first country to ratify the EDC treaty. Of course, 
Foreign minister Beyen’s attempt to pursue a Common Market by making concrete steps into 
this direction a condition for a European Political Community (EPC) depended on the prior 
establishment of the European Defense Community. At the same time, however, Dutch 
ratification of the EDC treaty was also meant as a gesture of goodwill, not least towards the 
United States where officials became increasingly worried that Dutch insistence on its 
economic goals in the EPC would become an extra reason for the French to reject the 
European Defense Community.39  
In January 1953, the newly elected Eisenhower administration had brought a new 
perspective on the EDC to the White House. President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John 
Foster Dulles perceived the EDC not just as a military solution to realize a German defense 
contribution. Instead, as Marc Trachtenberg has pointed out “The real point of the EDC (…) 
was to weld France and Germany together as the core of a strong European federation that 
could stand up to Russia on its own, and thus make it possible for American forces to 
withdraw from Europe in the near future.”40 According to Van der Beugel, “for the United 
States, the political, military and economic unification of Western Europe had become an end 
in itself and was no longer a means.”41  
The Eisenhower administration’s pressure on the European countries to ratify the EDC 
was relentless. White House pressure was added to the already zealous pressure for 
European integration from Capitol Hill, which had been a fact of transatlantic political life 
since the conception of the Marshall Plan. That the U.S. Congress had also embraced the EDC 
project as a step in the right direction was once more underlined in the Spring of 1952 when 
U.S. legislators had “made further aid to the European NATO powers dependent upon 
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‘concrete measures for political federation, military integration and economic unification in 
Europe.’”42 According to Van der Beugel, now “every act of American diplomacy towards the 
European countries was inspired and dominated by the issue of the ratification of the EDC.”43 
In December 1953 American pressure reached a climax when Secretary of State Dulles 
declared that if the European countries would fail to ratify the EDC treaty, “this would compel 
an agonizing reappraisal of basic United States policy,”44 which might include a withdrawal of 
United States forces from the European continent. Obviously, this was a nightmare scenario 
from Van der Beugel’s point of view, who regarded this “brusque” threat and “unprecedented 
bluntness in the intercourse between allied nations” as proof that for the United States “the 
issue was now presented in terms of the broadest political ideology and had elements of an 
almost theological dispute.”45 
While American pressure increased, the situation in France only worsened. The French 
Assemblée was permeated by a pervasive sense of uncertainty concerning the ratification of 
the EDC treaty. This situation was aggravated by the unstable political situation in Paris, which 
culminated in a political crisis that brought the radical Pierre Mendès France to power after 
the French military defeat at Dien Bien Phu in May 1954.46 While the new government was 
divided on the EDC Treaty, French General Charles de Gaulle denounced the entire EDC 
project on April 7, urging the French to become independent both from the United States and 
the Soviet Union.47 This view greatly alarmed Ernst van der Beugel who was convinced that 
the fate of Western civilization and Europe in particular depended on the closest possible 
bond between Europe and the United States and that a disintegration of the nascent Atlantic 
Community would only play into the hands of the Soviet Communists. 48   
The rising influence of the Gaullists in France had already led to the reluctant 
acceptance – under severe American pressure – of five interpretive protocols to the EDC 
Treaty in June 1953. After deliberately delaying the ratification process, Mendès France put 
forward a new series of proposals regarding the EDC in August 1954, which according to Van 
der Beugel “would have emptied the Treaty of its basic political meaning, because every trace 
of supranationalism was to be either deleted or delayed.” The Dutch also regarded the French 
proposals as discriminatory towards Germany. They were not the only ones who thought 
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Mendès France had crossed a line. Despite continuous American pressure his proposals 
crashed on “a solid front of refusal” of the other Five. Eventually, the EDC treaty died a 
certain death during a vote in the French Assemblée on August 30, 1954. Formally this was 
not a vote on the treaty itself, but – as Van der Beugel was keen to point out – on a Gaullist 
resolution eliminating the treaty from the Assemblée’s agenda. Van der Beugel also liked to 
underline that in their rejection of the EDC treaty the Gaullists found themselves on the same 
side as the communists in the French Assemblée.49  
Thus, Ernst van der Beugel’s worries concerning the EDC had materialized. Just weeks 
before its rejection he had asked the American ambassador to the Netherlands, Doc 
Matthews, with whom he had a very close relationship, whether the Americans were thinking 
about alternatives to the EDC. Matthews replied that he was very sorry, but that he had 
received instructions from the State Department prohibiting him to talk about any alternative. 
“That is how committed the Americans were to EDC!”, Van der Beugel would recall. 50  
In the end, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles called the French rejection a “tragedy” 
and issued a bitterly worded statement, but the ‘agonizing reappraisal’ was not put into 
effect. As an alternative to integrate the Germans into the Western defense structures, the 
old Brussels Treaty was dusted off and expanded to include Germany and Italy after which it 
was linked to NATO. In May 1955, after all signatories had ratified the new Brussels Treaty, 
the Federal Republic of Germany was eventually accepted into NATO. In his dissertation, 
published in 1966, Van der Beugel’s reflections on the American role during this episode were 
not exactly flattering:  
The dogmatic character of this policy, the refusal to consider alternatives, the 
confusion between means and ends and the unprecedented pressure to obtain a 
specific solution for a problem over which the United States had no ultimate 
control, led to a situation in which the strain on the Western alliance was increased 
instead of mitigated. In these kinds of circumstances, the leader of the alliance 
should have more maturity and wisdom, should act less dogmatically and should 
not commit its power and prestige to a case, of which the success was so much in 
doubt.51  
With the failure of the European Defense Community, Beyen’s dream of a Common Market 
linked to a European Political Community also burst into pieces. From the Dutch perspective, 
the moving train of European integration that Beyen had jumped onto in the fall of 1952 had 
been derailed by a French act of sabotage. Beyen was furious. Ernst van der Beugel had never 
experienced seeing a minister in office so distraught. Beyen just could not fathom what had 
happened. “At that moment he could have killed Mendès-France with his bare hands,”52 Van 
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der Beugel recalled. The EDC episode also left a significant dent in Van der Beugel’s already 
bruised confidence concerning the sincerity of the European and Atlantic intentions of the 
French and the Gaullists in particular. In November 1954, a few months after the French 
Assemblée had killed the EDC, Van der Beugel expressed his worries concerning a renewed 
French nationalism under Mendès-France, driven by the desire to position Europe as a third, 
neutral power between the United States and the Soviet Union:  
In my opinion, Mendès-France is a personalization of a very activist (that is new 
about it) French nationalism. The entire setting, design and methodology are 
brutally nationalistic. While on a positive note, it has a very large intelligence and 
activism combined with a non-conservative attitude towards certain problems, it 
remains essentially sharply nationalistic with (…) fascist tendencies. It is also 
completely opportunistic and that explains the group of Gaullists and third-way-
sympathizers surrounding him that I happen to know, who find each other in their 
activism and in particular through the reinforcement of a possible neutrality in this 
world.53 
The death of the EDC delivered a heavy blow to the process of continental European 
integration and heralded a period of great pessimism. The possibility of progress along 
economic and supranational lines – as the Dutch desired – looked particularly dim. “This 
French nationalism has not torpedoed the EDC based on a fear for the Germans, but based on 
a fear for the supranational development”54 Van der Beugel concluded. During the months 
following the failure of the EDC Van der Beugel stressed the need for a supranational 
approach to continental European integration both internally as well as in speeches to 
different audiences throughout the Netherlands. 
While he was devastated by the failure of the EDC, Beyen’s enthusiasm for European 
integration along supranational economic lines only grew stronger. At the same time, the 
minister shared Van der Beugel’s worries about the French nationalistic approach that had 
come to the fore under Mendès-France and called for a pause. As long as Mendès-France 
would be in charge, every truly supranational initiative would be rejected, he believed. 
Consequently, the Dutch would have to wait for a better political climate while resisting 
French “blackmail” in pursuit of “pseudo integration.”55 Van der Beugel agreed: “There are 
two forms of cooperation possible in the West”, he wrote in a letter to his friend Gerrit Jan 
van Heuven Goedhart, who served as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 
“On the one hand the intergovernmental cooperation like in NATO, OEEC, etc. which is a kind 
of cooperation we should not underestimate, but which – in the end – can never reach the 
fundamental solution and on the other hand the supranational solution in which the English 
will not participate, to which the French are currently opposed and which will also fail to 
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attract the Germans in a couple of years. In between there is a zone of hodgepodge, which – 
without any doubt – will be pursued by Mendès-France. In that zone it will be attempted to 
confuse both forms of cooperation, with the main purpose of undermining any form of truly 
supranational cooperation and to replace it with something that carries the disadvantages of 
both in it.”56  
Atlanticist vs. Europeanists and the Straightjacket of Administrative Discipline  
It was also in the context of the European Defense Community that a clear difference in 
priorities between Europeanists and Atlanticists became visible within the Dutch Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs.  As it turned out, Van der Beugel’s growing cautiousness towards European 
integration as it unfolded was not shared by some of his closest friends at the department. 
Already in February 1952, Van der Beugel noticed “a sharp dividing line” cutting through the 
Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs based on “a very profound disagreement on this issue” and 
feared that the issue had become as divisive as the decolonization of Indonesia had been 
during the late 1940s. “Facing those who are deeply worried about surrendering large tracts 
of sovereignty to the group of six Schuman countries are those who consider a fast – and I 
would almost say virtually unconditional – blending into the larger continental European unity 
as the only solution for both the German problem and the future of the European countries.” 
Van der Beugel considered this situation the hardest for those, including himself, “who seek 
to find a middle ground (…) in the end we are in our positions to defend, without reserve, 
Dutch interests – also when these Dutch interests clash with the political pressure towards 
the quickest and maximum amount of integration possible.”57   
Overall, the international situation had become so strained, Van der Beugel argued, that 
the best solution would be to insert “a pause for reflection.”58 He had in fact been so 
charmed by an article in The Economist that proposed such a pause that he had suggested to 
Conny Patijn to give a copy to Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs Dirk Stikker. The ensuing 
correspondence reflects the schism that had developed within the Dutch Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs: Patijn disagreed completely with the article and found it above all representative of a 
Britain out of touch with the rest of Europe. He also questioned Van der Beugel’s motives: “Is 
your sympathy for this article not based on the fact that it gives you some good arguments for 
your position that nothing should happen and thus, that it works towards stalling European 
integration-along-lines-you-do-not-want?”59, he wondered. For Van der Beugel this was an 
affront: “I have great difficulties with the dogmatism of European integration as professed by 
you,” he replied. “When I have objections against (…) Karl Barth or against the new church 
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order or against Christian education, I do not wish to be confronted constantly with the 
question whether I believe in the resurrection of the dead.”60  
Van der Beugel’s letters did not only demonstrate a growing distrust towards French 
politics, but also revealed a clear sympathy towards the United Kingdom. This sympathy was 
primarily based on the idea that British participation in the process of European integration 
would “offer a guarantee for a closer transatlantic bond.”61 He also claimed to be sincere in 
his request for a pause. The EDC had thus far been only a paper plan, he argued. It had not 
been well enough thought through and – most importantly – it “did not fit the political 
realities of its time in Germany and France.” Instead, he felt that the emphasis should lie not 
on political and military integration, but on the economic and financial spheres:  
I refuse to cheer blindly for a concept of continental European integration. After 
what has happened during the preceding six months less than ever so. With 
regards to this issue, the spirit is definitely not upon me, and that is the core of 
your accusation.62  
While Van der Beugel noted that it was above all “a matter of pace” that separated him from 
his Europeanist friends, on a more fundamental level it was his more realist outlook that 
clashed with the European idealism of some of his best friends. To Ernst van der Beugel, not 
European integration an sich, but the Dutch national interest – which for security reasons he 
regarded as directly tied to the closest possible transatlantic relationship – should be the 
main priority of Dutch foreign policy. European integration was thus only desirable to the 
extent in which it amplified the Dutch national interest by strengthening the Atlantic alliance 
in the face of Soviet communism. While at first European integration seemed to go hand in 
hand with close transatlantic relations, Van der Beugel now found himself separated from 
some of his most intimate friends, on the other side of a schism separating Europeans from 
Atlanticists.  
At the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, however, the Atlanticists were in the majority. As 
Jérôme Heldring would later put it, a “regent tradition” lived on at the Dutch Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs that “manifested itself in a pragmatic, non-ideological policy, which, 
consequently, approached the ideology of European federalism with suspicion.”63 Conny 
Patijn was in fact one of the few European exceptions to the Atlanticist rule. Max Kohnstamm 
was another exception.64 They were two of the odd ones out at a department where realism 
reigned supreme and their passionate pro-European activism was not appreciated by the 
department’s leadership. From the spring of 1951 onwards, Max Kohnstamm had 
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experienced the feeling that he had reached a ‘dead end’ at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
“la voie de garage,”65 as he put it. The old guard at the department regarded him with 
suspicion, not just because of his strong federalist sympathies, but also as a result of his 
unconventional informal activities. Kohnstamm would, for example, frequently contact 
Europe-minded members of parliament with the intention to push the Dutch government 
through parliament into the direction of further integration.66 This was simply ‘not done’ 
according to Secretary-General Han Boon who made sure that Kohnstamm got kaltgestellt.67 
In the summer of 1952 Kohnstamm left the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to join Jean Monnet as 
his secretary at the High Authority of the ECSC, a position in which Kohnstamm was “perfectly 
happy” according to Van der Beugel.68 Kohnstamm’s diaries demonstrate, however, that the 
discrepancy between the European political goals he tried to pursue and the ‘technocratic 
element’ was even greater at the High Authority than at a ‘national ministry’. Thus, when 
Monnet left the High Authority in 1956, Kohnstamm gladly joined him to pursue their 
European ideals “as a free agent” behind the scenes of transatlantic diplomacy.69 That same 
year Patijn exchanged his position at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for a seat in the Second 
Chamber of the Dutch parliament representing the PvdA.70  
While Kohnstamm struggled with the Atlanticist administrative discipline under Stikker, 
Ernst Van der Beugel’s personal convictions with regards to the process of European 
integration did not always square with the more ambitious European plans of minister Beyen. 
Even so, as a civil servant it was his task to defend and execute his minister’s policy. To 
illustrate, in March 1953 Dirk Stikker, who had accepted a post as Dutch ambassador to 
Britain after he had stepped down as Minister of Foreign Affairs, stated his growing concerns 
about the European policy of his successor in a letter to Beyen. He had the impression that 
the Netherlands was “leading the way in a federalist direction” with its ambitions vis-à-vis the 
marché unique of the six Schuman countries, a development he considered “dangerous”. He 
expressed great pessimism with regards to “the French, in other words ‘continental’ 
integration plans” and warned against the “weakness and hollowness” of the French. Stikker 
advised Beyen to seek cooperation with England instead. Last but not least, he also feared 
“the danger of deadlock with regards to the EDC”, based on his impression that France would 
not ratify the EDC treaty, at least not in a form which would be acceptable to the other 
partners – and without the EDC no political community or economic community would come 
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into existence.  Consequently, Stikker advised Beyen to study alternative possibilities to 
involve Germany in the defense of Europe.  
It should be no surprise that Ernst van der Beugel strongly sympathized with the worries 
expressed by Stikker. While Beyen was aware of this, or as Van der Beugel himself suggested, 
maybe exactly because he was aware of this, Beyen asked Van der Beugel to formulate his 
reply to Stikker, which Van der Beugel did.71 In the reply, Van der Beugel defended Beyen’s 
policy with verve explaining that by signing the ECSC and EDC treaties the Dutch had reached 
a “point of no return.”72 Beyen only made minimal editorial changes to the final version and 
even decided to distribute copies to the Dutch ambassadors in Washington, Brussels, 
Luxembourg, Paris and Bonn, arguing that this could be “useful as a clarification of the Dutch 
point of view regarding integration.”73 A more serious instance in which Van der Beugel’s 
personal convictions clashed with Beyen’s European policy concerned the relaunch of Beyen’s 
plans for economic integration in 1955. 
During spring 1955 the dark clouds that had gathered over the process of European 
integration since the Gaullists had torpedoed the EDC in the summer of 1954 seemed to be 
slowly drifting away from the firmament of little Europe. The fall of the Mendès-France 
administration on 6 February 1955 followed by the emergence of a new cabinet under the 
leadership of Edgar Faure ushered in a period that seemed to enable a “Relance Européenne”. 
In the new French cabinet “the anti-European (i.e. anti-integration) Gaullist element was 
considerably weaker.” Instead, with Antoine Pinay appointed as Minister of Foreign Affairs 
and Robert Schuman as Minister of Justice, the pro-European M.R.P. now held important 
posts, which contributed to “a new optimism characterized by a resurgence of pro-integration 
hopes and expectations.”74  
Since September 1954, Jean Monnet – the godfather of the Schuman Plan and the EDC – 
had been working on a new blueprint to get the derailed process of European integration 
back on track. In the process, he closely cooperated with the Belgian Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Paul Henri Spaak who notified his Benelux colleagues in March 1955 about their 
evolving ideas. Their plans were based on relaunching European integration through a 
supranational sectoral approach focused on expanding the supranational powers of the ECSC 
to the energy and transport sectors combined with the creation of a new, distinct High 
Authority for the production of atomic energy for civil purposes. While Beyen supported the 
supranational approach he was not happy with Monnet’s sectoral methodology. Instead, he 
wanted to use the opportunity to revamp his own plan for horizontal economic integration on 
a supranational basis and to propose the creation of a Benelux initiative aimed at the creation 
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of a Western European Economic Union. If necessary, this initiative could be combined with 
Monnet’s plans.75  
Ernst van der Beugel, however, did not share Beyen’s optimism. In response to Beyen’s 
intentions to resurrect his original plan Van der Beugel had asked his close advisor Jaap 
Kymmell to review the “original ideas of the Beyen Plan”. The result of this exercise reminded 
Van der Beugel of how “correct” as well as “ambitious” this original plan had been. “At the 
relaunch of these plans, we cannot completely close our eyes to the central question whether 
they make a truly realistic chance in Europe today” he subsequently wrote to Beyen.76 In fact, 
Van der Beugel was convinced that this question had to be answered negatively. He believed 
that on the short term the ideas voiced in the Beyen Plan would not only be unacceptable to 
France, but to all five partner countries. As he explained to Beyen:  
I belong indeed to the pessimists who do not believe that a reduction of tariffs, 
combined with the idea of a fund and coupled to certain necessary harmonization 
measures belongs to the realm of reality. I have no concrete evidence to support 
this, but when we look at the Benelux and when we look further at the 
conversation concerning European integration that we have been conducting all 
the time, I believe that there is more reason for this pessimism than to hope for 
the possibility of realization.77  
Instead, Van der Beugel made clear that, considering the circumstances, he actually regarded 
Jean Monnet’s proposal for an expansion of the ECSC as the only realistic option in the short 
term. While Van der Beugel underlined that he shared Beyen’s general objections against the 
sectoral approach, he suggested to be careful with the assumption that supranational 
cooperation in certain sectors would probably never lead to general supranational 
cooperation, saying it “could very well turn out to the only slow but realistic way.” In contrast, 
he believed that in the foreseeable future Beyen’s plan could only lead to “an excessively 
lengthy study.”78 Kymmell and Van der Beugel were not the only ones to draw this 
conclusion. The entire top leadership of the department of Foreign Affairs opposed Beyen’s 
initiative, including the highest official Secretary General Tuyll van Serooskerken as well as the 
Director General for Political Affairs Eschauzier, but it was Van der Beugel who led the pack in 
their opposition.  
Beyen, however, was not amused by Van der Beugel’s initiative to submit his original 
plan to a critical internal examination, nor by the unsolicited advice that resulted from the 
review. A week later he responded in a very businesslike memorandum concluding that if 
things were up to Kymmell and Van der Beugel it would be certain that nothing would happen 
with regards to European integration. Beyen suspected them of rejecting continental 
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supranational integration in favor of intergovernmental integration within the framework of 
the OEEC, as Stikker had originally tried. This was also the suspicion of two devout Europeans 
at the department concerned with the matter, Director of Western Cooperation Theo Bot and 
the Chief of the Bureau for European Integration Charles Rutten, both of whom backed 
Beyen’s plan and turned themselves against Van der Beugel’s memorandum. Their direct 
superior, however, was Director General Eschauzier who agreed with Van der Beugel.79 Beyen 
claimed not to have any illusions concerning the feasibility of his plan, but argued that “one 
should never stop fighting for the cause of European integration.”80  Van der Beugel 
emphasized that he and Beyen did not disagree about the desired form of integration, 
claiming that he too perceived supranational integration as the only possibility, but that he 
did not see “how the ultimate objective, on which you and we do not differ of opinion, can be 
achieved on the short term.” According to Beyen it was “more than the methodology”; their 
differences involved their “basic attitudes and understanding.”81  
Ernst van der Beugel forwarded his correspondence with Beyen to Tjarda van 
Starkenborgh Stachouwer, the Dutch Ambassador to the North Atlantic Council and the OEEC 
in Paris “because it is necessary that one knows in Paris how the ideas are developing”. After 
explicating his own stance once more, Van der Beugel concluded that “it is for Tuyll, 
Eschauzier and myself, who completely agree on this matter, rather annoying that our ideas 
encounter such great resistance from the Minister.” Even so, he had explained to Beyen, that 
he considered it as the task of civil servants to express internally what was on their minds, but 
that Beyen would eventually be the one who determined the policy to which they would 
“direct themselves with good humor and energy.”82 Thus, Van der Beugel once more 
experienced the limitations of his room for maneuver as a government official bound by the 
department’s administrative discipline and directed himself to his minister’s orders. In his 
memoirs, Beyen recalled how very fortunate he had been with the fact that, with regards to 
his European policy, his senior executives Van der Beugel and Eschauzier “exerted 
themselves with me for the goal I pursued – even though they were not all as 
convinced as I was.”83  
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Despite these differences of opinion, Ernst van der Beugel continued to play a key role 
in the coordination of Beyen’s European policy, which despite Van der Beugel’s pessimism, 
quickly reaped an unexpected but far reaching success.84 At the Messina Conference in June 
1955, the Benelux countries introduced a memorandum, which tied the plans of an atomic 
energy community to the idea of a Common Market. Against all expectations this move led to 
the establishment of a committee, which would work out the ideas put forward in the 
memorandum under the leadership of the Belgian minister of foreign affairs Paul-Henri 
Spaak. 85  As it turned out, the Messina Conference paved the way for the Treaties of Rome, 
which would establish EUROTOM and the Common Market. “We have all been mistaken”, 
Van der Beugel exclaimed after the Messina Conference, “Who would have thought that the 
French would be willing to trade a customs union for the bomb?”86 While Beyen’s ideas 
became key tenets of the Rome treaties, and thus of the process of European integration, the 
1956 Dutch elections prevented the foreign minister from personally overseeing the 
negotiations concerning these treaties.  
After the elections of June 1956, the construction with two Dutch Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs was abandoned. Instead, it was decided that the Minister of Foreign Affairs would be 
assisted by a deputy. Next to serving as a general substitute to the Minister, this new Deputy 
Minister of Foreign Affairs – also referred to as ‘State Secretary of Foreign Affairs’ – would 
specifically be charged with matters concerning European integration. After long negotiations 
about the cabinet formation, Joseph Luns was eventually appointed as the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs in October 1956. But, to the chagrin of Catholic Party leader Romme, he found no 
suitable candidate for the position of Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs within his own 
Catholic Party. Instead, Luns desired this position to be fulfilled by Ernst van der Beugel whom 
he had known since his student years and in whom he had great faith. In fact, Luns had 
already asked Van der Beugel to become his State Secretary at an earlier, rather premature 
stage but Van der Beugel had not shown any interest in this political position.87 This time, 
however, both Joseph Luns and Prime-Minister Drees were committed to convince Van der 
Beugel to accept.  
The PvdA faction in parliament was less enthusiastic. As faction leader Jaap Burger 
explained, “whether rightly so or not” Ernst van der Beugel had “acquired a reputation of 
being an inhibiting, if not an antagonistic factor with regard to European integration.”88 
Consequently, due to Van der Beugel’s alleged “anti-European predisposition” the party 
preferred a more outspoken European, like Conny Patijn or Jan Meijer. Drees had replied to 
similar accusations by telling Burger that at least Van der Beugel didn’t give in to Burger’s – by 
now pro-European – faction so easily. Burger was furious about this comment, which 
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obviously only served as grist to the mill of his objections and only strengthened the faction 
leader’s suspicion towards Van der Beugel’s European sympathies.89   
It soon turned out that the fact that Prime Minister Drees had nominated Van der 
Beugel for this position had been an important reason in itself for the faction to distrust Van 
der Beugel’s stance on European integration. As a result of Drees’ enthusiasm, Van der Beugel 
was regarded as a “Drees boy” and as a result party members who did not know him very well 
now projected the Prime Minister’s views on European integration onto Ernst van der 
Beugel.90 While they definitely shared a certain degree of skepticism towards the ongoing 
process of European integration and a mistrust of French designs, Drees’s cynicism was of a 
more dogmatic nature than Van der Beugel’s hesitancy, which was rather driven by a more 
detached pragmatic realism combined with a somewhat sentimental attachment to United 
States. With regard to the institutional debates raging in Europe, for example, Van der Beugel 
did not share Drees’ aversion to supranationalism. Even so, Van der Beugel had clearly 
become part of a power struggle between Prime Minister Drees and faction leader Burger 
that was played out above his head.91 
Faced with this lack of trust, Van der Beugel informed Luns and Drees that he could not 
accept their offer. Drees, however, was furious about the interference of his own party’s 
faction leader and would not give up his fight. On November 22, the prime minister 
telephoned Van der Beugel with the announcement that the PvdA faction had withdrawn its 
objections. When Van der Beugel tried to explain that he needed some time to think about 
this rather unexpected turn of events, Drees became angry and told him that turning down 
the position was not an option.92 The prime minister had completely committed himself to 
the case and after his confrontation with Burger a rejection by Van der Beugel would be 
“politically unacceptable”.93  The next day Van der Beugel’s appointment had already reached 
the press.94  
State Secretary: the Road to Rome 
As State Secretary Ernst van der Beugel became responsible for matters of foreign affairs 
concerning European integration and transatlantic policy. In this capacity he oversaw Dutch 
policy in the run op to the Rome Treaties and conducted the negotiations concerning a British 
proposal to establish a Free Trade Area encompassing not just the six Common Market 
countries, but the entire OEEC.  In the process, the distrust that Ernst van der Beugel had 
started to develop towards the European and Atlantic intentions of the Gaullists during the 
events surrounding the EDC fiasco would only grow stronger. What is more, he again felt 
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restricted in his pursuit of what he perceived to be the Dutch national interest as a result of 
American insistence on a speedy integration process. As it turns out, this pressure – as well as 
a great deal of the pressure he came to face from within the Dutch parliament – could be 
traced back to the influence of non-state actors behind the scenes of transatlantic diplomacy 
including Jean Monnet and his dear friend Max Kohnstamm. 
During the negotiations about the Common Market the Dutch once again found 
themselves at loggerheads with the French on basically all the issues they cared most about. 
Whereas the Dutch desired an open community with a low external customs tariff, the French 
aimed for the opposite. While the Dutch believed social harmonization should not be a 
condition for the implementation of the Common Market, the French believed it should. In 
addition, the Dutch had come to manifest themselves as staunch advocates of a supranational 
structure for the Common Market – partly to make sure that (especially French) political 
forces could be kept at bay while safeguarding the free market. In fact, the Dutch council of 
ministers had unanimously decided that the Dutch should withdraw itself from the Europe of 
the Six if too few responsibilities would be transferred to the supranational commission, since 
in that case the Europe of the six would not be that different from the more Atlantic oriented, 
but intergovernmental OEEC, as Van der Beugel had also argued in the past.95  
The recurrent difficulties with the French function as a key leitmotif in the diary that 
Ernst van der Beugel kept during his stint as Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs. His notes 
clearly demonstrate his growing frustration and resentment towards the French, who 
allegedly acted “scandalous”96 during the negotiations in the Spaak Committee. Van der 
Beugel constantly had the feeling that they were all being spoofed by the French “and the 
entire French-infiltrated secretariat.”97 Already during his first month in office he felt the 
Dutch were getting increasingly isolated. As he became convinced that Spaak just wanted to 
push the treaties through, that the French aimed for this as well in order to secure their 
privileged position while Italy acted like “Europe’s prostitute”, Van der Beugel reported that 
the negotiations filled him with ever increasing concern, even keeping him awake at night.98 
Meanwhile on the home front the fourth Drees cabinet was divided between a group of 
deeply devoted European idealists, including  Agriculture minister Sicco Mansholt, Justice 
minister Ivo Samkalden and the minister for Social Work Marga Klompé on the one hand, and 
more skeptical Europeans including Drees, Luns and Van der Beugel on the other hand. This 
could be a challenge in itself, but what complicated matters even more for Ernst van der 
Beugel was that most Europeans in the Dutch cabinet as well as in parliament had close ties 
to Jean Monnet and his recently established private pressure group for European integration, 
the Action Committee for a United States of Europe.  
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After handing over the presidency of the High Authority in June, 1955 Jean Monnet had 
established a highly effective lobby-group to promote and revive the process of European 
integration after the failure of the EDC.99 Through so-called “resolutions” leading 
parliamentarians and trade-unionists committed themselves to the goals of the Action 
Committee, making it an influential multinational lobby. With the exclusion of the extreme 
left and right, members from almost all political parties were connected to the Action 
Committee; enabling Jean Monnet to mobilize broad support for the process of European 
integration as he envisioned it.100  Ernst van der Beugel was deeply impressed – as well as 
annoyed – by the power Monnet was able to assert as a private agent in the political-
diplomatic arena, which at times severely limited the freedom of action he as a government 
representative had in executing Dutch European policy. “As soon as the Action Committee 
agreed on a certain issue or line of action, the governments were, in view of the composition 
of the Monnet group, confronted with a solid front, the attitude of which they were forced to 
take into account”, Van der Beugel recalled. “If for instance, the Netherlands Government 
took a position during the negotiations, which in the eyes of Monnet was detrimental to the 
outcome, the Dutch members of the group were mobilized to put pressure on the 
Netherlands Government to yield a point or to take action or initiatives which, by itself, it 
would not have undertaken. This, sometimes, severely limited the possibilities of negotiation 
for the governments and it often subjected them to a force which did not originate in the 
political life of their own countries.”101   
This experience with Monnet also proved to be an important lesson to Van der Beugel 
on the power of informal transnational networks and private individuals to influence 
international policy and negotiations. It made him realize how “one individual from a foreign 
country can influence leading statesmen and officials of a very powerful and in many aspects 
decisive nation.” While it would be hard to measure his “great and permanent influence” 
exactly, Van der Beugel observed that “the history of American policy towards the process of 
European unification cannot (…) be explained without recognition of Monnet’s influence on 
the formulation of that policy.” 102 Thus, Van der Beugel – inspired by his personal experience 
– himself also subscribed to one of the key tenets of New Diplomatic History, namely that one 
does not need to be formally employed by a government to be a significant, even dominant, 
player on the diplomatic playing field.  
While Monnet had a superb European network, Van der Beugel was most impressed by 
the Frenchman’s strong bonds with influentials in Washington both within the Democratic 
and the Republican parties. These connections providing Monnet with access to the American 
decision-making establishment and enabled him to mobilize the American diplomatic 
machinery “to remove the many obstacles on the road to final and concrete results of the 
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negotiations, leading to the Treaties of Rome.” If Monnet believed a particular country caused 
the negotiations to run into difficulties he immediately alerted his American contacts who 
made sure that “the American diplomatic representative in that country approached the 
Foreign Ministry in order to communicate the opinion of the American government which, in 
practically all cases, coincided with Monnet’s point of view.”103 Thus, Van der Beugel 
concluded, “Monnet and his Action Committee were unofficially supervising the 
negotiations.” What annoyed Van der Beugel most about this situation was the fact that 
“Monnet was so obsessed by the necessity of obtaining concrete results that he and his 
Committee tended to lend a willing ear to the most difficult partner in the negotiations – 
France. Thereby, it often lost its indispensable objectivity and sometimes, unwillingly, became 
an instrument of French demands and negotiating positions.”104 At times this gave the more 
cautious Europeans in The Hague the feeling that they were seated “not in the Dutch, but in 
the French Cabinet.”105 Van der Beugel deeply deplored that his more dogmatic colleagues, 
blinded by their passion for European integration, at times came to disregard the Dutch 
national interest in the process. 
In the end, however, Van der Beugel was relieved when the negotiations were 
completed. “The treaties are not very pretty”, he wrote in his diary.  “I’m very skeptical 
towards their implementation, but it is a political necessity, which, relatively speaking, has not 
ended badly for us.”106 The result of these negotiations, as Van der Beugel saw it, was above 
all a very French treaty. By acting like the most difficult party at the negotiation table 
combined with the rush of the more dévoué Europeans like Spaak and Monnet’s Action 
Committee’s efforts via the European parliaments and the American diplomatic machinery to 
push the treaties through as fast as possible, the French had been able to leave a much 
greater mark on the treaty with regards to their institutional as well as their economic views 
than any other partner.107  While the Rome treaties had been more French in character than 
Van der Beugel would have liked, he had great hopes that now these treaties had been 
signed, negotiations would follow about a British plan to connect the six countries of the 
newly established European Economic Community to the rest of the OEEC countries by means 
of an industrial Free Trade Area.  
Hope and disillusionment: the Free Trade Area and Charles de Gaulle 
Following the presentation of the ‘Spaak Report’ in the summer of 1956, the English – 
observing that the process of European integration that had suddenly been revamped in 
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Messina seemed to take off without them, thus leading to the creation of a rival continental 
European economic block – submitted a proposal in the OEEC to study the feasibility of an 
association between the six Common Market countries and the rest of the OEEC in the form 
of an industrial Free Trade Area. While Van der Beugel considered it of the utmost 
importance to create a close association with the UK and the other OEEC countries, he 
believed the UK would not get on board unless they would be confronted with a ‘fait 
accompli’ in the form of the Rome Treaties. Meanwhile, he believed it was of great 
importance to follow the very ‘promising’ developments in UK closely and even to take these 
developments into consideration during the negotiations on the road to the Rome treaties.108  
During the fall of 1957, after the treaties of Rome had been signed, the feasibility of the 
British proposal for a Free Trade Area (FTA) in manufactured goods only (so excluding 
agriculture) was considered by a committee set up by the OEEC under the chairmanship of 
the British Paymaster General Reginald Maudling.109 On August 29, 1957 Van der Beugel met 
Maudling for the first time during a visit in The Hague where the Englishman left an ‘excellent’ 
first impression on Van der Beugel for whom the FTA negotiations would be the first big 
multilateral negotiations that he had to lead himself. From the start of the discussions in 
October 1957, Van der Beugel had the impression that the Dutch and the Germans were on 
the same page concerning the feasibility of the English plans as both German Foreign Minister 
Heinrich von Brentano and the German top diplomat Walter Hallstein, who in January 1958 
became the first president of the European Commission, had been very positive. In the Dutch 
council of ministers, however, Van der Beugel encountered similar problems as he had done 
during the negotiations for the Rome treaties: this time characterized by strong resistance 
against the Free Trade Area that he traced back to Jean Monnet’s Action Committee.110  
What worried Van der Beugel even more, however, was the political crisis that unfolded 
in France as a result of the May 13 Algiers putsch, which had its origins in a demonstration in 
Algiers against the formation of Pierre Pflimlin’s new government after Plimlin had declared 
to be in favor of negotiations with the Front de la Libération Nationale (FLN) in the Algerian 
War. The coup was perpetrated by French civilians and military personnel trying to impose a 
policy change in favor of French Algeria and brought France on the brink of a civil war.111 
During a secret cabinet level meeting of the EEC on May 19, 1958, Maurice Faure sketched a 
deeply depressing image of the situation in France which ended with the remark that if the 
Christian Democratic prime minister Pierre Pflimlin would not succeed in uniting the France of 
Algiers with the France of Paris, General de Gaulle would move into power within ten days. “If 
de Gaulle comes to power in France, I envision the phantom image of an anti-NATO politics of 
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the French government combined with a soothing attitude towards the Six in order to use the 
Six an instrument of French power politics. An unacceptable situation”, Van der Beugel wrote 
in his diary. “I have the same feeling in my stomach as in ‘33. I believe it is going to be de 
Gaulle, but that means, that rebelling generals can send an, in this case rotten, but still 
democratic regime home. The situation is just as serious as it was in 1933.” During the days 
that followed Van der Beugel slept poorly and “thought of nothing but Paris.” He could not 
stand the people who believed de Gaulle would be a good solution. “It is better than a 
Popular Front” he concluded, “but it is the bankruptcy of much that is dear to us.”112  
When a few weeks later de Gaulle did indeed come to power in France Van der Beugel 
was deeply concerned about the consequences this would have for the negotiations 
concerning the Free Trade Area – not without reason as would become clear later on.113 In 
July, Van der Beugel still had the feeling that the French understood how isolated they were 
in their rejection of the Free Trade Area, but it was all downhill from that moment on.  Back 
home in the Netherlands, a conflict unfolded between Van der Beugel and Monnet adept 
Sicco Mansholt concerning the exclusion of agricultural policy in the British plans for a Free 
Trade Area, which created a rift within the Dutch government on the issue. In September, it 
became clear that the Germans – who Van der Beugel had considered as his main allies in the 
negotiations – had completely aligned themselves with the French position. Meanwhile, the 
Belgians were useless according to Van der Beugel and the Italians “sold themselves to the 
highest bidder.” As it turned out, not the French but the Dutch found themselves isolated in 
their enthusiasm for the FTA – a situation that filled Van der Beugel with grave concern.114 On 
9 October, 1958 Max Kohnstamm reported in his diary that Van der Beugel was so somber 
about the negotiations that he no longer believed the FTA would be achievable.115 During a 
big press conference on 20 October 1958 Van der Beugel shared his concerns with the Dutch 
and international press. A week later he was again deeply dismayed by the French attitude. 
“The way in which they treated us, defies any description”, Van der Beugel wrote. “While the 
meetings took place in Paris, no French minister showed up.” The only positive element was 
that the Germans finally found out that they had been deceived by the French. “They 
exploded in the most literal sense of the word.” While this appeared to be all very ‘amusing’ 
Van der Beugel argued that amusement did not help the negotiations one step further. In 
fact, the situation was so grave that Van der Beugel suggested during a lunch with Stikker and 
Maudling that the only way the FTA could still be saved might be a meeting between De 
Gaulle, Adenauer and MacMillan. “This is not just about the Free Trade Area, but it is much 
more about the life of the Six themselves. Things cannot go on like this”, Van der Beugel 
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wrote in his diary. “We cannot form a community on the conditions of a country that 
preaches sheer protectionism.”116 
Ernst der Beugel spent most of November in the United States, where he complained 
about the impasse in the FTA negotiations as a result of the French attitude and beseeched 
the Americans to intervene. During a conversation with undersecretary of state Herter he 
argued “that the future of the OEEC depended on these negotiations and that the OEEC was 
after all their baby.”117 In fact, the “political consequences of a split between the EEC and the 
rest of the OEEC countries” could be so great, he argued that it would “endanger much of the 
accomplishments of the postwar period, including NATO.” At the same time, he “doubted 
that a restrictionist EEC could long survive.” 118 Van der Beugel also expressed concerns about 
the consequences of the negotiations for French-German relations, an issue the U.S. cared 
deeply about.  While great progress had been made, he “feared that the French were pushing 
the Germans too hard”.  Since an inward-looking Common Market was contrary to German 
interests Van der Beugel was afraid that this would eventually backfire if the French forced 
German acquiescence in this respect, which might cause German industrial leaders to rebel 
“with potentially dangerous consequences to French-German relations.” He told Herter that 
the Dutch government believed that “the most efficacious American role in the EEC-FTA 
problem might be found in an attempt to influence the Chancellor to take a fairly strong line 
with the French in respect to the need for a liberal oriented Common Market.” He claimed to 
understand American “caution in respect to intervening in the current dispute – also 
considering the fact that the ‘ghost of the EDC’ could still be sensed in the Department’s 
halls” but maintained that the “the friends of trade liberalism within the EEC were in rather 
desperate need of assistance.”119 In the end, it would all be to no avail as the Americans did 
not intervene and Charles de Gaulle unilaterally rejected the Free Trade Area.  
Shortly after Van der Beugel returned from the United States the fourth Drees cabinet 
collapsed after which Van der Beugel accepted a temporary position enabling him to continue 
his role in the failing negotiations concerning the relationship between the Common Market 
countries and the rest of the OEEC. After a clash between the French and the English on the 
16th of December Van der Beugel concluded that the “breach is complete.” Europe was 
heading towards months of serious crises with regard to the economic cooperation filled with 
more “sabotage” by the French. A “deeply depressing” situation, Van der Beugel observed. 
“Seldom I have seen the situation for our country with regards to European integration as 
somber as in these weeks.”120    
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 Now that the formal negotiations had reached a deadlock, the unofficial Atlantic elite 
mobilized in an attempt to mediate the crisis that had emerged in the FTA negotiations in a 
more informal atmosphere. To this end, Ernst van der Beugel and other key individuals 
involved in the official negotiations were invited by Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands – the 
spouse of Queen Juliana – to attend a special ad-hoc Bilderberg Meeting on “the present 
state of negotiations regarding the EEC and the Free Trade Area.” 121  The meeting took place 
at “Hotel de Bilderberg” in Oosterbeek – the same venue as where the very first Bilderberg 
conference had been organized in a private attempt to mediate growing transatlantic 
tensions in 1954.122 For the purposes of the 1959 meeting, the hotel had been “entirely taken 
over for the meeting” from noon on Saturday January 17 until noon on Monday, January 
19.123  
Ernst van der Beugel was positively impressed by the meeting, in particular by the high 
level of both the discussions and the participants.124 In a report he prepared for Foreign 
Minister Luns, he described the debates as “very candid and more informal than is possible in 
official meetings.” As a result they also “had the advantage of making the positions even 
more clear than they had become during the last couple of months.”125  The verbatim report 
of the meeting shows that Van der Beugel actively participated in the debates. He used the 
opportunity, for example, to bring up tensions within the group of six Common Market 
countries, a point he introduced by stressing that he was going to bring up “a rather delicate 
subject, which can be discussed in this group, and which cannot be discussed in more official 
gatherings.”126 After the meeting Van der Beugel wrote in his diary that he had not only 
actively participated in the discussions, but also “introduced some controversial subjects – to 
the visible delight of the Prince”, whom he obviously had tried to impress.127  On a personal 
level, the Bilderberg weekend also helped to intensify Van der Beugel’s contact with his 
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German colleague Müller-Armack. They agreed to keep each other informed about any new 
developments in the future.128 
What is more, the open discussions at the Bilderberg meeting played a crucial role in the 
confirmation of Van der Beugel’s already strong suspicions concerning French ambitions with 
regards to European integration under De Gaulle. The ‘clearer’ impressions with which Van 
der Beugel left the meeting filled him with the “the greatest possible concern.”  As he 
informed Luns afterwards, during the candid discussions at the Bilderberg meeting it had 
been confirmed that France “attached itself to the Europe of the Six, not because it wants 
integration, but because it wants to attain the leadership of this group. Villiers and Aron, who 
are both close to the government, have left absolutely no room for misunderstanding on 
this.” While this idea was not new, Van der Beugel noted that it had received a new impetus 
with the election of De Gaulle. With regards to the situation in France, he furthermore 
observed that all “political life underneath de Gaulle has ceased to exist” arguing that France 
had become an “absolute monarchy, but without the mistresses.” Considering the serious 
nature of this situation Van der Beugel hoped to meet up soon with Luns to discuss these 
problems personally arguing that a “Europe of the Six as an instrument of French domination 
would be completely unacceptable.”129 Thus, while Van der Beugel considered the Bilderberg 
discussions very useful and illuminating, with regards to the FTA negotiations they had above 
all confirmed beyond a doubt that “the French would not be prepared to accept a free trade 
zone, even if all their requirements were met.”130 
A few days later Van der Beugel had a ‘heart to heart’ talk with European Commission 
president Hallstein at his home in The Hague during which Van der Beugel shared his gloomy 
thoughts as well as his criticism on the German’s policy in the ‘most explicit terms’. The talk 
revealed to Van der Beugel the depth of the differences in their thinking about Europe.  “He is 
a supporter of the theory that the marché commun is and should be a precursor of the 
political integration of the Six. As a consequence of that position he does not want to 
endanger this process in any way. I do not believe in political integration with the France of de 
Gaulle and consequently my main priority is for the Six to operate as the driving force behind 
a deeper cooperation in a larger Europe.”131 With the OEEC negotiations in a deadlock, Van 
der Beugel had started preparations for a new quest, this time focused on an attempt to 
enlarge the marché commun, starting with the U.K., but this too had been to no avail. After all 
the frustrations he had experienced with the French first during the negotiations about the 
European Defense Community, followed by the Rome Treaties and now the Free Trade 
Association, the arrival of Charles de Gaulle on the European scene was the real game 
changer for Van der Beugel’s attitude towards the process of European integration. “All my 
instincts rise up against the treatment we need to put up with and against the life-threatening 
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instincts that are in the process of gaining the upper hand. We are becoming an instrument of 
French politics which is totally disastrous.” Rumors that de Gaulle wanted to retreat the 
French Mediterranean fleet from the NATO-command, an act Van der Beugel regarded as “an 
existential deterioration of Western policy”132 fed his worries even more. The experiences of 
these last months not only affected Van der Beugel’s views on European integration and 
transatlantic relations, but also deepened the rift in thinking between him and his 
Europeanist friends, including Max Kohnstamm. “Max remains a sweet and intimate friend”, 
Van der Beugel wrote in the spring of 1959, “the most difficult thing, however, is that 
gradually we have come to disagree very fundamentally about the European issue. He is the 
dreamy idealist, deeply impressed by Monnet, and during these last couple of months I have 
become deeply disillusioned and extremely skeptical towards the entire venture.”133  
As he was about to leave the Dutch government in May 1959, Van der Beugel shared his 
disappointment in and disillusionment with the process of European integration as it had 
unfolded in a couple of speeches that received a great deal of attention in the Dutch media, 
summing up his views on Dutch European and Atlantic policy as they had crystallized during 
his career in public service. The time for sweet idealistic dreams about European integration 
had ended, he declared. The expectations with which the Netherlands had entered the 
process of European integration had not materialized. First of all, they had expected that the 
EEC would be followed by a free trade zone, which never materialized – especially as a result 
of French resistance. Secondly, they had expected that German economic liberalism would 
function as a counterweight to French protectionism, but in reality political forces had 
rendered the expected balance impossible and a French-German axis had developed in ‘Little 
Europe’ instead. Thirdly, the Dutch had expected that the European Commission would also 
stand up for the interests of the little countries, but here too, everything revolved around the 
French-German axis. It was now time the Netherlands pursued its own interests, in this 
pursuit solidarity with the United States should be the main priority. It would be a big 
mistake, according to Van der Beugel, if the European countries would think that they could 
pursue their own plans, independently form the United States.134  
Conclusion: an Atlanticist European 
As a result of the close links between the Marshall Plan and European integration, Ernst van 
der Beugel became closely involved in the process of European integration. While he had 
enthusiastically embraced the Schuman Plan in 1950, he became more skeptical as the 
integration process unfolded. In debates between Atlanticists and Europeanists, Van der 
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Beugel clearly belonged to the Atlanticist camp. This did not mean, however, that he was anti-
European integration.  
When a journalist of the Rotterdammer newspaper informed the Belgian Prime Minister 
Paul Henri Spaak about the controversy surrounding Ernst van der Beugel’s appointment as 
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs caused by his alleged anti-European attitude, Spaak acted 
surprised, saying that he considered such critical doubts incomprehensible and praised Van 
der Beugel as an “excellent European”. Obviously, the standard of what makes an “excellent 
European” partly depends on the eyes of the beholder. In the eyes of fervent Europeanists 
like Max Kohnstamm, Conny Patijn, Charles Rutten or Theo Bot Van der Beugel’s European 
faith was weighed and found wanting. While Ernst van der Beugel was not against European 
integration he lacked the ideological fervor of more fanatic Europeans. His approach, in 
contrast, reflected the more detached and pragmatic realism that prevailed at the Dutch 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but it would be a severe oversimplification to conclude from this 
that he was anti-European. The debates between Europeanists and Atlanticists did not 
revolve around the question “European integration or no European integration?” There was a 
basic consensus about the necessity of European integration in general. The disputes that 
arose mainly concerned the form and purpose of this integration.  
Van der Beugel’s hesitancy towards speedy European integration was determined by a 
different, more restrictive, understanding of what kinds of integration would be desirable. In 
contrast to the Europeanists, Van der Beugel did not perceive European integration as an end 
in and of itself, but as a means to enhance the Dutch national interest. On an economic level, 
this meant a form of European integration that limited protectionism and facilitated free 
trade in an open economic community – a desire that the Dutch shared with the United 
Kingdom and the United States, but which was rather unpopular in France. Overall, Van der 
Beugel took a rather pragmatic approach to the institutional debates about supranationalism 
vs. intergovernmentalism and sectoral vs. general integration dictated by his understanding of 
the Dutch national interest in light of the existing circumstances.  If continental integration 
could not be realized on a supranational footing, Van der Beugel preferred a more Atlanticist 
approach, even if that meant that this had to happen in the intergovernmental context of the 
OEEC.  
Of supreme importance in any discussion regarding the direction of European 
integration was the Dutch – and Atlantic – security interest. Ernst van der Beugel’s 
understanding of the ideal Atlantic Community was rooted in a realist stream of Atlanticism, 
which regarded Atlantic unity under strong American leadership as essential for the security 
of the West in the context of the Cold War. Consequently, European integration was always 
meant to play an ancillary role. Since Van der Beugel believed that the security of the 
Netherlands, as well as the security of the entire European continent and Western civilization 
in general, depended completely on Atlantic unity under strong American leadership as 
institutionalized in NATO, he objected to any form of integration that could possibly loosen 
transatlantic ties. Hence, he declared that European integration “may never be seen as an 
109 
 
attempt to close itself off from the rest of the world, but only as an attempt to strengthen the 
European pillar of the Western alliance”, claiming that “our national and personal existence 
depends on it.”135   
From early on Van der Beugel suspected that the Gaullists wanted Europe to pursue a 
course more independent from the United States. A more independent Europe that might 
even be tempted to position itself as a third, neutral power between the Soviet Union on the 
one hand and the United States on the other, was one of his biggest fears. Such a 
disintegration of the nascent Atlantic Community would leave Western Europe weak and 
vulnerable and thus as an easy prey for expansionist Soviet power and influence.  His 
experience of the failure of the European Defense Community, and in particular the role of a 
France that often successfully pursued interests that were diametrically opposed to those of 
the Netherlands by playing the ‘most difficult partner’ card greatly frustrated Van der Beugel 
and made him pessimistic about the direction and possibilities of continental European 
integration along lines that would be in the Dutch national – and Atlantic – interest as he 
perceived it. The subsequent rise of Charles de Gaulle to power, the death stroke he delivered 
to the negotiations about the Free Trade Area and especially his desire to create a Europe 
that would act more independently from the United States was the real game changer for 
Ernst van der Beugel, who regarded this as an utterly unacceptable development. The only 
integration Charles de Gaulle would allow would be detrimental to the Dutch national interest 
and to Atlantic security. In this context, he believed, stagnation was better than progress into 
what he considered as a perilous direction. Consequently, he left the Dutch government 
disappointed and disillusioned with how European integration was unfolding. As a private 
citizen, however, he would be free to express himself as the European Atlanticist he had 
become.  
  After all, this chapter has also demonstrated how in his official position Ernst van der 
Beugel – as any civil servant – had to execute the policy set out by his minister. While the 
Atlantic priority at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had taken root under the leadership of Dirk 
Stikker, his successor, Willem Beyen, pursued a more Europeanist path. In this context Van 
der Beugel’s Atlanticist priority sometimes clashed with his minister’s ideas, revealing a 
certain tension between the formal policy line and his personal convictions, as illustrated for 
example by the Stikker letter or Van der Beugel’s opposition to the relance européenne. Max 
Kohnstamm had experienced similar tensions as a Europeanist working at a predominantly 
Atlanticist Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 1956 he had transferred to the private sector, where 
he could more purely pursue his own European ideals through Jean Monnet’s Action 
Committee.  
 As this chapter has demonstrated, when we adjust our frame of analysis just a little 
bit by adding a transnational layer to it, we gain a more holistic understanding of the 
diplomatic process. By also including the role of private individuals and organizations that 
                                                            
135 “Europa’s integratie is geen streven naar de derde weg”, Trouw, 24 November 1956. 
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were active in the transatlantic diplomatic arena – such as Jean Monnet and his Action 
Committee and the Bilderberg Meetings – it becomes clear that formal diplomacy did not 
take place in a vacuum: there were more stakeholders involved in transatlantic diplomacy 
than just nation states. Their activities were closely connected and all of them were trying to 
contribute to the multidimensional management of the transatlantic relationship.  As Deputy 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ernst van der Beugel witnessed from up close how powerful these 
private actors could be. In fact, as an official government representative he frequently felt 
restricted in his pursuit of what he believed to be the Dutch national interest as a result of 
Monnet’s influence behind the scenes of transatlantic diplomacy. Domestically, Van der 
Beugel had to deal with Monnet’s influence on members of the Dutch parliament who had 
close ties to his Action Committee for a United Europe, but even more important was 
Monnet’s personal influence on the American foreign policy establishment. The American 
pressure on European countries with regards to a speedy European integration, which Van 
der Beugel often regarded as detrimental for the Atlantic relationship could often be traced 
back to the Frenchman’s direct influence within the U.S. State department and diplomatic 
machinery.136 At the same time, he also experienced how an unofficial venture like the 
Bilderberg Meetings could complement the formal transatlantic diplomatic infrastructure by 
offering a meeting place where the different transatlantic stakeholders could speak more 
freely and build relationships of trust in an informal atmosphere. Eventually, Van der Beugel 
himself came to subscribe to a key tenet of New Diplomatic History, arguing in his dissertation 
that “the history of American policy towards the process of European unification cannot (…) 
be explained without recognition of Monnet’s influence on the formulation of that policy.” 137 
While he often disapproved of Monnet’s influence because he believed the Europeanists, 
with their eagerness for a swift integration, indirectly played into the hands of the Gaullists, 
Van der Beugel would take the lessons concerning the informal means and unofficial channels 
used by Monnet to heart. After he had left the Dutch government himself, he took inspiration 
from Monnet convinced that at least part of his modus operandi could also be very well 
applied in the pursuit of Atlanticist goals.138  
                                                            
136 When we add a transnational layer to our analysis of the transatlantic diplomatic process this also further 
complicates more simplistic ideas of passive Europeans undergoing American hegemony as the ideas driving U.S. 
policy also have some more complex transnational roots that include European influences.  
137 Van der Beugel, From Marshall Aid to Atlantic Partnership, 246-247.  
138 See: E.H. van der Beugel to Shepard Stone and Joseph E. Slater, 13 June 1967, box ID#18975, Report#010874, IA-
Joseph E. Slater, Ford Foundation Archive (hereafter “FFA”), Rockefeller Archive Center (RAC). 
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4. Unofficial Ambassador for an Atlantic Community 
In July 1959 Ernst van der Beugel officially left the Dutch government for a position in the 
private sector. Such a transfer might have heralded the final chapter of a more traditional 
account of diplomatic history that limits the study of diplomacy to the nation state and its 
formal representatives. Yet, from the perspective of New Diplomatic History with its emphasis 
on an individual’s diplomatic role and contribution to the diplomatic process instead of his or 
her position in or outside of officialdom, such a transition does not necessarily have to mean 
the end of one’s relevance to diplomatic history. To the contrary, as the following chapters 
will demonstrate: if we decide to keep following Ernst van der Beugel into the private sphere 
it becomes clear that his diplomatic role and his contribution to the diplomatic process did 
not end at all with his move out of officialdom, but continued in an unofficial capacity and 
through informal diplomatic channels. It is not so much his departure from officialdom but 
rather the continuation of his role in transatlantic diplomacy that is most striking. 
Consequently, while the next three chapters will primarily zoom in on what this diplomatic 
role entailed by focusing on three case studies concerning Van der Beugel’s unofficial 
diplomatic efforts in the light of perceived challenges to the transatlantic relationship, this 
chapter will focus on his transition to the private sector and identify key factors that enabled 
the continuation of his role in transatlantic diplomacy after he formally left the Dutch 
government.1  
Statesman without Office 
The fall of the fourth Drees cabinet on 11 December 1958 came as “quite a shock” to Ernst 
van der Beugel.2  He handed in his notice of resignation together with the other PvdA Cabinet 
members and was unexpectedly forced to reconsider his future. “The following day I started 
to realize what it meant to be without a job and without an alternative”, Van der Beugel 
wrote in his diary on December 12. “It is as if all the securities outside of the personal sphere 
suddenly fall away and thoughts about the future control the day.”3 He experienced the 
following days as a crisis period in which he felt confronted with a “rather definitive choice” 
                                                            
1 Parts of this chapter also appeared in: Albertine Bloemendal, “Between Dinner Table and Formal Diplomacy: Ernst 
van der Beugel as an Unofficial Diplomat for an Atlantic Community”, New Global Studies, 8:1 (2014): 103-119.  
2 EvdB/Kersten Oral History Interview, file 61-66, EvdB, NAH, p. 252: “Het was natuurlijk volkomen onverwachts. En 
het was voor mij dus niet het einde van twee jaar staatssecretariaat, maar het was het einde van alles wat ik tot nu 
toe gedaan had vanaf 1945. Dat is ‘quite a shock’.”; Foreign Service Dispatch, “Views of Dr. Ernst H. van der Beugel, 
Former Secretary of State, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on Dutch Political Situation”, 30 December, 1958, RG59, F482, 
Roll 6 (“Department of State Decimal File 1954-1959”), RSC:  "Dr. Van der Beugel said that when the Cabinet decided 
to ask Finance Minister Hofstra to put the Parliament proposal for a two-year extension of certain temporary tax 
measures, it had no idea that it would be provoking a Cabinet crisis.” 
3 E.H. van der Beugel, “Dagboek van een Staatssecretaris”, file 1, EvdB, p. 195 (translation mine). 
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which he had preferred to avoid for a long time to come.4 He did not worry much about losing 
his political position as Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, but the prospect of leaving the 
department and the insecurity he experienced concerning his future fell heavy on him. 
During the days and weeks that followed, Van der Beugel received several job offers. 
Rumors about an appointment as Government Commissioner for European Integration 
reached the Dutch embassy in Washington DC, but these were soon debunked by Van der 
Beugel.  “I have come to the conclusion that I should not again occupy a position similar to 
the one I had before I became Deputy Foreign Minister, whether this would mean occupying 
the chair of Director General or becoming Government Commissioner”, he explained to 
ambassador van Roijen. “One should only return to an old chair, when one is inwardly 
convinced that one will remain seated on it for a fairly long period, and I certainly lack that 
inward conviction. As a result I would consider it indecent to take upon me anything but a 
temporary position.”5 Consequently, Van der Beugel informed Joseph Luns that he did not 
desire to return to his old position at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs because he considered 
this to be “improper.”6  Even so, the choice did not come easy and Van der Beugel told Luns 
he would very much appreciate a periode transitoire. This way, he would not have to break 
with his work at the department instantaneously – he was after all still immersed in the 
negotiations concerning the Free Trade Area – and it would offer him a basis from which he 
could decide what his next move would be. Thus, on Van der Beugel’s request, Luns created 
an interim position for him as Special Advisor of the Minister of Foreign Affairs with the title 
of Ambassador in which he would “remain in his present office” and “continue to speak for 
Holland in negotiations over the Free Trade Area and other such European problems.” He 
would start on January 1, 1959 “with it known that he may move to other fields of activity 
within the next year or two.”7 
While Van der Beugel was still figuring out what path to take he confided to ambassador 
van Roijen that he was certain about a few things he did not want to do. PvdA leader Jaap 
Burger had offered him a seat in the Second Chamber,8 but Van der Beugel had no desire to 
remain in the political spotlight. When he had just been appointed as Deputy Foreign Minister 
he had written in his diary that he was not “wired” to be a politician because he considered 
himself too vulnerable and too objective for this. His experience as Deputy Foreign Minister 
had only confirmed this. Hence, he did not want to return to a prominent political position – 
now less than ever, in fact, because he feared a radicalization within the PvdA. “Like you, I still 
                                                            
4 E.H. van der Beugel to J.H. van Roijen, 23 December 1958, file 45, J.H. van Roijen Papers (hereafter “van Roijen 
Papers”), NAH (translation mine). 
5 Ibid. 
6 “Dagboek van een Staatssecretaris”, 196 (translation mine). 
7 “Views of Dr. Ernst H. van der Beugel”, 30 December, 1958, RG59, F482, Roll 6 (Department of State Decimal File 
1954-1959), RSC; “Dagboek van een Staatssecretaris”, 199. 
8 “Dagboek van een Staatssecretaris”, 202; “Views of Dr. Ernst H. van der Beugel”, 30 December, 1958: “He had been 
offered a seat in the Second Chamber, and has refused it. He had been offered the job of ‘Commissioner for Europe” 
in the Foreign Office – a position now not existing, but with proto-types in the Commissioner for Indonesia, Mr. Blom, 
and the unfulfilled Commissioner for Germany. He has refused that assignment as well, arguing that it would be 
improper for him to accept such an assignment with mental reservations over how long he would stay in it”.  
113 
 
completely support the broad spiritual background of the Labor Party, but I cannot declare 
my solidarity to many points of practical politics,” he explained to van Roijen. Considering 
these circumstances, Van der Beugel believed it would be best to stay on as a member of the 
PvdA in an effort “to exert a moderating influence” on the party from behind the scenes.9  
The alternative options he considered were a position in the Foreign Service and a 
switch to the private sector. Since no position in the Foreign Service was available in which 
Van der Beugel would feel both “happy and satisfied” and because he considered it 
“incorrect” to do something with his special training that others could do just as well or even 
better, the road ahead seemed to lead more and more into the direction of the private 
sector.10 Van Roijen was disappointed to hear this and, stressing his diplomatic value, 
disagreed with Van der Beugel’s argumentation against taking a job in the Foreign Service: 
With regards to ‘the future’ I continue to think that it would be a great loss for our 
national interest if you would move to the corporate sector. I am convinced that 
sooner or later a post will open up in the Foreign Service in which you, as well as 
Miekje, shall find full satisfaction. As a man of the trade, I say this with some 
diffidence, but objectively I will have to conclude that at the moment there are few 
individuals in the Foreign Service who have shown to serve our country with as 
much dedication, but especially also with as much understanding and insight as 
you have.11  
Nevertheless, this was the direction Van der Beugel was gravitating towards. As a result of his 
experience during the Marshall Plan and the close cooperation with the private sector during 
that period combined with his father’s contacts in the financial and corporate world, Van der 
Beugel was well connected in private circles. Now that he could no longer turn to his father, 
who had passed away in 1953, one of the first people Ernst van der Beugel turned to for 
advice concerning his future was another important individual from his past: Hans Max 
Hirschfeld, with whom Van der Beugel had remained very close. Hirschfeld had already made 
the transfer to the private sector right after the completion of his work for the Marshall Plan 
in 1952. With him, Van der Beugel discussed possibilities for a future at the Rotterdamsche 
Bank, where Hirschfeld had started his career and where he was now a member of the Board 
of Supervisors, as well as the pros and cons of joining KLM Royal Dutch Airlines following a 
request by KLM president Aler to join the company as his possible successor.12  
 
                                                            
9  E.H. van der Beugel to J.H. van Roijen, 23 december 1958, file 45, van Roijen Papers. 
10 Ibid. 
11 J.H. van Roijen to E.H. van der Beugel, 6 January, 1959, file 45, van Roijen Papers (translation mine).  
12 Hirschfeld had collected no less than eighteen positions on prominent Supervisory Boards after he left the Dutch 
government; “Dagboek van een Staatssecretaris”, 196; Meindert Fennema and John Rhijnsburger, Hans Max 




Ernst van der Beugel was no stranger to the KLM leadership. The Flying Dutchman had been a 
major recipient of American aid during the Marshall Plan years. In 1953, Van der Beugel had 
also been part of a committee appointed to study the Plesman Plan – a postwar proposal that 
focused on international cooperation in the execution and finance of grand infrastructural 
projects championed by aviation pioneer and legendary KLM-founder Albert Plesman. When 
Fons Aler replaced Plesman in 1954 Ernst van der Beugel sent him a personal note to 
congratulate him.13  
During his career at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Van der Beugel had also become 
acquainted with Prince Bernhard von Lippe-Biesterfeld, the German-born spouse of Queen 
Juliana of the Netherlands. The prince, who had obtained his pilot license in England during 
the Second World War, was an avid aviation enthusiast and a member of the Board of 
Supervisors at KLM.14 After the war, Prince Bernhard had been appointed as Inspector-
General of the Dutch armed forces and had established himself as a goodwill-ambassador of 
Dutch business interests abroad. When Van der Beugel still worked at the Marshall Plan 
Bureau, the prince would occasionally contact him to discuss informal meetings he had 
conducted with top officials in the United States and issues close to his heart, such as the off-
shore possibilities for the Dutch ammunition industry in the U.S. or NATO plans for a 
collective production program for the aviation industry. Their relationship further intensified 
during Van der Beugel’s stint as Deputy Foreign Minister when formalities made him a 
recurrent guest at Soestdijk Palace, the residence of the Dutch Queen and the prince 
consort.15 Even more important, however, was Van der Beugel’s leadership of the Dutch 
delegation during the 1957 landing rights negotiations for KLM in the United States.   
The acquisition of landing rights for KLM in the United States had been a recurring 
theme in Dutch-American relations since the Second World War, which caused a considerable 
amount of bilateral friction.  KLM not only played a crucial role in the Dutch economy and in 
the post-war recovery of the Netherlands, but as the oldest airline in the world and carrier of 
the Dutch flag KLM was a vital source of pride for the Dutch – especially after the Netherlands 
had to let go of its lost empire in the East Indies.16  
                                                            
13 E.H. van der Beugel to I.A. Aler, 30 March 1954, EvdB, 35; EvdB/Kersten Oral History, 409. 
14 Gerard Aalders, Het Lockheed Schandaal (Amsterdam: Boom, 2011), 140-144. 
15 See for example: E.H. van der Beugel to T and M, 20 March 1956, file 5, EvdB; “Verslag bezoek aan Prins Bernhard”, 
file 5, EvdB; EvdB/Kersen Oral History, p.388: “Ik heb natuurlijk veel met hem te maken gehad in functie. Als 
staatssecretaris en vooral in die militaire zaak ook, zag je elkaar. Hij kwam toen ook wel bij me. Ik kwam natuurlijk bij 
de koningin in functie, maar ik kwam ook wel bij hem een borrel drinken in die tijd. Toen is de KLM gekomen, waar hij 
commissaris was en waar ik heel veel met hem te maken heb gehad.”  
16 Giles Scott-Smith and David J. Snyder, “A Test of Sentiments: Civil Aviation, Alliance Politics, and the KLM Challenge 
in Dutch-American Relations”, Diplomatic History 37: 5 (2013): 921; Marc Dierikx, “’Een spel zonder kaarten’: KLM-
landingsrechten als nationaal belang, 1945-1957” in Jaarboek Buitenlandse Zaken: Derde Jaarboek voor de 
geschiedenis van de Nederlandse buitenlandse politiek, ed. D.A. Hellema, C. Wiebes, B. Zeeman,  (Den Haag: Sdu, 
1997): 11-25; S.C. Labadie, “’Desert for dessert’ De onderhandelingen tot het afsluiten van de 
luchtvaartovereenkomst van 3 april 1957 tussen Nederland en de Verenigde Staten van Amerika” (masters thesis, VU 
University Amsterdam, 2000): 20-25. 
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As one of the leading European airlines the ‘Flying Dutchman’ had wanted to expand its 
services in the United States after the war but the Americans were reluctant to grant them 
the necessary landing rights. Whereas the Dutch strongly favored freedom of the air, which 
offered the only way for such a small country to endure international competition, they soon 
found out that their American partners merely paid lip service to this idea. In practice the 
Americans pursued more protectionist policies based on bilateral agreements on a quid pro 
quo basis. With only one significant airport in the country, this left the Dutch with little to 
bargain with – except for their political loyalty as a faithful transatlantic ally in the Cold War. 
The U.S. State department was relatively sympathetic to Dutch landing rights requests as a 
means to reward a loyal Cold War ally with access to American airports, but they faced strong 
opposition from domestic airlines who saw KLM as a strong rival with whom they did not 
desire to compete on their home turf. The U.S. aviation industry was well organized and 
skillfully linked their own commercial interests to Cold War fears and security interests while 
lobbying Congress. After all, aviation was regarded as an industry that did not only have 
economic, but also military-strategic significance. As a result, in the absence of a real treaty 
the Dutch only received a series of temporary landing rights agreements during the first post-
war decade. In the Netherlands, the American reluctance to successfully negotiate a real 
treaty was interpreted as unfriendly and unthankful behavior by the Americans towards one 
of its most loyal allies, hurting not only Dutch pride, but also the bilateral relationship.17  
In the spring of 1956, with the expiration of the temporary permits in sight, the Dutch 
started to put pressure on the United States to resolve the landing rights dispute. The 
importance attached to this issue by the Dutch was underlined by the fact that Queen Juliana 
explicitly mentioned the matter in her annual speech to the Dutch parliament, beseeching the 
Americans to take the ‘reasonable Dutch demands’ into consideration. Prime minister Drees 
furthermore sent a personal letter to President Eisenhower to emphasize the importance of 
the matter and the Dutch cabinet postponed the ratification of a proposed Treaty of 
Friendship and Commerce between the Netherlands and the United States, which had been 
on the table since 1948, and in which Ernst van der Beugel had also invested much time 
during his days at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.18 The ‘reasonable Dutch demands’ 
mentioned by the Queen consisted of the replacement of the temporary arrangement by a 
standard civil air agreement and an expansion of KLM’s service to the United States with 
three new flights: they wanted access to Los Angeles, Houston and a route including 
Amsterdam-New York-Curacao. The importance attached to these negotiations in the 
Netherlands did not go unnoticed in the United States. “Rarely have instruments of both the 
Cabinet and Parliament gone to such lengths in public to achieve what would seem to 
outsiders to be a fairly limited objective”, a New York Times journalist observed shortly before 
                                                            
17 Labadie, “Desert for dessert”: 25-30; Scott-Smith and Snyder, “A Test of Sentiments”, 920-922. 
18 “Dagboek van een Staatssecretaris”, 25; “A Test of Sentiments”, 922-930; “Memorandum to the President 
concerning U.S.-Netherlands Civil Aviation Negotiations, March 14, 1957, box 1, Chronological File – March 1957 (2), 
Christian A. Herter Papers, Eisenhower Presidential Library (EPL); “Troonrede 18 september 1956”, last accessed 7 
December, 2016. http://www.troonredes.nl/troonrede-18-september-1956/ 
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the negotiations were finally reopened in the spring of 1957. What is more, “the importance 
the Netherlands attaches to the discussion” was also reflected, the journalist noted, “by the 
fact that her delegation will be led by the second man in the Foreign Ministry, Dr. E.H. van der 
Beugel, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs.”19 
Ernst van der Beugel was not very eager about this appointment at first. The subject was 
not really his ‘thing’ and even though he “liked the opportunity to spend some time in the 
U.S.”, he believed that there was “little honor to be gained” with this task. “It will be difficult”, 
he wrote in his diary on 23 February, “and I don’t think we will get it.” Once he got involved, 
however, he became a passionate champion for KLM landing rights in the U.S. and very 
critical of the American attitude in this context.20   
The negotiations were indeed difficult as expected. They were also followed with an 
exceptional high degree of attention in the Dutch parliament and press, a fact about which 
Van der Beugel, who turned out to be a tough negotiator, frequently reminded his American 
counterparts.  At some point, the Americans were willing to accept the demand for a civil air 
agreement including the expansion of landing rights for Houston and New York, but argued 
that they had to solve a conflict in Congress before they could discuss Los Angeles. This 
infuriated Van der Beugel, who in turn suggested breaking off the talks completely and told 
the American delegation that he considered any deal excluding the West Coast as “unjust, 
discriminatory and dishonorable”.21 In a letter, explaining this position to Foreign minister 
Luns, Van der Beugel argued that the West Coast was so essential that he would rather leave 
Washington “quarrelling” than without landing rights to Los Angeles. He regarded the 
exclusion of the West Coast – for which comparable European airlines like Lufthansa, BOAC 
and SAS had received landing rights – as extremely discriminatory and argued that it would 
severely impair KLM’s standing in the world by relegating it to being a “second rate” airline 
for the foreseeable future.22 Not just KLM’s future, but the Dutch national interest – not to 
mention Dutch pride – were at stake here. With the Dutch delegation threatening to walk out 
on the negotiations, President Eisenhower was informed and a crisis meeting was set up with 
the American Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in which Van der Beugel repeated his 
position, backed by both KLM and the Dutch cabinet.23 In the end, however, he received 
instructions from the Dutch government to accept the deal offered to him by the Americans – 
without Los Angeles. They had decided that the far–reaching political consequences of a 
Dutch ‘no’ would be too grave.  
While the American refusal to grant KLM access to the West Coast received a “sharply 
critical” response in the Netherlands, Van der Beugel’s efforts were very much appreciated – 
                                                            
19 Walter H. Waggoner, “Dutch put Hopes in U.S. Air Talks: Stake National Pride on Plea for Expanded Rights”, New 
York Times, 11 March, 1957, 46. 
20 “Dagboek van een Staatssecretaris”, 13. 
21 E.H. van der Beugel to J.M.A.H. Luns and W. Drees, 27 March 1957, file 3, EvdB. 
22 E.H. van der Beugel to J.M.A.H. Luns, 22 March, 1957, file 3, EvdB; E.H. van der Beugel to J.Algera (Minister of 
Transportation), 26 March 1957, file 3, EvdB.   
23 Codebericht 3687, E.H. van der Beugel to J.M.A.H. Luns, 29 March 1957, file 3, EvdB.  
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by the Dutch government and by the public at large as demonstrated by the massive coverage 
of the event in the Dutch media.24 In the years that followed Van der Beugel regularly openly 
criticized the United States on this point. After all, the American position – which he found 
hypocritical and unfair – not only hurt the Dutch national interest, but also undermined the 
transatlantic relationship. To Van der Beugel’s frustration, the civil aviation dispute would 
remain a major source of friction in Dutch-American relations for at least two more decades. 
Van der Beugel’s role in this narrative would also continue, albeit in different capacities.  
Ernst van der Beugel’s efforts on behalf of the Flying Dutchman in the United States 
were also greatly appreciated among the airline’s leadership. About a week before the fall of 
the Drees cabinet, KLM president Aler approached Van der Beugel to probe his interests in a 
career at KLM in the event that he might have to leave his position as Deputy Minister 
prematurely. Van der Beugel told him that if such a thing were to happen he would earnestly 
consider any serious proposal. This was not the first time that Van der Beugel was offered a 
job at KLM. Prior to the 1956 Cabinet forming negotiations – and thus prior to his negotiations 
on behalf of KLM in the United States – Van der Beugel had already been offered a 
directorship at KLM, which he had declined.25 Since then circumstances had changed, 
however, and so had the job offer. As it turned out, the Flying Dutchman was experiencing 
some turbulence while entering the jet age resulting, among other things, from the 
acquisition of a series of new aircraft and the Board of Supervisors believed it would be good 
to blow some fresh air through the airline’s leadership. Moreover, in December 1958 KLM 
president Fons Aler announced that he had decided to step down as president once he would 
reach retirement age in May 1961. As a result, the KLM leadership was looking for a capable 
successor. 26   
In the meantime, Ernst van der Beugel’s relationship to KLM had changed somewhat as 
well. While he had originally considered the landing rights matter a boring business, he had 
come to take a personal interest in the airline. In April 1958 he wrote a letter to Prime-
Minister Drees in which he expressed “grave worries” about the direction KLM was taking – a 
move he explained to the Prime-Minister by saying that KLM had received “a special place” in 
his heart since the landing rights negotiations he had conducted for them in the United 
States.27  His experience as a participant in these negotiations proved to be especially 
valuable now that the Board of Supervisors had come to the conclusion “that the increasingly 
complex world of international aviation required a new type of leadership in which patience, 
tact, diplomacy and familiarity with the field of international relations – traits through which 
neither Plesman nor Aler had distinguished themselves – would be a necessity.”28  Thus, Van 
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der Beugel’s diplomatic skills were regarded as an important asset, which should help him, in 
the words of Time Magazine, “to steer the world's fourth-largest international airline deftly 
through the financial perils of the jet age.”29  
After some weeks of negotiations, during which he wanted to make sure that he would 
enter KLM not just as vice-president but as the certain successor of Aler,  Van der Beugel 
decided to take the leap to the private sector and joined KLM.30 While he mentioned on 
different occasions that he considered this a difficult decision, because it meant the end of 
fifteen years of work for the Dutch government which he had done with great enthusiasm 
and dedication and in which he had put “much of his heart”31, Van der Beugel mentioned 
repeatedly that, in contrast, his choice for KLM was a purely rational one:  
It is a decision that I take with my mind and not with my heart. With my mind, 
because I do not want a political gamble, even though I am perfectly happy in my 
current position, even without the State Secretariat, but I am of the opinion that 
rationally this is the best moment to cut this line. If I say ‘no’ again, I will have 
become the man who has decided at the moment in which they wanted him to 
stay employed with the government. That is both for my career and for my 
finances too big a risk.32   
Transition and Continuity 
Thus, on May 25, 1959 Ernst van der Beugel left the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs to join 
KLM Dutch Royal Airlines as its Vice-President.33 While this transition to the private sector 
may at first sight appear as a fundamental break with his career as a diplomat, reality proved 
to be more complex. The end of Van der Beugel’s official career at the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs did, in fact, not mean the end of his involvement in transatlantic relations. Instead, his 
experience as a formal diplomat rather served as a kind of springboard to a more diffuse and 
free-from approach to transatlantic diplomacy.  
During his career at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and through his work for the 
Marshall Plan, Ernst van der Beugel had developed an extensive social network that reached 
all over the Atlantic Community. Hence, he was very well connected, he had earned a good 
deal of trust and credibility, and he was seen by many as an authoritative expert in the field of 
European integration and transatlantic affairs whose consultation was sought after regularly. 
On December 2, 1959, for example – just a few months after he had left the Dutch 
government – Ernst van der Beugel was invited by the Council on Foreign Relations in New 
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119 
 
York to talk about “issues in the Common Market” at a private and off-the-record round table 
meeting in his honor attended by “a group of men widely experienced in United States 
foreign economic policy and the European economy.”34 During the meeting, Van der Beugel 
voiced his worries about recent developments concerning the process of European 
integration. “While a look at the Common Market at this juncture may have given one the 
impression that it had been a success”, Van der Beugel expressed “serious apprehensions” 
and informed his audience about his “impression of failure” ensuing from the fact that the 
organization of the Common Market had resulted in a split in Europe between the ‘inner six’ 
Common Market countries and the ‘outer seven’ EFTA countries. Thus, he argued, “the 
Common Market rather runs counter to the movement of cohesion of Western countries – is 
a step away from it.”35 Van der Beugel specifically shared his disapproval of America’s role in 
this development, criticizing its Common Market-focused policy at the expense of a broader 
Free Trade Area including Great Britain and beseeched the American foreign policy 
establishment to put pressure on the European countries of the “six” and the “seven” to 
come together and to pursue its “former policy aims of European cooperation in OEEC and 
NATO in favor of greater Western cohesion.”36 On a more positive note, he also used the 
opportunity to express his admiration for the Council on Foreign Relations and his hopes “that 
Europeans will create a similar organization of statesman without office.”37 Many more 
similar visits and exhortations would follow during the ensuing decades. 
As mentioned in chapter two, the Council on Foreign Relations was one of the central 
meeting places of the unofficial foreign policy elite in the United States, often referred to as 
the ‘East Coast establishment’ with which Ernst van der Beugel had been closely associated 
since the Marshall Plan. Back home in the Netherlands, he also remained an eminent member 
of the informal Dutch foreign policy establishment and served as vice-chairman of one of its 
key organizations: the Netherlands Institute for Foreign Affairs.38 In addition to that, Van der 
Beugel did not only stay closely involved in the Dutch Labor Party, trying to influence its 
course from behind the scenes, he also served as a member of multiple informal advisory 
committee’s consulting the Dutch government on issues involving foreign and security policy, 
including the informal advisory committee with members from the business community that 
Hirschfeld had set up during the Marshall Plan days, which Van der Beugel joined as a private 
member in 1965 and to which he was appointed chairman in 1978. He also served as a 
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member of temporary advisory committees to consult the government on specific issues, 
such as the committee of civil and military experts (1971-1972) also known as the “Van 
Rijckevorsel Committee” and the advisory committee on the European Union (1974-1975) 
that become known as the “Spierenburg Committee”. In the meantime, Van der Beugel 
maintained close contact with his former colleagues at the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and in particular with the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs Joseph Luns, who continued to 
serve as Foreign Minister until 1971 when he was appointed Secretary General of NATO – a 
position he would hold until 1984, offering Van der Beugel direct access to the highest 
echelons of NATO leadership.  In addition, he also remained closely in touch with his 
international diplomatic and political acquaintances, thus ensuring access to formal decision-
making establishments throughout the Atlantic Community.   
Ernst van der Beugel’s extensive web of contacts, combined with the trust and 
credibility he had earned through the years, made him a well-informed and valuable source of 
information and offered a useful backchannel for informal communication. When he acquired 
intelligence he considered significant, he wrote reports comparable to the diplomatic 
dispatches he used to write while still a government official, which he distributed to 
whomever he deemed valuable. In September 1960, for example, he wrote a letter to Joseph 
Luns and the Secretary General of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs Baron Tuyll van 
Serooskerken, to inform them about a conversation he had had in London with the British 
Labor politician Denis Healey concerning changes in the British attitude toward the Common 
Market and the recent visit of the British Prime Minister MacMillan to German Chancellor 
Adenauer.39 He also frequently briefed his American contacts about the latest developments 
in Europe and after visits to the US State Department he wrote “confidential memoranda” 
about conversations with American politicians and diplomats like George Ball, Bob Schaetzel 
and Henry Owen which he distributed within his network including formal diplomats like the 
Dutch ambassador in Washington, Herman van Roijen, who remained a close friend of Ernst 
van der Beugel.40  
The Unofficial Atlantic Community 
The continuation of Van der Beugel’s role in transatlantic diplomacy was also greatly 
facilitated by the existence of the unofficial transatlantic sphere mentioned in the 
introduction of this dissertation. A great part of the social fabric at the heart of the unofficial 
post-war Atlantic Community found its origins in the intense cooperation between Americans 
and Europeans during World War II, the Marshall Plan and the formation of NATO during 
which many high-level transatlantic friendships developed based on shared experiences and a 
deep sense of common purpose and destiny, which created an important foundation for 
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future cooperation.41  As the Norwegian historian Geir Lundestad argues, “it was obvious that 
the many meetings in the various Atlantic organizations and the establishment of permanent 
bureaucratic structures for these organizations had to encourage the creation of 
transnational elites.”42   
One of the important characteristics of the highly integrated Atlantic elite that 
developed during the post-war decades was that it consisted not only of formal government 
representatives like diplomats and politicians but also included business men, lawyers, 
bankers, philanthropists, journalists and academics.43 “The creation of such elites far from 
ended conflicts among the participating nations, but it must have made the chances of 
resolving conflicts somewhat greater. The effect was significantly heightened by the fact that 
many of these members of these transnational elites had worked together for as long as they 
had under the most challenging circumstances. Huge events such as the Second World War 
and/or the start of the Cold War had to bring the various personalities together, particularly 
since the outcomes of these events were perceived as favorable as they were.”44 The 
Marshall Plan in particular served as a major catalyst of public-private cooperation within the 
emerging Atlantic Community facilitating the development of a diverse yet closely integrated 
Atlantic elite by bringing  Americans with different backgrounds, but many of them belonging 
to the East Coast Establishment,  in close contact with a diverse group of influentials from 
Western-European countries. 
After the Marshall Plan ended, many remained active through the diverse constellation 
of private Atlantic organizations that offered an unofficial transatlantic substructure for 
European and American elites to maintain contact while working on common causes. After 
all, the development of the unofficial post-war Atlantic Community went hand in hand with 
processes of globalization that made it easier for private individuals and groups to play a role 
in international relations. Hence, this period saw the rise of many private groups and 
individuals with various Atlanticist genealogies promoting close transatlantic cooperation.45  
The assemblage of Atlantic NGO’s included, for example, the International Movement for 
Atlantic Union, the Congress of European-American Associations, the Atlantic Treaty 
Organization, the Declaration of Atlantic Unity organization, the U.S. Citizens Commission on 
NATO, the Bilderberg Meetings, the Atlantic-Brücke, Le Cercle, the International Institute for 
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Strategic Studies and the Atlantic Institute.  Many of them served as unofficial meeting places 
for the Atlantic elite. Thus, they not only served as vehicles for Atlanticist inspired action and 
thinking, but also helped to sustain a closely-knit transatlantic elite network.46 Harvard 
professor Charles Maier even writes about the emergence of an Atlantic elite with “semi-
sacral status: Marshal, McCloy, Lovett, Spaak, Monnet, and other ‘wise men’ who exhorted to 
common effort and cooperation (…) transatlantic trips, common foreign policy forums, a 
network of clubby associations for talk and mutual self-regard created in effect a 
transnational ruling group.”47 Thus, next to and at times overlapping the formal transatlantic 
structures, there existed an unofficial realm accommodating private individuals, networks and 
organizations all committed to fostering close transatlantic ties.  
The official and unofficial realms of transatlantic diplomacy did not operate in isolation 
from each other, but were closely linked through unofficial transnational networks and 
converged at informal meeting places, which were all part of one and the same transatlantic 
diplomatic playing field. The unofficial Atlantic Community thus accommodated “a complex 
combination of private initiatives and official encouragement through which a shared 
experience in the war or the immediate after-war years was more important than distinctions 
between State and private groups.”48 While the Atlantic NGO’s at times cooperated with 
nation states in pursuit of common goals we should not disregard the agency of these private 
ventures. As Valérie Aubourg’s research on Bilderberg and the Atlantic Institute has 
demonstrated:  
[I]n neither case do we find a systematic organization of a Cold War waged by 
covert means through these two private institutions. We see rather a more 
nuanced picture of multiple initiatives, rooted in the same conception of culture as 
a crucial tool in transatlantic relations, people who often had a similar experience 
of the war, of the occupation in Germany or of the Marshall Plan. They were 
                                                            
46 Joseph E. Johnson to American Participants in Bilderberg Meetings, 13 July 1962 (“Private Organizations Concerned 
with Atlantic and/or European Unity”), Business Correspondence, J. General Correspondence; Jul-Aug 1962, Christian 
A. Herter Papers, HCL; Kenneth Weisbrode, “The Political and Cultural Underpinnings of Atlanticism’s Crisis in the 
1960s”, in More Atlantic Crossings? European Voices in the Postwar Atlantic Community, GHI Bulletin Supplement 10 
eds. Jan Logemann and Mary Nolan (2014), 53; Weisbrode, The Atlantic Century, 165-169;  David Ellwood, “What 
Winning Stories Teach: The Marshall Plan and Atlanticism as Enduring Narratives,” in Defining the Atlantic 
Community: Culture, Intellectuals, and Policies in the Mid-Twentieth Century, ed. Marco Mariano (New York, 
Routledge, 2010) , 119-123; Valérie Aubourg, “Organizing Atlanticism: the Bilderberg Group and  the Atlantic 
Institute, 1952-1963,” in The Cultural Cold War in Western Europe 1945-1960, eds. Giles Scott-Smith and Hans 
Krabbendam (London, Frank Cass Publishers, 2003), 92-108. 
47 Charles Maier, “Empires or Nations? 1918, 1945, 1989”, in Three Postwar Eras in Comparison: Western Europe 
1918–1945–1989, eds. Carl Levy and Mark Roseman (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 59-60; Qtd. In D.W.Ellwood, “From 
Marshall Plan to Atlanticism: Communication Strategies and Geopolitical Narrarives, ” in European Community, 
Atlantic Community?, ed. Valérie Aubourg, Gérard Bosuat and Giles Scott-Smith (Paris: Soleb, 2008), 53. 
48 Valérie Aubourg, “Organizing Atlanticism: The Bilderberg Group and the Atlantic Institute” in The Cultural Cold War 




convinced that close interaction of European and American elites was key to a 
stable, Atlantic region.49  
It was in the context of this unofficial realm at the heart of the Atlantic Community that Ernst 
van der Beugel was able to carve out a prominent role for himself after he left the Dutch 
government. A pivotal event that facilitated and fortified the continuation of his role in 
transatlantic diplomacy during this time of transition from officialdom to the private sphere 
was his appointment as Honorary Secretary General of the Bilderberg Meetings; one of the 
key Cold War meeting places between formal diplomats and politicians and the broader 
unofficial Atlantic elite and, according to Richardson, Kakabadse and Kakabadse, “the most 
prestigious of all informal transnational networks.”50  
The Bilderberg Meetings 
The Bilderberg conferences came into being during a period of rising transatlantic tensions in 
the early 1950s.  The main goal of the meetings, which were the brain child of the Polish 
champion of the European movement Joseph Retinger, was to maintain Atlantic unity 
through informal off the record conferences where European and American influentials could 
speak freely, ease policy differences and dispel misunderstandings.51 The Bilderberg Meetings 
were thus meant to facilitate the informal exchange of information, the establishment of 
relationships of trust among members of the Atlantic elite, and the strengthening of common 
values and beliefs, while also serving as a “safety valve for dissent and conflicting views within 
the pluralistic community of the West.”52 The meetings took three days, offering the 
attendees plenty of opportunities to bond, and thus to foster a very concrete sense of 
transatlantic community among the elite. Participants were seen as “Atlantic community 
leaders”, drawn from government and military circles, the worlds of business, law and 
finance, philanthropy, academia and the media, or in the words of the American honorary 
secretary general of the Bilderberg Meetings, Joseph E. Johnson, “a trans-national cross-
section of people who are directly or indirectly influential in policy making and the leadership 
of public opinion.”53 
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As described in the previous chapter, Ernst van der Beugel attended his first Bilderberg 
meeting in January 1959, when he was still employed as special advisor to the Dutch Minister 
of Foreign Affairs. This meeting was not a normal Bilderberg Meeting, but a so-called 
“enlarged steering committee meeting”, a more ad-hoc get-together than the general 
conferences set up to discuss a specific crisis situation – in this case the deadlock in the FTA 
negotiations – with a select group of thirty one high-level participants.54  That same year, Van 
der Beugel, who by now had left the Dutch government to join KLM as vice-president, was 
also invited to the ‘normal’ Bilderberg Meeting in Yesilkoy, Turkey on September 18-19.55 
What is more, Prince Bernhard had also invited him to the Steering Committee meeting that 
took place during that same weekend. It was at this meeting that Bilderberg founder Joseph 
Retinger announced to resign as Secretary General after which the prince proposed to 
appoint Ernst van der Beugel as Retinger’s successor. Despite the fact that Van der Beugel 
was rather new to Bilderberg this proposal was hailed with “unanimous approval” by the rest 
of the Steering Committee. Ernst van der Beugel accepted and it was decided that he would 
“officially assume his functions as Honorary Secretary General of the European Group on the 
first of January, 1960.”56    
According to the Danish historian Ingeborg Philipsen, the 1959-1960 change of was a 
“real turning point” for Bilderberg as a permanent organization. One of the key reasons for 
this was that Van der Beugel’s relationship with the Americans was “much more harmonious 
than Retinger’s had been.”57  The beginning of the Bilderberg conferences had in fact been a 
bit rusty. The Americans had initially not been very keen to respond to Retinger’s initiative, 
partly because they simply did not trust him. During the Second World War, Retinger had 
cooperated with the British intelligence services and according to Thomas Gijswijt his “actions 
had aroused suspicions in Washington intelligence circles.” The prominent American 
Bilderberger Charles Douglas Jackson, an expert on psychological warfare who had served in 
the Office of Strategic Services during World War II, in fact suspected that he was a British 
secret agent. While they failed to establish a definite connection between Retinger and the 
British Secret Service, suspicions within the American group never really disappeared.58 
In December 1959, shortly after it had been decided that Ernst van der Beugel would 
succeed Retinger, the Secretary-General to be made a trip to New York where American 
Steering Committee member Jack Heinz – CEO of the Heinz food processing company – 
organized a dinner in his honor, giving Van der Beugel the “privilege to have much contact 
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with the members of the American group, individually as well as collectively.”59 During this 
stay it turned out that the replacement of Retinger could not have happened soon enough. 
“They rejoice in the final termination of the operations of the London secretariat”, Van der 
Beugel wrote in a report to Prince Bernhard. Even so, it turned out that the Americans were 
still worried about the continuation of certain activities by Retinger’s assistant John Pomian, 
whose position had not been discussed at the Steering Committee meeting in Turkey.  
Ernst van der Beugel and Prince Bernhard had decided that it would be best to move the 
Bilderberg secretariat from London to The Hague and to replace Pomian by the former Dutch 
diplomat Arnold Lamping, who had just ended his formal diplomatic career in May 1959 as 
the Dutch ambassador in Bonn.60  This idea was “well received” by the Americans.61  How 
urgent the replacement matter actually from the perspective of the American Bilderbergers 
became especially clear when Pomian sent out the invitations for a meeting of the Advisory 
Committee to be held on the 30th of January 1960.  After the American Steering Committee 
members found out that these invitations had still been sent out by Pomian, American 
Secretary General Joe Johnson sent an urgent telex to Van der Beugel saying that the 
Americans had understood Pomian would be out by the first of January. “We did not know of 
any plan to continue him for three months. I believe that if his status during that period is any 
more than a consultative one we will lose senior American co-chairman,”62 Johnson stated.  
The senior American co-chairman was the earlier mentioned C.D. Jackson. Van der Beugel, 
who wrote to Prince Bernhard that it struck him that the American group seemed to have 
developed “an allergy for anything that is in any way related to the old Secretariat”63 
immediately tried to take the American worries away by means of a telex with the following 
message: 
Presume that our conversation yesterday dispelled any doubt about position 
Pomian. I repeat Pomian will stop function as from first of January when I, assisted 
by former ambassador Lamping will take over. Pomian will be at disposal for 3 
months of Lamping to transfer secretariat and will not even have a consultative 
capacity. In other words the outside world will have no dealings whatsoever with 
Pomian after the first of January. This is an even more definite and clear solution 
than we agreed upon in Istanbul when only Retingers position was arranged and 
Pomians position was still open. Therefore I do not see any reason why these 
definite solutions as to Retinger and Pomians positions should not satisfy our 
American friends.64  
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Thus, Ernst van der Beugel’s succession of Retinger established a new sense of trust between 
the American group and the Europeans within Bilderberg, which greatly strengthened the 
foundation of the venture. On a personal level, Van der Beugel’s position in Bilderberg helped 
him to gather “transnational social capital”; it gave him a new kind of status as an unofficial 
ambassador for Atlantic unity and consolidated his position among the transatlantic elite.65 As 
Secretary General, van der Beugel played a key role in selecting the participants and the 
topics of conversation during the meetings. Thus, he did not only serve as a facilitator of 
informal transatlantic contact but also helped to set the agenda of the unofficial transatlantic 
elite. For the next twenty years Ernst van der Beugel would serve as the driving force behind 
the Bilderberg Meetings, or as Henry Kissinger put it “I considered him for many years as sort 
of the glue that held the group together.”66   
In her dissertation, Ingeborg Philipsen describes Bilderberg as a “diplomatic” initiative.67 
It is important to realize, however, that this was not just a label retrospectively attached to 
the venture by an academic. Those involved in the Bilderberg Meetings also perceived 
themselves as unofficial diplomats; as participants in and contributors to the transatlantic 
diplomatic process and likewise employed the language of diplomacy to describe their own 
activities. As John Pomian, explained to Van der Beugel during the transition of the Bilderberg 
secretariat from London to The Hague: “The principle activity of the [Bilderberg] Secretariat is 
of what might be called, a diplomatic nature. It involves keeping in touch with the members 
of the group, keeping abreast of political developments and in particular of the developments 
of ideas and with the people who are behind them.”68  
Meanwhile, the European Secretariat referred to the members of the Steering 
Committee as “Bilderberg ambassadors” to their respective countries.69 With regard to the 
Bilderberg Meetings, Ernst van der Beugel himself would speak of “our non-official 
international relations,”70 whereas his successor as European Secretary General of the 
Bilderberg Meetings, Victor Halberstadt, also referred to Ernst van der Beugel as a “private 
diplomat”.71 
Ernst der Beugel’s position in Bilderberg gave him a kind of unofficial diplomatic 
standing that transcended his role as an individual actor, while he did not represent a nation 
state, he did represent a valued institute on the transatlantic diplomatic playing field that 
offered a meeting place for the transatlantic elite committed to the transnational pursuit of 
Atlantic Community. The Bilderberg secretariat became Van der Beugel’s unofficial Atlantic 
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headquarters and the meetings a key vehicle in his pursuit of transatlantic unity, as the 
following chapters will demonstrate in more detail.  
Public Voice 
In addition to his activities behind the scenes of transatlantic diplomacy, Ernst van der Beugel 
also did not shy away from publicly speaking his mind – something he often could not do 
while still a formal civil servant. To illustrate this, it is useful to take a closer look at a rather 
outspoken speech he delivered on July 1961 at the Dutch Chamber of Commerce in London. 
In the speech, he fiercely criticized Gaullist France as well as the attitude of the Germans and 
proclaimed in very strong terms that – in order to create a healthy balance of power in 
Europe and to thwart the Gaullist dream to dominate the continent – it was absolutely 
necessary that the English apply for membership of the Common Market. He presented this 
not merely as his personal opinion, but added that “the Netherlands” would very much 
applaud this.72 Present in the audience were many representatives of trade and industry, 
members of the Dutch and British press as well as the Dutch ambassador in London, the 
English ambassador to the Netherlands, the earlier mentioned Labor politician and Bilderberg 
Steering Committee member Denis Healey and the British Minister of Trade Reginald 
Maudling.73 Maudling had represented Great Britain in the negotiations about the Free Trade 
Area and the Common Market and was also a close acquaintance of Van der Beugel through 
the Bilderberg Steering Committee. It was probably no coincidence that on the same day the 
British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan announced that he would soon make a formal 
statement concerning the British relationship to the Common Market.74 A few weeks later the 
United Kingdom officially applied for membership of the Common Market. 
The speech did not go unnoticed in the Netherlands. The initial news coverage of the 
speech was soon followed by a series of editorials in Dutch magazines and newspapers 
discussing the role of private individuals – and in particular Ernst van der Beugel – in 
international relations. How did they respond to this private diplomatic intervention? Some 
editorials called the speech brave, others disassociated themselves from it saying that when 
Van der Beugel spoke of “the Netherlands” he did not speak for them. Many feared that the 
Dutchman’s harsh words about France and Germany might have negative consequences for 
KLM’s relations in those countries, thus indirectly hurting the Dutch national interest.75 
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According to the Volkskrant (a prominent Dutch daily newspaper) Van der Beugel had turned 
himself into the mouthpiece of his former employer: the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.76  
During his speech, Van der Beugel himself had pointed out that now that he was not 
attached to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs any more, he could finally speak freely – a great 
advantage of his newly acquired unofficial capacity. After all, as the preceding chapter also 
demonstrated, as a civil servant he had to conform to the formal position of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and as a Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs he had to comply with the cabinet, 
but now, Van der Beugel argued, he was a free citizen.77  Some found, however, that he had 
no business meddling in international relations as a private individual in the first place – an 
idea that was dismissed as archaic by an editor of the Rotterdamsche Courant: “Here and 
there one still finds traces of the opinion that relations between states are exclusively the 
business of governments”, he observed. “In the middle of the twentieth century, however, we 
must have reached the point where a private citizen can no longer be denied the right to 
make contact with others should he consider it useful, even at the international level.”78 
While there was no clear consensus on who or what Van der Beugel represented or what the 
repercussions of his actions would be, all the editorials took the speech very seriously. By 
doing so, they all seemed to agree that Ernst van der Beugel, even as a private citizen, was a 
serious actor in the diplomatic arena whose actions mattered.  
Diplomats at the American embassy in The Hague seemed to agree with this and kept a 
close eye on Van der Beugel’s activities. They informed their colleagues in Washington when 
they found out that Van der Beugel planned to visit the United States and offered assistance 
in setting up meetings. They also reported on articles he wrote, speeches he delivered and 
meetings they had with him. In a 1964 diplomatic dispatch from the American embassy in The 
Hague he was described as: “Van der Beugel, who is well and favorably known to many 
American officials, holds no official position at the moment, but is at once a leading member 
of the Labor Party and influential in government circles.”79 
A Transatlantic Mediator 
One of the Americans with whom Ernst van der Beugel developed a particularly close 
relationship was Henry Kissinger. They had first met in 1957 when Kissinger was a promising 
junior scholar at Harvard and Van der Beugel served as Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs.80 
They got along right away. Over time their relationship developed into a very close friendship, 
which according to both men resembled a relationship between brothers.81 They kept an 
intensive correspondence, telephoned each other regularly and met often.  
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Their relationship also proved to be useful for diplomatic purposes – especially after Van 
der Beugel had left the Dutch government. In May 1961, for example, Kissinger forwarded a 
letter from his friend outlining Dutch agitation about the ongoing Dutch-American landing 
rights dispute to President Kennedy’s National Security Advisor, Mc. George Bundy. This 
would certainly not be the last time that Van der Beugel appealed to Kissinger in the context 
of KLM’s landing rights negotiations. During the same period, soon after Prime-Minister 
Harold MacMillan’s announcement that Britain wanted to apply for membership of the 
Common Market, Van der Beugel again wrote a long letter to Kissinger; this time outlining his 
ideas concerning the importance of Britain’s inclusion in the Common Market with a strong 
emphasis on the significance of American pressure. “The US should persuade Britain not to try 
to arrange too much beforehand” he told Kissinger, “most of their problems can also be 
solved when being a full member – and they should try to convince the French that it is of the 
greatest political importance that the enlarged Community comes into being and starts 
working as soon as possible.”82 Henry Kissinger, in turn also called upon Ernst van der Beugel 
for aid when he ran into diplomatic difficulties with regard to Europe as will be demonstrated 
in chapter six of this dissertation. 
According to Kissinger, Van der Beugel was still “taken very seriously” within the 
transatlantic diplomatic scene after he had left the Dutch government. Kissinger described 
the Dutchman as “a sort of mediator”, on the one hand “between America and Europe” but 
also “in inter-European disputes” – in particular “between conflicting points of view.”83 These 
conflicting points of view came very clearly to the fore in 1963, when Charles de Gaulle 
vetoed British Membership of the EEC and dragged the Atlantic alliance into an existential 
crisis.84 While this did not surprise Ernst van der Beugel, it did very much upset him. In fact, 
the Gaullist challenge to Atlantic cohesion was an important motivation for Ernst van der 
Beugel to remain active in transatlantic diplomacy – as were other threats to the Atlantic 
Community. He was certainly not the only Atlanticist who had left government service to be 
roused back into action as a private citizen to defend the Atlantic relationship that he had 
helped to build and maintain during the first post-war years. As Kenneth Weisbrode points 
out in his history of the US State Department’s Bureau of European Affairs: 
De Gaulle, by rejecting British admission to the Common Market in 1963, signing a 
separate Franco-German treaty soon thereafter, and withdrawing from the unified 
NATO military command in 1966, seemed to confirm the worst suspicions of the 
Atlanticists about the risks of experimenting with alternative approaches. Into this 
breach, then, they came from their perches outside government to defend the 
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idea of Atlantic Community inherited from the late 1940s and to act as its self-
appointed policy guardian.85 
About a year earlier, in the Spring of 1962, the American diplomat and Atlanticist Theodore 
Achilles, a close friend of Ernst van der Beugel, had even deliberately ended his thirty-year 
career at the U.S. State Department arguing that he could “contribute best toward the 
realization of these goals [such as expanding and deepening Atlantic Community] as a private 
citizen”.86  
Turbulence at KLM 
1963 also happened to be the year in which Ernst van der Beugel left his post at KLM. While 
looking back decades later, Van der Beugel emphasized that his move to KLM had very much 
been motivated by the “glamor” and “sex appeal” of the job, a desire for status, security and 
“to maintain a prestigious position.”87 The glamor wore off rapidly, however, when in January 
1963 he resigned after which he was admitted to a hospital in The Hague suffering from what 
was officially described as ‘exhaustion’. As one clever editor at Time Magazine pointed out, 
however, “the fundamental causes of Van der Beugel’s departure had as much to do with 
KLM’s health as with his own.”88 
While it appeared on the outside that business was going well, the Dutch aviation 
historian Marc Dierikx points out that Van der Beugel had in fact entered a company that was 
preparing for hard times.89  For a large part this was the result of developments that had 
taken place and decisions that had been made before Van der Beugel entered the picture, but 
things certainly did not improve once Van der Beugel took over and crisis kept on following 
upon crisis. Since KLM’s annual figures still remained positive, the seriousness of the situation 
initially remained concealed, but by 1961 – the year in which Van der Beugel succeeded Aler – 
the perilous condition of KLM became awfully clear. Overcapacity, wrong aircraft purchases 
and the very high investments associated with the purchase of DC-8 aircraft together with the 
loss of landing rights in Jakarta in December 1957 combined with the subsequent termination 
of KLM’s cooperation with Garuda airlines in Indonesia in January 1958, drew a trail of 
destruction through KLM’s finances. By 1961 the ensuing crisis was further exacerbated by 
the revaluation of the Dutch guilder that cost KLM about eleven million guilders. Around the 
same time, Schiphol airport introduced a new tax on aircraft fuel that disproportionally 
affected KLM. Meanwhile, KLM’s market share of the crucial transatlantic market dropped 
considerably since the Dutch, despite Van der Beugel’s efforts behind the scenes, were still 
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not able to reach agreement with the Americans on the desired expansion of landing rights in 
the United States.   To make matters worse, two brand-new KLM airplanes crashed in the 
spring of 1961, which did not particularly help KLM’s image. This event also took a high 
emotional toll from Ernst van der Beugel who tried to personally visit the families of each and 
every victim of these disastrous accidents.90    
Ernst van der Beugel personally took the lead in drafting a long turn strategic report to 
turn the tide at KLM. To survive, the airline had to shrink drastically, freeze its production for 
several years while its revenue should be increased considerably, Van der Beugel argued in his 
pessimistic report. The entire operation had to cost up to 1500 jobs.91 While it was clear that 
only radical reorganizations could solve the situation, the KLM leadership was divided. “Such 
financial turbulence made everyone fasten seat belts in KLM’s executive suites,” Time 
Magazine observed. “One group of entrenched, old-line KLM executives argued that despite 
the economic headwinds, the line should just continue to expand and even resume its service 
to Indonesia” while “a more moderate faction” sympathized with Ernst van der Beugel and 
“favored cutting back.”92   
In the end, Van der Beugel was unable to unite his directors behind his plans. Instead of 
a drastic reorganization of the airline, they decided to patch things up by improving the 
financial results though an intensification of their marketing efforts combined with cost 
control. In practice, this meant that no fundamental changes were made. As a result, in 
December 1961 Van der Beugel was forced to turn to the Dutch government for financial 
assistance. The government, which held 71% of the airline’s stocks,93 came to KLM’s aid but 
offered only a temporary solution that did not solve the structural problems that KLM had to 
deal with. Consequently, as “more and more knotty problems piled up on his desk” as more 
fundamental solutions appeared unattainable, Van der Beugel decided to call in outside 
support by asking the American management consulting firm McKinsey & Company for 
advice. The ensuing report was devastating for the KLM directors. They had provided 
inadequate leadership and barely had any hold of the line-organization of the company, 
according to the McKinsey report’s verdict.94 Ernst van der Beugel resigned.   
Looking back on the affair, Van der Beugel acknowledged that he had failed and that he 
should have intervened far more radically.95 More striking though, is the fact that according 
to Van der Beugel the root cause of his malfunctioning could in the end be reduced to a 
simple lack of interest and commitment:  
I found that I was not sufficiently concentrated – not sufficiently committed. I 
actually considered it annoying. Apart from the question whether it was good or 
bad, I found it wearisome. I considered talking and thinking about aviation all day 
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long annoying. And if your heart is not in it, you are not doing things well, 
obviously.96  
 
In contrast, as this chapter has illustrated, Van der Beugel’s heart and interest above all still 
went out to the Atlantic cause and it was during his time at KLM that he discovered how the 
unofficial networks and channels at the heart of the Atlantic Community still allowed him to 
play a role on the transatlantic diplomatic playing field – a role in which he, as a private 
citizen, could speak more freely than as a government servant and in which he could devote 
his energy unambiguously to the causes he believed in. The close transatlantic relations that 
had been established during the post-war period had to be maintained, secured and 
defended – with passion. Consequently, after Ernst van der Beugel left KLM, he decided to 
pursue an even more diffuse existence in which he greatly expanded his unofficial activities in 
transatlantic relations. 
First of all, he wrote a dissertation titled “From Marshall Aid to Atlantic Partnership: 
European Integration as a Concern of American Foreign Policy”, which was published by 
Elsevier in 1966 with a foreword by Henry Kissinger. During that same year, Van der Beugel 
was appointed as “Professor of Western Cooperation after the Second World War” at Leiden 
University. He also regularly visited Harvard University as a guest lecturer. His academic 
position furthermore added to his status as an expert in the field of European integration and 
trans-Atlantic relations and as such he became an active contributor to public debates 
concerning European integration and trans-Atlantic relations. He published numerous articles 
in newspapers and magazines and delivered many speeches in both Europe and the United 
States. Furthermore, he became involved with exchange programs, think tanks and informal 
international relations councils like the Atlantic Institute in France, the International Institute 
for Strategic Studies and the Ditchley Foundation in England and the Council on Foreign 
Relations in the United States as well as with powerful American foundations like the Ford 
Foundation and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, which provided most of the 
funding for private Atlanticist organizations.97 In addition, Van der Beugel started to collect an 
impressive list of directorships in the business sector and the financial world that came to 
serve as his main source of income, enabling him to travel abundantly and to keep up a 
lifestyle that facilitated the kind of private undertakings in pursuit of Atlantic cooperation that 
he was so passionate about.98  
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When Van der Beugel had left the Dutch government he was approached to join the 
board of directors from several companies. When he left KLM the list grew fast – with 
positions not just in the Netherlands, but also abroad. This included a very prestigious 
directorship at the Warburg bank in London, where the renowned Siegfried Warburg had 
initially even asked Van der Beugel to become a partner; a proposition he eventually declined 
in favor of a more diverse and freestyle career that enabled him to stay more involved in 
transatlantic diplomacy. Van der Beugel would later remark that the connections he made 
through Bilderberg had also without any doubt helped in the acquisition of new positions. He 
questioned whether he would have gotten his directorships at Xerox in the United States, 
General Electric in England and Petrofina in Belgium without Bilderberg and he was certain 
that his chairmanship of the renowned International Institute for Strategic Studies in London 
was a direct result of his role in the Bilderberg Meetings.99  He was careful, however, not to 
devote more than half of his time to his growing assortment of directorships that brought in 
most of the money. The other half of his time he wanted to devote to his ‘non-profit 
activities’, most of which were dedicated to fostering and maintaining close transatlantic 
relations. 100 While there is no reason to doubt Ernst van der Beugel’s sincerity in pursuit of 
close transatlantic relations, it is important to keep in mind that the participants of ventures 
like the Bilderberg Meetings were not always and not solely driven by motivations of a 
diplomatic nature, but that there were also other strong incentives such as personal status 
and prestige at play.101 At the same time, Van der Beugel’s personal status and prestige were 
also assets that enabled him to continue to play a role on the transatlantic diplomatic playing 
field even after he had left the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  
Conclusion 
Ernst van der Beugel’s career switch to the private sector was a rational decision based on his 
desire to further his professional career in a way that enabled him to maintain his status and a 
sense of financial security.  At KLM the initial sex appeal soon wore off, however, since his 
heart was not in it. Instead, he was still intellectually and emotionally attached to the process 
of transatlantic diplomacy, which had played a central role in his life since 1947. It was during 
his career at KLM that Van der Beugel carved out a place for himself among the unofficial 
Atlantic elite that enabled him to remain involved in the process of transatlantic relations in a 
private capacity. Despite the fact that he was not a formal diplomat anymore he was still 
taken seriously as a private actor on the diplomatic playing field.  What is more, Ernst van der 
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Beugel and other non-state actors involved in Bilderberg, for example, also took their own 
role in transatlantic diplomacy seriously, describing themselves as “private diplomats” 
engaged in “non-official international relations.” The continuation of Van der Beugel’s 
diplomatic role in a private capacity makes him an interesting subject from the perspective of 
New Diplomatic History. While the following chapters will focus in more detail on what this 
role entailed and how his unofficial activities related to the formal diplomatic process in the 
context of three specific challenges to the transatlantic relationship, this chapter primarily 
focused on the period of transition from officialdom to the unofficial realm of transatlantic 
diplomacy so central to New Diplomatic History. In doing so, it demonstrated that an actor’s 
relevance to the diplomatic process and an actor’s role on the diplomatic playing field is 
determined by more factors than one’s official relationship to a nation-state.  
The endurance of Ernst van der Beugel’s role in transatlantic diplomacy was enabled by 
both personal and external factors that neatly tied into each other. On the personal level, one 
can discern a combination of assets that can be classified in categories of social, intellectual 
and financial capital, which were not only important in and of themselves, but which also 
amplified each other. First of all, with regards to social capital, Ernst van der Beugel possessed 
an extensive network that stretched all over the Atlantic Community. This network consisted 
of influentials from different spheres including journalists, academics, philanthropists, 
lawyers, captains of industry, labor leaders, civil servants and politicians. Due to his track 
record as an official diplomat, Van der Beugel was known and trusted as a professional.  
Above all, his experience as an official diplomat allowed him to maintain a certain insider-
status in an otherwise relatively closed-off world. His professional experience, network, 
expertise and credibility thus offered him access to formal decision making establishments in 
different countries across the Atlantic, in particular in the Netherlands and in the United 
States. Secondly, but closely related to the first, through his career as a formal diplomat Van 
der Beugel had gained a great deal of knowledge and experience that gave him a high level of 
expertise, in particular with regards to the process of European integration and transatlantic 
foreign, security and economic policy. From 1966 onwards Van der Beugel’s position as 
Professor of Western Cooperation at Leiden University reinforced his status as an expert. In 
fact, this position even offered him the ability to create the illusion of objectivity through 
academic detachment. Meanwhile, his ever expanding social network and access to 
influentials across the Atlantic Community provided him with a great amount of valuable 
insider information, which in turn made him an interesting individual to connect with – an 
interlocuteur valable – which consecutively provided the potential to further expand his 
access. Last but not least, his expertise combined with his access to influentials on both sides 
of the Atlantic made him an attractive candidate for consultancy positions and directorships, 
both in the Netherlands and abroad, which subsequently enabled Van der Beugel to finance 
his private activities in pursuit of transatlantic relations.102  
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In addition to these personal assets, the continuation of Van der Beugel’s role in 
transatlantic diplomacy was facilitated by the existence of a closely-knit Atlantic elite, that 
Van der Beugel – through his personal experiences and in particular through his role in the 
Marshall Plan – had almost organically been woven into. The perpetuation of his role in 
transatlantic affairs as a private citizen was also facilitated by processes of globalization that 
made it easier for private individuals, in particular those belonging to the elite, to play a 
greater role in international and transnational relations in general. Within the North Atlantic 
area, these processes went hand in hand with the development of an unofficial Atlantic 
Community, which through a complex constellation of private organizations and initiatives 
next to and at times overlapping the formal structures of transatlantic diplomacy provided 
the infrastructure through which an unofficial transnational elite could operate –  at times 
independently and at times in tandem with formal diplomacy –  in pursuit of Atlantic unity in 
the context of the Cold War. Indeed, it was through his central position in one of the most 
prestigious of these organizations, namely the Bilderberg Meetings, that Ernst van der Beugel 
was able to consolidate a central position among the unofficial Atlantic elite through which he 
could remain a relevant and serious player – with direct access to the formal foreign policy 
establishments – on the transatlantic diplomatic playing field.  
The continuation of his diplomatic role unintentionally seems to have received a 
symbolic twist by the fact that after he left KLM Ernst van der Beugel moved back into the 
very same building at the Smidswater in The Hague that had once served as the nerve center 
of the Marshall Plan bureau established by Hans Max Hirschfeld in 1948. It was this building, 
in which Van der Beugel had already housed the Bilderberg Secretariat in 1960, which from 
1963 onwards became the unofficial headquarters from which he executed his informal 
transatlantic diplomacy in pursuit of Atlantic unity. As the remaining chapters will 
demonstrate, over the years Ernst van der Beugel would be roused into action by multiple 
perceived threats to the strength, cohesion and sustainability of the Atlantic Community that 
he had helped to build. Consequently, the following chapters will more specifically focus on 
Van der Beugel’s unofficial activities in the context of three challenges to Atlantic unity: 1) the 
Gaullist challenge of the 1960’s, 2) the challenge posed by détente, the democratization of 
foreign policy and the changing transatlantic landscape during the late 1960’s and the early 
1970’s and 3) the challenge posed by the rise of a new generation that did not share the 
experiences of the Second World War, the reconstruction of Europe or the beginning of the 




5. The Gaullist Challenge  
Ernst van der Beugel regarded Charles de Gaulle’s dream of an independent continental 
Europe des patries under French leadership as one of his worst nightmares endangering the 
post-war transatlantic relationship that he perceived to be fundamental to the security of 
Western Europe. It did not only threaten the evolution of the transatlantic relationship into a 
full blown Atlantic Community, but he feared it would also make the transatlantic ties that 
had been carefully woven during the preceding decades come apart at the seams. This threat 
to Atlantic unity, which he already perceived during his years as a civil servant, became even 
more pertinent during the early 1960’s and – as mentioned in the preceding chapter – served 
as an important motivation for the continuation of Van der Beugel’s role in transatlantic 
diplomacy in a private capacity. While much has been written on the transatlantic tensions 
caused by Charles de Gaulle during the 1960s, little attention has been paid to the role of the 
unofficial Atlantic elite and private foreign relations councils like the Bilderberg Meetings in 
trying to mediate these tensions.1  
Since the continuation of his role in the diplomatic process is key to what makes Ernst 
van der Beugel an interesting subject from the perspective of New Diplomatic History, this 
chapter will concentrate in more detail on what this ‘diplomatic role’ entailed, specifically in 
the context of the perceived Gaullist challenge to Atlantic unity. What did Van der Beugel try 
to achieve and why and what modus operandi did he apply to these ends? Through which 
channels did he move and what diplomatic tools did he wield as a private citizen? While it is 
clear who or what a formal diplomat represents, namely his or her country and its perceived 
national interest, this is less obvious for actors whose ties to the nation state have been 
severed – if they ever existed at all. Consequently, this also raises the question ‘who or what 
did Ernst van der Beugel represent as a private actor on the diplomatic playing field?’ 
These questions will be at the heart not just of this chapter, but central to all three 
remaining chapters, each one focusing on Van der Beugel’s private activities in response to a 
specific perceived threat to Atlantic unity. In doing so, they will also allow us to reflect on how 
Ernst van der Beugel’s unofficial activities and the networks through which he moved related 
to the formal diplomatic realm, enabling a more holistic understanding of transatlantic 
diplomacy. Thus, true to the calling of New Diplomatic History these chapters will offer a 
more in depth exploration and analysis of the process and machinery of transatlantic 
                                                            
1An excellent exception is the dissertation by Thomas Gijswijt, who does pay attention to the way in which the 
Bilderberg Meetings tried to deal with the Gaullist challenge. This chapter will offer new insight into the way in which 
the Bilderberg Meetings were used to address this challenge by incorporating different archival material, including 
newly released documents from the official Bilderberg Archive that shine new light on the role of the Bilderberg 
Secretariat and their attempts to manage the tensions following Charles de Gaulle’s 1963 press conference. In 
addition, it places these Bilderberg Meetings in a broader context of unofficial efforts to counter the Gaullist 
challenge. See: Gijswijt, “Uniting the West”, 243-278. For an overview of scholarly works on the Gaullist challenge to 




diplomacy with a focus on Ernst van der Beugel and the unofficial realm from which he 
operated. In doing so, they will demonstrate that an individual’s ‘diplomatic role’ can better 
be determined by what our subjects do and how and why they do this than by where they sit 
in or out of officialdom.  
Atlantic Crisis: A Nightmare Come True 
“My nightmare of three years has come true”, Ernst van der Beugel wrote to Henry Kissinger 
after President Charles de Gaulle’s renowned press conference of January 14, 1963 had 
plunged both the EEC and the Atlantic alliance into a severe crisis. “How I long to talk to you. 
From time to time I have the feeling that you and I at our first meeting in the Golf Club in 
Wassenaar were practically the only human beings who saw what was coming.”2 
While Ernst van der Beugel had been terribly worried about Charles de Gaulle’s rise to 
power since the 1950’s, things seemed to look quite promising for the Atlantic alliance around 
1960. The Western world had made a transition through the Marshall Plan, OEEC, EEC and 
NATO from a loose group of competing and quarreling nation states into a structured system 
of cooperation and interdependence that, from Van der Beugel’s perspective, served as the 
foundation of an evolving Atlantic Community in the context of the Cold War. In July 1961 
Britain had applied for membership of the EEC and – following the signing of the American 
Trade Expansion Act, which, according to Van der Beugel was meant to usher in “a new 
chapter in the evolution of the Atlantic Community”3 – President Kennedy introduced the 
concept of an Atlantic Partnership as part of his Grand Design for Western Europe. To be 
more precise, after declaring that the U.S. did not regard a strong and united Europe as a rival 
but as a partner, president Kennedy declared on July 4, 1962 that:  
We see in such a Europe a partner with whom we can deal on a basis of full 
equality in all the great and burdensome tasks of building and defending a 
community of free nations. It would be premature at this time to do more than 
indicate the high regard with which we view the formation of this partnership. The 
first order of business is for our European friends to go forward in forming the 
more perfect union which will someday make this partnership possible.4  
While he was skeptical about the emphasis the American president put on the precondition of 
the European countries to first form a “more perfect union” and about the idea that this 
European union (which would have to include the United Kingdom) would – or even should – 
prepare the way for a partnership between trans-Atlantic equals, these developments did 
arouse a sense of hope even in Ernst van der Beugel. As he put it: “It looked as if the process 
                                                            
2 E.H. van der Beugel to H.A. Kissinger, February 19, 1963, file 7, EvdB.  
3 Qtd. in: Van der Beugel, From Marshall Aid to Atlantic Partnership: European Integration as a Concern of American 
Foreign Policy (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1966), 371. 
4 John F. Kennedy, “Fourth of July Address at Independence Hall”, Philadelphia, July 4, 1962, accessed 5 December 
2016, http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/jfkindependencehall.htm.  
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of European integration would receive a new and indispensable momentum by the joining of 
the U.K. and other European countries and that a true partnership between the U.S. and a 
unified Europe could be embarked upon as a crowning achievement of this process of 
structuring the Western World, which was started around 1947.”5 On January 14, 1963 these 
hopes were crushed by Charles de Gaulle in what Ernst van der Beugel would describe as “a 
frontal attack on the concept of the Atlantic Partnership as conceived by the Kennedy 
administration and understood in a great part of Europe.”6  
In his press conference, Charles de Gaulle expressed his intention to veto British 
membership to the Common Market while he underlined the affinity which, according to him, 
existed between the six continental countries. Meanwhile, he painted a picture of Great 
Britain as both an unwanted outsider and a rival challenging the Gaullist vision of European 
integration. By doing so, he clearly suggested that the differences between the Anglo-Saxons 
and the six were of a fundamental nature. Central to de Gaulle’s rejection of Great Britain 
were Britain’s close ties to the United States. De Gaulle equated British membership of the 
Common Market to the entry of an American Trojan horse, claiming that the EEC “would 
seem like a colossal Atlantic Community under American dependence and direction, and that 
is not at all what France wanted to do and is doing, which is a strictly European 
construction.”7 In addition, he rejected the supranational approach to European integration 
while promoting the centrality of the nation-state in an Europe des patries. He furthermore 
underlined the protectionist character he desired in the economic field (in particular with 
regard to a common agricultural policy) and claimed the right for France to develop its own 
nuclear arsenal, thereby rejecting the American idea to create a transatlantic multilateral 
nuclear force arguing that for the French “integration in this field is something that is 
unimaginable.”8 To make matters worse, de Gaulle’s press conference was followed eight 
days later by the signing of the Elysée Treaty; a Franco-German treaty of friendship “aimed at 
establishing common policies in foreign affairs, defense, education, and youth matters 
through an extensive system of bilateral meetings.”9 Thus, as Van der Beugel had feared, 
Charles de Gaulle came to represent a severe political challenge to the concept of European 
integration within an Atlantic framework under American leadership, which he perceived as 
fundamental to the security of the West in the context of the Cold War.  
                                                            
5 E.H. van der Beugel, “Introduction Prof. E.H. van der Beugel at the Atlantic Symposium”, Greenwich, October 3, 
1967, box “Lezingen E.H. van der Beugel” (hereafter “Lezingen”), private archive Aukelien van Hoytema-van der 
Beugel (hereafter AHB). 
6 Van der Beugel, From Marshall Aid to Atlantic Partnership, 376.  
7 Qtd. in Geir Lundestad, The United States and Western Europe since 1945: From “Empire” by Invitation to 
Translantic Drift (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 123.  
8 Qtd. in:  Van der Beugel, From Marshall Aid to Atlantic Partnership, 378-379. See also: Sebastian Reyn, “Atlantis 
Lost: the American Experience with de Gaulle, 1958-1969” (PhD diss, Leiden University, 2007) p. 414-416; “The 
Multilateral Force Questions and Answers”, box 76, Arthur H. Dean Papers, Cornell University Library (CUL).  
9 Lundestad, The United States and Western Europe since 1945, 123.  
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Ernst van der Beugel had barely left KLM when Charles de Gaulle “dropped his bomb” 
on the hopes of those who desired a close-knit Atlantic partnership. 10 While he was not 
surprised by this turn of events – after all he had warned against this for years – he was very 
upset about its consequences.11  “I am terribly worried and after the first shock I see already 
in Europe that people still do not see the seriousness of what is happening,”12 he told 
Kissinger. After the Franco-German Elysée treaty Van der Beugel also did not trust “the old 
man in Germany” anymore. Besides, he believed it was a “bad mark for Washington that they 
make the impression to be absolutely surprised by the events of the last months, and have 
not prepared any workable alternative.”13  
As a response to these events and inspired by suspicions that the Elysée Treaty secretly 
incorporated nuclear ambitions, the Kennedy Administration had introduced a proposal 
within the NATO council in February to establish a multilateral nuclear force (MLF). The MLF-
plan proposed the integration of a European nuclear force within NATO by producing a fleet 
of warships armed with Polaris ballistic missiles that were to be manned by mixed 
international crews under NATO command. Van der Beugel, who was not particularly thrilled 
by this idea, subsequently told Kissinger that he had the impression that the Americans were 
just trying “to patch things up” by means of the MLF project about which he had read a lot, 
but which nevertheless remained “completely unclear” to him. “Even if it would be clear”, 
Van der Beugel noted, “I do not think it would solve our problems.”14 Kissinger agreed that 
the multilateral force was not the answer: “I deplore General de Gaulle’s actions”, he replied. 
“On the other hand, a nuclear force in which the Germans will be the strongest single 
member does not send me exactly into simple transports of joy either.”15 
So, what should be done? “I am deeply convinced that the Brussels’ process must be 
slowed down without throwing things away”, Van der Beugel told Kissinger in early March. 
“The only way the French will feel that they are deeply on the wrong track is to hurt them in 
their European plans and to a large extent Brussels is the place.”16 He hoped that the Dutch 
government would remain firm in its stand against de Gaulle as they had done in blocking the 
Gaullist attempt at creating a European Political Union by means of the Fouchet Plan in 1961-
                                                            
10 E.H. van der Beugel to HRH Prince Bernhard, March 8, 1963, file 67, Collection “Bilderberg Conferenties: 
Secretariaat, 1952-2004” (hereafter “Bilderberg”), NAH. 
11 Van der Beugel, From Marshall Aid to Atlantic Partnership, 376, 377. As van der Beugel put it in his dissertation: 
“For those who read and analyzed his [de Gaulle’s] writings and speeches, the veto to Britain’s entry not only could 
be expected but was an inevitable consequence of the Gaullist concept (…) The optimism of the United States and 
most European countries about the outcome of the negotiations between the Community in Brussels and the United 
Kingdom was unfounded. The contents of the press conference of January 1963, were not new. They were a strictly 
logical consequence of everything De Gaulle had written or said in the previous years.” 
12 E.H. van der Beugel to H.A. Kissinger, 19 February 1963, file 7, EvdB. 
13 E.H. van der Beugel to H.A. Kissinger, March 4, 1963, file 7, EvdB.   
14 Ibid. 
15 H.A. Kissinger to E.H. van der Beugel, March 6, 1963, Correspondence from the private archive of dr. Henry A. 
Kissinger’ (hereafter “HAK”); H.A. Kissinger to E.H. van der Beugel, March 15, 1963, HAK. 
16 E.H. van der Beugel to H.A. Kissinger, 4 March 1963, file 7, EvdB..   
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1962.17 While slowing things down in Europe, Van der Beugel believed that – as Kissinger had 
proposed in his January 1963 Foreign Affairs article “Strains on the Alliance”18 – “we should 
give serious thought to the Atlantic Community idea” and that this “should be done in a 
different way as we proceed in Europe, by which I mean that politics must have priority over 
economics.”19  
Meanwhile, the prominent Dutch political journalist and columnist Jérôme Heldring 
perceived a useful role for Ernst van der Beugel in countering the negative effects de Gaulle’s 
actions might have for the transatlantic relationship. In a column published on the 10th of 
February Heldring warned his readers about the risks of antagonizing the American 
Congress.20 “A Congress that for whatever reason would turn not only anti-French, but anti-
European would be able to block all the pretty Atlantic plans of the Administration”, he 
argued. Even worse, it might turn away from Europe altogether by driving the Americans back 
into isolationism. Since the U.S. Congress depended more directly on the favor of the 
American public it would be of fundamental importance for the survival of Atlantic 
cooperation not to create the impression among the American public that “the anti-American 
de Gaulle” represented general European sentiments. To achieve this, Heldring called for the 
deployment of the Dutch public diplomacy apparatus for “an intelligent campaign” to prevent 
any such identification of the other Western European countries with the person and policies 
of Charles de Gaulle in the eyes of the American public. More specifically he argued that:  
Such a campaign should not only be executed by civil servants of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. Not because we hold anything against them, but because as civil 
servants they are less free in their expressions and formulations than a private 
individual would be. For that reason, such a campaign should also include the 
deployment of private individuals who – and that goes without saying – share the 
vision of the government, but who are not bound to a specific text, cautiously 
composed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or its embassy in Washington.21 
From Heldring’s perspective these private individuals should be exempted from their daily 
occupations for a certain period “to give lectures in the United States and to maintain other 
                                                            
17 For the Dutch and the Fouchet Plan see: Jan van der Harst, “Dutch and U.S. Assessments of European Political 
integration”, in Four Centuries of Dutch-American Relations, ed. Hans Krabbendam, Cornelis A. van Minnen and Giles 
Scott-Smith (Amsterdam: Boom, 2009); 641-651; Mathieu Segers, “De Gaulle’s Race to the Bottom: The Netherlands, 
France and the Interwoven Problems of British EEC Membership and European Political Union, 1958-1963”, 
Contemporary European History, 19 (2010): 111-132.  
18 Kissinger, Henry A. “Strains on the Alliance”, Foreign Affairs, 41:2 (1963): 261-285. 
19 E.H. van der Beugel to H.A. Kissinger, 4 March 1963, file 7, EvdB. 
20 This column was possibly a response to a column James Reston published in the New York Times on January 21, in 
which Reston argued that the United States would not be prepared to “defend a Europe which questions American 
good faith” and rejected Great Britain. Adenauer, Reston wrote, would have to choose between France and the 
United States. In a remarkable sign of US anger at de Gaulle, the State Department instructed its European embassies 
to make ‘urgent use’ of Reston’s column since it reflected the views of the White House.” See: Thomas Gijswijt, 
“Uniting the West: The Bilderberg Group, the Cold War and European Integration 1952-1977” (PhD diss., Heidelberg 
University, 2007), 265.  
21 J.L. Heldring, De Rotterdammer, 10 February 1963 (translation mine).  
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kinds of contact with Americans.”22 For this job, Heldring had two individuals in particular in 
mind, both of whom were well versed in the issues concerned and, also not unimportant, able 
to speak “with ease and authority” on these matters: Ernst van der Beugel and his former 
colleague at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs professor Jaap Kymmell.23 Heldring warned his 
readers that like most public diplomacy campaigns, the purpose would be preventive action, 
meaning that no one should expect any tangible results because prevention cannot be 
measured in retrospect, but this did not make the job any less valuable.24 While nothing 
indicates that the Dutch government took up the task assigned to them by Heldring in 
response to the column, Ernst van der Beugel did not need government direction to see that 
as a private individual he still had a role to play in countering the Gaullist challenge to 
transatlantic relations. In fact, this role would not be restricted to the private efforts at public 
diplomacy described by Heldring either. 
While he hoped that the Dutch government would remain firm in its stance against de 
Gaulle and that the Americans would come up with a workable alternative to the Gaullist 
challenge to Kennedy’s goal of an Atlantic Partnership, Van der Beugel also went to work 
through his own private activities. Two weeks after de Gaulle’s press conference, he paid a 
visit to Paris with Prince Bernhard in preparation of the forthcoming Bilderberg conference in 
March 1963, which coincidently happened to be planned in France.25 The trip also offered 
Van der Beugel a chance to take the temperature of the situation in the French capital, which 
exceeded his already existing worries. “The mess in Europe and in our Atlantic world is worse 
than even I – and you know how pessimistic I was – expected”, Van der Beugel wrote to the 
American Bilderberger, publisher of Life Magazine, and expert on psychological warfare C.D. 
Jackson upon his return. “How are we going to do the repair job?” From Van der Beugel’s 
perspective, much depended on the upcoming Bilderberg conference in Cannes.26  
Beyond ‘facilitation’: the run-up to the Bilderberg Meeting in Cannes 
After having been admitted to a hospital in early January 1963 to recover from the exhaustion 
caused by his turbulent times at KLM, Ernst van der Beugel decided to take things somewhat 
easier by “going in the sabbatical business” for a while.27 In the process, he decided to 
embark on writing a doctors thesis in the form of a book on European integration as a 
                                                            
22 Ibid.  
23 Jaap Kymmell worked under van der Beugel at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (see chapter 3) and in 1963 he would 
become van der Beugel’s doctoral supervisor at the University of Rotterdam.  
24 J.L. Heldring, De Rotterdammer, 10 February 1963. 
25 During this trip van der Beugel had met with the French Bilderberg Steering Committee members Baumgartner and 
Nebolsine among others. He also met with Sali de Gorter of the Dutch embasssy to discuss a press communique 
about the Bilderberg Conference which de Gorter would make sure to spread among French journalists in advance of 
the conference. “Vergadering ten kantore van de Heer Rijkens, 22 February 1963, file 55, Bilderberg. 
26 E.H. van der Beugel to C.D. Jackson, 29 January 1963, box 109, C.D. Jackson Papers, EPL. 
27 “Rust voor v.d. Beugel”, Het Parool, 5 January 1963; E.H. van der Beugel to C.D. Jackson, 25 April, 1963, box 109, 
C.D. Jackson Papers, EPL. 
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concern of American foreign policy – a decision that also gave him more time to focus on his 
private diplomatic activities.  
After his resignation from KLM worries arose among the American Bilderbergers that 
Van der Beugel might also consider leaving his post at Bilderberg. They showed great relief 
when Prince Bernhard assured them that these worries were ungrounded.28 In reality Van der 
Beugel would only start to invest more time in Bilderberg by taking up more of the ‘diplomatic 
work’ as described by John Pomian after Van der Beugel’s succession of Retinger. Next to the 
fact that he had more time on his hands, Van der Beugel believed that Bilderberg’s 
importance had only increased with the revitalized Gaullist challenge to Atlantic unity. 
“Precisely under the current political tensions a Bilderberg conference could lead to 
constructive results,” he believed, “because it could create an opportunity to reduce, in an 
atmosphere of trust, the contradictions that have developed in Atlantic relations – the very 
goal of Bilderberg.”29 In a letter to Prince Bernhard, Van der Beugel underlined the high 
stakes of the Cannes conference, pointing out that next to opportunities there were also very 
serious risks involved:  
There is no doubt that this will be one of the most complicated conferences that 
Your Royal Highness will have to chair in the context of Bilderberg. The situation is 
explosive; the subjects are explosive; the participants are explosive and, in 
addition, it has become clear from my conversations that nobody knows what 
should happen after the General’s intervention. Both the Americans and the 
English lack a policy; the Germans are floating more than ever and the state of the 
Alliance is, in my opinion more serious and more confused than has ever been the 
case since 1945. All of this makes the Bilderberg conference extremely important, 
because it is the first time that this kind of group comes together after De Gaulle 
dropped his bomb. However, if the conference is not steered into the right 
direction, it contains grave dangers (...). In fact, it would not be difficult, for 
example, to chase all the French on one big angry heap during the first half hour, 
but it will be difficult to have these days end with a somewhat positive 
impression.30 
To steer the conference in the ‘right’ direction, Van der Beugel considered it “necessary that 
this time the Prince would give a rather strong guidance as to the atmosphere and 
proceedings of the discussion.”31 During a meeting of the core group of the European 
secretariat, which referred to itself as the ‘small committee’ and whose members were all 
Dutch32, it was decided that Van der Beugel would write an introductory note for the Prince 
                                                            
28 Joseph E. Johnson to HRH Prince Bernhard, 28 January 1963, box 76, file 2, Arthur H. Dean Papers, CUL; Prince 
Bernhard to Joseph E. Johnson, 19 January, 1963, box 76, file 2, Arthur H. Dean Papers, CUL.  
29 E.H. van der Beugel to HRH Prince Bernhard, February 5, 1963, file 67, Bilderberg, NAH (translation mine). 
30 E.H. van der Beugel to HRH Prince Bernhard, 8 March 1963, file 67, Bilderberg (translation mine). 
31 E.H. van der Beugel to Wilfrid S. Baumgartner and George Nebolsine, March 8, 1963, file 21, Bilderberg.  
32 The European secretariat consisted next to van der Beugel of Secretary Arnold Lamping, Treasurer Paul Rijkens, 
A.E. van Braam Houckgeest (the personal secretary of Prince Bernhard) and two secretarial assistants. 
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to be presented at the beginning of the conference, which, after discussion in the small 
committee and approval by the Prince, would first be send to all the members of the Steering 
Committee one week before the conference after which it would also be distributed to the 
other participants. 33 
This introductory note, which started with some general remarks on Bilderberg stating 
that “What we have always tried to do is to analyze and to discuss problems of mutual 
concern and in our different jobs try to influence our friends outside Bilderberg with the aim 
of strengthening the Western Community and of fostering a better understanding not only 
between Europe and our North American friends but also inside Europe itself”, provided clear 
guidelines for the discussions in Cannes. While recognizing “that there are important 
disagreements within the Western Alliance”34, the note warned the participants that they 
“should try to avoid being “too explosive” about some of the issues which have come so much 
into the open during recent months” and encouraged them “to analyze rather than to attack 
and finally to try to define what should happen from now on.”35 In order to do this, a few 
specific points on which there seemed to be a wide divergence of opinion were introduced, 
including the following questions to guide the discussion:  
A. Will the growing strength of Europe tend to lead to a competition 
between Europe and the U.S. in the market of world power, or will it lead 
to an equal partnership in a single enterprise? What are the conditions 
for such a partnership? We should be more specific than we have been 
till now.   
B. Is the idea of a multilateral or multinational nuclear force a panacea for 
the troubles of the Alliance? What exactly does it mean? How is the 
problem of the ultimate political control of such a force to be solved? 
What is the relevance of this concept to the current general disarray of 
the alliance?                                                                          
C. How will economic relations between the Western countries be affected 
by the breakdown of the Brussels negotiations? Is the Trade Expansion 
Act a workable instrument after this breakdown? What chances are 
there after the Brussels breakdown for a more liberal trade pattern in 
the Western World and what can be done to avoid a further cleavage 
between the most important trading blocs?36  
                                                            
33 “Bespreking bij de Heer Rijkens”, March 8, 1963, file 55, Bilderberg; E.H. van der Beugel to HRH Prince Bernhard, 13 
March 1963, file 67, Bilderberg. 
34 Van der Beugel’s original version actually mentioned “a deep schism” within the Western alliance, but this was 
taken out because it was considered to be too pessimistic. See: “Bespreking bij de heer Rijkens”, 8 March 1963, file 
55, Bilderberg.   




These questions – which focused on analyzing the troubles faced by the Atlantic Community 
and practical instruments to overcome them – would remain central to discussions in 
Bilderberg during the ensuing years. What is more, the Bilderberg Secretariat had also already 
put some thought into the desirable outcome. During a meeting at the office of Bilderberg 
treasurer and founding chairman of Unilever Paul Rijkens, the ‘small committee’ under 
leadership of Ernst van der Beugel laid down a very specific aim for the upcoming Bilderberg 
conference with regard to point A of the introductory paper, stating that the “goal” of the 
Cannes conference should be to formulate a “better definition” for the concept of Atlantic 
Partnership, which would “not include the danger of a third force.” The report of this meeting 
of the European Secretariat states explicitly that “the Prince should work towards this.”37 
Thus, while it is often argued by those involved in the meetings that the Bilderberg 
conferences simply offered a meeting place facilitating a free exchange of views, a close study 
of the reports of the meetings of the European secretariat’s ‘small committee’ show that the 
Dutch organizers in fact had more specific goals and consciously tried to steer the 
conferences into a very specific Atlanticist direction. 
While the Kennedy administration’s concept of Atlantic partnership implicitly excluded 
the idea of an integrated Europe as a third force, Van der Beugel believed that the Americans 
had been too vague about the kind of integrated Europe they desired (namely an Atlantic 
oriented Europe), and, consequently, too undiscriminatory in their support for any form of 
European integration that moved the process of a closer union among the Western European 
countries forward. As he wrote to Kissinger, “European integration is not persé a contribution 
to the strength of the Western World. If we give priority to the cohesion of the Atlantic 
World, European integration is only a contribution to that cohesion on specific conditions 
which have till now not been fulfilled. My preliminary opinion is that the support of the 
United States Administration up until 1963 to the continental European integration has not 
been discriminatory enough.”38  
Thus, what was needed, from Van der Beugel’s perspective, was a clear rejection of the 
Gaullist conception of an integrated continental Europe as a third force. It was important to 
remind everybody involved that this conception was incompatible with the goal of Atlantic 
Partnership and that any movement into this direction would undermine the transatlantic 
relationship. In addition, a rejection of the Gaullist conception by the European participants 
would be important to reassure the Americans that de Gaulle – whose actions not surprisingly 
had caused resentment among the Americans – did not speak for all of Europe.39  At the same 
time, while trying to isolate the French, it was important that the meeting should not 
                                                            
37 See: “Vergadering ten kantore van de Heer Rijkens”, 27 February 1963, file 55, Bilderberg (translation mine): “Doel 
conferentie: betere definitie te geven voor 'equal partnership' wat niet mag insluiten het gevaar van een 3de macht. 
De Prins moet hier naar toe werken.” 
38 E.H. van der Beugel to H.A. Kissinger, 5 September 1963, HAK. The EDC and the Fouchet Plan were examples of 
occasions in which the Americans had been ‘not discriminatory enough’ .  
39 This, and in particular the effect on American public opinion, was also emphasized during the Cannes conference by 
an American participant. See: “Cannes Conference report.” Accessed December 5, 2016. 
http://file.wikileaks.org/file/bilderberg-meetings-report-1963.pdf.   
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estrange or antagonize the French either – hence the warning to Prince Bernhard not to 
“chase them all on one big angry heap” and the cautious emphasis on not being “too 
explosive” and on “analyzing” instead of “attacking” in the introductory note.40    
The relationship with the French furthermore had to be treated with extra delicacy since 
several French participants had left the previous Bilderberg conference with a rather bad 
taste in their mouths. This was at least partly due to the fact that a New York Times column by 
James Reston that was critical of Charles de Gaulle had been a big hit at the 1962 
Saltsjöbaden conference. In the column, Reston had drafted a fable in which various 
statesmen and countries were represented by animals – with Adenauer as an old fox, 
Macmillan as a lion, the United States as a buffalo and de Gaulle as a Giraffe (which was very 
proud and “taller than the Washington Monument, and he thought he could see farther than 
all the other animals”). As Thomas Gijswijt has pointed out, “the morale of the story was that 
if the giraffe and the old fox kept the lion out of the forest this might anger the buffalo that 
was responsible for defending the forest. Once the buffalo was gone and the old giraffe had 
died, the foxes took over. The bear in the East did not like this. Together with the tiger 
(China), the bear thereupon ate all the foxes and the giraffes.” The Bilderberg secretariat had 
distributed copies of this column to all conference participants and, at the conference “all the 
representatives referred to international personages by animal name rather than surname.” 
This whole episode had caused French participants to protest “against this insult to their Chief 
of State”. It probably did not help that the giraffe died of “a terrible sore throat.”41  
This episode may also have contributed to the fact that President De Gaulle considered 
the 1962 conference in Saltsjöbaden to be “overly critical of France.”42 During the 
preparations for the upcoming Bilderberg Meeting, which was planned to take place in 
Cannes, the French government initially even insisted that the conference should avoid 
“acutely controversial issues.”43 By doing so, they clearly demonstrated how seriously official 
government representatives took these unofficial meetings. In response, Van der Beugel 
prepped Prince Bernhard in November 1962 for a conversation with French “Bilderberg 
ambassador” Wilfrid Baumgartner by advising him to make it absolutely clear to the 
Frenchman that any request for topical restrictions meant to evade subjects sensitive to the 
French were in fact an “attack on the essence of Bilderberg.” The eventual conversation 
seemed to have its desired effect as Baumgartner afterwards convinced De Gaulle that the 
conference could only be hosted by the French if the government “refrained from trying to 
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influence the discussions” after which the General gave in and agreed to welcome the 
Bilderberg conference without any conditions.44  
After the events of January 1963, the Bilderberg secretariat considered it of 
fundamental importance to keep the French engaged in the transatlantic conversation. 
Especially during this time of crisis the channels of communication had to remain wide open 
to avoid transatlantic estrangement, both intellectual – with regard to policy – but also on a 
very personal human level. During the 1960’s, in the absence of a formal trans-Atlantic 
political structure, the Bilderberg conferences served as a vibrant forum for this very 
purpose.45 The Bilderberg secretariat tried to manage the transatlantic relationship and its 
challenges as well as possible by keeping everybody engaged in the Atlantic conversation, 
offering a channel for venting frustrations and irritations, fostering mutual understanding and 
reconciling differences. Ernst van der Beugel regarded Bilderberg as an important tool for 
mediating trans-Atlantic tensions before they would escalate and blow up the alliance during 
a very explosive situation. The Atlantic alliance had to be guided, as well as possible, through 
these stormy weathers. To this end, first of all, everybody was to remain aboard. Secondly, 
the ship had to be steered towards the Atlantic..  
Cannes, 1963: “We now know what we are up against.”  
In retrospect, Ernst van der Beugel regarded the Bilderberg conference in Cannes as “an 
exceptionally good meeting as far as the level of the participants and the frankness of their 
statements” was concerned but also “gloomy as to what it brought to the surface about the 
future.”46 His pessimistic impressions concerning the state of the alliance had once more 
been confirmed. The Americans had been “off balance” and had no alternative policy after 
the breakdown of Brussels. The Germans appeared more confused than ever and the British 
were in a very difficult position as a result of their domestic scene.47  
The political topic on the agenda was introduced by the preliminary note Van der Beugel 
had drafted for Prince Bernhard followed by a paper by the Italian ambassador to Great 
Britain, Pietro Quaroni with the rather vague title “The Balance of Power in the Light of 
Recent International Developments”.  During a meeting of the Bilderberg Secretariat, Deputy 
Secretary-General Lamping had asked Van der Beugel whether he did not want to prepare a 
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speech for the conference himself, but Van der Beugel did not consider this necessary since 
his views were already reflected in Ambassador Quaroni’s paper.48 In his paper Quaroni 
emphasized the need “to remain loyal to NATO and to accept American superiority as a fact” 
– matters the conference participants “could generally adhere to”, according to the 
conference report.  Quaroni furthermore expressed bitter regret concerning the breakdown 
of the negotiations between the United Kingdom and the E.E.C. which he described as “a 
blow from which European integration might never recover.”49  
In response to Quaroni’s speech, Jacques Baumel, the Secretary-General of the French 
Gaullist party Union pour la Nouvelle République, very candidly shared Charles de Gaulle’s 
perspective on Atlantic relations in an exposé that, to Van der Beugel’s satisfaction, was 
“practically universally rejected”50 by the participants of the Bilderberg conference. As van 
der Beugel confided to Henry Kissinger:  
The French were absolutely impossible; the Gaullists stated their case and the 
others amongst whom Faure, former Prime Ministers and people like Fontaine and 
Baumgartner did not really dare to speak up. Since 1944 I never had the feeling 
that fascism was in a room where I was, but now I had. If after the Bilderberg 
meeting anybody would have any illusion about their attitude they must be nuts.51  
The nuclear issue played an important role in Baumel’s speech in which he “rejected the 
concept of a multilateral or multinational NATO nuclear force, and expressed the 
determination of the French government to continue with its policy of maintaining its own 
national nuclear deterrent.” Baumel particularly stressed the Gaullist distrust of the American 
willingness to come to the aid of the European countries in all circumstances. While several 
Europeans, including some French participants, took issue with this statement, as with several 
others, there were also a few Europeans who appeared to share the Gaullist view. According 
to an American report for the Ford Foundation “this expression of doubt on the part of the 
Europeans aroused some bitter comments by Americans, who felt that our past performance 
gave no indication that we would not honor our pledge to defend Europe.” In response, two 
Kennedy Administration officials defended the MLF, which was subsequently also supported 
by “several European speakers.”52  
Deputy Secretary-General Arnold Lamping left the conference convinced that “the 
Gaullists had felt their isolation.” He believed that the American statements, which had 
expressed “a deep-felt disappointment” concerning de Gaulle’s recent actions, had left a deep 
impression on the participants.  In addition, the French opposition to de Gaulle “seemed 
satisfied” since the meeting had provided them “the opportunity to voice their objections 
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against the politics of their president at an international forum of a very high caliber”53 – an 
opportunity which, according to Lamping, they received less and less. As his comment to 
Kissinger concerning the non-Gaullist French participants of the conference already indicated, 
Van der Beugel was not particularly satisfied as to the use they had made of this opportunity 
– a point he also stressed in a letter to Peter Fleck: “The French case was completely hopeless 
and the worst thing was how much the Gaullist thinking-terror influences people like Aron, 
Fontaine, Baumgartner, not to mention the former-premiers who were present, but did not 
speak.”54   
The official report of the conference55, which was afterwards distributed among the 
participants, and which Van der Beugel also circulated within his own social network, 
deliberately paid a great deal of attention to the exposé of Jacques Baumel because the 
secretariat considered it very valuable that “for the first time a clear, complete overview had 
been given of the Atlantic politics of General de Gaulle.”56 Indeed, according to a report by 
the Ford Foundation, “several participants expressed the opinion afterwards that this was the 
most forthright presentation of the Gaullist point of view ever put forth in any forum.”57 The 
Secretariat’s report also gave ample attention to the isolation of the Gaullists at the 
conference. As secretary Lamping put it: “The ‘Baumel seul’ motif runs as the main thread 
through the entire report, which clearly reflects that the propositions brought forward by de 
Gaulle’s spokesperson were practically unanimously rejected.”58 As the Ford Foundation 
report pointed out, however, there was also some support for some of Baumel’s arguments, 
which might suggest that the official report may have exaggerated the Baumel seul motif 
somewhat. Nevertheless, the American undersecretary of State George Ball left the 
conference “convinced that the majority of Europeans did not accept de Gaulle as their true 
spokesman,”59 which suggests one of the key goals of the European Secretariat had been 
met. At the same time, the Bilderberg Conference had succeeded in not estranging or 
antagonizing the French. French participants had even expressed appreciation of “the way in 
which, and the atmosphere in which, they had been given the full opportunity to express the 
French views.”  When deputy Secretary-General Lamping contacted Jacques Baumel 
afterwards to inquire about his experience of the Bilderberg meeting the Frenchman 
mentioned that he would gladly be present again during a subsequent conference “si le Prince 
me ferait l'honneur de m'inviter à nouveau."  “Not a bad result”, Lamping concluded.60
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From the perspective of the Ford Foundation, a major private sponsor of the 
conferences, the Bilderberg Meeting in Cannes had provided a welcome addition to the 
formal diplomatic process. “For the first time since General de Gaulle’s January 
pronouncement, the Bilderberg meeting provided a quiet and unpublicized opportunity for 
leading French figures to meet with other European and American members of the Bilderberg 
Group for serious and frank discussions of the Atlantic situation” where “contacts were re-
established, and a free exchange of opinions took place that could not have occurred in an 
official gathering.”61 
“I think that Cannes was a great success for everybody involved. We now know what we 
are up against,”62 Van der Beugel told American Steering Committee member C.D. Jackson. “I 
completely agree that the recent Bilderberg was one of the best, if not absolutely the best we 
have ever had”, Jackson replied. “To be sure, events played into your hands, but you and the 
Prince took extremely skillful advantage of them. I have a strong suspicion that the ripples 
from Cannes will have an effect on important American-European events for many months to 
come. I cannot conceive that Baumel did not report un certain froid to his boss, and 
conceivably this week’s sudden cordiality may be a direct result.”63  
The MLF Conversion: from “patch-up” tool to instrument for Atlantic cohesion. 
Despite Ernst van der Beugel’s satisfaction about the isolation of the Gaullists at the Cannes 
conference, he also perceived considerable room for improvement – in particular with regard 
to the American role and attitude. In Cannes, the Americans had appeared to be “off balance” 
and failed to put forward any alternative policy that could move Atlantic cooperation forward 
after the Brussels breakdown of January 1963. Consequently, while preparing the 1964 
conference, which was to be held in Williamsburg Virginia, Van der Beugel focused his efforts 
on trying to make sure that the Americans would show more strength and initiative in the 
hope that some constructive movement in otherwise stagnant transatlantic relations would 
be attained. While he had initially been rather skeptical about the American plans for a 
multilateral atomic force, in the run-up to the Williamsburg conference Van der Beugel came 
to embrace the MLF as one of the most promising means to this end.   
It appears that Ernst van der Beugel changed his mind about the MLF after a visit to the 
United States in the fall of 1963. After he spent four weeks at Harvard, where he was invited 
by Henry Kissinger to do research for his dissertation and to give some lectures, Van der 
Beugel exchanged Cambridge for Washington where he met with several key members of the 
American foreign policy establishment including National Security Advisor MacGeorge Bundy, 
Special Assistant to the President Arthur Schlessinger Jr., former Secretaries of State Christian 
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Herter and Dean Acheson and Vice Chairman of the Atlantic Council Theodore Achilles.64 At 
the State Department Van der Beugel met with Deputy Assistant Secretary for Atlantic Affairs 
Robert Schaetzel, Director of Atlantic Political and Economic Affairs Deane R. Hinton as well as 
with the Director of Policy Planning Walt Whitman Rostow and Henry Owen at the Policy 
Planning Council to discuss European-American relations and the upcoming Bilderberg 
Meeting about which they were “extremely well informed” according to Van der Beugel.65 
George Ball – who together with Schaetzel and Owen    belonged to a group of the most avid 
promotors of the MLF who due to their “quasi-religious devotion”66 to this policy were also 
known as ‘the theologians’ – had arranged the meetings at the State Department where his 
colleagues were eager to convert influential Europeans to their cause. They were convinced 
that European opinion on the proposal would to a large extent determine the American 
administration’s attitude towards the plan.67 In March 1963 George Ball and Robert Bowie 
had already communicated to Max Kohnstamm that it would help if European support for the 
MLF would be voiced, because they did not want the MLF to be looked at as a Kennedy 
scheme. They regarded the Bilderberg Meetings as an important channel through which this 
could be accomplished.68   
The MLF campaign at the State department dovetailed nicely with Van der Beugel’s 
search for an American policy initiative that could create a new constructive dynamic in 
transatlantic relations. Van der Beugel would never really be thrilled about the MLF’s military-
strategic virtues,69 but he came to see great merit in its role as a political tool to cement a 
stronger transatlantic relationship, especially since he came to believe – like George Ball – 
that it could serve as one of the most concrete means to demonstrate opposition to Charles 
de Gaulle.70 After all, the realization of a multilateral nuclear force in NATO would thwart the 
possibility that de Gaulle could create a French hegemony in Europe based on his force de 
frappe. “You convinced me about the multilateral force”, Van der Beugel wrote to Henry 
Owen after their meeting at the State department. “I immediately went to work on this point 
and I hope and expect that a positive attitude will be taken [at the upcoming Bilderberg 
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Conference].”71  To this end, Owen and his colleagues at the State department had also done 
suggestions for possible participants for the Bilderberg Conference which Van der Beugel 
considered “extremely valuable.”72   
Ernst van der Beugel was not the only one who went to work on the MLF in preparation 
for the 1964 Bilderberg conference. Once the final guest list for the Bilderberg Meeting had 
been composed, the State department’s Office of the Special Assistant for the MLF contacted 
key American participants in March 1964 to provide them with information kits containing 
“general background information on the latest thinking about the aims, purposes, and 
possible form of the MLF” as it had emerged at the State Department.73 Since they could only 
distribute unclassified material, the State department also arranged personal briefings on the 
MLF through which the department could better prepare American Bilderberg participants 
with regards to “such factors as attitudes of the key political elements and personalities in the 
various countries involved, general tactical considerations, and projected schedules for 
further steps.”74  
Transatlantic family quarrels: the lingering rivalry of Europeanists vs. Atlanticists 
Shortly after Van der Beugel returned home in November 1963, President Kennedy was 
assassinated. Kennedy’s European policy, including the concept of an equal Atlantic 
partnership between the United States and an integrated Europe, also known as the 
‘dumbbell’ idea, had been greatly influenced by the ideas of Jean Monnet.  Central to this was 
the influential position of Monnet’s close friend and apprentice George Ball – “one of the 
strongest and most self-consciously ‘European’ personalities ever to set foot in Foggy 
Bottom” – who, as Undersecretary of State under both Kennedy and Johnson, dominated the 
State Department’s European policy.75 While Van der Beugel and Ball were on good terms 
with each other and agreed on many things – including the political value of the MLF and the 
need to oppose Gaullism – their priorities with regard to the process of European integration 
and the development of an Atlantic Community were different. In fact, the struggle about the 
structure of the Atlantic relationship was not just a rivalry between third-force-Gaullists and 
those who recognized and welcomed the United States as a European power and desired to 
maintain close-transatlantic ties. There also still existed a clear rivalry among those who 
favored an Atlantic-oriented Europe, especially with regards to the role and shape of 
European integration in the broader Atlantic framework and the strategy that should be 
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pursued with regard to Gaullist France. In essence, the debates between Europeanists and 
Atlanticists that first came to the fore in the 1950s had never really been resolved and even 
gained a new sense of urgency with the arrival of Charles de Gaulle on the transatlantic 
diplomatic scene. While Europeanists like Monnet, Kohnstamm and Ball shared the desire for 
an Atlantic oriented Europe with the Atlanticists, they were more open to collaboration with 
Charles de Gaulle in their attempts to move European integration forward in the direction of 
a European political union. As Jan van der Harst explains:  
Monnet made the analysis that de Gaulle’s ideas could help Europe advance 
toward a federation by passing through some kind of ‘European 
confederation.’  This might be needed as the interim stage of evolution toward the 
new Europe, since no adequate framework existed in which the Six could jointly 
tackle political questions. It might also convince the European citizens that 
unification was not solely geared toward economic prosperity but also had a 
political dimension. Monnet envisioned two methods to be at work 
simultaneously: the integration method and another method for political, 
educational, and defense questions. He saw great potential in letting these two 
evolve together.76 
In contrast, Atlanticists like Ernst van der Beugel – who were afraid that any European 
political union with France and without the United Kingdom would eventually lead to the 
development of a third force continental Europe under French hegemony – perceived this as 
a grave danger to the Atlantic Community. From Van der Beugel’s perspective, de Gaulle’s 
talk of a “Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals” was nothing more than a civilized way of 
saying “Yankees go home.” If put into practice, the result would be a power vacuum in Europe 
with only one power capable of filling it, namely the Soviet Union.77  In 1967 Van der Beugel 
expressed his fears in the following words:  
Those Gaullist objectives must eventually (and maybe sooner rather than later) 
lead to the neutralization of Europe, because the antagonism towards the Anglo-
Saxon World grows bigger step by step. (…) In terms of power, this schism between 
the continent and the Anglo-Saxon world means the creation of a power vacuum in 
Europe. That vacuum can only and shall be filled by the Soviet Union and for this 
no military aggression is necessary. In that case, our children will live at best in 
Finland and in the worst scenario in Bulgaria. It is 1936.78  
While Monnet and his fellow Europeanists did not desire to sever Europe’s transatlantic ties, 
Van der Beugel believed that by giving absolute priority to a swift realization of European 
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integration they were willing to take too many risks by giving in to the French just to make 
sure the European project would keep moving.79 Ernst van der Beugel, who regarded any 
concessions to de Gaulle as appeasement, believed that it was better to pause European 
political and military integration for the time being. Stagnation in the political-military field 
would not hurt the process of economic and monetary integration in Europe, he believed, 
while advancement would mean progress into an undesirable direction that would likely be 
detrimental to the Atlantic alliance to which he gave absolute priority. Fundamentally, it was 
the old discussion about ends and means all over again: was European integration to be 
regarded as an end in itself or was it mainly supposed to be a means to strengthen the 
Atlantic Community?  
During the 1960s the struggle between Atlanticists and Europeanists took place on 
many different fronts; within informal foreign policy establishments as well as inside the 
Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, among staffers of the U.S. State Department and between 
different government departments, but also in national and international political arenas, as 
well as in public debates through speeches and newspapers articles. Ernst van der Beugel was 
active on all these fronts where he became one of the key representatives of the realist 
Atlanticist school of thought while he simultaneously tried to harmonize and mediate the 
differences between the different groups, for example through the Bilderberg meetings, in an 
attempt to make sure this struggle between rivaling visions would not erode Atlantic unity.  
He also tried to use his access to the foreign policy establishments in Europe and the United 
States to convince its members of his Atlanticist perspective and priorities.  
When Henry Kissinger asked Van der Beugel for a European perspective on the new 
Johnson Administration in January 1964, Van der Beugel vented his frustrations about the 
lingering influence of Monnet’s school of thought at the State department, informing 
Kissinger that he was “most critical about the attitude of the American administration 
towards European unity.” He especially resented the American attitude towards resurfacing 
discussions concerning a potential continental political arrangement between the six and the 
pressure the American Administration (“which is only and exclusively George Ball”) put on 
European countries to give in to French demands in this context. “Why the hell should we 
have a new political set up when it is crystal clear that the six are in basic disagreement on 
foreign and military policy?”80, Van der Beugel questioned. He considered it “outrageous” to 
enter any European political arrangement without the British. This was exactly what de Gaulle 
wanted so he could “formalize his ideas with the five on his bandwagon”, Van der Beugel 
claimed. “Monnet and Ball think that a political set up would give the five the possibility to 
line up against De Gaulle's policy. This is a crazy idea which only could come up in the heads 
of those who have messed up already so many European things.”81 Once again, Van der 
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Beugel found himself in the ironic position of being ‘plus americain que les Americains.’ As he 
put it: 
The confusion of ends and means in Washington is again complete and for us it is a 
rather bitter thing to oppose De Gaulle because of the fact that his policy is 
basically anti-American and then see us under American pressure to do what De 
Gaulle so much desires. It would be the task and the duty of American foreign 
policy to put us under pressure not to go into a new political adventure; what we 
see, however, is the opposite. It becomes increasingly difficult to defend what we 
consider as an American interest against American policy itself.82 
American Leadership: a Cri de Coeur  
While he complained about American pressure on European countries to move European 
integration forward, Van der Beugel believed the Americans should assert stronger leadership 
in favor of the Atlantic alliance and he used each and every opportunity he got to encourage 
this. Even in his letters to American officials expressing sympathy after the death of President 
Kennedy, Van der Beugel saw an opportunity to stress the issue of American leadership. In a 
letter to Henry Owen, Van der Beugel wrote that: 
Never before in history people on this side of the ocean have had a similar 
experience. They simply feel that they have lost ‘their’ President. This is definitely 
not a feeling confined to a few internationally minded men but what is so touching 
about it is that this is the feeling of the average citizen. Our American friends might 
find some consolation in the fact that by instinct people in the Western World 
recognize that the man in the White house is their leader.83  
While the Europeans recognized American leadership according to Van der Beugel, he 
considered the Americans themselves too timid in asserting it. At the Bilderberg conference in 
Cannes Van der Beugel “could not escape the impression that the U.S. attitude was hesitant, 
vague and apologetic.”84 Besides, both George Ball and Paul Nitze had been “weak in their 
presentation.”85 Van der Beugel considered this lack of American leadership in the alliance as 
“an extremely frightening phenomenon, because if ever leadership were required, now would 
be the moment.”86 This had to be different at the next conference, which would be hosted by 
the Americans in the old colonial town of Williamsburg, Virginia. “Sixty rather important 
Europeans (at least they think that they are important) cross the Ocean to be in 
Williamsburg”, Van der Beugel warned American Steering Committee member C.D. Jackson. 
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“They will meet a top U.S. delegation and even more than at a meeting in Europe the 
conference will be colored by the attitude of the American group.”87  
In March 1964, just weeks before the Bilderberg conference in Williamsburg, Van der 
Beugel sent a letter to C.D. Jackson concerning the desired attitude of the Americans at the 
upcoming conference. This unusually passionate epistle, which Ernst van der Beugel himself 
described as a cri de coeur, was one long plea for strong American leadership. Its opening 
remarks also give an interesting perspective on how Van der Beugel perceived his own role, 
motivation and aims in transatlantic affairs – not as a Dutchman, but as a transnational actor 
in pursuit of an Atlantic Community under American leadership:  
I do not write to you as Secretary-General [of Bilderberg], even less as a Dutchman. 
I write because the only issue in the field of foreign relations, in which I am totally 
and emotionally involved is the issue of United States – European relations. I feel 
myself committed to do everything I can (although I know that I cannot do very 
much) to foster and defend the closest possible relations with, and friendship for 
the United States. I know that I have the reputation of being sometimes ‘plus 
américain que les Américains’ but I very much love that country of yours and I 
consider the world a livable place only if we recognize your undisputed 
leadership.88 
This undisputed leadership had not only been lacking in Cannes. During his most recent visit 
to Washington van der Beugel had also “experienced a lack of self-confidence” among the 
Americans which had “frightened” him. Many of Van der Beugel’s European friends who 
shared his views of the United States and who had crossed the Atlantic since shared this 
experience. “The highest people in Washington have an attitude which is as sympathetic from 
the purely personal and human point of view as it is ineffective and dangerous from the 
political angle. It is the kind of atmosphere in which they ask us: ‘Do you really think we made 
so many mistakes? What is wrong with our policy? Tell us what we should do.”  Van der 
Beugel stressed that this kind of attitude was to be avoided in Williamsburg. “It is much less 
harmful when Europeans disagree with the American point of view, than when they go away 
with the feeling that there is no self-confidence on your side and a vagueness and uncertainty 
which was too much apparent at Cannes and presently in Washington,” he argued. 89  
Reverberations of Williamsburg 
During the Bilderberg Meeting in Williamsburg the American delegation did indeed show 
“great strength and cohesion”90 as Van der Beugel had hoped and encouraged. The same 
could be said about the five non-French members of the Common Market. After the 
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conference Van der Beugel informed the Dutch ambassador in Rome that “It had become 
clear without any doubt that the problems which existed did not exist between Europe and 
the United States, but between the French and the rest.”91 The Gaullists had again done their 
“utmost to be uncompromising on every single point,”92 and Van der Beugel considered it 
heart-warming that after the French intervention, the Germans, the Belgians, the Dutch and 
the Italians had all distanced themselves from the “pernicious ideas of the Gaullists.”93 The 
fact that all of this happened “in the presence of the top of the American Congress and the 
Administration was enough to make the trip to Williamsburg completely worth it,” according 
to Van der Beugel, who believed “that the congressional participants were convinced beyond 
any doubt about the positive attitude of the overwhelming majority of the Europeans 
towards the United States and NATO.”94  
The reverberations of the Bilderberg Meeting in Williamsburg also left their traces in 
formal diplomacy. Shortly after the conference, messages started to appear in the formal 
diplomatic correspondence from the American embassies in Brussels and The Hague listing 
options for action to be taken in response to “disquieting” ideas concerning the future of 
NATO voiced by one of the Gaullist participants of the Bilderberg conference. One of the 
diplomatic dispatches mentions that the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs Paul-Henri Spaak 
and the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs Joseph Luns were discussing the desirability of 
proposing at the North Atlantic Council “that basic review of NATO be undertaken to develop 
recommendation to strengthen it in the years ahead.”95 Luns and Spaak both recognized that 
such a proposal might result in a major clash with the French but the alternative was to let 
the situation continue to drift with the French gradually eroding NATO away.96 As a second 
response to counter the ideas voiced during the Bilderberg meeting Luns believed it was 
important to make very clear to the America’s, both North and South that de Gaulle “does not 
speak for Europe”. To emphasize this Luns “hoped to insert a reference in the Queen’s 
forthcoming speech in Mexico saying that not one voice speaks for Europe”97 – an effort in 
which the Bilderberg meetings in Cannes and Williamsburg had played an expedient role.  
MLF: the Battle Continues 
Despite the efforts by the State Department the MLF “did not do too badly, but not well 
enough”98 in Williamsburg according to Van der Beugel. In the spring of 1964, the State 
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Department’s MLF campaign was revitalized by a renewed commitment to the MLF by 
President Johnson. During discussions with his policy advisors – including George Ball, Walt 
Rostow and Henry Owen – concerning the MLF in April 1964, the president had declared that 
“if possible”, an agreement on the MLF should “be reached by the end of the year.”99 With 
this new timetable in mind, the advocates of the MLF in the State Department stepped up 
their campaign to push the project ahead. They increased their determination to win souls in 
Congress, tried to foster favorable press coverage by organizing briefings for domestic and 
foreign media, and notified their European allies of America’s strength of purpose concerning 
the project.100  During a meeting with his NATO colleagues in the Netherlands in May, 
Secretary of State Dean Rusk declared that the American Administration regarded the MLF 
“as meeting real political and military needs, and we intend to go ahead.”101  
Meanwhile, Ernst van der Beugel also continued to promote the MLF outside of 
Bilderberg, in particular in the Netherlands, where the Dutch government was still in the 
process of determining its definitive stance on the multilateral force.102 A 1964 diplomatic 
cable from the American embassy in The Hague mentions that the “leading” Dutch columnist 
G.B.J. Hilterman, in discussing “the extremists’ struggle around MLF”, had pointed out that 
there existed no emotional Atlantic extremism comparable to the emotional national French 
extremism, but that instead there were strict formalists into which category doctrinaire 
Dutchmen fell. The cable subsequently quoted Hilterman, saying that “in very moderate 
terms, Van der Beugel had made himself their spokesman.”103  
Ernst van der Beugel also took part in the discussions concerning the MLF in the Dutch 
Labor Party, which was also trying to determine its position on the transatlantic nuclear 
challenge.104  Since the moment the Kennedy administration had proposed the MLF in the 
NATO Council in 1963, the PvdA had taken a rather negative stance towards the multilateral 
force. In early 1964, however, advocates of the proposal started to stir themselves, partly 
motivated by the fact that Jean Monnet and his Action Committee had embraced the MLF in 
February 1964, thus making the project appealing to both Europeanists and Atlanticists alike. 
The result was a party wide consultation in November 1964. While the pro- and con-MLF 
camps were not able to reach a consensus during this meeting, the pro-MLF group had gained 
quite some strength in the course of 1964 – a development that reflected a broader national 
trend in the Netherlands.105 At the same time, partly as a result of the mounting Gaullist 
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opposition to the initiative, a reverse trend revealed itself in other European countries as well 
as in the United States.106  
While promoting the MLF in the Netherlands – behind the scenes as well as in the public 
debate surrounding this issue – Van der Beugel kept in close touch with Owen and Schaetzel 
at the State Department who were “most interested” in hearing from him about the 
developments in The Hague. 107  After British Prime Minister Harold Wilson called the MLF a 
“divisive force in Europe”108 in his November 23 speech to parliament, Schaetzel contacted 
Van der Beugel to encourage him to convince Luns during one of their regular Sunday 
breakfasts to issue “a forthright statement of Dutch intentions” in favor of the MLF arguing 
that “given what appears to have been the retrogressive position established by Wilson it 
may be all the more necessary for constructive minded Dutch and Italians to rally to the 
cause.”109 Van der Beugel, who replied from London, in turn informed Schaetzel about the 
atmosphere in England, advising the Americans to keep the conversation with the English 
going since he found the British “more positive than might seem from the Prime Minister’s 
speech.” It would just be very important “not to compromise the time limit,” he argued. 
Furthermore, Van der Beugel informed Schaetzel that no clear public statement was to be 
expected from the Dutch since such a statement would not be likely to lead to any positive 
result before the negotiations with the British. Instead, Van der Beugel suggested that the 
Dutch could play a constructive role by quietly talking to the Germans and the British behind 
the scenes. He also warned Schaetzel and Owen to be cautious about his own role in these 
affairs, saying that “the fact that I see my Dutch colleagues so frequently must be kept, as you 
will understand, as privately as possible because an eventual influence on them always 
diminishes when people know about our very frequent contacts.”110  
European Political Union revisited: The Erhard Plan.  
During his visit to the State Department in November 1964 Van der Beugel had started to 
notice a change in Washington in regard to its European policy: while there were still 
“remnants of the old policy”, his contacts at the State Department now seemed to fall more 
in line with some of his own ideas. After talks with George Ball, Bill Tyler, Bob Schaetzel and 
Henry Owen, he wrote a very upbeat “strictly confidential” memorandum, which he 
distributed within his network, among others to the Dutch ambassador in London, Herman 
van Roijen. “Slowly the State Department begins to realize that the cohesion of the Atlantic 
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world and the interests of the United States are not by definition served in all circumstances 
by European unification now,”111 he asserted. More specifically, he observed that the idea 
that the transatlantic relationship could “exclusively be based on a relation between the 
United States and a unified Europe” was starting to change. At the same time, Van der Beugel 
sensed “a new realization for the first time that [the creation of a European Political Union] 
could be highly dangerous.”112 The Americans now even showed great appreciation for the 
attitude of the Dutch government: 
Our American friends now realize that previous pressures on the Dutch to go along 
with everything which has the appearance of European unification was a wrong 
policy. I explained to them how difficult it was from time to time for those on the 
continent who gave priority to the Atlantic concept and to close relations with the 
United States to see that in fighting this battle they were not supported by the 
diplomacy of the United States and, on the contrary, were left lonely in their 
efforts.113 
Van der Beugel was keen to spread this message to his friends in the Netherlands, where the 
Dutch government was determining its position concerning plans of West-German Chancellor 
Ludwig Erhard to revamp talks between the six EEC countries concerning the creation of a 
European Political Union along intergovernmental lines. During the subsequent months Van 
der Beugel frequently voiced his opposition against this plan in public, pushing instead for 
stronger political and military cooperation within the Atlantic alliance, thus turning himself 
into a driving force behind the Dutch Atlanticist opposition against the plan Erhard.  
The fact that Van der Beugel came to personify the Atlanticist opposition against a 
European Political Union within the Dutch policy debate is also reflected in official documents 
of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. To illustrate, in a November 1964 memorandum for 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Joseph Luns, meant as a first attempt to determine the Dutch 
position with regard to the political aspects of the Plan Erhard, the question was posed 
whether the Dutch should focus on finding compromises or, whether, on behalf of the 
Atlantic relationship the Netherlands should pursue a stagnation policy for the time being. In 
this assessment, the government memorandum explicitly referred to the “stagnation policy” 
option as the “Van der Beugel proposition.”114  
Meanwhile, the American embassy in The Hague maintained in close touch with Van der 
Beugel and kept Washington informed of his activities. After Van der Beugel had published an 
article in Le Monde Diplomatique in November 1964 in which he explained the motivations 
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behind Dutch opposition to a political organization of the Six, the American embassy cabled a 
translation of his article to the State Department, saying that “Van der Beugel does in fact 
present the logic of the Dutch position although Foreign Minister Luns has said that the Dutch 
would not hold out alone for British accession or significant supra-nationality in the event that 
proposals such as those from Bonn, Rome and Brussels were to win support from all others in 
the Six including France.” The American diplomat responsible for the cable did point out, 
however, that “Van der Beugel in private conversation goes somewhat further than the views 
expressed in his article.”115 
Despite the efforts on behalf of the MLF by the State Department’s theologians and to 
Van der Beugel’s great disappointment, President Johnson decided to shelve the multilateral 
force in December 1964. Van der Beugel’s friends at the State Department had been 
effectively side-tracked. With the MLF “relegated to the transatlantic boulevard of broken 
dreams”116 and the Germans pushing for a rehabilitation of talks on a European political 
union, the optimism Van der Beugel had expressed in his Washington memorandum rapidly 
vaporized. “The situation in Europe is even more depressing than ever because of the lack of 
a strong American initiative which the MLF provided but which was taken away by the 
President”, he wrote to Kissinger. “The Germans are rushing into the arms of de Gaulle and 
the friends of the U.S. in Europe who give priority to the Atlantic approach feel baffled and 
isolated.”117 Even Kissinger, who had manifested himself as a fierce opponent to the MLF, 
seemed a little startled by its sudden demise. “I agree with your last paragraph on the 
situation in Europe”, he told Van der Beugel: “I had always opposed the MLF because I had 
thought it put too much strain on the German political fabric for a dubious objective. But 
having gone this far, we should not have dropped matters so completely.”118    
Van der Beugel’s worries augmented after Ludwig Erhard met with Charles de Gaulle at 
Rambouillet in January 1965, where de Gaulle expressed a willingness to re-open discussions 
about a European political union. With an even more concrete prospect of such talks on the 
horizon, Van der Beugel continued to voice his concerns. The Netherlands should reject even 
the invitation of an institutionalized consultation about such a political union, he insisted. By 
doing so the Dutch would not only be able to punch substantially above their weight, but be 
able to make a decisive difference like they had done during the negotiations about the 
Fouchet Plan.119 At the same time, Van der Beugel kept voicing the precondition of British 
participation to any European set-up in the Netherlands, as well as in Britain. “We in the 
Netherlands need Great Britain” he declared in a speech in London in February 1965.120
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 While the Atlanticist school of thought was still dominant at the Dutch Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, the position of minister of Foreign Affairs Joseph Luns was eroding during the 
course of the 1960s. Especially after 1963, foreign policy became more and more a matter of 
discussion within the Dutch cabinet and European policy in particular was increasingly 
approached as cabinet policy. 121 According to Albert Kersten, the latter development was 
partly the result of the growing importance of European decision-making for the Dutch 
national policy, but it was also connected to the policies that Luns had pursued. While his 
actions in reply to the French veto of Great Britain were widely supported in the Netherlands, 
his opposition against a European political union had been less popular.122 In addition, the 
Dutch parliament, which tended to be more inclined towards the Monnet school of thought 
on European integration than the more Atlanticist Ministry of Foreign Affairs, increasingly 
demanded to have a say in the formulation of Dutch foreign policy – a situation that worried 
Ernst van der Beugel as well as some of his Atlanticist friends (not to mention Luns himself). 
While never wavering in his defense of NATO as the cornerstone of Dutch foreign policy, Luns 
did concede to drop the pre-condition of English participation, also known as the prealable 
anglais, during discussions in the Second Chamber in the fall of 1964 – a step back from the 
ideal course of action as envisioned by Ernst van der Beugel.123      
In order to fortify Luns’ anti-Gaullist position in parliament, Ernst van der Beugel and 
some like-minded friends - including Jerôme Heldring, Theo Joekes, Willem Michiels van 
Kessenich, Jaap Kymmell and Berend Jan Udink – decided to compose an open letter in 
support of Luns’ Atlanticist policies on the occasion of his 12,5 year anniversary as minister of 
Foreign Affairs.124 The plan was in fact orchestrated in consultation with the Dutch Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, which had indicated that it would “welcome” such a campaign.125 Once the 
letter had been drafted Van der Beugel called upon his social network to get prominent 
individuals to sign the letter.126 The result was a list with 38 signatures of prominent 
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Dutchmen with very mixed political and professional backgrounds, including statesmen, union 
leaders, professors and justices, bankers and captains of industry, mayors and civil servants – 
all of whom acted in a “purely personal capacity.”127 This emphasis on the private capacity of 
the signatories reveals the same tension as is at play at the Bilderberg meetings: while 
formally acting in an informal capacity these individuals are chosen to participate exactly 
because of the positions they hold in society and it was obviously exactly the status of their 
formal positions in society that contributed weight to the letter.  
The presentation of the letter to minister Luns – which Van der Beugel described as a 
“very cheerful affair” – was crossed by the fall of the Marijnen administration on the very 
same day. 128  To make sure that the fall of the Dutch cabinet did not steal away the thunder 
of the 38, the publication of the letter was cunningly postponed until a few days later. Ernst 
van der Beugel personally delivered the open letter – under embargo – to the different 
newspaper offices with the request to give it ample attention.129 In the end, the letter was 
not only published in numerous newspapers in the Netherlands, but also captured the 
attention of the media in France, Germany and England. The publication of the letter was 
soon followed by a flurry of editorials and opinion pieces discussing its contents. It was also 
discussed in the German Bundestag as well as in the U.S. House of Representatives, and while 
the French government did not formally respond to the letter, French press agency AFP 
reported that the letter had been received “coldly” in government circles.130 Minister Luns 
responded with a public statement expressing his gratitude for the “valuable support” for his 
policies offered by these eminent Dutchmen. Indeed, as multiple commentators were keen to 
point out, the views expressed in the letter were so much in line with Luns’ own views that he 
could very well have written the letter himself.131    
A few weeks after the publication of the letter, de Gaulle rejected Erhard’s plan to 
organize a conference for Foreign Ministers in Venice to discuss the potential re-launch of a 
European political union in May 1965.132  According to the chief diplomatic correspondent of 
the French newspaper France Soir, Maurice Delarue, the French rejection of this plan was a 
direct result of the open letter by the 38 prominent Dutchmen. Since the Dutch Atlanticist 
“manifesto” had been publicly approved by minister Luns the French government was of the 
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opinion that a meeting under these circumstances would be “useless,”133 according to 
Delarue. Officials in The Hague responded that if these assertions were true, Paris was just 
using the letter as an excuse to pass the responsibility of its own unconstructive role to The 
Hague. Meanwhile, Erhard’s attempts at revamping talks on political union were met with 
little enthusiasm in Paris and soon faded into the background.   
Instead, 1965 would be the year of the empty-chair crisis: a six-month French boycott of 
decision-making in Brussels bred by disagreements about the Common Agricultural Policy, 
which were eventually resolved in January 1966 by means of the Luxembourg Compromise. It 
was also the year in which Charles de Gaulle got re-elected, officially for another 7 years. In 
March 1966 de Gaulle withdrew France from the military integration in NATO. All in all, this 
was a rather frustrating period for Atlanticists and Europeanists alike.  At the 1965 Bilderberg 
meeting, which took place at Villa d’Este near lake Como in Italy just a few months before the 
empty chair crises started, Ernst van der Beugel had delivered a paper on the “State of the 
Alliance” in which he analyzed the breakdown of the initial post-war consensus on the 
transatlantic relationship into three schools of thought – the Gaullists, the (Monnet-inspired) 
Europeanists and the Atlanticists, after which he personally pleaded for an Atlanticist 
offensive by deepening and developing “military, economic and political integration, co-
operation and consultation in the Alliance” while “limiting efforts in Europe to the economic 
field.”134 He was still hopeful that maybe the MLF could still be revived in some form for this 
purpose. His Atlanticist plea, however, found little support among the Bilderberg participants. 
It did find its way to the American Secretary of State Dean Rusk, however, though probably 
not as Van der Beugel might have hoped. “There are many contradictory elements underlying 
the concept of European unity and the Atlantic partnership”, American ambassador to 
Germany George McGhee wrote to Rusk after the Bilderberg conference at Villa d’Este. “If we 
are to succeed in both, I believe we must not let one get ahead of another. Compromises 
must be affected all along the way. An uncompromising Atlanticist attitude which leaps over 
Europe altogether, such as that Van der Beugel proposed at the Bilderberg Meeting in Como 
last spring and which was turned down unanimously by the Europeans present, could I 
believe only end in our failure on both counts.” 135  McGhee was obviously not a supporter of 
Van der Beugel’s “uncompromising Atlanticist attitude” at Villa d’Este. While Van der Beugel’s 
ideas for an Atlanticist offensive did not receive much support, McGhee’s assertion that his 
ideas were unanimously rejected by the Europeans present at the Bilderberg conference 
seems too strong and is not reflected in the conference report of the meeting. Instead, this 
might be an exaggeration by the Ambassador who himself was a supporter of the Monnet-
inspired European school of thought, which maintained that a united Europe should serve as 
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a prerequisite for an equal partnership between Europe and the United States.136 Even so, 
the Bilderberg participants at Villa d’Este did come to “the conclusion that little could be done 
as long as de Gaulle remained in power.”137      
Ernst van der Beugel’s Bilderberg analysis of the three schools of thought on 
transatlantic relations unexpectedly received a much wider audience just weeks later when 
columnist James Reston printed it – “against all rules” according to Prince Bernhard – as his 
own brainchild in the New York Times.138 Van der Beugel, however, was preoccupied with 
bigger problems. The MLF, the key instrument to breathe new life into the Atlantic 
Community, was dead and would not be revived as Van der Beugel had hoped.  From now on, 
the emphasis would be on maintaining the transatlantic relations that had been forged during 
the first postwar decade while weathering “the Gaullist driven storms” of the 1960s.139   
Conclusion 
From the perspective of New Diplomatic History, Ernst van der Beugel remains a relevant 
subject of study even after he left the Dutch government because, as this chapter has 
demonstrated, he remained an integral part of the transatlantic diplomatic process. This 
chapter has attempted to answer the question what this role entailed specifically in the 
context of the perceived Gaullist threat to Atlantic unity by focusing on the diplomatic process 
and Van der Beugel’s goals and modus operandi and how his activities related to formal 
diplomacy.  
Ernst van der Beugel manifested himself on the diplomatic playing field as a 
transnational actor representing a realist stream of Atlanticism pursuing the closest possible 
transatlantic relations under strong American leadership based on the idea that the security 
of Western Europe totally depended on the U.S. military guarantee supported by its nuclear 
umbrella. While Charles de Gaulle posed a direct threat to this idea, Van der Beugel also 
regarded the Europeanists who followed Jean Monnet’s school of thought as an indirect but 
still dangerous threat to Atlantic unity because they were willing to give in to Charles de 
Gaulle too easily from Van der Beugel’s perspective. During the period described in this 
chapter the Monnet school of thought was still dominant within the U.S. State Department. 
Van der Beugel and the Europeanists found common ground, however, on the issue of the 
multilateral force, allowing them to join forces in the diplomatic arena.   
In the absence of a formal transatlantic political structure beyond NATO, Ernst van der 
Beugel used the Bilderberg Meetings as an important vehicle in his attempts to manage, 
                                                            
136 “Bilderberg Meetings: Villa D’Este Conference 2-4 April 1965”, box 34, Personal Papers of Edwin Martin, KPL. 
137 Gijswijt, “Uniting the West”, 287.  
138 See: Prince Bernhard’s contribution to “Book on Ernst”, box 27, Folder 1, Shepard Stone Papers, RSCL; James 
Reston, “Challenge to Alliance: A View from Europe’s Attitudes on the Future of NATO, New York Times, 12 April, 
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139 Kenneth Weisbrode, “The State Department’s Bureau of European Affairs in the 1970s”, in Atlantic, Euratlantic or 
Europe-America? Vol.2 Eds. Giles Scott-Smith and Valérie Aubourg (Paris: Soleb, 2011), 194.  
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mediate and strengthen the transatlantic relationship. After Charles de Gaulle’s famous press-
conference created a crisis in transatlantic relations he used the Cannes conference to relieve 
transatlantic tension by offering a forum where problems could be analyzed, frustrations 
vented and positions clarified in a way that was regarded as ‘impossible’ in a formal setting. 
By doing so, the Bilderberg Meetings were used to keep the channels of communication wide 
open in order to counter transatlantic estrangement both on a personal and on an intellectual 
level. In the process, the meetings filled a void that formal diplomacy was unable to fill. 
 Fearing that de Gaulle’s fierce language against the U.S. might estrange the 
Americans from Europe and inspire Congress to retreat into isolationism, Van der Beugel 
more specifically used the Cannes conference to isolate the French by facilitating the creation 
of an unofficial front against the idea of a united Europe as a third force in order to 
demonstrate to the American foreign policy elite and Congressional representatives that de 
Gaulle did not speak for Europe. Instead of focusing his attention mostly on convincing the 
American public of this – as Jérôme Heldring had suggested – Van der Beugel helped to create 
an environment in which this message could effectively be brought across to the U.S. 
decision-making establishment directly. At the same time, he made sure to create an 
atmosphere in which the Bilderberg Meetings would not estrange or antagonize the French, 
but which allowed them to remain engaged in the transatlantic conversation.  
 These meetings were taken very seriously by representatives of the governments of 
participating countries, as illustrated not just by the high-ranking government officials that 
participated, but also, for example, by the French government’s attempt to meddle in the 
proceedings of the Cannes conference. The insights that the Cannes meeting provided into 
the thinking of the Gaullists with regards to Europe in turn provoked Dutch diplomats to take 
formal action to distance them from the French policies in public, e.g. by suggesting to insert 
elements in the Queen’s speech to be delivered on the American continent. State Department 
officials in turn regarded the Bilderberg Meetings as an important channel to foster elite 
support for policies like the MLF. Having been convinced of the value of the MLF as a common 
transatlantic project that could strengthen the Atlantic relationship while opposing de Gaulle, 
Van der Beugel happily cooperated with the facilitation of these efforts. Thus, these 
conferences reverberated in formal diplomacy and left their traces in official diplomatic 
correspondence demonstrating that the formal diplomatic establishment perceived these 
unofficial activities as valuable elements of the diplomatic process. In that sense, it is 
surprising that diplomatic historians have not demonstrated a similar interest in the unofficial 
realm of diplomacy.  
  Ernst van der Beugel did not only work through Bilderberg, although his role in the 
organization gave him a kind of unofficial diplomatic status. He personally maintained close 
contact with and had direct access to formal decision-making establishments on both sides of 
the Atlantic. Within these foreign policy establishments, his presence on the diplomatic 
playing field was not just recognized, but validated through close cooperation on issues of 
mutual interest. He played an active role in exchanging information on the atmosphere, 
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attitude and thinking with regards to specific international policy issues in different localities. 
He regularly informed individuals in his transatlantic network about the sentiments regarding 
specific policies in the United Kingdom, in the United States or on the European continent – a 
key element of the diplomatic practice. Sometimes he took the initiative himself, while at 
other times he was approached by government officials for consultation, thus indicating that 
his observations and contributions were valued and taken seriously by his interlocuteurs. He 
also served as a direct channel of communication between official government 
representatives, for example between U.S. State department officials and Dutch Foreign 
Minister Luns. Clearly, the private realm of transatlantic diplomacy, including the Bilderberg 
meetings, as well as Van der Beugel’s individual unofficial activities did not function in 
isolation from formal diplomacy, but was neatly woven into the web of formal diplomatic 
structures; they fed and complimented each other. 
 Meanwhile, in the Netherlands Van der Beugel also actively tried to influence Dutch 
politics as a private citizen. He did so from behind the scenes, for example in his attempt to 
influence the policies of the Dutch Labor Party with regards to the MLF, but also in public like 
when he mobilized Dutch influentials into a pressure group by means of an open letter 
published in numerous newspapers in an attempt to fortify the Atlanticist position of Foreign 
Minister Luns vis-à-vis the Dutch parliament where Monnet’s ideas found more support – an 
act that eventually also reverberated in formal diplomacy.  
By 1966 new dangers started to manifest themselves on the Western horizon, which 
Van der Beugel regarded as even more acute threats to the Atlantic Community than the 
Gaullist challenge. While the years following the 1963 Brussels breakdown had demonstrated 
that there was a consensus among the great majority of Bilderberg participants about the 
fundamental value of transatlantic relations that had proven strong enough to resist de 
Gaulle’s deviation from this consensus to “weather the Gaullist driven storms of the mid-
1960s”140, Van der Beugel started to ring the alarm in the Bilderberg Steering Committee in 
August 1966 stating that the basic assumptions of “practically every participant in the 
Bilderberg conferences” – like “the need for European integration”, “the need for a maximum 
cohesion in the Atlantic world” and the “need for a strong defensive posture towards the 
Eastern Bloc”– were no longer shared by disturbingly large parts of the populations in the 
West. “I consider the Gaullist deviation as much less dangerous than the complete ignorance 
of and indifference to our basic assumptions in the minds and hearts of a substantial part of 
the population in our part of the world,” he warned. Consequently, the following chapter will 
focus on Van der Beugel’s private activities in response to this new challenge in the light of 
the changing transatlantic landscape during the second half of the 1960’s and the early 1970s.  
                                                            




6. Defense, Détente and the “Average Man” 
This chapter will continue the analysis of Ernst van der Beugel’s diplomatic role and his modus 
operandi from the perspective of New Diplomatic History in the context of the challenge to a 
strong Atlantic defense posed by the coalescence of détente and the democratization of 
foreign affairs during the late 1960’s and early 1970s. While the previous chapter 
predominantly focused on Van der Beugel’s relations with the Atlantic elite and foreign policy 
establishments on both sides of the Atlantic, this chapter will pay more attention to Ernst van 
der Beugel’s private activities in the context of Atlantic public diplomacy and psychological 
warfare. While public diplomacy has traditionally been interpreted as “a state-based 
instrument used by foreign ministries and other government agencies to engage and 
persuade foreign publics for the purpose of influencing their governments”, scholars in 
international relations as well as in diplomatic and communication studies are increasingly 
studying the role of non-state actors in public diplomacy. As a result, “public diplomacy has 
come to mean an instrument used by states, associations of states, and some sub-state and 
non-state actors to understand cultures, attitudes, and behavior; build and manage 
relationships; and influence thoughts and mobilize actions to advance their interests and 
values.”1   
Moreover, in today’s “complex world of transnational relations” a more holistic 
understanding of public diplomacy also breaks down the rigid separation between outreach 
to domestic and foreign publics in creating a conducive context for more concrete diplomatic 
goals.2 Melissen argues that public diplomacy can thus be seen as “a metaphor for the 
democratization of diplomacy” as it has not only brought diplomats to the forefront, “making 
them more visible than they have ever been”, but its development has also “been 
instrumental in opening up the traditionally closed domain of accredited practitioners.”3 
When we apply this more inclusive frame to our analysis of Ernst van der Beugel’s 
transatlantic activities, it becomes clear that Van der Beugel, as a transnational actor, already 
engaged in this kind of unofficial public diplomacy during the 1960s and 1970s – indeed, 
during a key period in the democratization of foreign policy.  At the same time, this chapter 
will demonstrate how these public diplomacy activities were part of a bigger continuous 
effort to contribute to the management of the transatlantic relationship through both public 
channels and diplomatic elite circuits. 
 
                                                            
1 Bruce Gregory, “American Public Diplomacy: Enduring Characteristics, Elusive Transformation”, The Hague Journal 
of Diplomacy, 6:3/4 (2011): 353.  
2 Jan Melissen, “Beyond the New Public Diplomacy”, Clingendael Paper No. 3, (The Hague: Netherlands Institute for 
International Relations ‘Clingendael’, 2011): 3, 19-20.  
3 Ibid, 2. 
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Détente and the Soviet threat 
Western cooperation, according to Ernst van der Beugel, was most of all a child of the Cold 
War conceived by the combined elements of the perceived Soviet threat and American 
hegemony, which he understood in terms of ‘accepted’ and ‘acceptable’ leadership.  To a 
lesser extent he believed it was also born out of the post-war realization that certain 
problems – especially in the economic and security realms – could no longer be solved within 
the limited framework of the nation state.4 During the course of the 1960’s Van der Beugel 
observed how all three of these elements became subject to erosion, thus creating new 
threats to Atlantic cohesion and consequently to the security of the West. As Van der Beugel 
put it in February 1968: 
There is no field, whether political or economic or monetary in which things do not 
drift apart. Priorities in the U.S., by necessity of the circumstances have the 
tendency to change; Western Europe is in a complete mess; (…) and we talk about 
detente without knowing what detente is exactly about and what consequences 
we should draw from it. In other words, while the situation is screaming for a 
maximum cohesion of the West in practically every field, things have the tendency 
to fall apart.5  
By 1966 Ernst van der Beugel had pretty much consolidated the set-up of his freestyle career 
in trans-Atlantic affairs. In January 1966 he defended his dissertation “From Marshall Aid to 
Atlantic Partnership: European integration as a Concern of American Foreign Policy” at the 
Netherlands School of Economics in Rotterdam. The book was published by Elsevier with a 
foreword by his close friend and rising star Henry Kissinger. Subsequently, in October 1966 
Van der Beugel was appointed as Professor of Post-War Western Cooperation at Leiden 
University – a position made possible by an endowment from the Leiden University Fund. 
While many of his other activities were more elusive to the public eye – as they took place 
behind the scenes in boardrooms and through back channels – Ernst van der Beugel’s role as 
professor gave him a clear position and a renewed kind of status as an expert. In this new 
capacity, Van der Beugel started to play a more prominent role in the public debate. As 
Jérôme Heldring had already pointed out in his 1963 column suggesting Van der Beugel 
should take the task of private transatlantic public diplomacy upon himself, public opinion 
mattered a great deal in international relations. This observation only grew in relevance 
during the course of the 1960’s when foreign policy increasingly became a subject of Dutch 
public debate. As had been the case with the Gaullist challenge, international relations could 
not be separated from domestic developments in public opinion and policy making, thus 
rousing Ernst van der Beugel into action on the domestic as well as on the international front.  
                                                            
4 See: “De huidige problemen in de Westelijke Samenwerking - Voordracht gehouden op het Congres ter gelegenheid 
van het 100-jarig bestaan van de Hogere Krijgsschool op 19 november 1968”, box “Lezingen EvdB”, AHB; “Verslag van 
het Congres ‘Afschrikking en Ontspanning’”, Internationale Spectator, 23:1 (1969): 37. 
5 E.H. van der Beugel to Dr. Fabio Luca Cavazza, 2 February 1968, file 7, EvdB.  
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Consequently, this chapter focuses on Ernst van der Beugel’s analysis of the changing 
transatlantic landscape during the late 1960’s and early 1970’s and his subsequent efforts in 
pursuit of Atlantic cohesion with an emphasis on the legitimization of close Atlantic 
cooperation and a strong defense effort in the face of détente and the breakdown of the Cold 
War consensus.   
While the first 10-15 years of the Atlantic alliance had been characterized by a sense of 
clarity undergirded by a basic consensus about the Soviet threat which led to a general 
recognition of the necessity to arm and defend the West, the alliance entered a twilight zone 
in the course of the 1960’s as tensions in the relationship between East and West started to 
diminish and the consensus about the character of the Soviet threat broke down.6 The 
cautious rapprochement between East and West that began during the early 1960’s started to 
gain a more concrete form towards the end of the decade as demonstrated by NATO’s 
adoption of the Harmel Report in December 1967, which extended the organization’s mission 
in response to the changing Cold War framework.  Next to its original job “to maintain 
adequate military strength and political solidarity to deter aggression and other forms of 
pressure and to defend the territory of member countries if aggression should occur” NATO 
would now also “pursue the search for progress towards a more stable relationship in which 
underlying issues can be solved.”7 Thus, as Geir Lundestad has pointed out, the report not 
only ratified the process of détente but also gave NATO an important role in the process.8  
Half a year later, in July 1968, a Non-Proliferation Treaty was signed by the U.S. and the Soviet 
Union as well as some other nations. In 1969 détente entered a new phase. With Richard 
Nixon in the White House and Willy Brandt pursuing Ostpolitik in West-Germany, the process 
was further formalized and ushered into the ‘era of negotiations’.9 Moreover, 1969 was also 
the year in which the Soviet Union realized its goal of reaching strategic parity with the United 
States, making it a “turning point in the history of the Cold War” according to Cold War 
historian John Lewis Gaddis. 10   
At the 1967 Bilderberg conference in Cambridge, England Foreign minister Joseph Luns 
had asked Ernst van der Beugel to serve as a Dutch rapporteur for the NATO study on the 
future of the alliance that eventually led to the Harmel report – a request Van der Beugel 
seriously considered. He was briefed on the subject by the Dutch Permanent NATO 
Representative Han Boon and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and discussed the option 
with the American Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Eugene V. Rostow and the U.S. 
                                                            
6 “Defensie-Inspanning Zinvol”, De Reserve-officier (1967), file 47, EvdB, NAH; “Prof. Van der Beugel: Westen in 
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7 Qtd. In: Geir Lundestad, The United States and Western Europe since 1945: From “Empire” by Invitation to 
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10 Qtd. In Hellema, Nederland en de Jaren Zeventig, 120.  
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Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council Harlan Cleveland. Both Americans 
supported Van der Beugel’s appointment and were disappointed to find out shortly 
afterwards that the Dutchman had decided against accepting the position.11 The reason was 
“purely a matter of time” Van der Beugel explained. He considered the study as very 
important, but his commitments for the next three months were such that he could not give it 
the absolute priority that it deserved.12  
Ernst van der Beugel remained indeed very concerned about the future of NATO, which 
he avidly tried to support though his private efforts. During the second half of the 1960’s, he 
carved out a place for himself as a public intellectual by sharing his increasingly disquieting 
observations of “disintegrating factors” within the Atlantic Community through a rich 
collection of speeches and articles. The evolving process of détente played a major role in 
these observations. To Van der Beugel’s consternation, détente caused many in the West to 
think that the Soviet threat had diminished and that the Cold War was over. Many believed, 
according to Van der Beugel “that the interpretation of the external threat has either been 
wrong or that it has been outdated, that the existence of the two blocs stands in the way of a 
peaceful solution in the world and especially in Europe; that ideological differences are 
irrelevant for political relations; that, consequently, the dissolution of the two blocks would 
mean a positive contribution for the attainment of peace; that the dissolution of the blocks 
would mean that Western Europe should free itself from the hegemonic position of the 
United States and that maintaining and à fortiori strengthening NATO is a step back to an 
angry and irrelevant past.” In fact, between this view and the other “extreme” point of view 
which stated “that nothing has changed and that what was relevant in 1947 is still as relevant 
today” Van der Beugel observed “tens of thousands of opinions and publications, which 
testify more or less to the dissatisfaction with the status quo.”13  
The consensus that once existed about the Soviet threat had clearly broken down and 
the great variety of interpretations of détente obfuscated the need for close transatlantic 
unity as well as the need for a robust Atlantic defense.  Since Van der Beugel considered the 
“external threat as one of the most important impulses of the process of Western 
cooperation” it logically followed that “a change in the evaluation of that threat would imply 
a weakening” of this cooperation.14 This development greatly worried Ernst van der Beugel, 
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who did not believe that détente reflected any actual changes in the aims and motives of the 
Soviet Union.  Instead, he belonged to the skeptics who, as Max Kohnstamm phrased it, 
doubted “whether anything has really changed except the girl’s make-up and our way of 
looking at her.”15 
The enduring malicious objectives of the Soviet Union had been openly reaffirmed in the 
final communiqué of the April 1967 Conference of the communist Parties in Karlovy Vary, 
Czechoslovakia, Van der Beugel argued. These included the dismantling of NATO, the removal 
of the American presence from the European continent and the permanent discrimination 
against the Federal Republic of Germany.16 In addition to this line of conduct, which had not 
changed since 1945, he added the Russian desire to completely dominate the Soviet 
imperium and – when given the opportunity – to expand it.17 Developments like the non-
proliferation treaty or agreements about nuclear testing were not in conflict with these 
objectives, but fitted perfectly within the narrow interpretation of détente as “the simple 
desire to avoid a nuclear conflict”, which also happened to be the definition Van der Beugel 
preferred to use.18  “Essentially, détente is not more and not less than the will of the 
superpowers to avoid a military confrontation”19, he maintained. While Van der Beugel 
hoped that the dialogue between the United States and the Soviet Union on the above 
mentioned issues would continue, it should never obfuscate the underlying objectives of the 
Soviet Union, which remained unchanged: “What has not changed is that we still live in a 
world which is partly dominated by the rivalry of the two systems. East is East and West is 
West and in the foreseeable future the punishment for forgetting this will be severe.”20  
According to Ernst van der Beugel, the easing of East-West tensions was the result of 
the strength and cohesion that the West had shown after the Second World War. Now, the 
Atlantic alliance was in danger of becoming a victim of its own success.21 After all, a reduction 
in the strength and cohesion of the West in response to détente would destroy the very 
instruments that had brought about this change in the first place and would enable the Soviet 
Union to increase its influence and to bring the nations of Western Europe into a form of 
subordination through which it could strengthen its position vis-à-vis the only other relevant 
power in the world: the United States. This would not necessarily have to be a military 
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subordination according to Van der Beugel; it could just as well be political in nature leading 
to the ‘finlandization’ of Europe.22 Either way, it would be supported by an enormous military 
power, which was only increasing in strength.23 The only thing that had kept the Soviet Union 
from extending its domination over Western Europe was that it had been kept in check by a 
strong opposing power. If that counter-power would diminish the communists would 
immediately make use of this situation since, as Van der Beugel perceived the situation 
through his realist spectacles, “The Russians are simply practicing a politics of immediately 
filling up any power vacuum [that might occur].”24 
While Ernst van der Beugel consistently stressed the importance of power relations and 
often described the Atlantic Community as a security community in his speeches and 
publications, he believed it was a mistake to disregard the importance of value systems and 
ideology in this context. Power politics void of ideological considerations were senseless, he 
claimed. Jérôme Heldring, with whom Van der Beugel usually found himself in agreement, did 
not share this conviction. In January 1968, this difference of view led to a rhetorical dispute 
between the two men that ended up on the pages of the Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant. 
“Why are you and I afraid of a power vacuum being filled up by the Soviet Union? Not just 
because of the strictly theoretical reason that every power should be kept in check by a 
countervailing power?” Van der Beugel asked Heldring while following up with his own 
answer to the question: 
We are seriously concerned about such a development because the power vacuum 
in which we in Europe would live would be filled, not by a theoretical power but by 
the power of the Soviet Union, which advocates a form of society in which neither 
you nor I would wish to live, nor could live. To consider this as a secondary reason 
that ought to be subordinated by the pure theory that a power should be kept in 
check by a countervailing power is unrealistic and narrow-minded, and what will 
appeal more to you, factually incorrect.25 
Western Europe needed to cooperate closely with the United States because it belonged to 
the same community of values; a civilization that was being threatened by the power of the 
Soviet Union that desired to impose a system of values under which Van der Beugel did not 
desire to live.26 “Individual freedom”, Van der Beugel argued in multiple speeches, “is not a 
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marginal phenomenon. It is fundamental. A system that pursues individual freedom – and 
that is what happens in the countries of the Western system – often shows many weaknesses, 
flaws and shortcomings, but it demonstrates to be so clearly superior to a system that denies 
these freedoms that an obfuscation or even a denial of these differences must invoke the 
judgment of a lack of integrity.”27  While Van der Beugel believed the threat of a full-out 
nuclear war had faded, he was convinced that the political threat of falling prey to the 
domination of a reprehensible political system had not faded a bit and was still to be feared – 
a conviction he tried to convey to whomever would listen. “I realize,” he acknowledged, “that 
this point of view is often classified as Cold War-orthodoxy carried by our trauma of the 
1930’s and inspired by an outdated view of the power relations in the world or the intentions 
of those with respect to whom we have built up that strength. I do not want there to be any 
misunderstanding about the fact that I belong to that orthodoxy and that I would see a 
weakening of that strength or the creation of unclear situations as a calamity that would 
either bring the war closer or disturb the balance of power and at the very least it would 
expose us in Europe to the political pressure of the Soviet Union.”28  Consequently, Van der 
Beugel argued that “European security is for the time being still bound to maintaining the 
structure, organization and power of the Western World.”29 In this, Van der Beugel believed 
that American leadership and a continued American presence on the European continent 
played a central role. The American role and presence in Europe, however, had also become 
subject to erosion.  
A Decline in Accepted and Acceptable American Leadership 
American leadership in the Atlantic Community was a two way street according to Van der 
Beugel: not only should it be accepted by the receiving party (the Europeans), it also had to 
be embraced by the party exercising power (the Americans). During the course of the 1960’s, 
Van der Beugel observed how both European acceptance of American leadership and the 
American desire to assert leadership on the European continent were deteriorating. The 
Vietnam War played a key role in this process. “However one thinks about the American 
engagement in Vietnam – and in many of those thoughts I am often struck by the frightful 
lack of nuance in those judgments – one thing is certain, namely that Vietnam has sucked 
away both the material and mental sources of other objects of its foreign policy, and 
particularly from the process of Western cooperation,”30 Van der Beugel observed. “Nobody 
can deny that the intense preoccupation with Europe by the United States has been 
substituted by its commitment to the war in Vietnam. I belong to those who support in 
                                                                                                                                                             
kracht in de Westelijke wereld van heden heeft onder meer tot doel het handhaven en verdedigen van een bepaalde 
maatschappijvorm. Spaak noemde het zelfs – en naar mijn mening terecht – een beschaving.” 
27 Van der Beugel, “Changes in the Western World”, 19. 
28 “Verslag van het Congres ‘Afschrikking en Ontspanning’”, 40 (translation mine). 
29 Van der Beugel, “Stadium Generale” (translation mine). 
30 Van der Beugel, “De huidige problemen in de Westelijke Samenwerking” (translation mine). 
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general America’s role in that area because I feel that the outcome of this struggle is as much 
in our interest as in that of our American friends. We all are committed to America’s prestige 
because it is the position and prestige of the only relevant power in the free world of which 
we are a part.”31 Van der Beugel acknowledged however that American prestige was also 
greatly undermined by the Vietnam War, which served as a key catalyst for criticism of the 
United States in Western Europe.32  
To make matters worse, the Vietnam War coincided with the manifestation of immense 
problems in American society itself, especially with regards to issues of race and poverty; “the 
discovery that an unbearable tension can develop between the blessings of the system and 
the neglect of gaping wounds”33 as Van der Beugel put it, which further amplified a shift in 
American priorities away from Europe. “If we add to this a general fatigue with regards to 
carrying global responsibilities, an endangered balance of payments and an increasing 
estrangement of those groups who helped to design and carry out America’s post-war 
politics, it is no wonder that [America’s] hegemonic position (…) has been seriously 
weakened, not in terms of power, but in terms of accepted and acceptable leadership”34, 
Van der Beugel concluded. Europeans were less eager to accept American leadership and 
Americans were less inclined to provide it.  While the U.S. was struggling with domestic 
unrest, a balance of payments problem and the War in Vietnam, Western Europe had grown 
stronger economically and increasingly Americans started to wonder why Europeans could 
not pick up more of the burden of their own defense.35  
The Atlantic Elite and the ‘Average Man’ 
Meanwhile, the Atlantic elite tried to come to grips with this shifting trans-Atlantic landscape. 
At the 1967 Bilderberg meeting in Cambridge, England the question was explored whether 
the basic concepts of Atlantic cooperation remained valid for the evolving world situation. 
“What should the Atlantic Alliance be – if there should be an Atlantic Alliance; in an era of 
détente – if there is any détente?” In these words Max Kohnstamm rephrased the central 
question in an attempt to sum up the conclusions of the debate following papers by the 
German journalist Theo Sommer and the renowned Harvard professor of international 
relations Stanley Hoffman.  As it turned out, the participants of the conference had trouble 
getting beyond defining the “evolving world situation” in the first place. No agreement could 
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be reached about the nature of the context in which the Atlantic alliance was operating: “We 
differ as to how this détente should be defined and where it is leading to”, Max Kohnstamm 
observed. There was disagreement about the objectives of the alliance and he perceived “a 
considerable amount of disagreement concerning our means” as well as about “the emphasis 
that should be placed on national action on the one hand and alliance action on the other in 
the use of military and political forces.” There was also divergence of opinion on the non-
proliferation treaty and about the exact nature of the Soviet threat.36 As Lord Shawcross 
wrote to Ernst van der Beugel afterwards, the conference brought home “the force of some 
of the disharmonies and the differences of objective which exist in the Atlantic alliance” 
making it “all the more obvious how much we ought to work to overcome some of the 
differences which exist and to find a sensible modus vivendi for the future.”37  
Ernst van der Beugel could not agree more. He was very worried about the 
fragmentation of views that also manifested itself at the conference and during the following 
decade the Bilderberg Meetings served as a central forum where the Atlantic elite tried to 
come to grips with the evolving world situation. The Ford Foundation also saw an important 
role for Bilderberg in this context; in a way as a private substitute to make up for the lack of 
attention given to Europe by the American government.  In 1968, the foundation decided to 
approve a $50.000 grant to cover Bilderberg expenses during the following three years stating 
that “given the present state of tension in European-American relations, contacts of this kind 
should be cultivated” especially in the context of “European concerns that U.S. Government 
policy is not giving sufficient attention to Europe (on account of our involvement in Asia).”38  
On Van der Beugel’s instigation the debate on “the relations between the West and the 
Communist countries” was continued at the 1968 Bilderberg conference in Mont Tremblant, 
Canada.39 This time, “in appraising the shortcomings and imperfections of the Atlantic 
Alliance, considerable attention was paid to the unsatisfactory state of public opinion vis-a-vis 
NATO.” During the discussion “various speakers stressed the importance of taking action to 
win the support of the public for the Western alliance.”40 While the debate in Mont 
Tremblant had again exposed a division of views on the evolving Cold War context, a certain 
consensus about the fundamental importance of the Atlantic alliance could still be detected 
among Bilderberg participants. What worried Van der Beugel most was that this consensus no 
longer reflected general trends among the public at large: the Atlantic elite had run out of 
sync with the general public in the countries represented at the Bilderberg conferences. 
Consequently, in finding a sensible modus vivendi for the future trying to foster mutual 
understanding among the elite did no longer suffice.  
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Already in August 1966, Ernst van der Beugel had rung the alarm bells within the 
Bilderberg Steering Committee concerning the “widening gap between the views (…) of the 
leading elites of our countries whose members still hold most of the vital posts in the Western 
world on the one hand, and, on the other, the great mass of people, and most especially the 
young”. In the past, Van der Beugel argued, “practically everybody in a position of influence in 
the Western World and practically every participant in the Bilderberg conferences agreed on 
a few basic assumptions” among which were the “need for a maximum of cohesion in the 
Atlantic world” and the “need for a strong defensive posture towards the Eastern Bloc”. Even 
more important, according to Van der Beugel, was the fact that “in agreeing to these basic 
assumptions the Bilderberg participants represented the main current of political thought in 
their respective countries”. Now that this was no longer the case, “the necessity for a strong 
and cohesive Atlantic world and for the strongest possible ties between the United States and 
Europe” was “in danger of becoming the credo of a very small group which is essentially the 
establishment of 1952 not that of 1966 and certainly not that of the seventies.”41  
In this context, Van der Beugel was especially worried about “the complete ignorance of 
and indifference to our basic assumptions in the minds and hearts of such a substantial 
segment of the population in our part of the world,” which he considered to be very 
“dangerous”.42 After accepting an invitation as an “independent speaker” by NATO’s Supreme 
Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General Goodpaster, in May 1970 to give a critical 
speech on “the Preservation of an Effective Alliance in the 1970s” to the NATO leadership at 
SHAPEX, Van der Beugel identified this as the key challenge to the future of the alliance.43 
“The time is over that foreign and military policy was formulated and executed by a small 
elite”, he declared. “The average person in our countries is more than ever important in 
relation to NATO.” He did not even try to hide his elitist disdain of these developments as he 
admitted to “have a certain nostalgia” for the period when the elite did not have to pay 
attention to the masses stating that he was “not overly enthusiastic about all the political, 
military and strategic theories of protestant clergyman, marrying priests, new leftish 
sociologists, leaders of student movements, television commentators and even some 
members of parliament.” Even so, they were no longer to be ignored: “we must admit that 
they want to be more involved in the process of decision making in foreign policy and its 
military consequence than formerly,” he acknowledged. “Therefore the perspective of the 
average person of NATO becomes more important.”44  
The ensuing situation created a major challenge for the Atlantic alliance: while the 
Americans were demanding an increase in the European defense contribution – and rightly so 
according to Van der Beugel – public opinion seemed to be moving in the opposite 
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direction.45 Increasingly, raising the defense budget was going to be a hard sell in most 
European countries. According to Van der Beugel, it was particularly difficult to mobilize a 
consensus behind NATO because the average person, notwithstanding all available 
information, was “confused” about the organization. This confusion was a result of 
developments like détente, nuclear parity and the diminishing role of American leadership in 
Europe, but also of the subsequent change in NATO’s military strategy from the black and 
white simplicity of “massive retaliation” to the more complex strategy of “flexible response”, 
which was harder to explain to the general public. For more than a decade it had been 
“hammered” into the minds of European citizens that conventional forces were practically 
irrelevant for NATO, and now they “suddenly had to accept that conventional forces were not 
only meaningful but vital for the flexible response strategy and that there was no longer a 
nuclear superiority of the United States.”46  This message had not come across yet and to 
change this Ernst van der Beugel emphasized the importance of making sure “that the thesis 
that substantial conventional forces are a condition sine qua non for stability and peace in this 
part of the world” be translated into the “language of the average man.” This was crucial Van 
der Beugel emphasized “because in our modern times we need the understanding and the 
consent of broad groups of average people to implement policies of this nature.” For a large 
part, this was a matter of ‘education’. Van der Beugel was very critical of the way in which the 
public had been informed, especially by the news media, but he believed that this could still 
be corrected. “There are fortunately even now on both sides of the Ocean majorities which, if 
properly informed, would still be in support of the basic political assumptions from which 
NATO was born”, he claimed. “But important and vocal groups have dropped out of the 
consensus.”47 Consequently, he considered “bringing back, at least the serious fragment of 
those groups, to the view that Western cooperation is not a relic of a bygone era” as essential 
for the perseverance of the Atlantic Community.48  
An important segment of these groups consisted of a new generation that had grown up 
after the Second World War. Their falling out could partly be explained by the development of 
a generation gap – a challenge in itself that the next chapter will focus on in more detail. But, 
Van der Beugel argued, “this is not only a matter of generations – the so – called generation 
gap. The change is more profound. Increasingly no clear distinction can be drawn between 
domestic and foreign policy and when there are rather fundamental changes in our domestic 
political and social structures they must have a serious impact on the Western system and the 
foreign policy of the countries in the West. (…) I think that for the survival of the Western 
system – of our kind of society – it is essential that we will do everything to restore a certain 
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consensus about our relations with the Communist world.”49  In the context of Atlantic 
security, Van der Beugel believed it was the task of the “very small well informed group of 
military personnel and diplomats” to convince the masses about the necessity of a strong 
defense contribution.50 He believed this was first and foremost a task for the national 
governments.51 In the Netherlands, however, he found that the national government was not 
pro-active enough in this field. Consequently, it was in this perceived void that Ernst van der 
Beugel stepped forward.  
In doing so, Van der Beugel certainly was not the only or the first private actor taking up 
a role in transatlantic public diplomacy. As Valérie Aubourg has pointed out, the development 
of NATO’s Information Service (NATIS) was intertwined with the organic grass-root 
development of Atlantic NGO’s, which led to a complementary role in transatlantic 
diplomacy. While NATO’s member governments had a clear perception of the importance of 
public opinion, NATIS had been faced with strong limitations from the start. Government 
representatives had no intention of giving up their national prerogatives in the field of 
information policy and NATO did not want to come across as aggressive. A too belligerent 
public diplomacy campaign was regarded as particularly counterproductive as it might 
actually start to reek of communist-like propaganda, damaging its credibility in the West.52 In 
contrast, private support from transatlantic civil society emphasized a view of the alliance as a 
“defensive cooperation between free, democratic states.” Most important, however, was the 
fact that NATO relied on private actors “as opinion framers to spread out its message much 
more efficiently than through official propaganda.”53  Thus, from early on NATO outsourced 
part of its public diplomacy to private proxies as NATIS deliberately cooperated with non-
state actors to spread a better understanding of NATO, its aims and necessity, thus including 
them “among recognized actors in transatlantic public diplomacy.”54 As Aubourg put it: 
“governments and official institutions were of course essential [in promoting the Atlantic 
alliance], but so were middle-level elites – including public intellectuals, the media, and non-
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governmental organizations for example – who captured the fleeting ideas about the Atlantic 
Community and acted as a transmission belt to the larger public.”55  
The Dutch Scene: Nieuw Links, the PvdA and the Vietnam Letter 
Also in the Netherlands Van der Beugel’s views were running out of vogue during the late 
1960s as voices more critical of the status quo and especially of the establishment – to which 
Van der Beugel clearly belonged – were gaining strength and the broad post-war consensus 
underlying Dutch defense and security policy started to erode. The War in Vietnam (which 
was formally supported by the Dutch government), NATO, the arms race and the overall 
compliant attitude of the Dutch government towards the United States all became subject of 
social debate and criticism. “Current fashion”, Van der Beugel observed in 1967, “is 
characterized by long hair, short skirts and anti-Americanism.”56  
Cracks in the post-war foreign policy and security consensus also became visible within 
the Dutch Labor Party.57 While the PvdA had traditionally been supportive of the Atlantic 
alliance, in 1966 a radical group of reformists that came to be known as Nieuw Links (New 
Left) came to the fore within the party. To Van der Beugel’s chagrin, the rise of Nieuw Links 
led to a more vocal opposition to ‘Cold War dogmas’ accompanied, among other things, with 
pleas for a ‘critical NATO-membership’ and a decrease of the defense budget.58  In an attempt 
to do away with the Cold War mentality, members of Nieuw Links wanted to replace the 
preoccupation with the East-West divide by more attention for the North-South divide and a 
greater role for the Netherlands in the Third World. Van der Beugel, who still regarded Europe 
as a key theatre in a military and ideological stand-off between East and West, regarded this 
as a dangerous development, arguing that the punishment of such a shift of attention would 
be “severe”. 59   
In the spring of 1966 criticism regarding America’s Vietnam policy appeared so popular 
that the PvdA party leadership was tempted to see it as a means to gain votes in its campaign 
for the provincial elections. Hence, on May 2, PvdA chair Sjeng Tans publicly delivered a 
critical letter on America’s Vietnam policy to the U.S. ambassador to the Netherlands, William 
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Tyler. In the letter, which received a great deal of attention in the Dutch media, the PvdA 
leadership informed the American government that Dutch public opinion was growing 
increasingly disturbed by the enduring war in Vietnam and subsequently requested the 
Americans to stop their bombing campaign in Vietnam in order “to restore the shaken faith in 
the purposes of American politics.”60  
Ernst Van der Beugel strongly disagreed with this rather blunt and undiplomatic move 
by his own party. Together with three other prominent PvdA party members of the older 
generation – Frans Goedhart, Marinus van der Goes van Naters and Lou de Jong61 – he 
composed a critical response to the Vietnam letter which was published in two prominent 
Dutch Newspapers: Het Parool and Het Vrije Volk. In their response, the four critics accused 
the party leadership of defiling the international political-psychological climate and of playing 
into the hands of the communists by exercising “pacifist capitulation politics”. They 
furthermore warned the party leadership that it “should in no way cooperate with those who 
try to put pressure on America to ensure that the people in Vietnam will be left to their fate in 
their fight against the communists.” Instead, all the horrors of the Vietnam War should be 
seen as the responsibility of the instigators, “namely the communists in Hanoi, Peking and 
Moscow.”62  According to the writers, those who realized that resistance against communism 
“ought to be exercised with strength” were deeply disappointed and it was now up to the 
party leadership to do everything in its power to regain the trust of this group. During the 
course of 1967, however, it became increasingly clear that individuals like Ernst van der 
Beugel, represented a minority in the PvdA and the party leadership proved to be more 
interested in accommodating Nieuw Links than regaining the favor of the angry old guard.63     
In October 1966 Van der Beugel vented his remaining frustrations about the Vietnam 
letter in an opinion article in Het Parool and the PvdA journal Socialisme en Democratie. He 
now requested a clarification from the party leadership with regard to the letter on Vietnam 
and added the matter of the letter’s timing, namely weeks before the provincial elections, to 
his earlier voiced concerns while accusing the party leadership of jeopardizing Dutch relations 
with the Americans merely for the sake of domestic political purposes; in other words: to gain 
votes. Van der Beugel furthermore defended the United States as Holland’s greatest ally, 
reminding his readers of America’s benevolent role in and following the Second World War 
and as defender of the Free World in the Cold War. While this did not mean that the Dutch or 
the PvdA should accept America’s policy in Vietnam at face value, without any room for 
criticism, it did mean, Van der Beugel explained, that the way in which the United States 
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would solve this problem was an issue in which the Dutch people including PvdA members – 
as free people – were intimately involved.  “However one thinks about the question whether 
Vietnam is the ideal place to commit so much American might and prestige, today we have to 
deal with the fact that this commitment is there and that an American defeat or humiliation is 
not tolerable – also not for us – because it would seriously impair the position of the only 
source of power in the Western World.” In the rest of the article, Van der Beugel went on to 
defend the American position and – again – suggested a communist plot. “Nowhere has the 
communist propaganda worked so effective and so subtle as in the case of the Vietnam-issue, 
not even in their attempts to systematically fuel fears of Germany”64, he argued.   
The PvdA’s international secretary Piet Dankert replied to Van der Beugel’s complaints 
on behalf of the party leadership in the same issue of Socialisme en Democratie. The party 
leadership’s letter to the American ambassador was not so much about the goals as it was 
about the methods of the Vietnam War, he explained. On the latter subject, however, Van der 
Beugel et al had been awfully silent. While arguing for an informed debate about a complex 
issue they had made themselves guilty of simplistic rhetoric that totally defied any such 
complexities, Dankert argued, while he, in turn, compared the style of the initial publication 
by the four critics of the Vietnam letter to the rhetoric used in communist propaganda. 
Dankert ended his piece by clarifying that the party leadership’s letter should first and 
foremost be understood as an expression of sympathy with those in the United States who 
strive towards a reasonable compromise that meets the need for order, rest and peace of 
great segments of the people of South-Vietnam.65   
In April 1967, Van der Beugel signed a petition of the Reaktiekomité Vietnam, a group of 
pro-America demonstrators set up by students from Rotterdam. In an effort to counter the 
anti-Vietnam War protesters, the group organized a demonstration during which they 
delivered a letter of support for America’s Vietnam policy to the American Ambassador and a 
petition of a similar nature to the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Lou de Jong and Van der 
Goes van Naters were also among the signatories of the letter showing support for the 
Americans in Vietnam.66 In November 1967, Nieuw Links won seven seats in the PvdA party 
council. After talks with the PvdA leadership in late 1967, in which they had shown no interest 
in countering the ‘anti-American’ forces unleashed within the party by Nieuw Links, Van der 
Beugel decided to terminate his PvdA membership in December 1967. He did so silently and 
never became a member of another political party again.67  
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The Dutch Defense Debate 
During most of the 1960’s, the Dutch defense contribution had decreased as a percentage of 
the Dutch GDP. While in 1962 the Netherlands dedicated 5,1 percent of its gross national 
income to its defense, this number had declined to 3,8 percent by 1970.68  Van der Beugel not 
only believed that this budgetary trend had to be turned around in order to meet the NATO 
requirements, but was also convinced that the Dutch armed forces needed to be reformed so 
as to become more efficient. Both issues were highly controversial. In response to Van der 
Beugel’s SHAPEX speech on ‘NATO and the Average Man’, professor Jaap Kymmell had 
written to him that “in essence, we can only arouse public interest in and appreciation for 
NATO and for the defense effort if we make the people afraid; afraid of the departure of the 
Americans and afraid of the dependence on the Russians. More information about the 
alliance, strategic conceptions, nuclear weapons, etc. essentially will not help.”69 While the 
Soviet threat and the dangers of an American retreat from the European continent were 
certainly central recurring themes in Van der Beugel’s repertoire as a public intellectual, it 
was another Dutchman who, in the summer of 1970, succeeded to ignite a real national 
debate on the future of the Dutch defense by drawing upon some of the country’s worst 
fears.  
In June 1970, Lou de Jong, at the time the most renowned Dutch historian of the Second 
World War, delivered a speech titled “The Crisis of Our Defense” to an audience of former 
World War II political prisoners in the old Dutch city of Delft in which he drew direct parallels 
between the deplorable state of the Dutch military during the run-up to the Second World 
War and the current situation. History, de Jong argued, was repeating itself.70 De Jong, who 
was one of the PvdA members who had joined Ernst van der Beugel in his protest against the 
party’s Vietnam letter to the American ambassador, not only noticed a lack of public support 
for the Dutch armed forces, but also argued that the military itself was not trained nor 
equipped well enough to quickly repel a possible attack from the Warschaupact countries. 71 
With regards to the Dutch transatlantic commitments he also warned that: 
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A situation threatens to arise in which our Army (I will just have to limit myself to 
that now) because of a lack of means – through obsolete armaments, through 
worn-out vehicles, though insufficient training, is simply incapable of performing 
the defensive task which it has to carry out in the framework of the alliance.72 
As Jan Willem Honig has pointed out, de Jong’s speech “for the first time effectively drew the 
attention of a wide audience to the fact that all was not well with Holland’s defense.” Thus, 
Honig argued, “it can be said that de Jong sparked off a national debate that was to drag on 
for several years. For the first time it seemed possible that forces outside the defense 
establishment would have a voice in defense reform.”73  The speech indeed received a great 
deal of attention in Dutch media. Responses varied from astonishment to disbelief. While 
Foreign Affairs minister Joseph Luns and Defense minister Willem den Toon welcomed the 
speech, Joop den Uyl, the faction leader of the PvdA of which Lou de Jong was still a member, 
responded annoyed, saying de Jong had been fooled by the military establishment.74 This, in 
turn, inspired Ernst van der Beugel to write an angry letter in response to den Uyl in which he 
accused the PvdA leader of trying to appease “a completely impossible stream within the 
party”, which would only lead to an “increasingly irresponsible radicalization of the party.”75 
Den Uyl, in turn, replied by saying that he believed that de Jong’s warning in fact undermined 
the defensibility of the West.  He was convinced that the comparison with the 1930’s was 
flawed and that the argumentation that raising the defense budget would solve the problem 
“played into the hands of the most conventional and conservative approach to the defense-
problem.” According to Den Uyl, the worst enemies of the West were those, who – as a result 
of repeatedly renewed escalations of violence – have come to identify the West with 
violence.76  
Lou de Jong had also sent a copy of his speech to Ernst van der Beugel, who was – not 
surprisingly – quite jubilant about it, and even called de Jong’s fear mongering speech ‘well-
balanced’: “I do not have to tell you how much I applaud the fact that you have spoken these 
words. It is a good, important and well-balanced narrative. I agree with everything in it and I 
am thankful that you, an individual who naturally receives much publicity, have delivered this 
speech at this congress,”77 he wrote. De Jong in turn, believed that van der Beugel’s SHAPEX 
speech should be published for a broader audience.78 In the debate that unfolded, Ernst van 
der Beugel stepped forward as one of the main public proponents of a strong defense effort. 
He was not only active on the public front, but also used his connections behind the scenes to 
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pursue his goal of a strong Atlantic defense. Since Richard Nixon’s inauguration as President in 
January 1969, Ernst van der Beugel also had a very intimate friend in the White House.  
A Friend in the White House 
It was not a given that Henry Kissinger, who was a close friend and associate of Nelson 
Rockefeller, would end up in the Nixon White House. In the summer of 1968, after Nelson 
Rockefeller – “the only man who could have restored America’s position abroad and unified 
the country” according to Kissinger – had been defeated by Nixon in his attempt to win the 
Republican nomination, Kissinger was not sure what to do. “The Nixon people have offered 
me a job, but I cannot hop from candidate to candidate”, he told Van der Beugel. “In any 
event”, he added, “I detest Nixon.”79 
Richard Nixon’s appointment of Henry Kissinger as his National Security Advisor 
provided Ernst van der Beugel with a direct line to the White House. In the course of the 
1960’s the relationship between Van der Beugel and Kissinger had developed into a very 
intimate friendship that remained strong when Kissinger moved into the highest echelons of 
power, a reality to which their correspondence as well as the White House telephone 
conversation record testify.80 
While Kissinger and Van der Beugel had first met when Kissinger was still a little known 
up-and-coming Harvard intellectual and Van der Beugel served as Deputy Minister of Foreign 
Affairs in the Netherlands, now the tables were more than turned. “From time to time it is 
difficult to realize that you and I still belong to the same human species and the only thing I 
can say is that I still feel very safe with you in the spot of chief political astronaut”, Van der 
Beugel wrote to Kissinger in the Spring of 1969.  “At the same time even imagining that we 
can remain in the usual contact is absolute nonsense. That will come after you return to a less 
demanding life. Demanding it will always be.”81  Over the course of Kissinger’s career at the 
White House, Van der Beugel was very touched and impressed by the fact that in reality little 
changed in their personal contact and that Kissinger “did not show any signs of a too strong 
influence by the power that he exercised.” Van der Beugel expressed a great appreciation for 
the exceptional loyalty Kissinger displayed in his friendship and the extraordinary desire for 
contact with old friends who had no direct interest in the work that he now exercised. 82  
While Van der Beugel probably meant to include himself in the category of those who had no 
direct interest in Kissinger’s work, in practice this was not entirely the case. While these 
interests certainly did not serve as the foundation of their friendship, their relationship also 
proved to be a diplomatic asset. As it turned out, the character of diplomacy and the 
centrality of personal relationships in this line of work have a tendency to blur the lines 
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between the personal and the professional and the changing circumstances did not stop 
Kissinger and Van der Beugel from calling upon each other for assistance with international 
diplomatic or political situations.   
Kissinger frequently solicited Van der Beugel’s views on the evolving world situation and 
in particular on developments in Europe and valued his friend’s judgement. “I have always 
gained confidence in crises of decision by asking myself how Ernst would respond to them”, 
he wrote while looking back on their relationship in 1980.83 In the fall of 1969, Kissinger asked 
Van der Beugel whether he knew if there was any particular reason why the Nixon White 
House did not have the same intimate contacts with the Monnet Committee as the previous 
administrations had had. Van der Beugel subsequently contacted Max Kohnstamm about this 
matter and instigated him to contact Kissinger, thus facilitating the re-establishment of 
contact between the White House and the Monnet Committee on Kissinger’s request.84  
When in early 1969 Richard Nixon kicked off his presidency with a trip to Western 
Europe visiting Germany, France, England, Italy and Belgium, but not the Netherlands, he ran 
into some diplomatic trouble with the Dutch prompting Kissinger to call Van der Beugel for 
advice on how to respond. According to the telephone conversation transcript, Kissinger said 
Van der Beugel’s “friend, the Foreign Minister is very agitated that we are going to Brussels 
and not to The Hague.” Kissinger explained to Van der Beugel that they were going to Brussels 
because of the international organizations and that they would be happy to invite Foreign 
Minister Luns and Prime Minister de Jong to call on the President in Brussels but that they did 
not want to do this “if this creates bad feelings – beneath their dignity, etc.” Van der Beugel 
told Kissinger he thought it was the right decision to visit the countries on the president’s 
itinerary and that he believed that with regards to the idea to invite Luns to Brussels, the view 
of the American ambassador to The Hague Bill Tyler was important, adding that “if FM and 
PM go to Brussels it should be made clear that the meeting will take place in Brussels because 
of above reason but will not be distinct from other meeting.”85  
It is unclear whether Van der Beugel contacted Luns about the matter, although it is 
likely they discussed it. Luns did not let himself be appeased and chose to interpret the 
matter “as a slight for a close and loyal ally” that came right after he had “risked considerable 
damage in the Netherlands by backing the U.S. effort in Vietnam.”86 In an attempt to make 
amends, President Nixon subsequently invited Luns and Prime Minister Piet de Jong to the 
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White House, making them the first Western-European leaders to officially visit Nixon there.87 
Luns, however, was not yet satisfied. As Giles Scott-Smith has pointed out: “The message 
from The Hague was that the Dutchmen must return home after the meeting with some form 
of concrete policy concession.”88 Topping the Dutch wish list were a nuclear submarine and 
landing rights for KLM at Chicago’s O’Hare airport. The possibility of negotiations about a 
Dutch nuclear submarine, however, proved soon unrealistic since this ran into strong 
opposition from the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Agency, thus bringing the 
focus back to KLM.  
During the preceding decade Luns had raised the landing rights issue with the Americans 
at practically every single opportunity he got and it was probably at least partly due to his 
tenacity that in September 1968 a new round of informal talks on KLM landing rights had 
been initiated. Even so, these had not led to any concrete results. Luns was aware, however, 
that there was a strong “feeling of guilt” at the State Department concerning the strain on 
transatlantic relations as a result of Dutch dissatisfaction with the ongoing landing rights 
negotiations, which he had tried to use to the advantage of the Dutch.89 After all, as Van der 
Beugel explained in a letter to Kissinger several years earlier there had been a “constant 
stream of assurances by top Administration people, that the thing would be settled. On 
numerous occasions Mr. Herter and Mr. Dillon and their staff have assured our Foreign 
Minister and other people from our government that it was much better not to bring the 
thing into the open because things were practically in the bag.” In the end, however, the State 
Department had never been able to actually deliver. Consequently, there was a “definite 
feeling in the Netherlands Government that we have been treated badly.”90 It was this sense 
of guilt on the American side that Luns now used to tap into even further. As a result, a new 
window of opportunity was cracking open through which the friendship between Ernst van 
der Beugel and Henry Kissinger eventually “set the context in which a successful agreement 
could be reached.”91 
The issue of KLM-landing rights never really stopped to occupy Ernst van der Beugel. 
Next to the fact that he believed American policy was unfair to small countries like the 
Netherlands it greatly bothered him that this issue – which was of no great significance to the 
Americans who otherwise spent billions of dollars to “make themselves popular” – was 
creating an atmosphere of anti-Americanism in the Netherlands that “could not be described 
                                                            
87 “Exchange of remarks between the President and Prime Minister de Jong and Foreign Minister Luns of the 
Netherlands”, May 28, 1969, box 933, NSC Files, NPL.  
88 Giles Scott-Smith, “Ghosts in the Machine? Ernst van der Beugel, the Translantic elite, and the ‘New’ Diplomatic 
History,” accessed December 5, 2016, http://hdl.handle.net/1887/19602.   
89 Already in 1960 Luns wrote to Ernst van der Beugel “In Washington heb ik, zoals je inmiddels waarschijnlijk hebt 
gehoord, de KLM-zaak met klem bij Dillon e.a. voorgebracht en er is nog een kans dat ik de President te zien krijg. Of 
het veel zal helpen? Er is ontegenzeggelijk op het State Department een gevoel van schuld, doch, althans op dit 
moment, brengt ons dit niet verder.” J.M.A.H. Luns to E.H. van der Beugel, 21 September 1960, file 297, J.M.A.H. Luns 
archive, NAH.  
90 E.H. van der Beugel to H.A. Kissinger, December 23, 1960, HAK. 
91 Scott-Smith, “Ghosts in the Machine”. 
189 
 
by any pen.”92  At different occasions he had tried to use his network to build sympathy for 
the Dutch case in the United States. In March 1960, for example, when the negotiations for 
landing rights in Los Angeles came to a deadlock for the second time, Van der Beugel wrote a 
long letter to George Ball, whom he had acquainted at his first Bilderberg Meeting in 1959, in 
which he described the history of Dutch-American landing rights negotiations and the Dutch 
role as a faithful ally to the United States from 1945 up to that moment as well as the way in 
which the matter was hurting transatlantic relations:  
(…) the recent decision of the American Government makes it painfully clear to the 
people of Holland that all their efforts, also on behalf of the North Atlantic co-
operation, are only measured against the geographical size of their country, which 
has little military or political influence. This lack of appreciation for the work and 
character of the Dutch nation, who rightly regard KLM as a major component of 
the national economy, has given rise to intense public resentment, disappointment 
and coolness towards the United States. Without exception the Dutch Press has 
criticized the attitude of the U.S. Government in biting editorials and derisive 
cartoons, wondering how it is possible that in the field of civil aviation the 
American point of view should be completely incompatible with the spirit of free 
enterprise and fair competition, so widely advocated by them!93 
George Ball, however, believed it would be “improper” to get involved in the controversy 
since his law firm served as the general counsel for Pan American World Airways and one of 
Ball’s partners at the law firm – Henry Friendly – was in fact the Vice President of Pan Am, one 
of KLMs biggest adversaries in its struggle for U.S. landing rights.94 On the 5th of January 1961, 
roughly two weeks before he assumed office as Secretary of State, Van der Beugel also made 
sure to bring the matter to the attention of Dean Rusk.95 In addition, as mentioned before, 
Van der Beugel also repeatedly vented his frustrations about the landing rights matter in his 
correspondence with Henry Kissinger.96 In fact, he did not only make sure that Kissinger was 
well informed about the landing rights issue, but also acquainted him with the airline itself: 
“through Van der Beugel, Kissinger gradually became drawn into the world of KLM.”97 To 
illustrate, when Van der Beugel was president of KLM, he organized a big annual KLM-dinner 
for “the great and the good” in the Netherlands to which he invited Henry Kissinger three 
years in a row as the guest speaker and made sure the table arrangements were as favorable 
for Kissinger as possible. In 1962, for example, Van der Beugel arranged that he got seated 
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next to Crown Princess Beatrix of the Netherlands.98 Meanwhile, Van der Beugel ensured that 
Kissinger could cross the Atlantic comfortably with KLM, “all expenses paid”.99 Next to the 
KLM-events, Van der Beugel organized meetings with the “top people dealing with military 
and foreign policy” in the Netherlands.100 Kissinger, who was still an up and coming academic 
at the time, was very thankful for these occasions which enabled him to get acquainted with 
the Dutch elite.101  
Thus, when in 1969 KLM landing rights negotiations again appeared on the radar, 
Kissinger was no stranger to this matter. As Scott-Smith and Snyder have demonstrated in 
their 2013 Diplomatic History article “‘A Test of Sentiments’: Civil Aviation, Alliance Politics, 
and the KLM Challenge in Dutch-American Relations”, he even took a personal interest in 
their progress by staying on top of the matter from start to finish, informing his colleagues at 
the State Department that he “would especially appreciate being informed should the 
negotiations run into difficulty.”102  What is more, based on the documentary record Scott-
Smith and Snyder argue that Kissinger “was able to shift the way in which the issue would be 
treated.”103 While in April 1969 it still appeared that the Americans would have to deny the 
Dutch their desired landing rights, by May 20 Helmut Sonnenfeldt reported to Kissinger that 
the State Department, while still internally divided, now recommended laying “the 
groundwork for a satisfactory negotiated outcome.”104  
What happened in between? Scott-Smith suggests that Kissinger personally laid the 
groundwork for a favorable outcome by making it possible for the President to intervene 
directly in the decision-making process of the landing rights negotiations. In fact, in early 
March it was reported that President Nixon was “supporting stronger State Department 
direction of international air transport activities…to permit a tighter application of foreign 
policy considerations.”105 After all, due to its small territory and the fact that the Americans 
already had access to the few airports that existed in the Netherlands, the Dutch only had 
foreign policy considerations to bargain with. On May 23, Nixon was advised that, 
“considering long-standing support for U.S. objectives on Vietnam, nuclear proliferation, and 
trade and monetary policy, ‘this visit should build renewed Dutch confidence in the United 
States.’”106 When Luns and de Jong subsequently visited the White House on May 27, the 
Dutchmen were able to reach an agreement with the Americans in principle “to settle their 
longstanding request for additional landing rights for KLM in Chicago”, with the “technical 
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details” to be worked out in Washington in July.”107 Afterwards, Van der Beugel wrote the 
following note to Kissinger, thanking him for his help in the process:  
I can hardly tell you how excellently everything has worked. It has been a repair job 
of the highest order and the impact on American-Dutch relations could not be 
better. It will please you to know that both of them [Luns and de Jong] fully 
realized how very important the role has been which you have played in the 
arrangement and the substance of the visit. I repeat, it could not have been 
better.108 
To follow up on the White House meeting and to work out the further details of the deal, the 
American Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs Peter Flanigan 
subsequently visited the Netherlands for preparatory talks on the Chicago deal. In this 
context, Ernst van der Beugel again served as an “informal link-man” by contacting Secretary 
of State for Transportation M.J. Keyzer to make sure there were no remaining obstacles, 
something Kissinger greatly appreciated.109 Van der Beugel made sure to also keep Luns in 
the loop during this process.110  
In July, Kissinger asked Van der Beugel to meet with Peter Flanigan in the Netherlands 
who wanted to consult Van der Beugel in the context of an assignment he was given by 
President Nixon, namely to organize a study into American aviation politics as a foundation 
for possible reforms. During his meeting with Van der Beugel, Flanigan told the Dutchman 
that “Long before [Kissinger] had accepted his position in the White House, [Van der Beugel] 
had continuously reminded him that U.S. aviation policy created difficulties with other 
countries, which were unjustifiable if one considered these interests in the context of 
relations with these countries as a whole.”111 Ernst van der Beugel, subsequently wrote a 
memorandum for Flanigan with his ideas on possible reforms. Before he did so, however, he 
secretly approached Deputy Minister of Transportation M.J. Keyzer and proposed to turn his 
memorandum into a “joint effort” through cooperation with the Ministry of Transportation 
and KLM.112  He also consulted H.A. Wassenbergh and G. van der Wal of KLM, whose remarks 
he subsequently included in his final report to Flanigan.113   
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In the end, Scott-Smith concludes that while “the State Department’s advice to Nixon to 
take the opportunity to quell a major irritant in Dutch-American relations probably had more 
weight (…) there is no doubt that the Kissinger – Van der Beugel relation was a constant factor 
in the background.”114  Scott-Smith’s case study supports Van der Beugel’s own account of 
the matter in his oral history. When asked whether he had ever used his close friendship with 
Henry Kissinger to gain any results on policy matters, Van der Beugel answered by saying: “no, 
I don’t remember anymore…I have one example (…) KLM got Chicago because I arranged that 
through Henry.”115 As this chapter will demonstrate, however, this was not the only time.  
A Small Intervention that Could Make All the Difference 
While Ernst van der Beugel tried to be selective in appealing to Kissinger with “official” 
requests, they certainly did occur. In the fall of 1970, a situation developed in the Netherlands 
that compelled Van der Beugel to approach his friend in the White House. “This is the first 
time in all our conversations during your official tenure that I ask your attention for an 
‘official’ issue”, Van der Beugel wrote to Kissinger. “I do it because I think that in this country 
of mine it is of vital importance.” The ‘official issue’ concerned the Dutch defense budget and 
the Dutch contribution to NATO, which had become highly controversial; not only due to the 
speech by Lou de Jong about which Van der Beugel also informed Kissinger, but with elections 
coming up in the Spring of 1971, the Dutch debate had gained an extra sense of urgency: the 
next cabinet would have to make some very important decisions. In fact, according to Van der 
Beugel the defense question would be “one of the most difficult and delicate issues with 
which this and the next government is faced.”116  
Van der Beugel explained to Kissinger that he believed the Dutch defense budget should 
be increased during the next cabinet period in terms of expenditure, percentage of the 
budget and in terms of percentage of the G.N.P. “in order to correct grave deficiencies, 
especially in the effectiveness of the army. Only in this way our contribution to NATO can be 
valid and meaningful,” he argued. While historians like Kim van der Wijngaart have pointed 
out that the De Jong cabinet in fact already manifested itself as a loyal ally in NATO, also with 
regards to the defense contribution, Van der Beugel expected a little more. 117  “With a few 
excellent exceptions” he explained to Kissinger, the current Dutch government is “hesitant at 
best.” In this context, a small intervention by Kissinger, he believed, could make all the 
difference.118  
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On November 13, 1970 NATO Secretary General Manlio Brosio and SACEUR General 
Andy Goodpaster were scheduled to visit the Dutch cabinet to discuss the military and 
political situation. “Without any doubt the Dutch military contribution will also be discussed”, 
Van der Beugel wrote to Kissinger, but “the danger of these meetings is always that they take 
place in an atmosphere of smoothness and ‘senatorial courtesy’”. During the upcoming visit 
such routines were to be avoided according to Van der Beugel, who asked Kissinger to “give a 
signal to Andy Goodpaster” to make sure that “the tone of the NATO representatives should 
be tough and worried, not only about the general situation but also about the specific Dutch 
contribution.” Van der Beugel believed that this “could just change the balance between 
those who want to do something and those who want to let things drift.”119  
Ernst van der Beugel’s letter did not go to Kissinger directly, but was processed by 
Kissinger’s close associate Helmut Sonnenfeldt. Ernst der Beugel was no stranger to 
Sonnenfeldt. Shortly after his appointment as National Security Advisor, Kissinger had invited 
Van der Beugel to the White House where he introduced him to his staff, including 
Sonnenfeldt who soon became a close acquaintance of Van der Beugel.120  Sonnenfeldt 
informed Kissinger about the content of Van der Beugel’s letter saying that he believed the 
Dutchman’s suggestion to urge Brosio and Goodpaster to make their visit “more than a mere 
formality and really express their concern” was “very good.”121 Kissinger, in turn, did as Van 
der Beugel had requested. He had been briefed on the speech by Lou de Jong and watched 
the developments that Van der Beugel had described with concern. “It is, unfortunately, not 
unique to your country”, he wrote to Van der Beugel in reply, “but I agree that if it can 
somehow be arrested there it would also have a beneficial effect elsewhere.”122  
What this episode illustrates, is that Ernst van der Beugel had access to key members of 
the American foreign policy decision-making establishment – also under the Nixon 
Administration – and that he was taken seriously. While the above mentioned ‘intervention’ 
fitted perfectly within America’s foreign policy framework, it appears that Kissinger would not 
have taken this specific action if Van der Beugel had not requested it. It does remain 
questionable, however, whether the Dutch government really needed to be pressured into 
caring more for its defense – whether it was really as ‘weak’ and ‘hesitant’ as Van der Beugel 
made it appear. As the Dutch historian Kim van der Wijngaart has pointed out, the De Jong 
government was in fact already convinced of the importance of transatlantic burden sharing 
and a strong defense posture and did not really need any further stimulation. 123  
What remained unclear, however, was how the next Dutch government would respond 
to the changing atmosphere in society, which was reflected in some political parties – like the 
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PvdA – by a more critical stance towards defense spending. Hence, as Van der Beugel had 
already anticipated, the fate of the Dutch defense and the country’s contribution to NATO 
would for a large part depend on the next government.  It was in this context, with the 
election campaigns in full swing, that Ernst Van der Beugel urged Henry Kissinger in the spring 
of 1971 to receive the up-and-coming leader of the Dutch Catholic People’s Party (KVP) 
Norbert Schmelzer – a likely candidate to succeed Joseph Luns as Minister of Foreign Affairs – 
in the White House. While Schmelzer – who was offered a trip to the United States by the 
American embassy in The Hague – was a supporter of NATO who recognized the need for a 
strong defense posture, the KVP was actually pressing for a reduction of Dutch brigades from 
six to four. Schmelzer personally did not agree with this decision, but a little pressure from 
the White House to fortify his position vis-à-vis his party probably would not do any harm.124 
“Norbert is a very nice man, very clever in domestic politics, but he is innocent and 
inexperienced in the field of foreign policy”, Van der Beugel told Kissinger. “His concept of the 
world is that of the youth congress of the Young Christian Democrats in Nancy.” The latter 
was not meant as a compliment.125 While Van der Beugel was very fond of Schmelzer, he was 
also a bit “worried about the possibility that he gets Foreign Affairs” since Schmelzer was 
more European than Atlanticist in his orientation and he believed that a chat with Kissinger 
was “extremely important for Schmelzer’s education.”126 The American ambassador to The 
Hague, John William Middendorf II, also recommended Kissinger to receive the up-and-
coming KVP politician.   
This was not Ernst van der Beugel’s first attempt to familiarize Schmelzer with the 
Western foreign policy establishment. He had also made sure that he got introduced to the 
Atlantic elite by inviting him to the 1969 Bilderberg Conference. In addition, Van der Beugel 
had already introduced Schmelzer to Kissinger during one of the renowned dinners at his own 
home in The Hague, where he brought many members of the Dutch establishment in contact 
with prominent Americans and Europeans.127  
Upon his return from the United States, Schmelzer was enthusiastic about his meeting 
with Kissinger and sent Ernst van der Beugel an elaborate report on his American trip.128 
During the trip he had been reminded of the importance of conventional forces in a time of 
nuclear parity and the problems the Nixon Administration faced in explaining to Congress why 
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the U.S. had to spend more and more on conventional forces while the feeling prevailed in 
Congress that the European allies did not increase their efforts. Defense Secretary Laird had 
expressed his appreciation for the NATO policy of Joseph Luns as well as for the initiatives 
that the Dutch Defense Minister den Toom had taken as chair of the Eurogroup in December 
1970. Schmelzer had also been warned by the Defense Secretary that the importance of the 
Dutch contribution to NATO should not be underestimated, especially since he was convinced 
that a decrease of the scope or quality of the Dutch defense-effort would have an irrevocable 
snowball-effect in Europe which would seriously weaken the position of the American 
government vis-à-vis the American Congress.129  He understood the necessity of defense 
reforms in the Netherlands, but made it very clear to the up-and-coming politician that he 
believed that a reduction of Dutch brigades, as proposed by some of Schmelzer’s fellow 
Catholic Party members, would be very difficult to digest for the American Congress.  
The Biesheuvel Cabinet and the Committee of Civil and Military Experts 
In July 1971, Norbert Schmelzer was appointed as Minister of Foreign Affairs in the newly 
established center-right Biesheuvel cabinet as Joseph Luns left this post – “after 17 years of 
tsardom”130 – to become Secretary General of NATO, a position he would hold until 1984. 
As expected, the matter of the Dutch defense turned out to be one of the more difficult 
issues during the lengthy cabinet formation that followed the elections of April 28, 1971. In 
the run-up to the elections, Van der Beugel – who was also well connected to the 
transatlantic security community – had been closely in touch with some top individuals of the 
Dutch department of Defense. In preparation of the debate on the military budget scheduled 
in October 1969, Deputy Minister of Defense Heax had handed Van der Beugel a 
memorandum justifying the desired defense budget prepared for the debate concerning the 
defense budget in the Second Chamber, which was scheduled later that month. In response 
to the memo and in preparation of the upcoming political debate, Van der Beugel told Haex 
he completely agreed with the document, but that the focus was too much on a military 
escalation. Instead, in order to justify the proposed defense budget he advised Haex to pay 
more attention to the dangers of a disruption of the power equilibrium in Europe also when 
that would happen without military means. “When you concentrate the possibility of a 
disturbance of the power balance too much on the purely military balance in a discussion with 
so many individuals who lack expertise”, Van der Beugel cautioned, “you always risk that they 
will dismiss the matter by saying that there will come no war anyway.” Consequently, Van der 
Beugel advised Haex to also remind his audience of the risk of finlandization.131   
In April 1971 Van der Beugel informed some of his friends about a “memorandum 
dealing with the Dutch defense effort” for the cabinet formateur which he had drafted on 
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“request”. While Van der Beugel did not specify on whose request he drafted the memo he 
did mention that he had reached agreement on the memorandum with Deputy Minister 
Haex. He furthermore sent a copy of the document to his friend Frans Goedhart writing that 
he had better “destroy the document after reading.”132 It is not completely clear what 
happened with Van der Beugel’s memorandum. What is clear, however is that during that 
same month Defense Minister den Toom brought forward a white paper to aid the Cabinet 
formation concerning the defense effort, which was very much in line with Van der Beugel’s 
ideas. 133   
During the lengthy cabinet formation following the elections of April 28, 1971, Minister 
den Toom’s white paper on the future of the Dutch defense, which pleaded for reforms and 
underlined the necessity of increasing the defense budget, eventually inspired the creation of 
a committee of civil and military experts to be established on 28 September, 1971 with the 
specific task to examine the Dutch defense obligations with regards to NATO and the financial 
means necessary to fulfill these obligations in the future.134  Ernst van der Beugel was 
mentioned in Dutch newspapers as a likely candidate to chair the committee as an 
‘authoritative civilian expert’, but he showed no interest in this position arguing he did not 
have the time required to lead the pack of experts.135 In the end he gladly joined the 
committee as one of the civilian experts while KVP politician Karel van Rijckevorsel was 
appointed as chair. The committee counted fourteen ‘wise men’ including five experts from 
the Ministry of Defense, one from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and five members that were 
appointed by the main political parties, namely Karel van Rijckevorsel (KVP), Laurens Jan 
Brinkhorst (D66), Peter Kooijmans (ARP), Henk Neuman (KVP) en Wiebe Wierda (PvdA). The 
other four ‘civilian experts’ were J.P. van den Bent (CHU-member), Has Beyen (VVD-member), 
Frans Goedhart (DS’70) and Ernst van der Beugel, who was not formally affiliated with any 
political party anymore, making him ‘independent’.136  
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In her annual speech to Parliament reflecting the Cabinet’s policy – de Troonrede – 
Queen Juliana remarked in September 1971 that the Dutch government hoped that the work 
of the Van Rijckevorsel Committee would help to foster public support for the Dutch defense 
effort so that it would be “carried by the conviction of our people.” As Theo de Jong noted in 
the Dutch daily Algemeen Dagblad “With this sentence the queen touches upon the key 
problem, because a substantial part of the Dutch people, and consequently of the political 
parties, is not yet convinced of the fact that more money for the armed forces should be put 
on the table.”137 In fact, several .opposition parties – including the PvdA – pleaded for a  
significant reduction of the defense budget.138 After the goal of fostering public support for 
the Dutch defense effort through the Van Rijckevorsel Committee was also highlighted by 
prime-minister Biesheuvel, a journalist at the Dutch  (left-wing) weekly magazine Vrij 
Nederland observed that “clearly, the armed forces need to be ‘sold’ [to the public] with nice 
slogans.”139 
The deliberations of the Van Rijckevorsel Committee were followed closely by the 
American embassy in The Hague, where Ambassador J. William Middendorf II maintained 
close contact with Ernst van der Beugel. After all, decisions on Dutch defense in the NATO 
context were directly tied to domestic pressures in the United States to reduce the American 
military presence on the European continent. In November 1971 Ernst van der Beugel tried to 
put the ambassador’s “mind at rest” by informing him that “the group was becoming more 
and more convinced that it had to take a hard line as regards defense and he predicted that a 
significant majority would favor this when the Committee submitted its report on March 1.” 
Van der Beugel admitted, however, that it was still necessary to convince certain members of 
the Committee leading him to believe “that a favorable consensus report was probable, but 
that a unanimous report was probably not possible.”140  Middendorf sent a memorandum of 
this conversation to Henry Kissinger, who had already been informed by Van der Beugel 
himself, who – among others – also kept Secretary General Joseph Luns and General 
Goodpaster at NATO in the loop.141  
In January 1972, while the Van Rijckevorsel Committee was in the middle of its 
proceedings, Prime Minister Biesheuvel paid a low-key visit to the White House. In advance, 
Van der Beugel had offered his services to Biesheuvel, telling him that he was available for a 
chat prior to the trip, if Biesheuvel desired. In addition, Van der Beugel offered Biesheuvel to 
arrange a meeting with Henry Kissinger for him. “Naturally, this shall be prepared through 
official channels, but should it be certain that you go, then I would consider it of great 
importance that you have a quiet hour to talk with Kissinger alone”, Van der Beugel wrote, 
adding that “that is difficult to arrange via the official channels and I would gladly help you 
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with this.”142 In January, Van der Beugel subsequently encouraged Kissinger to meet with 
Biesheuvel, arguing that a chat “would be extremely helpful.”143 Why was Van der Beugel so 
keen to arrange this? Well, as Van der Beugel informed Kissinger, Biesheuvel was 
“reasonable, but not too strong on defense matters” and Van der Beugel once again hoped to 
use his connection with Kissinger to put pressure on the Dutch government to increase its 
defense effort. He specifically provided Kissinger with the following suggestions:  
I think that the line you should take, should be rather tough, making it clear that 
U.S. military posture in NATO is not only linked to reasonable defense effort of 
European allies, but also dependent on economic climate, which enables the 
President to maintain his present NATO policy.144 
This time, however, Kissinger did not follow up on Van der Beugel’s suggestion. In fact, as Kim 
van der Wijngaart has pointed out, the Americans did quite the opposite: they gave the Dutch 
prime minister a compliment. President Nixon himself explicitly expressed his appreciation for 
the continuing Dutch support for the unity and strength of Western cooperation as well as for 
the Dutch defense contribution. Compared to some other allies, the Dutch role in this field 
was actually perceived as exemplary by the Americans.145  
After fifty-five full days of meetings spread out over six months during which the Van 
Rijckevorsel Committee studied the Dutch defense situation and heard many experts, both 
foreign and domestic, the Committee presented its report to Prime Minister Biesheuvel on 
March 27, 1972. As Van der Beugel had predicted, the civil and military experts had not been 
able to come to a unanimous consensus on Dutch defense policy. Instead, their conclusions 
underlined the schism that had developed both in society and in the political arena as the 
Committee was split into a majority and a minority view – reflected in two separate 
reports.146 The majority presented a report that was in line with the white paper that former 
Defense Minister den Toom prepared for the 1971 cabinet formation arguing for an increase 
of the level of defense spending from 3,945 percent of the national income in 1972 to an 
average of 4,25 percent between 1973 and 1977.147 The minority recommended maintaining 
the defense budget on the existing level of 3,945 percent of the Dutch national income in 
1972.148  Considering the circumstances, Van der Beugel was quite satisfied with this 
outcome. As he wrote to General Goodpaster: 
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The majority of the Committee recommends a rather steep increase in defense 
expenditure for the first four years. Needless to say that I belong to the majority. 
The paradoxal situation exists that I don’t consider the majority view as the main 
achievement of the Committee but rather that the majority pushed the minority to 
a point of view in which they propose the maintenance (fortunately not a 
reduction, which I expected them to do in the beginning of our deliberations) of 
our present effort.149 
The committee’s chair Karel van Rijckevorsel had at the last moment sided with the minority, 
a decision that “was not received without irritation.”150 Consequently, in the flurry of media 
attention following the publication of the reports, Ernst van der Beugel emerged as a key 
spokesperson of the majority viewpoint. He gave interviews and wrote opinion articles, 
delivered speeches and appeared on national TV. In March 1972, for example, Ernst van der 
Beugel appeared in the popular current affairs program “Extra-Brandpunt” to comment on 
the Van Rijckevorsel report and to defend the majority viewpoint.  Afterwards, Philip van Tijn 
of the Dutch social-democratic newspaper ‘Het Vrije Volk’ described the event as a lovely 
comeback of Ernst van der Beugel into the Dutch public debate through which “the smell of 
the Russian danger entered the living room.”151  
In Pursuit of a Domestic Climate Conducive to Close Transatlantic Relations 
Overall, in his contribution to the public debate – through speeches and articles, lectures, 
interviews and commentary – Ernst van der Beugel consistently tried to counter the anti-
American trends he perceived by trying to explain the American position to the Dutch as well 
as the necessity of a strong defense effort. These two issues were closely interrelated, not 
just in the Netherlands, but also in the United States where European anti-Americanism and 
the relatively meager European defense contributions were feeding Congressional pressures 
to decrease the amount of American conventional forces on the European continent.152  At 
the same time, Van der Beugel tried to foster understanding among the American foreign 
policy and defense establishment concerning the complications in bringing about an increase 
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in the European defense budgets, thus trying to mediate international pressure and 
expectations on the one hand and domestic tensions on the other.153 Van der Beugel believed 
that it was of fundamental importance to “create the climate” in which maintenance of a 
sizeable American force would be possible.154  It was to such a climate – a public  atmosphere 
conducive to close transatlantic relations and a strong defense – that he tried to contribute 
through his private efforts in the public domain, not just through his own publications, but 
also through his connections with journalists.  
Ernst van der Beugel maintained contact with an extensive network of journalists 
throughout the Atlantic community.155 Back home in the Netherlands, Van der Beugel was 
extremely annoyed by the negative views articulated by Dutch journalists about the United 
States and on defense matters.156  The lack of an informed public opinion about matters of 
international relations and defense was, from Van der Beugel’s perspective, for a large part 
the result of ignorance and bad reporting on behalf of the Dutch press. This in turn, 
undermined the possibility of an informed public debate about these issues. Van der Beugel 
did not let these things go by without voicing his disapproval, for example through critical 
letters to journalists or their editors-in-chief when he believed they had gone out of line. He 
was not particularly mild in his criticism either.157 To illustrate, in 1967 Van der Beugel ended 
his subscription of the Dutch daily newspaper Algemeen Handelsblad with a long letter to the 
editor-in-chief to whom he explained that his decision was “an act of protest” from his side 
directed towards “the daily menu of protest by some of your younger employees” and in 
particular aimed at the either “open, hidden or creeping anti-Americanism” in the newspaper 
that he considered not just “incorrect”, but “life threatening and cheap.”158 A similar letter 
followed in 1970  to the editor-in-chief of the Volkskrant, arguing that the paper increasingly 
reflected “the forged, distorted, tendentious and deceitful reporting that is the beginning or 
the accompanying phenomenon of every form of terror.”159    
At the same time he was very supportive of journalists whose work he admired. He 
regularly sent personal notes to journalists to express his admiration in response to articles 
                                                            
153 Van der Beugel, “NATO and the Average Man”. 
154 Aiken, “European Security tied to U.S. Troops”.  
155 Van der Beugel was for example well acquainted with the American political commentator Walter Lippmann and 
with New York Times journalists James “Scotty” Reston and Cyrus L. Sulzberger, Raymond Aron of Le Figaro and Theo 
Sommer from Die Zeit.  
156 See for example: “Prof. E.H. van der Beugel lucht zijn hart: ‘Nederlandse politiek verliest niveau’, De Telegraaf, 19 
April 1972: “Velen bij de pers, radio en televisie (…) geven een oordeel dat verre van representatief is van wat er 
werkelijk leeft; een scheefgetrokken beeld van de publieke opinie. Bovendien is het niveau van meningsuiters 
eenvoudig onvoldoende; tot een werkelijke dialoog is men vaak niet in stand.” 
157 In 1966, Van der Beugel wrote a letter to W.G.N. de Keizer, the editor-in-chief of Elsevier’s Weekblad (an 
influential weekly magazine) in which he complained, among things, about some articles by the journalist Lunshof  
which he considered “not only bad, but completely unacceptable” accusing him of publishing ‘fundamental 
falsehoods.” Keizer replied to van der Beugel that the ‘Lunshof problem’ would ‘undoubtedly’ be ‘solved’ in 1966.  
158 E.H. van der Beugel to C.A. Steketee, 12 April 1967, file 7, EvdB. 
159 E.H. van der Beugel to J.M.M. van der Pluym, 10 April 1970, file 9, EvdB: “…de vervalste, verdraaide, tendentieuze 
en leugenachtige berichtgeving, die het begin of het begeleidingsverschijnsel is van iedere vorm van terreur. Of die 




they had written or to provide encouragement. More important, though, was the fact that – 
as Jérôme Heldring also pointed out – Ernst van der Beugel could “open doors” by providing 
the necessary introductions for journalists who desired to meet with one of the prima 
donna’s in his extensive network.160 Van der Beugel was eager to arrange access to 
prominent Americans for Dutch journalists whose judgement he trusted and of whom he 
expected satisfactory coverage of the United States. To illustrate, in 1968, he arranged a 
whole series of meetings with influential Americans for the renowned Dutch journalist G.B.J. 
Hilterman, who had written to Van der Beugel that he did not intend to “rediscover America” 
nor to throw himself completely on “negroes and poverty” but that he instead intended to 
focus on some “preferably positive aspects of American society, which may be less well 
known, but still very much worth the effort.”161 Ernst van der Beugel was happy to help, 
providing introductions to a whole list of influentials including Henry Kissinger, Bill Moyers, 
Zbigniew Brzeziński, David Rockefeller, Richard Neustadt, Ted Sorensen, George Ball and Joe 
Johnson.162 In 1970  Van der Beugel arranged a meeting with Henry Kissinger for Jérôme 
Heldring, whom Kissinger (and his assistant Helmut Sonnenfeldt) had already met at dinners 
at Van der Beugel’s home, as well as at a Bilderberg Conference.163 In the summer of 1973, 
Van der Beugel recommended Kissinger to give an interview to the foreign editor of Elsevier’s 
Magazine Gerry Philip Mok, whom he described as the one serious and responsible exception 
in the Dutch weekly press, which for the rest was “in the hands of the irresponsible left wing 
liberal establishment.”164  
Ernst van der Beugel also invited Dutch journalists whose work he appreciated to 
dinners at his home and to the Bilderberg Meetings, which enabled them to establish 
valuable contacts while enabling them to tap into the insider knowledge and ideas that 
proliferated among the Atlantic elite.165 To illustrate, in 1971, Van der Beugel invited André 
Spoor, the editor-in-chief of NRC Handelsblad, to a Bilderberg meeting. When Spoor in May 
1973 requested an interview with Henry Kissinger, the American embassy noted that Spoor 
had met Kissinger two years before at a Bilderberg conference. This comment was followed 
                                                            
160 Jérôme Heldring, interview by the author.  
161 G.B.J. Hilterman to E.H. van der Beugel, 21 May 1968, file 8, EvdB. 
162 E.H. van der Beugel to G.B.J. Hilterman, 13 June 1968, file 8, EvdB.   
163 E.H. van der Beugel to David Young (Assistant to Dr. Henry Kissinger), 8 May 1970, file 9, EvdB: “He knows Henry 
because he has met him several times at my house and in Boston and I know that Henry has always been very much 
impressed by his intelligence and knowledge”; E.H. van der Beugel to H. Sonnenfeldt, 8 May 1970, file 9, EvdB: “I 
learned that my friend Jérôme Heldring, whom you have met at the dinner in my house, will spend three days in 
Washington notably May 25th, 26th and 27th. Jérôme Heldring is in my opinion beyond any shadow of a doubt the 
most intelligent and influential journalist in Holland. He is chief-editor of the "Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant" and 
has an absolutely first-class mind; Interview Jérôme Heldring. 
164 E.H. van der Beugel to H.A. Kissinger, 13 August, 1973, file 10, EvdB.  
165 For a study of the relationship between Bilderberg and the Press see: Ingeborg Philipsen, “Diplomacy with 
Ambiguity: the history of the Bilderberg Organization” (PhD diss., Copenhagen University, 2009) 220- 237: “part of 
the reason behind inviting journalists to attend the conferences was obviously also that they were in a good position 
to influence public opinion.” In this way, “journalists were not expected to act like passive observers; they were 
expected to take part in the foreign policy process.” (Philipsen, 227-228). 
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by the recommendation that “a background conversation with Spoor would be helpful, 
providing as it would for a sympathetic presentation of U.S. views in the Dutch press.”166  
Van der Beugel’s own publications mostly appeared in Dutch newspapers as well as 
international foreign affairs magazines such as Le Monde Diplomatique, the Atlantic Quarterly 
and the Knickerbocker. In the Netherlands he had especially good contacts at Het Parool and 
NRC Handelsblad where he published the majority of his analyses and opinion articles for a 
general audience. His speeches usually received ample attention in the media. Journalists 
approached him for interviews and solicited his views as an expert on transatlantic relations 
and defense matters. His stint at the Van Rijckevorsel Committee followed by his 
appointment as chairman of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, which 
through its studies and publications tried to contribute to an informed public debate on 
defense matters, added to his renown as an authoritative expert on matters of international 
relations and defense.  His undertakings did not go unnoticed by the American embassy in 
The Hague where successive ambassadors thanked Van der Beugel for his efforts. “I should 
like you to know how much I appreciate the time and effort that you give to creating a better 
understanding of American institutions and our role in the Western Alliance”, Ambassador 
Middendorf II wrote to Ernst van der Beugel on January 14, 1970. “We all feel greatly 
indebted to you.”167 
Thus, Ernst van der Beugel established a prominent position in the public debate. When 
in 1972 a journalist inquired during an interview whether he considered going back into 
politics, Van der Beugel answered he had no desire to do so whatsoever. “I consider my 
current combination of activities ideal”, he explained. “There is no other way in which I could 
make myself more useful for the public cause than by doing the work I do now: public 
speaking, teaching and/or publishing.”168  In a similar vein he had already told his sister in 
1970 that “When I would be offered the Embassy in Washington, I would not need ten 
seconds to decline clearly and friendly. Never again am I going to do something other than 
this.”169 
In the end, no major changes took place with regards to the Dutch defense policy during 
the Biesheuvel administrations, which were characterized by a high degree of continuity in 
this field.170 However, as Van der Beugel had pointed out to Goodpaster – considering the 
negative trend in public opinion concerning defense spending – stability could be seen as a 
victory in itself as the feared spending cuts were held at bay. During the subsequent years, 
                                                            
166 “Memorandum for Mr. Kissinger”, 7 May 1973, box 54, folder CO108 Netherlands 1/1/73, White House Central 
Files, Subject Files, Countries, NPL. 
167 J. William Middendorf, II (U.S. ambassador to the Netherlands) to E.H. van der Beugel, January 14, 1970, file 8, 
EvdB.  
168 “Prof. E.H. van der Beugel lucht zijn hart: “Nederlandse politiek verliest niveau” (translation mine): “De combinatie 
van werkzaamheden van nu vind ik ideaal ik (…) Ik kan me voor de publieke zaak niet nuttiger maken dan wanneer ik 
werk zoals ik nu doe: spreken, doceren en/of publiceren” 
169 EvdB to I. Brokmeijer-van der Beugel, 13 January 1970, file 8, EvdB: “Wanneer mij de Ambassade in Washington 
zou worden aangeboden, zou ik geen tien seconden nodig hebben om even vriendelijk als duidelijk neen te zeggen. Ik 
ga nooit meer iets anders doen dan dit.”  
170 Van der Wijngaart, Bondgenootschap onder spanning, 111-112. 
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however, when the Netherlands was governed by a relatively left-wing cabinet under the 
leadership of Joop den Uyl (PvdA), the defense contribution increasingly came under 
pressure. By 1976 Ernst van der Beugel wrote to Goedhart that “with regards to our advice in 
the Van Rijckevorsel committee, considering the current circumstances, I would 
wholeheartedly endorse the minority recommendations. At least we would have had 
something. One cannot be somber enough about the total paralysis of the West. To this 
paralysis, the Netherlands is contributing a more than proportional share.”171 
In the meantime, Ernst van der Beugel remained active as an informal liaison between 
Kissinger’s White House and the American State Department on the one hand and the Dutch 
foreign policy establishment on the other hand. In September 1972, for example, he informed 
Biesheuvel, Schmelzer and Defense Minister De Koster about developments in Washington 
concerning potential reductions of American forces on the European continent. “In general”, 
Van der Beugel wrote, “one hears in the United States that it will only be a matter of time 
until a substantial amount of American forces will be pulled out of Europe and that this could 
either happen unilaterally or as a result of the Mutual Balanced Force Reductions” (M.B.F.R.). 
Even so, Van der Beugel informed his countrymen, this was not Henry Kissinger’s opinion. 
Instead, he reassured them that “supposing that this Administration will stay in power, any 
possible reduction would take place within the framework of the M.B.F.R.” He furthermore 
informed them that any potential American troop reduction would not exceed the 10-15%, 
adding that in the meantime Kissinger “hoped and expected” that the European defense 
effort would not be reduced warning that any substantial decrease of the European effort 
could jeopardize the plans of the Nixon administration in the most serious way.172 Schmelzer 
greatly appreciated this confidential report and told Van der Beugel that he would welcome 
any new information that Van der Beugel would be able to provide in the future.173  
Ernst van der Beugel continued these activities after 1973, when Max van der Stoel 
replaced Schmelzer as minister of Foreign Affairs in the Netherlands and Henry Kissinger 
adopted a duel function as National Security Advisor and U.S. Secretary of State. Van der 
Beugel also served as a back channel between Kissinger and the NATO leadership, in 
particular Joseph Luns – who had been appointed as Secretary General of NATO in 1971 – and 
informed Kissinger about worries within NATO, for example concerning the American 
representation. In 1974, the Ernst van der Beugel – Kissinger backchannel was again 
instrumental in Dutch-American negotiations concerning the long desired landing rights for 
                                                            
171 E.H. van der Beugel to F.J. Goedhart, 16 January 1976, file 38, EvdB: "Voor wat betreft ons advies in de commissie 
van Rijckevorsel zou ik, gezien de gang van zaken nu, wholeheartedly de aanbevelingen van de minderheid 
onderschrijven. Dan hadden we tenminste iets. Men kan niet somber genoeg zijn over de totale paralyse van het 
Westen. Nederland levert aan die paralyse een meer dan evenredige bijdrage.” 
172 E.H. van der Beugel to B.W. Biesheuvel, W.K.N. Schmelzer and H.J. de Koster, 27 September 1972, file 9, EvdB.  
173 W.K.N. Schmelzer to E.H. van der Beugel, 30 October 1972, file 9, EvdB, NAH. “Mijn welgemeende dank voor je 
brief van 27 september 1972 over je gesprek met Kissinger ten aanzien van de MBFR en een eventuele terugtrekking 
van Amerikaanse troepen. Intussen kreeg ik ook de beschikking voer een samenvatting van het "Randall-rapport", 
welke samenvatting ik je voor jouw informatie in fotokopie doe toekomen. Graag blijf ik mij aanbevolen houden voor 
informatie zoals je mij nu vertrouwelijk hebt willen verschaffen.”  
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Los Angeles. After Van der Beugel raised the issue with Kissinger, the latter assured Van der 
Beugel that he would “overrule our bureaucracy” in order to satisfy a key ally in Europe due 
to an “overwhelming desire to support the Dutch position.”174  
During the rest of the 1970’s as well as the 1980’s Ernst van der Beugel continued to 
play an active role in the public debate, partly as an Atlanticist Jeremiah – lamenting the state 
of the alliance while defying the “false prophets” of détente, the moralist politics of marrying 
priests and protestant clergymen, the new leftish sociologists and a new generation with its 
long hair, short skirts and anti-Americanism in the public square. Even so, during the course of 
the 1970s his clout started to fade. While still consulted as an eminence grise, the fossilization 
of Van der Beugel’s ideas increasingly turned him into a remnant of a different time and 
generation with different experiences, views and priorities while across the Atlantic the old 
East Coast Establishment, with which Van der Beugel had been intimately associated, was 
starting to unravel. “For two decades, the Establishment had held sway by sitting squarely 
astride the middle ground of ‘informed’ public opinion. But by the seventies, the center no 
longer held; Vietnam had shattered the post-World War II consensus.”175  
The times they were a changin’ and in the process the Atlantic Community was 
confronted with an additional challenge as the old Marshall Plan-era establishment had to 
make way for a new generation to whom the fundamental importance of close transatlantic 
ties was not as obvious as it had been to Ernst van der Beugel and many of his friends.  In 
contrast to Van der Beugel’s generation, this generation had not lived through the horrors of 
the Second World War nor experienced the joy of liberation, the miracle of post-war 
reconstruction or the dawn of the Cold War. Instead, members of the successor generation 
spent their formative years during a period of détente combined with experiences like the 
Vietnam War followed by the Watergate Scandal. As they came of age – preparing themselves 
to move into positions of power throughout the West – one question became increasingly 
pertinent among the Atlantic elite: How could the values and aspirations of the post-war 
Atlanticist establishment be transferred to this new generation?  
Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated how the views of the Atlantic elite ran out of sync with the 
ideas and concerns of the ‘public at large’ – especially on the necessity of NATO and a strong 
Atlantic defense in the context of easing tensions between East and West. This happened 
during a period of democratization in foreign affairs during which the general public not only 
started to demonstrate a greater interest in foreign policy but also started to voice its 
concerns stronger and louder. In the process it demonstrated an awareness on Van der 
Beugel’s side that the Atlantic security community formalized through NATO in fact also 
                                                            
174 Qtd. In: Scott-Smith and Snyder, “‘A Test of Sentiments’”, 943 
175 Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They Made (London: Faber and Faber, 
2012), 725.  
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depended on the Atlantic Community as an imagined community. While the sense of 
belonging to such a community was still alive on an elite level, he feared that it was 
unravelling among the public at large due to a combination of growing anti-Americanism and 
a diminishing awareness of the Soviet threat. Through a combination of private efforts 
focused on public diplomacy and psychological warfare Van der Beugel attempted to foster 
and strengthen this sense of community in the mind of the ‘average man’.  He did so by 
countering anti-Americanism with a more positive image of the United States as liberator, ally 
and protector while keeping the enemy image of the Soviet Union alive. Thus, while he did 
not expect the Soviet Union to start a hot war any time soon, he presented the communist 
enemy above all as a threat to the Atlantic Community as a community of values based on a 
shared civilization and shared interests.  
While the democratization of foreign policy created new challenges for the Atlantic 
Community, it also increased the significance of public diplomacy, which in turn opened up 
new avenues for unofficial diplomats like Ernst van der Beugel to influence the transatlantic 
diplomatic process. While traditional state-centered approaches to diplomatic history tend to 
ignore the contribution of these unofficial actors to the diplomatic process, the perspective of 
New Diplomatic History makes it possible to demonstrate how Ernst van der Beugel as a 
private actor dissatisfied with official efforts at explaining NATO to the public at large, took it 
upon himself to contribute to this public diplomacy effort – and he was not the only one. The 
contributions of private actors, including many Atlantic NGOs, in public diplomacy and 
psychological warfare were recognized and encouraged by NATO officials who wanted to 
avoid suspicion of spreading communist-like propaganda. What is more, they believed that 
private actors could spread their messages more efficiently while granting more legitimacy to 
transatlantic public diplomacy efforts.  In a similar vein, as a private individual, Van der Beugel 
could also be more aggressive in his psychological warfare through his efforts of keeping the 
enemy image alive. 
From the second half of the 1960’s onwards Van der Beugel put an increasing portion of 
his time and energy into private public diplomacy efforts – trying to create a conducive public 
climate for close transatlantic relations and a strong Atlantic defense.  His positions as 
professor of transatlantic cooperation at Leiden University and chairman of the renowned 
International Institute for Strategic Studies in London provided him with extra status as an 
‘independent’ expert in his field. Through speeches, publications and TV appearances – 
mostly in the Netherlands, but also abroad – he became a key voice in the public debate on 
transatlantic relations and defense. In the process, he tried to create a positive image of the 
United States by keeping the memory of America’s role in the liberation and post-war 
recovery of the Netherlands alive in the face of the Vietnam War and growing anti-
Americanism while emphasizing the importance of the Dutch and Atlantic defense while 
contributing to psychological warfare efforts by reminding his publics that the Soviet threat 
had not truly diminished.  
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 Next to his own direct contribution to the public debate he also tried to influence the 
way in which Dutch journalists covered the United States, by offering access to American 
influentials to journalists whom he expected to write positively about the United States and 
by socializing them into the Atlantic elite by inviting them to Bilderberg Meetings or to 
dinners at his own home. While the greatest part of his public diplomacy efforts was focused 
on the Dutch public, these efforts were partly driven by the fear that the growing anti-
American sentiments among European publics might alienate the Americans and threaten 
their willingness to stay committed to the safety of the European continent. He also tried to 
explain the Dutch position to the American elites directly.  
While his public diplomacy efforts increased during this period, his role behind the 
scenes of transatlantic diplomacy did not diminish, as he remained well-connected to the 
formal diplomatic circuits, serving as an unofficial liaison between Washington, The Hague 
and NATO. In fact, as his close friend Henry Kissinger entered the Nixon White House first as 
National Security Adviser and later also as Secretary of State, his access to the official Foreign 
Policy Establishment in Washington was better than ever before.  Both men also used this 
connection for diplomatic purposes. Kissinger contacted Van der Beugel for example when he 
wanted to reconnect White House bonds with Monnet’s Action Committee for a United 
Europe through Kohnstamm or when the omission of the Netherlands on the itinerary of 
Nixon’s 1969 European tour rubbed foreign minister Luns the wrong way. The two main 
‘official’ issues about which Van der Beugel approached Kissinger repeatedly – the KLM-
landing rights negotiations in the U.S. and the Dutch defense budget – don’t just demonstrate 
that Ernst van der Beugel was taken seriously as an unofficial actor, but also show that he was 
not just an extension of the Dutch or the American government. He was very critical about 
American landing rights policy and helped the Dutch government to get U.S. landing rights, 
believing that resolving this issue was also in the interest of transatlantic cohesion. At the 
same time he did not mind to use his American connections to put pressure on the Dutch 
government via NATO and the White House to raise its defense budget.  In the end all of 
these private efforts – in public and behind the scenes – worked in tandem towards the same 




7. The Challenge of the Successor Generation 
While the preceding chapter already introduced Van der Beugel’s public diplomacy efforts in 
constructing a sense of Atlantic community by keeping the Atlantic mindset alive in a time of 
détente and the democratization of foreign policy, this chapter will continue this analysis with 
a more specific focus on the challenge of the successor generation.  After all, diplomacy is not 
just about short term goals such as negotiating deals and crafting policies. On a more 
fundamental level, diplomacy is just as much about fostering and maintaining relationships; 
about ideas, values and identities, about creating an environment and a climate that enables 
the realization of more concrete and short term goals.  Likewise, the challenge of the 
successor generation was not so much about how to shape European integration or how to 
legitimize a strong Atlantic defense. Instead it was concerned with the long-term challenge of 
fostering and maintaining the social fabric and mindset that served as the glue that kept the 
Atlantic Community together.  
This shared mindset as well as the social fabric supporting the Atlantic alliance was both 
maintained and embodied by the Atlantic elite, composed of the constellation of state 
officials and private individuals and organizations working to foster and maintain close 
transatlantic ties and who were committed to transmitting this understanding to the public at 
large. Both this social fabric and the “Atlantic-mindedness” that united them were for a 
significant part rooted in formative experiences described in earlier chapters; experiences of 
appeasement and war, liberation and reconstruction, followed by integration and 
cooperation in the face of renewed fears of war and authoritarian repression – experiences 
shared by those who were present at the creation.1 On the European continent these 
experiences had also influenced the development of a positive image of the United States as 
benevolent liberator, ally and protector. In the 1960s and 1970s, however, a new generation 
came of age that did not share these formative experiences so central to the genesis of the 
Atlantic Community. They had only known peace and grew up during a period of easing 
tensions between East and West. What is more, the European members of this generation did 
not associate the Americans with benevolent deeds of liberation and reconstruction, but 
rather saw the United States as belligerent and corrupt as a result of the Vietnam War and 
the Watergate scandal.  As an imagined community, however, the Atlantic Community – 
and the military alliance at the heart of this community – could only live on as long as the 
Atlantic mindset lived on in the next generation, as long as they too recognized the 
importance of transatlantic bonds and as long as the social fabric that had developed during 
war and reconstruction could be maintained. As this chapter will demonstrate, unofficial 
actors like Ernst van der Beugel and the Atlantic elite networks to which he belonged went 
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through great lengths to foster and maintain these long term bonds and to create social 
structures though which new and especially younger members could be engaged, socialized 
and play themselves an important role in transmitting this mindset within their own spheres 
of influence.  
A Very Serious Generation Problem 
During the 1960s Ernst van der Beugel’s speeches and activities were characterized by a 
growing emphasis on the importance of engaging and educating new generations of 
Americans and Europeans in Atlantic affairs. “Those who have not experienced the 1930’s, 
during which my student generation witnessed the horrifying consequences of the lack of 
will-power and strength in the West, which brought the Second World War upon us, who 
have never experienced the simplicity of purpose of the Second World War, nor the joy of 
recovery and integration of the Western world, will approach the fundamental problems of 
international politics in a different way,”2 Van der Beugel observed in the summer of 1968 – a 
year that would be characterized by massive student protests, dissatisfaction and unrest 
throughout the West. “There is no doubt a very serious generation problem in the Western 
World,” he acknowledged. “To escape it by calling it an irresponsible action of an 
irresponsible and tiny but violent minority does not meet the seriousness of the problem at 
all. Trying to link it to specific circumstances in specific countries does not lead to anything. 
The classrooms at the Sorbonne were overcrowded, but were they at Columbia? Where is the 
negro problem in Amsterdam, or the springer concern in Rome?”3  
The fact that the post-war generation perceived “the necessity of Western cooperation” 
as an element of the very status quo many of them detested while associating it with the 
‘establishment’ aroused strong feelings of antagonism against it, Van der Beugel observed.4 
“The feeling that the Cold War and the leadership of that period belong to the established 
order and therefore should be changed is very strong indeed among the younger 
generation.”5 In addition, many youths either principally opposed the use of power, or – and 
this category was much larger according to Van der Beugel – they manifested a curious 
blindness for the essential question of the purposes of the use of power. Consequently, they 
repeatedly contested the use of force or regarded it with suspicion, while isolating it from its 
ultimate purposes.6  “Maybe this is the case because many of those who direct themselves 
against the existing order; the rebels of today, at least those in Europe, have never 
experienced anything but peace, freedom and economic expansion”, Van der Beugel 
                                                            
2 E.H. van der Beugel, “Leiding VS in Atlantische wereld is onmisbaar”, Het Parool, 23 August 1968 (translation mine).   
3 E.H. van der Beugel, “A new Look at European-US Relations”, Knickerbocker International, August 1968, file 47, 
EvdB.   
4 E.H. van der Beugel, “De huidige problemen van de Westelijke samenwerking”, speech, 19 November 1968, box 
“lezingen”, AHB.  
5 E.H. van der Beugel, “Where are we going?”, speech, [date unknown, proabably June 1968], file 47, EvdB.  
6 These purposes included, according to van der Beugel, the protection of a way of life, a civilization that respected 
individual freedom. See: Van der Beugel, “De huidige problemen van de Westelijke samenwerking.” 
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maintained. “They have – as for the young, completely beyond their control – never stood in 
the conflict where the central question was whether those values would disappear. They live 
and agitate by the grace of those very values which they themselves want to destroy or 
whose endangerment they do not recognize.” Van der Beugel acknowledged that Western 
society demands a certain degree of dissatisfaction with its own shortcomings, but as he 
perceived the situation at hand, the dissatisfaction driving the wish to improve was keeling 
over into a blind disapproval of Western society, which in turn led to a process of self-
destruction in which essential accomplishments of the Atlantic Community were falling prey 
to unclear emotions. 7   
Ernst van der Beugel thus perceived the alienation of big clusters of young people from 
the principles of the process of Western cooperation and their identification of this 
cooperation with ‘the establishment’ and their rebellion against this establishment – of which 
he himself was obviously a prominent member – as “a serious disintegrating factor” in the 
Atlantic Community. Hence, he argued that bringing back the serious segments of these 
youths to the understanding that Western cooperation was not a remnant of a bygone era, 
was essential to the vitality and sustainability of the Atlantic alliance.8 As mentioned in the 
previous chapter, from 1965 onwards the Vietnam War was one of the prime catalysts of 
discontent – in particular among the younger generation. Even so, Van der Beugel warned in 
1968 that “nobody should make himself the slightest illusion that after the Vietnam conflict 
will be solved this clash between the young and what they consider the established order will 
be terminated.”9 The generation problem was bigger than that and in order to ensure the 
long term survival of the Atlantic Community and all it stood for, Ernst van der Beugel 
considered it particularly important to socialize promising young leaders into the Atlantic 
elite; in fact into the very establishment that so many of them had come to detest.  
These ideas did not develop in a vacuum, however, and Ernst van der Beugel was 
certainly not the only one contemplating the generational challenges to maintaining Atlantic 
cohesion. As historians like Valérie Aubourg and Giles Scott-Smith have demonstrated, similar 
worries with regard to “the passing of the scene of the Marshall Plan architects and the values 
gap with their successors” developed within broader Atlanticist circles during the early 
1960s.10 These concerns would reach their zenith during the early 1980s when the term 
‘successor generation’ was coined “to describe the group that will replace the McCloys, 
                                                            
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 
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Kissingers, Schmidts and others of the Founders Generation that created the Atlantic 
alliance.”11    
Consultancy: the Ford Foundation and the Successor Generation 
In order to gain a better understanding of Ernst van der Beugel’s ideas in the context of the 
successor generation it is useful to take a closer look at some of his advisory work for the Ford 
Foundation,12 one of the prime financial donors of the private Atlanticist organizations that 
together formed much of the informal infrastructure of the unofficial post-war Atlantic 
Community, which in turn facilitated many of Ernst van der Beugel’s private transatlantic 
activities.  
As Interjeet Parmar has shown, American philanthropic organizations and in particular 
the ‘Big three’ – the Rockefeller, Carnegie and Ford Foundations – have played a significant 
role in the forging of American foreign relations.13 While the Ford Foundation entered the 
international philanthropy scene relatively late in the early 1950s, it soon developed into the 
biggest philanthropic organization in the world. In 1951 Paul G. Hoffmann, who had just 
stepped down as the American director of the Marshall Plan’s European Cooperation 
Administration (ECA) became the Ford Foundation’s president.  Together with some other 
prominent associates from the Marshall Plan days, including his ECA colleagues Milton Katz 
and Richard M. Bissell as well as former High Commissioner to Germany John J. McCloy and 
his Political Affairs Director Shepard Stone, Hoffmann set out to develop an international 
affairs program, which during the 1960s and early 1970s came to focus a great deal of its 
attention on fostering and promoting close transatlantic ties within an Atlantic Community.14  
After President Kennedy introduced the idea of an Atlantic Partnership in 1962, the Ford 
Foundation decided to pursue the strengthening of this partnership as the core purpose of its 
International Affairs program. As one 1962 Ford Foundation report pointed out; “the primary 
objective of the International Affairs program is to identify key persons and institutions in the 
Atlantic area and assist them in developing the ideas and organizations required by the new 
challenges and opportunities.” In helping to “accelerate the development of the Atlantic 
partnership” through private activity, the report emphasized that “the Foundation would not 
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Rise of American Power (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012). 
14 Aubourg, “Problems of Transmission”, 419; Volker R. Berghahn, America and the Intellectual Cold Wars in Europe 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001) 143-177.  
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support activities that can be best carried on by governmental bodies. However, it would be 
considered appropriate to aid activities which would be suspect or impaired if national 
governments engaged in them.”15 In this context, the Ford Foundation provided funding for a 
whole series of Atlanticist organizations including the Bilderberg Meetings, the International 
Institute for Strategic Studies and the Atlantic Institute. The latter was founded in Paris in 
1961 with the purpose to “promote and develop a spirit of community among Atlantic 
peoples (…) the strengthening of (…) the social institutions of the Atlantic Community, the 
harmonization of the long range interests of the community”. The underlying goal was “to 
encourage the growth of a new generation of intellectuals and policy analysts working on 
Atlantic problems and thinking in Atlantic terms, as opposed to a national and restricted 
approach, therefore promoting harmonious and constructive Euro-American relations.”16  
Aubourg argues that “one of the major difficulties was to create more than a few short-
term projects and make this Atlantic outlook permanent.” 17 In a similar vein, Giles Scott-
Smith has pointed out that “the ‘belief system’ represented by the Atlantic Alliance needed to 
be embedded and maintained in transatlantic political culture. This awareness lay behind the 
efforts of many active in the public and private realms to ensure that NATO was seen as the 
central cornerstone of a wider and deeper social, cultural and economic Atlantic 
Community.”18 The generation gap posed a serious challenge to the preservation of this 
‘belief system’. As J.E. Dougherty explained in his work on the psychological milieu of the 
Atlantic Community: “Among those who do not remember the [Second World War], or for 
whom it was but a dim childhood experience, the slogans of the more immediate postwar 
period – about the external military menace and the need for tightened community – no 
longer fit meaningfully into a cognitive framework that was conditioned primarily by 
economic boom and absence of conflict.”19  Thus, as Aubourg has demonstrated, in a search 
for long term approaches to maintain the ‘Atlantic mindset’ during the early 1960s the idea 
developed within the Ford Foundation that “the key to more durable results lay in 
transmitting this Atlantic perspective to the upcoming generation.”20 In this context, the Ford 
Foundation for example justified its financial support for the University Institute headed by 
Max Kohnstamm in 1963 by arguing that it was a way to help “promising young scholars in 
developing an Atlantic approach to problems” through the identification of a set of common 
values and common interests, while  trying to define a “community of purpose directed 
toward common policies and actions on issues of vital concern between Europe and the 
                                                            
15 “Ford Foundation - Activities to strengthen the Atlantic Partnership”, box 18, folder 182, Office Files-IA-Slater, Ford 
Foundation, RAC.  
16 Qtd. in: Scott-Smith, “Maintaining Transatlantic Community”, 95.  
17 Aubourg, “Problems of Transmission”, 422. 
18 Scott-Smith, “Maintaining Transatlantic Community”, 90-91. 
19 James E. Dougherty, “The Atlantic Community - The Psychological Milieu”, in Atlantic Community in Crisis: A 
Redefinition of the Transatlantic Relationship, eds. Walter Hahn and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. (New York: Pergamon 
Press, 1979), 47. 
20 Aubourg, “Problems of Transmission”, 422. 
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United States.”21 Thus, while the term “successor generation” was not coined until the late 
1970s, historians like Valérie Aubourg and Giles Scott-Smith have demonstrated that the 
concept of a ‘successor generation’ was already clearly articulated by the Ford Foundation’s 
staff and consultants in the 1960s. One of these consultants was Ernst van der Beugel.  
In 1966 Ernst van der Beugel was asked by the Ford Foundation to write a report on the 
future of the Atlantic Institute, which had not lived up to the foundation’s hopes and 
expectations during the first five years of its existence. This raised the question whether the 
institute was still worth Foundation support and if so, how should the institute be 
reorganized? Ernst van der Beugel, who was also involved with the Atlantic Institute as a 
member of its working party on the problem of Britain’s entry into Europe, was also critical 
about the way the Institute was functioning.22  Even so, in his consultant reports he argued 
that from the perspective of “everybody who thinks that the cohesion of the Western World 
is still one of our primary objectives” there was an “urgent need” for a good Atlantic Institute 
– especially as an instrument “to keep these thoughts alive and to transmit them to the ruling 
generation and especially to those who are going to govern in the public, private and 
academic sectors of life.” As Van der Beugel explained in more detail:  
The generation who has lived through the thirties and still has the collapse of 
appeasement in its blood is approximately the same generation which has 
witnessed the ‘great acts’ of the 1948-1954 period in Atlantic relations. They are 
now between 50 and 75. Many of them are still in the leading establishment but 
they are practically fading out.  
The younger generation in Europe is pragmatic and less committed to any concept. 
Vietnam and the disappearance of the probability of an overt Soviet aggression 
plus the birth of the welfare state in Europe puts, to say the least of it, their 
feelings for the necessity of strength in the Western World in a different 
perspective.  
We – the older generation – have failed to transmit to them the message in which 
we believe. This message is that the Atlantic countries dispose of a unique 
reservoir of talent and resources. This reservoir can only be used if we live in a 
cooperating, organized and structured Western world.23  
There were a few “instruments available” according to Van der Beugel to address this 
problem, but they either did not function on a permanent basis – Bilderberg, for example – or 
they did not function “properly and imaginatively”. Consequently, Van der Beugel reasoned 
that the Atlantic Institute “should be the Center (and I also mean this in the physical sense) of 
                                                            
21 Ibid., 422. 
22 E.H. van der Beugel to Joe Slater, 9 January 1967, box 27, folder 286, Office Files, IA – Slater, FFA, RAC. 
23 E.H. van der Beugel to S. Stone and J.E. Slater, September 1966, box ID#18170-Report#010747, Unpublished Staff 
and Consultant Reports , IA – Joseph E. Slater, FFA, RAC. 
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those who are concerned with Atlantic relations. To put it in an oversimplified way, it should 
be a Bilderberg on a day-to-day basis”.  
In addition, Van der Beugel emphasized the value of visitor and exchange programs, 
maintaining that “there is no better investment in the cause of American-European relations 
than bringing Europeans closer to the American society, preferably by bringing them over 
here but also by American programs in Europe.”24  He referred to the Columbia-Leyden 
Program of American Law as a good example of a program bringing Americans to Europe25, 
but considered it of greater importance to create opportunities for Europeans to visit the 
United States arguing that “the real problem in American-European relations is primarily with 
Europeans and not with Americans.” In this context he believed that the Atlantic Institute 
should act as the selection place for programs intended to bring Europeans to the U.S. and, to 
a lesser degree, vice-versa, arguing that “in the political field one should concentrate on the 
intellectual left labor wing and the Catholic right wing. They should see America. In the 
academic and journalistic field, one should concentrate on people who might learn that the 
U.S. is concerned about the year 2000 and we in Europe are not.”26  Obviously, Van der 
Beugel talked from experience when he mentioned that “there is no single field in which 
investment yields so much as in the field of showing Europeans what the U.S. is really like”, 
but whereas his generation of leaders had been brought in direct contact with Americans and 
American society through the Marshall Plan, similar formative experiences now had to be 
consciously created through Foreign Leader Programs, educational exchanges, and other 
trans-Atlantic meeting places. The Atlantic Institute, like the Bilderberg Meetings, should also 
concentrate on functioning as such a “meeting place”.   
Van der Beugel also believed that the Atlanticists could learn from Jean Monnet’s Action 
Committee for a United Europe with regard to its ‘policy statement’ aspect, arguing that “the 
Atlantic Institute should from time to time (and not as an exclusive activity) issue policy 
statements on actual problems” which “through the composition of the board carry the 
weight of having a real political background.” To accomplish this, a “good Atlantic Institute 
should be carried by a representative board which consists of people who are responsible for 
the political decisions in their countries along the lines of what Monnet did in his Committee.” 
Last but not least, Van der Beugel recommended “a complete change in the Board of 
Governors in the sense that the establishment of 1950 should, to a great extent, be replaced 
by a younger generation.”27  
                                                            
24 E.H. van der Beugel to Shepard Stone and Joseph E. Slater, June 13, 1967, box ID#18975, Report#010874, IA-Joseph 
E. Slater, FFA, RAC. 
25 On the connections between the Ford Foundation and the Leyden-Columbia Summer Program in American Law 
and The Hague Academy, as well as Ernst van der Beugel’s role in this, see: Giles Scott-Smith, “Expanding the 
Diffusion of US Jurisprudence: The Netherlands as a ‘beachhead’ for US Foundations in the 1960s”, in American 
Foundations and the Coproduction of World Order in the Twentieth Century, eds. Helke Rausch and John Krige 
(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2012), 210-232.  
26 E.H. van der Beugel to Shepard Stone and Joseph E. Slater, June 13, 1967, box ID#18975, Report#010874, IA-Joseph 




Jim Huntley, a former U.S. Foreign Service officer and one of the founding fathers of the 
Atlantic Institute who had joined the Ford Foundation’s International Program in 1965, 
responded with great enthusiasm to Van der Beugel’s recommendations. “Van der Beugel 
sees the Institute as I saw it from the very beginning: the place where the vital interests of the 
Atlantic countries are thoroughly discussed and from which policy statements emanate. It 
should be largely a meeting place, a planning center, and a leadership development 
organization”, he wrote to his Ford Foundation colleagues Joe Johnson and Shepard Stone. 
“In my opinion, Ernst van der Beugel is the man for Director General of the Atlantic Institute. 
(…) I really cannot think of anyone besides Ernst who is equal to the task, although if he were 
not willing, another person could probably be found after a thorough search.”28   
Ernst van der Beugel, however, tried to convince his colleagues at the Ford Foundation 
to appoint Max Kohnstamm, who also worked as a consultant for Ford, to this position. Van 
der Beugel “strongly recommended” to Foundation officials that “we should do everything to 
bridge the gap between the ‘Europeans’ and the ‘Atlanticists’ which unfortunately exists.” 
According to Van der Beugel “not many things have hurt the Atlantic movement in Europe so 
much as this feeling that you either were a European or an Atlanticist”, arguing that this was 
“the reason that the real political appeal has been monopolized by the European 
movement.”29 To bridge this schism, Van der Beugel argued “a man should be appointed as 
Director who could personify the fact that there is not and should not be any antagonism 
between the two priorities of European unification and Atlantic cohesion.” Max Kohnstamm 
was the ideal man for this job according to Van der Beugel.30 This, however, was exactly what 
Huntley – who considered Kohnstamm as too Europeanist for his taste – was trying to 
prevent. He lamented the fact that the Atlantic Institute had originally “been launched on a 
course that would mainly support the Kennedy (but really Monnet-Ball) concept of Atlantic 
Partnership, not a broad transatlantic community of nations bound together in a complex 
web of intergovernmental institutions and less concrete but still very real habits of thought 
and heart built on a thousand or more years of common history.”31  While Kohnstamm would 
mean a continuation on the Monnet-Ball course, Ernst van der Beugel would be better suited 
to steer the Institute into the latter direction. In the end Jack Tuthill, a highly regarded former 
U.S. career diplomat became the new Director General, while both Max Kohnstamm and 
Ernst van der Beugel joined the Institute’s revised Board of Governors together with 14 other 
newly-elected governors – most of whom – like Van der Beugel’s old Marshall Plan friend 
Robert Marjolin and his fellow Bilderberg Steering Committee member Otto Wolff von 
Amerongen – did certainly not belong to the younger generation. Other recommendations 
                                                            
28 James R. Huntley to J.E. Slater, December 6, 1966, box 27, folder 187, IA/Slater, Ford Foundation, FFA, RAC.  
29 Van der Beugel to Stone and Slater, 13 June 1967, box ID#18975, Report#010874, Unpubished Reports, FFA, RAC. 
30 See for example: E.H. van der Beugel to George W. Ball and Siegmund Warburg, 6 September 1967, box 96, folder 
8, George W. Ball Papers, PUL. 
31 James R. Huntley, An Architect of Democracy: Building a Mosaic of Peace (Washington DC: New Academic 
Publishing, 2006), 201. 
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made by Van der Beugel did come back, however, in the eventual grant request for the 
restructured Atlantic Institute, which argued that: 
One of the prime requirements for such a center is the need to increase 
communication and understanding among the younger leaders in Europe and the 
United States. As suggested above, the opportunities for meeting and working 
together which were afforded emergent leaders in the immediate post-war era 
through the negotiations for new forms of international cooperation – the 
Marshall Plan, NATO, EEC, OECD and others – no longer exist in the same full 
measure. Established leaders at least have the Bilderberg meetings as a forum for 
an exchange of ideas but no similar opportunity is afforded to the younger 
generation, and it would be the aim of the Institute to work out a design for 
seminars which might ultimately result in something like a junior Bilderberg – 
without, however, detracting from the development of the specific meetings and 
workshops mentioned earlier in this section.”32 
Jim Huntley furthermore went on to extensively quote Van der Beugel’s ideas on the 
successor generation as a motivation to support an ambitious Young Leaders Program for the 
Atlantic Community through the Atlantic Institute.33 The Ford Foundation was certainly not 
the only American foundation supporting these kinds of efforts, however. While skeptical 
towards the Atlantic Institute as a whole, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, for example, also 
supported the Atlantic Institute’s Young Leaders Program, which was “conceived as a means 
of renewing those post-war working relationships among exceptional individuals, which have 
served the Atlantic Community so well in the recent past.” Here too the initiative was 
propelled by the idea that “if the necessary channels of communication can be established, 
and these emerging leaders can get acquainted with each other and exchange ideas on 
common problems, they can establish that community of ideas and goals so necessary if the 
Western peoples are to resolve together the issues which confront them in the decades 
ahead.”34 
It is helpful to look at Van der Beugel’s recommendations for the Atlantic Institute 
because it provides insight into the way in which he believed private actors and institutions 
should contribute to fostering close transatlantic relations and the importance of socializing 
younger generations in this endeavor. Even so, Ernst van der Beugel’s role as a consultant on 
and governor of the Atlantic Institute was rather marginal compared to his role as a professor 
of Post-War Western Cooperation, a supporter of exchange and visitor programs and his 
leadership in the Bilderberg Meetings where he acted on these ideas by becoming one of the 
                                                            
32 “Request for a grant of $160,000 to the Atlantic Institute for a five-year program of expanding activity in the field of 
studies and seminars for the promotion of Atlantic Unity”, Grant File 65-161, Reel 2757, FFA, RAC. 
33 “A Program for Development of Rising Young Leaders”, discussion Paper/Office of IA, December 7, 1966, box 18, 
folder 192, IA/Joseph E. Slater, FFA, RAC. 
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Rockefeller Brothers Fund, RAC.  
216 
 
driving forces behind a constant effort to educate new generations and to rejuvenate the 
Atlantic elite.  
Bilderberg and the pursuit of a ‘continuous rejuvenation’ 
Among those involved in the Bilderberg Meetings there was a certain understanding of 
Bilderberg as a vehicle to sustain the trans-Atlantic relationships and contacts that had 
originally developed during the Marshall Plan era by developing and maintaining the human 
infrastructure of an evolving Atlantic Community. As William P. Bundy35, who succeeded 
Joseph E. Johnson as Honorary Secretary General of the Bilderberg Meetings for the United 
States explained in response to the question why Bilderberg was founded:  
During the period of the Marshall Plan, many Americans in government and in 
certain sectors of private business were in close touch with all the European 
countries that were participating in the program. When the Marshall Plan came to 
a close in 1953 there was on the European side a very strong desire to maintain the 
kind of close contact with Americans in and out of government that had been 
established during that period. There was a concern that there would be a 
loosening of ties and perhaps a return to the kind of economic nationalism that 
had been such a terrible feature of the period between the First and Second World 
War. It was felt that we needed to maintain the strong cooperation that had 
developed in the field of defense and economics on both sides of the Atlantic. We 
needed a continuing forum where leaders on both sides of the ocean could come 
together – responsible people in many walks of life. That is my understanding how 
the conference came about and that is still the spirit in which it is conducted.36  
While this describes just one dimension of Bilderberg’s genesis it certainly was an important 
component and one in which Ernst van der Beugel played a central role.37 As Bundy related 
while looking back on his relationship with Ernst van der Beugel, “It was largely through Ernst 
that I came to realize the high degree to which Bilderberg was built on the relations formed 
during the period of the Marshall Plan. He was a direct link to a vitally important segment of 
history, in which the Netherlands had played a special part from the outset. He knew 
everybody from that time and their successors, and it was a privilege to observe, and in time, 
                                                            
35 William P. “Bill” Bundy was an American attorney and intelligence expert who worked as a CIA analyst in the 1950s 
until he joined president Eisenhower’s Commission on National Goals. He also served as an advisor on foreign affairs 
to presidents Kennedy and Johnson. During this period he became deeply involved in Vietnam War policy, first as 
deputy to Assistant Secretary of State for International Security Affairs Paul Nitze during the Kennedy years and later 
as Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific affairs under Johnson. After the election of Richard Nixon, he 
moved on to academia. In 1969 he started teaching at MIT and in 1973 he moved on to Princeton University where 
he worked as a professor for the rest of his life. Between 1975 and 1980 he served as the American Honorary 
Secretary General of the Bilderberg Meetings. 
36“Interview: with William P. Bundy”, Freeman Digest, November-December 1978, p. 41, Scrapbook XVI, AHB. 
37 See also Thomas Gijswijt, “The Bilderberg Group and Dutch-American Relations” in Four Centuries of Dutch-
American Relations, eds. Hans Krabbendam, Cornelis A. van Minnen and Giles Scott-Smith (Amsterdam: Boom, 2009), 
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share in those bonds.”38 While a significant segment of the Bilderbergers shared a common 
history from the Marshall Plan days, which had helped to facilitate the creation of the 
organization during a time of growing transatlantic tension, the Bilderberg Meetings were not 
just meant to serve as an annual reunion of those good old days. Rather, as Van der Beugel 
pointed out, it was meant as an instrument to “keep the relations good” – in the future as 
well.39 In this context, the need to involve “a larger number of ‘new faces’ as much as 
possible to be recruited from the younger generation” was recognized as early as 1961.40 In 
December 1963, Ernst van der Beugel informed Prince Bernhard about the necessity of a 
reorganization of the Steering Committee, arguing that its current composition severely 
prevented “the much needed circulation of fresh, young blood” which “guarantees that 
Bilderberg remains a vital organism.”41 As Van der Beugel explained:  
The problem is that we are too much inclined to invite people, who are arrivé 
either in the public or the private sector. It is obvious that the Bilderberg 
Conferences are only worthwhile when a significant part of the participants occupy 
important positions. On the other hand it is of great importance that we also get 
people, who are not yet arrivé, but of whom it is likely that they will become so in 
the future, or that they will have influence on important individuals.”42   
Even worse, the Steering Committee was stuck with quite some individuals who not even 
belonged to either one of the above-mentioned categories anymore. Instead, their main trait 
was that they once “had been arrivé”.  The number of European members of the Steering 
Committee had also grown considerably over the years, which was problematic because all of 
its members were to be invited to every Bilderberg Meeting. As a result, they “blocked” a 
great amount of the available seats, sometimes even representing half of the total number of 
participants.43 Meanwhile the Bilderberg leadership was slowly ageing.44 Consequently, what 
was needed, according to Van der Beugel was a rejuvenation of the Steering Committee, 
which meant that some of Bilderberg’s European “ambassadors in the different countries” 
had to be replaced. This was obviously going to be a “delicate problem” that would be 
accompanied with some “difficult conversations”, but it could no longer be avoided.45 The 
reorganization of Bilderberg’s leadership was subsequently discussed during the Steering 
Committee meeting at the 1964 Bilderberg Conference in Williamsburg, Virginia, where the 
                                                            
38 William P. Bundy, contribution to “Book on Ernst”, box 27, Folder 1, Shepard Stone Papers, RSCL. 
39 EvdB/Kersten Oral History, p. 737: “Van der Beugel: Meer: ‘om de contacten goed te houden’” (translation mine, 
emphasis mine). 
40 “Meeting of the Advisory Committee at the 'Century Club', New York”, 17 November 1961, file 61, Bilderberg. 
41 E.H. van der Beugel to HRH Prince Bernhard, 16 December 1963, file 66, Bilderberg (translation mine).  
42 E.H. van der Beugel to HRH Prince Bernhard, 20 October 1963, file 66, Bilderberg.  
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44 “Het Steering Committee”, A.T. Lamping, 6 March 1964, file 68A, Bilderberg. 
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Steering Committee agreed that “this situation ran counter to the widely-felt and widely-
expressed desire that the Bilderberg Meetings should undergo a strong and continuous 
rejuvenation process.”46  
The rejuvenation process that Van der Beugel initiated was also received with approval 
by the Ford Foundation’s Director of the International Affairs program Shepard Stone – 
himself a frequent Bilderberg participant – who asserted in a letter to Joe Johnson, the 
American Secretary General of the Bilderberg Meetings, that he was convinced that Van der 
Beugel’s suggested improvements were very much needed. When Stone travelled around 
Europe he found many “younger men who are now assuming larger responsibilities in 
parliaments, universities, and business” but who were not represented at Bilderberg. 
“Bilderberg does not include, in my opinion, a sufficient number of new faces, either 
European or American”, he argued. “As one looks back to Williamsburg, one might say that 
we should have had one of Goldwater’s young men on hand. This would not have been to my 
personal taste, but it might have been useful to all of us.”47 It is not unlikely that Van der 
Beugel had in fact been informally instructed by Stone, who was a close friend of Van der 
Beugel, to put greater emphasis on the socialization of promising young leaders in Bilderberg 
as this would happen repeatedly during the years that followed.48 In their June 1964 interim 
report to the Ford Foundation, the Bilderbergers made sure to underscore that “Both the 
Americans and the Europeans are conscious of the need to involve younger persons, and 
particularly future leaders, in the Bilderberg Meetings, and are making efforts to increase the 
number of such persons.”49  This emphasis on the successor generation would from this 
moment on remain a constantly recurring element in Bilderberg’s reports to the Ford 
Foundation. Stone, in turn, tried to help the Secretaries-General in their scouting efforts by 
providing Johnson “on a confidential basis” with a list of young leaders composed by Ford’s 
International Affairs department for possible Bilderberg selections, while reassuring his Ford 
Foundation colleague Joseph E. Slater that they were “working actively on the new crop.”50 
While the overhaul of the Steering Committee was a first step towards this goal, its 
members still found it difficult to include the desired amount of younger participants – 
younger meaning in this case ‘under 45’.51  Consequently, in his August 1966 memorandum  
that warned against Bilderberg running out of sync with “the great mass of people and most 
especially the young” mentioned in the preceding chapter, Van der Beugel also pushed for a 
                                                            
46 “Minutes of the Steering Committee Meeting held at Williamsburg”, 20 and 22 March 1964, file 67A, Bilderberg.   
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further rejuvenation of the Bilderberg meetings, this time with a prime focus on facilitating 
the integration of still younger members into the transatlantic establishment through its 
choice of subjects as well as its list of invitees. “It is a good thing”, Van der Beugel maintained, 
“that Bilderberg is after all an ‘establishment’ group. It could not function otherwise. But it 
would be a pity if we should become increasingly an emeritus ‘establishment’ group of 1952. 
If this analysis should be correct (and I hope very much that it is not) then we should draw the 
consequences in the choice of our subjects and especially in the composition of the 
participants.”52 
Ernst van der Beugel’s August memorandum was extensively discussed during a Steering 
Committee meeting at Soestdijk Palace53 in October 1966, where Van der Beugel explained 
that “in proposing to invite younger people with diverging opinions he did not mean the 
attendance of new participants with an entirely negative attitude towards basic assumptions 
of Bilderberg, but the people he had in mind should have constructive alternatives. Moreover, 
they should have the qualifications of 'coming men' and have a certain following. A 
percentage of 25 to 30 of this group on the total number of participants should be aimed at.” 
According to the minutes of the meeting, “all members present agreed with Mr. van der 
Beugel's suggestions.”54 Even so, actually living up to these standards continued to prove a 
challenge for the Steering Committee.55 At the Cambridge meeting in 1967, 25% of the 
American participants were under 45 years of age, but only four of them were under 40.56 
Ernst van der Beugel provided an example of the kind of younger individual with a “diverging” 
– but not too diverging – opinion he had in mind by inviting the 35 year old Dutch social-
democrat Piet Dankert, with whom he had debated the PvdA’s stance on the Vietnam War 
not long before, and who became the PvdA’s spokesperson on Foreign Affairs and Defense 
the year after. Even so, it was not until the 1969 conference in Marienlyst, Denmark that “a 
conspicuously successful effort was made to include a larger proportion of younger people in 
each of the delegations.”57  
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53 Soestdijk Palace was the residence of the Dutch Queen and Prince Bernhard in Baarn, the Netherlands.  
54 “Minutes of Steering Committee meeting at Soestdijk Palace on October 9, 1966”, box 76,  file 3, Arthur H. Dean 
Papers, CUL. 
55 See for example: “Final report to the Ford Foundation (…) 13 June 1963 - 1 May 1968”, box 76 , file 4, Arthur H. 
Dean Papers, CUL. “There has been marked success in getting new faces but some difficulty in getting as many 
younger people as we seek. This is partly because members of the steering committee on both sides of the Atlantic 
tend to think in terms of persons who have already ‘arrived’ and it is difficult for the administrators on both sides to 
counter this tendency. Also it has proved easier to identify promising younger persons among scholars and 
parliamentarians than among businessmen. The two Honorary Secretaries-General are constantly endeavoring to 
find more young people and hope to be more successful in 1969 than in1968. In this connection we hope to benefit 
from the files of names of up-and-coming young people in the possession of the Ford Foundation.”    
56 Joseph E. Johnson to Joseph E. Slater, 20 December 1967, Bilderberg Grant File, 56-341, Reel 5464, FFA, RAC; “Final 
report to the Ford Foundation (…) 13 June 1963 - 1 May 1968”, box 76 , file 4, Arthur H. Dean Papers, CUL. 
57 “Interim Report to the Ford Foundation Grant 56-341E”, May 1968-August 1969. Ford Foundation Grant File, 
Bilderberg, PA56-341, Section 3: Reports, Reel 5464, FFA, RAC. 
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Bridging the Generation Gap: from Marienlyst to Woodstock 
During his preparations for the Marienlyst conference, Ernst van der Beugel had emphasized 
that the rejuvenation process should be stepped up in “an effort to increase the participation 
of much younger people who are much nearer to the views of the student generation in vital 
matters of foreign policy and other relevant problems.” Out of 80 participants at least 20 
should come from the age group between 25 and 40 and they should not only be chosen on 
the basis of their age, but also on the basis of their opinion about policy matters. To illustrate 
what he meant by this, Van der Beugel suggested that the Bilderberg ambassadors should 
“reach out for the [Eugene] McCarthy and younger Kennedy people in the United States and 
the analogue groups in Europe.” 58  
Besides, the topics discussed at the conference departed from previous practice in that 
the agenda for the first time included a social issue: “Elements of Instability in Western 
Society.” The year before, a first attempt to use Bilderberg as a forum to come to grips with 
the challenges posed by the younger generation had been made by a last minute modification 
of the Conference programme when it was decided rather ad-hoc  to set the Saturday evening 
aside for a discussion of the “student problem.” This discussion had been introduced through 
a twelve page statement on this topic by James A. Perkins of Cornell University, who had 
argued that students should be perceived as members of a new ‘pre-adult class’ that 
distinguished itself by its early freedom, late responsibility, and detachment from the adult 
world combined with high motives and a genuine idealism which had not been tempered by 
adult contact, as a result of which they had “not seen how idealism must be modified in life 
by experience.”59  To counter the negative effects of this emerging new pre-adult class, 
Perkins stated that “We must put the ladders down for this group or else they are going to be 
at the mercy of their own ignorance and their own naïveté and continue to view the adult 
world as essentially hostile and unfriendly and one they want no part of.”60  The formal 
addition of a related social issue to the agenda of the Marienlyst conference now indicated a 
more serious attempt to use the Bilderberg Meeting as a forum to come to grips with the 
challenges posed by the younger generation to Atlantic stability.  
In response to Van der Beugel’s renewed call for younger participants, Canadian 
Steering Committee member Tony Griffin wrote to the European Secretary-General that he 
was “looking carefully into whom we might get in the category of a youngish man identified 
with the ‘New Left’ but who is not also on the periphery of lunacy.”61 In this context, he 
suggested to invite “not so much a member of youthful activism as their very prophet”, 
namely the media theorist Marshall McLuhan who had coined the famous phrase “the 
medium is the message”. While McLuhan was well beyond the age limit  he was “renowned 
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as [a member of] the avant-garde” and “closely identified with the problems of instability” 
Griffin argued, and as such he was invited to the conference. 
During the conference, Professor Daniel Bell of Columbia University and Professor Ralf 
Dahrendorf of Konstanz University in Germany delivered the papers on general elements of 
instability in Western society. Bell’s paper was meant to ignite a discussion on the sources of 
alienation among the young and the question to what extent this was a response to the 
Vietnam War, whereas the sheet with discussion points that came with Dahrendorf’s paper 
included questions like “what can we learn from student unrest – and how should we react to 
it?” and: “Are student unrest, the personalization of power, regionalism and hippiedom 
symptoms of the same ‘disease’ and is there any political action which can, and has to be 
taken in relation to it?”62   The second agenda item that was discussed – ‘Conflicting attitudes 
within the Western World toward relations with the USSR and the other Communist states of 
Eastern Europe in the light of recent events’ – “also took into account the attitudes and views 
of youth.”63 For this item the paper was prepared by François Duchêne, van der Beugel’s 
colleague at the International Institute for Strategic Studies.   
Looking back on the conference, Ernst van der Beugel was very pleased with the result. 
“It was a superb conference” he wrote to Kurt Birrenbach. “The experiment to mix 15 young 
and rather radical men with the older group proved to be a complete success.”64 According to 
the 1969 interim report to the Ford Foundation Van der Beugel was not the only one who 
believed this was the case:   
The combination of a high proportion of younger participants, representation of a 
wide range of views, and topics of unusual interest produced lively and often 
exciting discussions. Comments during and after the meetings indicated that 
veteran Bilderbergers viewed this as one of the most successful, in terms of the 
mutual education that is de raison d’être of Bilderberg. While perhaps few 
converts were made, there was unquestionably greater understanding of the 
issues, and, it is to be hoped, greater awareness of other points of view. Marienlyst 
Bilderberg helped bridge not only the Atlantic gap but the generation gap.65 
While planning the next conference Ernst van der Beugel felt “strongly about the necessity 
that we repeat the Marienlyst approach in inviting at least 25% young people with this kind of 
attitude apparent at our last conference.” It had not only been a useful experiment according 
to Van der Beugel, but – also important, since this was one of the main worries in the process 
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of engaging younger participants – “it did not in the least hurt the cohesion of the group and 
the ‘ambiance’ of the discussion as some had feared.”66 The latter analysis was not shared by 
everyone, however.  
After a meeting of the American Steering Committee, lawyer, diplomat and veteran 
Bilderberger Arthur Dean67 wrote a letter to the general Steering Committee in which he 
pointed out that while Ernst van der Beugel had “quite properly wished to lower the age of 
those who participate”, the experimental composition of the group in Marienlyst had – in 
contrast to what Van der Beugel claimed –  actually impaired the atmosphere of the meeting 
as he experienced it. “Due to the number of sociologists and younger people from vocations 
and callings generally not previously invited”, he wrote, “the character of the interchanges 
was quick and brisk and some such as that of Professor McLuhan were both tiresome, 
repetitious and unproductive.”68 It appears, however, that in the end not so much the young 
as the sociologists, and McLuhan in particular, received most of the blame for spoiling the 
atmosphere in Marienlyst. Years later an anonymous Bilderberger would tell a journalist of 
The Times that McLuhan had been invited to Bilderberg as a “daring move” in an attempt to 
be “really radical” adding that during the conference the Canadian prophet of the successor 
generation had “used so many four letter words that we had learnt our lesson.”69 As Dean 
mentioned in his report of the general Steering Committee meeting at Soestdijk Palace on 
October 8, 1969, there “was unanimous agreement that he should not be invited to another 
Bilderberg meeting.” In addition, there was “extended discussion as to whether people 
holding high offices in government would come if you had a preponderance of young men of 
the sociological type.” While the Steering Committee did not reach a definite conclusion on 
this, Dean mentioned that there “seemed to be a general consensus that we should not again 
invite sociologists to a Bilderberg meeting.”  It might be possible though, that this analysis 
mainly projected his own disagreements with sociologists, as already expressed in the 
discussion with the American Steering Committee and the remarks in his letter to the general 
Steering Committee. Even so, Dean added that there was also “a general feeling that we 
should continue to invite younger persons in the fields that we decided upon to discuss.”70  
The other Steering Committee members agreed, however, that it did not “seem advisable to 
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invite still younger people (20 years old), as this would probably be harmful to the cohesion of 
the conference.”71 
On Van der Beugel’s instigation the Steering Committee decided to repeat the 
experiment during the 1970 conference in Bad Ragaz, Switzerland – not only with regards to 
the invitees, but also with respect to the nature of the topics to be discussed.72 With one 
exception the general feeling within the Steering Committee was that the discussion about 
instability in Western Society had by no means been exhausted while its subject remained of 
prime importance. Therefore, van der Beugel suggested to continue the discussion; this time 
with a focus on one specific element of the general instability discussed in Marienlyst. Since 
“one place where the sources of instability present themselves in the most obvious way is the 
University” Van der Beugel suggested the “problems, function and future of the university in 
our society” as the first topic to be discussed at the following conference. The one person 
who was not so sure about continuing the Marienlyst discussion – the one exception 
mentioned above – was in fact the Swiss lawyer and diplomat Victor Umbricht, the host of the 
1970 conference in Bad Ragaz. He believed it might be better to postpone a continuation of 
the discussion on instability until 1971 which would enable the Bilderbergers to gain “valuable 
additional experience as to how instability is developing and how it should be handled” so 
that they would be able to confront the issue with “more aloofness to present-day 
happenings.” While Van der Beugel fully recognized the validity of these arguments he 
explained that he was nevertheless still inclined to press for discussing the university problem 
in 1970. “I feel that especially the situation at our universities is a burning problem”, he 
wrote, “relevant to all of us whether we work in the field of politics, business, journalism or 
the academic world.”73   
The importance of the university was also recognized in the American Steering 
committee, but the exact approach was a matter of extensive discussion in which all the 
major traits of the successor generation problem passed the revue.  Jack Heinz suggested to 
amend Van der Beugel’s topic to “the changing role of the university in relation to society”, 
emphasizing that he was not proposing a discussion of student disorders but of the 
significance of things like the popularity of Democratic presidential candidate and Vietnam 
war critic Eugene McCarthy among students, the suspension of university activity on 15 
October 1969 to protest the war in Vietnam, and the confrontation between Columbia 
University and the blacks of Harlem. “Clearly”, he argued, “the university today is no longer 
the ivory tower institution of the past, and this is having far-reaching repercussions.” The 
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American banker David Rockefeller74, however, was skeptical “as to whether the topic was 
sufficiently ‘Atlantic’ in scope and suggested to adapt the subject to “the impact of student 
disorder on Atlantic unity.” George Ball subsequently felt that the topic was “interesting in 
the light of the fact that today’s graduate students, who will soon occupy positions of 
leadership, are a generation away from the War”, arguing that “their experiences and 
priorities are vastly different from those of the pre-war generation: they no longer find the 
confrontation with the USSR relevant and think that too much attention is given to it: they 
grew up with the bomb and are therefore used to it; they have a greater deal of contempt for 
the older generation. The young, moreover are in the vanguard of the opposition to Vietnam 
War since they are the ones whose lives are most immediately tested by it. It is the issue of 
the war that unites them most firmly against their parents’ generation.” American Secretary 
General Joe Johnsen eventually proposed that “one way of approaching this topic might be to 
recruit a ‘young person’ on each side of the ocean to write a paper dealing with the priorities 
on foreign affairs” which should be “representative of the views of a rather large cross-
section of the post-war generation.”  While this idea appealed to most American Steering 
Committee members, Arthur Dean interjected that proposing a discussion on dissent of the 
young would result in losing a good part of the membership of Bilderberg. According to him at 
most ten to twenty per cent of the young actually shared the views attributed to them by 
George Ball, and he believed that there was “no need to devote too much time to them.” The 
other American Steering Committee members disagreed, however. While it was probably true 
that no more than ten per cent of the young would “take to the barricades”, the economist, 
former World Bank director and Exxon Corporation executive Emilio Collado pointed out that 
“a vast majority of the young does hold priorities very different from ‘ours’.”75  In the end, the 
Steering Committee decided to go ahead with the “Future function of the university in our 
society” as the first agenda item.76  
In this context, James A. Perkins, the American president of Cornell University delivered 
a paper on the ‘University and Society’ while Edgar Faure, who had just stepped down as 
France’s minister of Education in 1969 – a capacity in which he had pushed through major 
reforms of the French universities – delivered a paper on “Transformations in Society and the 
Replanning of Education”.  The Bilderbergers also decided to follow up on Joe Johnson’s 
suggestion to ask two younger participants, both academics, to serve as ambassadors for 
their generation. To this end, the 30 year old Harvard political scientist Graham T. Allison 
delivered a paper on “‘Young Americans’ Attitudes towards Foreign Policy for the 1970s’” 
while Van der Beugel asked the 35 year old German political scientist Karl Kaiser of the 
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University of the Saarland as a representative for the European youngsters on “Priorities in 
Foreign Policy.”77  
The Old Guard in Defense of the Capitalist System 
As a second agenda item for the Bad Ragaz conference, Van der Beugel had originally 
suggested to either take an important political or economic subject of current importance (…) 
or to “continue the discussion of the first day from a completely different angle e.g. 
“Problems, function and future of private enterprise in our society.”78  This topic greatly 
appealed to the Americans, who were concerned about the image of private enterprise in the 
US – especially among the young. “Many young people are convinced that corporations earn 
huge profits which are spent on ‘riotous living’ of the directors,”79 they observed. David 
Rockefeller had on multiple occasions publicly voiced his concerns on this topic. “Many of the 
attitudes expressed by the generation treading upon our heals are both uncongenial and 
deeply disturbing”, he had written in the Harvard Alumni Bulletin. “But they are realities, and 
angry denunciation will not cause them to vanish.” What might actually help to make them 
disappear, Rockefeller argued, was “for those of us who are over thirty to display in our 
professional lives precisely those qualities which our youthful critics say we lack – open 
mindedness, intellectual honesty and commitment to responsible social progress.” To foster 
among the young an appreciation of the importance of business and the profit motive, which 
many of them had come to despise, it was necessary to “demonstrate through action that the 
profit motive, properly employed, constitutes a powerful tool with which to achieve the goals 
that the best of our young people profess to want.” To this end, Rockefeller argued, “we must 
show beyond dispute that business can become the engine of progress in such areas as civil 
rights” as well as in fighting “poverty, urban decay, and pollution of the environment.”80 This 
sentiment was also present during the Steering Committee meeting at Soestdijk Palace, 
where there was a general agreement between the Americans and the Europeans that they 
should “try to get younger people in order to convince them that private enterprise was not 
wholly bad, and also to try to convince them that turning everything up to the state was not 
the most appropriate solution.”81  
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While the topic of business and the young did not turn up on the official agenda of the 
1970 Bad Ragaz conference, it was discussed at the conference. Even so, there was still a 
strong desire within the Steering Committee to go deeper into this topic afterwards.  Within 
the American Steering Committee, Gabriel Hauge, Tony Griffin and Arthur Dean in particular 
expressed a strong desire to see an agenda item, which had continuity with the “discussion on 
the environmental-cultural situation” in Bad Ragaz. This time, however, they believed 
“thoughtful business leaders or industrial leaders should prepare the papers and lead the 
discussion” on this topic. “If there is, as there must be, positive and constructive thinking on 
these problems in the international business community let it be advanced at Bilderberg and 
let a few younger people listen, criticize, etc.”82  
Shepard Stone, the Ford Foundation’s Director of International Affairs, also again 
expressed his support for Bilderberg’s shift in focus, this time with regards to the content of 
the meetings. As he wrote to Ernst van der Beugel: “though foreign policy and economic 
problems undoubtedly have larger appeal to most of our members, you have been right, I 
believe, to emphasize in recent years youth, university and environmental questions which 
are influencing decisions on international relations.”83 It was important not to lose this 
momentum now, he emphasized. In connection with this subject area, however, he believed 
it would be better not “to have young people or professors write the papers and tip off the 
discussion.” Instead, Stone proposed to ask two thoughtful businessmen, one European and 
one American, to write the papers and to open the discussion by explaining what established 
leaders, bankers, industrialists, lawyers and public officials are doing to meet the challenge of 
the environment and of social and intellectual change. “What is the response of 
administrators, industry, the law to the attitudes and criticisms of the young? What are they 
doing to achieve understanding of these problems, build bridges to the young who are their 
inevitable successors? What are they doing to expose the young to the complexity of 
problems, to work together in getting at new solutions where required or to fortify old and 
tested points where valid?”, Stone wondered. “To put this range of questions to thoughtful 
men of the David Rockefeller, Cy Vance, Otto Wolf type”, he believed, “might stimulate 
creative thinking among our older members and increase their interest.”84 Young participants 
would ‘undoubtedly’ challenge and debate these presentations, Stone believed, but it might 
serve as “a method to maintain interest in problems to which we should continue to give our 
attention.” In other words, reversing the roles of the young and the scholars on the one hand 
and the business and government leaders on the other might have a stimulating effect on 
both sides at the next conference. It might also, Stone added, “help to stimulate European-
American leaders to think through problems they have sometimes tried to avoid.”85 The 
desired defense of private enterprise eventually happened at the 1971 conference in 
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Woodstock, Vermont where “The contribution of business in dealing with current problems of 
instability” was put on the agenda next to attempts to deal with détente and the “possibility 
of a change of the American role in the world and its consequences.” Thus, while Bilderberg 
had started out as an instrument to mediate transatlantic friction by building bridges among 
the Atlantic elite, it was now also perceived as a vehicle to bridge the generation gap as part 
of the broader effort to sustain Western cooperation and all its stood for – including the 
capitalist system as represented by private enterprise.  
In a report to the Ford Foundation covering the 1969-1971 period, the Bilderbergers 
explained that “strenuous recruitment had led to a marked increase in the number of 
participants under forty.” Even so, there still remained some difficulty in getting as many 
younger people as they had sought, a situation the report attributed to the fact that many 
members in the Steering Committee – who were responsible for recruiting and suggesting 
participants – still had the tendency to “think in terms of persons who have already ‘arrived’.” 
This was especially problematic for the selection of participants from business and 
government since, as they argued “few people in business or government ‘arrive’ before 40”. 
In contrast, it had been “easier to identify outstanding young persons who are scholars and 
politicians than to find them in other walks of life.”86  What is more, while the American 
Secretary General Joe Johnson believed that Bilderberg could help participants “to 
understand their fellows of different ages, experience, and points of view” he also recognized 
that there existed a certain tension between the old guard and the new generation at the 
Bilderberg meetings. “There are at Bilderberg as elsewhere dialogues of the deaf; the young 
may sometimes fail to press their points vigorously; there may be manifestations of an old 
school tie spirit among the veterans of the Marshall Plan and NATO; the generation now 
coming to or on the threshold of power may be impatient or scornful of the backward glance, 
the apparent nostalgia, of their seniors”, he explained. “Nevertheless”, he concluded his 
evaluation, “I know no other place in which European and North-American men – and as of 
1972, women – of diverse nationalities, professions, ages, experiences, and interests can 
explore each other’s views and prejudices and establish contacts that may have significance 
and utility for the world of the ‘70s.”87 
As Joe Johnson pointed out, in 1972 the Steering Committee had for the first time also 
invited women to participate in the Bilderberg Meetings. Before 1972, some women had 
been present; most prominently the Dutch crown-princess Beatrix, the eldest daughter of 
Prince Bernhard and Queen Juliana, who was present at the Bilderberg meetings from 1962 
onwards. Formally, though, she was not a participant but an “observer” during those first 
years.88  In 1972, the Steering Committee departed from its habit of exclusively inviting male 
participants by inviting a first set of prominent women including Miriam Camps (whose work 
                                                            
86 “Ford Foundation Report of Bilderberg Meetings 1969-1971” Ford Foundation Grant File, Bilderberg, PA56-341, 
Section 3: Reports, Reel 5464, FFA, RAC. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Philipsen, “Diplomacy with Ambiguity”, 138.  
228 
 
Van der Beugel greatly admired), the Italian journalist Marion Dönhoff and the French 
journalist and politician Françoise Giroud, the Dutch economics professor Maria J. t Hooft, the 
British Labor politician Shirley Summerskill and Princess Beatrix of the Netherlands to fully 
participate as well. From correspondence between Ernst van der Beugel and Sydney Gruson 
of the New York Times it appears that Van der Beugel was in fact in favor of including women 
at an earlier stage, but that it was the chairman – Prince Bernhard – who had prevented this. 
As Van der Beugel told Gruson, who in 1971 suggested to include female participants: “I agree 
with your judgment (…) it takes, however, quite some time to break the very strong 
conviction of our Chairman of having women at the conference. It is a slow process but I 
know that in the end we will win.”89 It seems that the Ford Foundation also played a role in 
pushing this change through. Nevertheless, as in the case with the young, introducing women 
into Bilderberg remained a “slow process” as Van der Beugel had warned. “The ‘lady-
participants’ worked very well”, Van der Beugel remarked in June 1972, “It will, however, be 
difficult to keep up the level because in spite of ‘women’s lib’ the reservoir is not 
unlimited.”90  
The level of younger participants also fluctuated after the 1969-1971 experiments. 
Moreover, in 1972 the Steering Committee also discussed diversification by welcoming 
Japanese participants. They eventually decided against this, however, after which David 
Rockefeller set up the Trilateral Commission in 1973, which did include Japanese participants 
and became one of Bilderberg’s rival organizations.91 “Despite all the declarations of 
intentions to rejuvenate the membership of the organization”, Ingeborg Philipsen concluded 
in her dissertation on the Bilderberg meetings, “the SC members preferred to draw on their 
established network when choosing the participants, which meant that the average 
Bilderberg participant of the period was a white man in his sixties.”92  Eventually, it would 
take a severe crisis to create the opportunity for Ernst van der Beugel to push through a more 
fundamental rejuvenation of the Bilderberg Meetings.  
Bilderberg and the Lockheed Scandal: an Existential Crisis    
On February 7, 1976 news broke that during statements made during investigations of the 
Church Committee in the U.S. Senate it had been asserted that a “senior Netherlands official” 
had been involved in a huge bribery scandal concerning the American aerospace company 
Lockheed.93 Rumor had it that this Dutchman was Bilderberg chairman Prince Bernhard. It 
would not take long before the Dutch Prime Minister, Joop den Uyl, put forward a statement 
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confirming that Prince Bernhard – “the flying Dutchman of industry”94 – was indeed the 
person referred to in the evidence and that the government had decided to conduct an 
investigation while underlining that this did not mean that Prince Bernhard “was guilty of any 
reprehensible act.” The Prince, in turn, stated that he “had never received or accepted any 
money from Lockheed and invited an investigation concerning the development that resulted 
into his being named in this affair.”95  
Ernst van der Beugel – who was internationally known as a close associate of Prince 
Bernhard – put his reputation at stake by defending the Prince in Dutch media. “I have been 
in close working relationship with His Royal Highness for twenty-five years. I am totally 
convinced that there is no beginning of truth in these rumors,” he declared on a Dutch TV 
newscast the day after the statements were made in the U.S. Senate. 96  Van der Beugel also 
reassured members of the Bilderberg Steering committee that there was nothing to worry 
about. “I should like to repeat what I told you on Sunday”, he wrote in a telegram to his 
American counterpart Joe Johnson, “I am totally and completely convinced that nothing 
irregular has happened and that even if P.B.’s name is mentioned in Lockheed’s files, this in 
no way proves anything.”97 Nevertheless, Van der Beugel considered the case “a terrible 
headache”. The only way in which the issue could be solved, he believed, was when it would 
become clear to whom the money had in fact been paid. “I have good hope that the Dutch 
government will direct its activity to that purpose, because denials, arguing that the Prince 
was not involved, are not sufficient. The positive proof has to be delivered to show where the 
money did indeed end up. We keep our fingers crossed,” he wrote to his Dutch-American 
friend Peter Fleck.98  
The Bilderberg Steering Committee followed the developments closely as they unfolded. 
Just days after the news broke Arthur Dean called a meeting of the American Steering 
Committee together to discuss how to deal with the evolving situation. The upcoming 
Bilderberg conference was planned to take place in the Homestead near Hot Springs, Virginia 
and Dean feared that considering the circumstances “it may be difficult to get acceptances of 
the prominent personages in Europe who have been invited and of the U.S. officials who have 
been or are being invited. We may encounter difficulty in getting contributions from 
prospective American donors.”99 On March 8, the Wall Street Journal reported that the 1976 
Bilderberg Conference had in fact been cancelled after U.S. leaders invited to the conference 
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had expressed doubts about accepting the invitation “in view of the official investigation in 
the Netherlands”, which was confirmed by the Bilderberg Secretariat in The Hague.100  
The Europeans, however, appeared less concerned about the allegations against the 
Prince. A number of them had in fact indicated to Shepard Stone, who agreed with them, that 
the Homestead conference ought to be held despite the circumstances and they complained 
that “the Americans were really pressuring the Prince to postpone or to give it up.”101 As 
Ernst van der Beugel explained in a letter to the European members of the Steering 
Committee, “there was ‘without any doubt a difference between the approach of most 
Europeans and most Americans involved.’  In the US, there was a greater sensibility about 
these matters in an ambiance which, according to [Van der] Beugel, had ‘all the 
characteristics of a ‘witch-hunt.’” Even so, Van der Beugel recognized that it would be better 
to “preserve Bilderberg and to not get our meeting involved in undesired and malicious 
publicity.” 102  From Secretary General Joe Johnson’s correspondence, it appears that Van der 
Beugel was in fact quite irritated by the attitude of certain Americans in this context. After a 
visit to Prince Bernhard in March, Johnson told Stone that he had found the Prince “in very 
good spirits”, explaining that while he was “clearly annoyed at some of our American 
colleagues, he was much less bitter than Ernst who seemed to me to have gone a bit off the 
deep end.” Johnson had told Van der Beugel so, and “for once in our long association we had 
some rather sharp words.” More importantly, though, Johnson “came away from the palace 
more convinced than ever that P.B. [was] not guilty either in fact or in intent.” Instead, the 
American Secretary General was “very impressed by his attitude”, relating that the Prince 
“was most emphatic, incidentally, in his determination to keep Bilderberg going ‘until I 
die.’”103 In the end, despite American pressure to postpone the Homestead meeting , the 
Steering Committee seems to have had  enough confidence in its chairman to plan the next 
Steering Committee meeting at Soestdijk Palace in the fall – following the release of the 
report by the Dutch investigation committee. As Van der Beugel wrote to Canadian Steering 
Committee member Tony Griffin: 
My guess about the report of the Commission of Inquiry is that the report will 
come out in the middle or at the end of August, but I must repeat that it is only a 
guess. As to the contents I remain completely confident. I therefore have every 
reason to believe that the October Meeting of the Steering Committee will take 
place as we have planned. I have no recent news from our American friends, but I 
am in close touch with them. I think that everything is completely under control.104 
The report was eventually released on 26 August, 1976 and “all hell broke loose” after it 
became clear that the Prince had in fact been found guilty of accepting a $1.1 million bribe 
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from the Lockheed Corporation to ensure that the Dutch government would buy the 
American Lockheed F-104 Starfighter aircraft instead of the French Dassault Mirage 5.105  The 
event plunged the Bilderberg Meetings into an existential crisis recovery from which was 
uncertain at best. It was this crisis, however, that offered Ernst van der Beugel a window of 
opportunity to push through the more fundamental rejuvenation of Bilderberg that he had 
pursued for years.  
After the report of the Commission of Three was accepted by the Dutch government as 
well as by the Queen and the Prince and debated in Parliament, Ernst van der Beugel first of 
all met with Foreign Minister Max van der Stoel to discuss the Bilderberg Meetings. According 
to Van der Beugel’s report to the Bilderberg Steering Committee he explained to Van der 
Stoel “that Bilderberg was a private organization but that [he] always had been in touch with 
the Dutch Government if matters of foreign policy arose which could have an effect on the 
constitutional position of H.R.H.” This time, however, Van der Beugel explained “I came to see 
him because in the new circumstances I could neither fruitfully talk to my colleagues in the 
Steering Committee nor to H.R.H. without knowing the opinion of the Netherlands 
government.”  The two Dutchmen “agreed immediately that continuation of the 
chairmanship of Bilderberg by the Prince was out of the question.” Subsequently, Van der 
Beugel discussed two other options, namely to liquidate Bilderberg at the end of the year or 
to continue without the Prince. Because he “felt that Bilderberg as an instrument and as a 
formula was unique in the transatlantic dialogue which was more necessary than ever”, Van 
der Stoel expressed “a strong preference” for a continuation of the Bilderberg Meetings.106 
Next to that, he believed that it would be better if the Bilderberg Meetings would not be 
terminated as an “immediate consequence of the change in the position of the Prince.” While 
the Prince had played an important role in the Meetings, Bilderberg had “substance on its 
own” and “liquidation now would create the impression that it had been a kind of private club 
of the Prince and would be retroactively depreciating,” the Dutch foreign minister argued. 107 
After consulting Max van der Stoel, Ernst van der Beugel started to solicit the opinion of 
the European members of the Steering Committee by telephone. He also consulted some 
former participants who were not members of the Steering Committee including the German 
economist and politician Helmut Schmidt, the British labor politician Denis Healey, the Dutch 
banker and former prime-minister Jelle Zijlstra and OECD Secretary General Emile van 
Lennep.  Could Bilderberg survive this crisis? A great majority believed it was worth trying and 
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expressed a preference for a continuation of the Bilderberg Meetings.108 During that same 
week, Van der Beugel also visited the Prince, whose  position as chairman of the Bilderberg 
Meetings had become untenable and Van der Beugel was the one who had to tell him that it 
was time to resign – a task which he experienced as “extremely unpleasant.” 109  While a few 
individuals like the Italian Giovanni Agnelli and the Frenchman Edmond de Rothschild thought 
it was ridiculous that anyone would need to step down due to such an affair, the overall 
consensus within the Steering Committee was that the prince had to go.110 The Americans 
with whom Ernst van der Beugel met in New York on the 17th of September, and David 
Rockefeller in particular, were unforgiving in their judgment and did not want to be 
associated in any way with the scandal that surrounded the Prince. While Van der Beugel 
agreed that Prince Bernhard had to resign, he was offended by the harshness of the response 
by some of the Americans who until then had been frequent guests at Soestdijk Palace. While 
Van der Beugel was personally disappointed in Bernhard and losing his chairmanship of the 
Bilderberg Meetings was a big blow to the Prince, both men maintained that the event did 
not damage their relationship.111   
“The Smoothest Coup d’état in the history of the Atlantic Alliance” 
It was decided that the fall meeting of the Steering Committee, originally planned at Soestdijk 
Palace, would take place at the Savoy Hotel in London instead – under the chairmanship of 
Max Kohnstamm.  With regards to the future of Bilderberg a special study group would be 
assembled. The big question was: should the Bilderberg Meetings continue and if so, in what 
form? As a memorandum from the American Steering Committee put it: “Events have 
produced an occasion to review and re-evaluate the Bilderberg meetings which had been 
running for 23 years with little change in format and organization.”112 It was this forced re-
evaluation that offered Ernst van der Beugel the opportunity to push through the more 
fundamental rejuvenation of Bilderberg that he had pursued for years. 
At the October and January committee meetings the consensus was “that the need was 
as great as ever for an informal Atlantic Community forum such as Bilderberg.”113  The 
Working Party decided to leave the traditional format of the conferences unchanged. While 
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opening up the Bilderberg Meetings to Japanese participants was once more considered, the 
members of the working party decided against this, arguing that “there was an established 
camaraderie in Bilderberg, a shared cultural tradition, which risked being lost in widening 
membership.” Furthermore, “it looked as if considerable difficulties between Europe and 
America lay ahead, and it was important to preserve a unique forum like Bilderberg, designed 
as it was to foster transatlantic understanding through personal contact.” In addition, by now 
the Trilateral Commission “already provided an excellent means for including the Japanese in 
discussions with the West.” 114 To ensure frank and open discussion, the working party 
considered it essential to preserve the private character of the meetings, with no quotations 
or attributions allowed. 
With regards to the organization and leadership of the conferences it was decided that a 
European chairman would be chosen for three years.  While Van der Beugel had already 
before the Lockheed affair indicated that he wanted to retire as Secretary-General, “the 
consensus was that it would be difficult for Bilderberg to have to break in the same year with 
a new Chairman and a new European Secretary General, especially given the detailed 
administrative functions of the latter office.”115 This was all the more complicated since Joe 
Johnsen, who in 1975 had announced that he would leave the Bilderberg Meetings after the 
Homestead meeting, would already be replaced by Bill Bundy. 116  Consequently, “at the 
urging of the other members of the Working Party, Ernst van der Beugel therefore agreed to 
carry on with his duties for an additional year, i.e. until after the 1978 conference – on 
condition that in the interim the Steering Committee would work hard at locating a suitable 
successor.”117  Meanwhile, it was decided that the members of the Steering Committee 
would rotate by arranging staggered terms of five years, with no member eligible for re-
election until he had been off the Committee for at least one year. The Working Group 
furthermore asked Van der Beugel, Bundy and Griffin to get together as a sub-committee to 
decide about the composition of the Steering Committee and to draw lots for the rotation of 
its members. This rotation of Steering Committee members had as its object the “refreshing 
of the Committee from year to year, as new members took the place of retiring ones.” 118  
It was in this context that Ernst van der Beugel finally demanded that the Steering 
Committee would be thoroughly rejuvenated and that an operation would be set in motion to 
facilitate the smooth transfer  of the Bilderberg Meetings from its ‘founding fathers’ 
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(“Bilderberg One”) to the next generation (“Bilderberg Two”) by 1980.119  If Bilderberg was to 
continue, Van der Beugel maintained, we should “use the time left to us to create Bilderberg 
II in the sense that it would be carried in all aspects by the younger generation” – meaning an 
age group between +/- 30 and +/-50 years of age. More concretely, Van der Beugel explained, 
“That means a brand new Steering Committee with only Daniel Janssen, Thierry de Montbrial, 
Niels Norlund and Theo Sommer from the present Steering Committee with the addition of 
Chris Bertram, Victor Halberstadt, Andrew Knight, Leon Lambers and others form the 
European side and also a complete set of younger Americans.”120  To this end, Van der Beugel 
invited the above mentioned younger Europeans who were to be “instrumental in ‘carrying’ 
Bilderberg Two” to his house in The Hague to hear their opinions and to solicit their views on 
this endeavor. Meanwhile, Bill Bundy organized a parallel meeting on the other side of the 
ocean by inviting younger Americans including Harvard political scientist Graham Allison, Jack 
Bennett of Exxon, Foreign Affairs editor James Chase, Paul B. Finney of Fortune magazine, 
Charles Getchell of the Gray, Wendell & Clark law firm, lawyer, civil rights activist and 
president of the National Urban League Vernon Jordan, Winston Lord - who had just left the 
State Department to become the President of the Council on Foreign Relations, former 
president of CBS and founder of the private investment concern Tayler & Company Arthur 
Taylor; Labor leader Murray Finley of the Clothing Workers Union, Nicholas Katzenbach who 
had moved to IBM after having served under both president Kennedy and president Johnson, 
Georgetown professor and former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger,  Kissinger’s closest 
counselor and associate at the NSC and the U.S. State department Helmut Sonnenfeldt, who 
now served as a visiting scholar at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International 
Studies, president of the Brookings Institution Bruce MacLaury and the automobile executive, 
professor of economics and frequent government adviser Marina von Neumann Whitman – 
all of whom had participated in past Bilderberg Meetings.121 Both groups expressed strong 
support for carrying on Bilderberg “on the grounds that Europeans and North Americans need 
more than ever to cooperate and understand each other’s viewpoints, while at the same time 
there will continue to be the possibility of serious differences in outlook and policy on central 
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economic and other issues.”122 Furthermore, it was decided that the transition from 
Bilderberg I to Bilderberg II should be completed during a “grand finale” at the Bilderberg 
Conference in the Federal Republic of Germany in 1980. Before that date, a new Steering 
Committee should have been constituted and a new top set of officers selected, ready to take 
over. “After that”, Van der Beugel and Bundy reported, “it is up to the youngsters.”123  
While some members of the Steering Committee felt that an effective transition to the 
successor generation could be made gradually without the rather dramatic contrast implied 
by the labels “Bilderberg I” and “Bilderberg II”, the great majority endorsed Van der Beugel’s 
operation as illustrated by an analogy to the motor car industry by the Italian industrialist and 
principal shareholder of Fiat Gianni Agnelli: “There were times, he said, when a ‘face lift’ 
would do, but at other times a whole new model was needed, and Bilderberg now found itself 
in the latter situation.”124  Those members in the Steering Committee who had felt some 
hesitation at first also “expressed their agreement after having heard the various arguments” 
and there was “no doubt” that the “younger groups” convened by Van der Beugel and Bundy, 
which included younger members of the present Steering Committee, could “produce the 
nucleus around which a Bilderberg II [could] be constructed.” 125    
The Dutchman Victor Halberstadt, a finance professor at Leiden University and Van der 
Beugel’s protégé, was chosen as the new Honorary Secretary General of the Bilderberg 
Meetings for Europe while it was decided that Paul B. Finney would succeed Bill Bundy on the 
American side. While the Younger Working Groups decided to keep the same overall 
structure, they did consider introducing some changes, including “slightly more austere 
meeting places than have sometimes been the case in the past”, cutting the overall size of the 
group from 100 to 75-80 participants and having one or more of the five conference sessions 
on a split-up basis by topic. As the Bilderberg Conferences were transferred to the next 
generation during the 1980 “grand finale” in Aachen, Victor Halberstadt described the event 
as “the smoothest coup d’état in the history of the Atlantic Alliance. But even more 
remarkable: it is a coup d’état staged by one of the principals in Bilderberg who carefully 
planned to be dethroned and on top of that acquired the support of his friends to do so.”126 
 The transfer of Bilderberg I to Bilderberg II was a crowning achievement to Van der 
Beugel’s decades long efforts to ensure the long term survival of transatlantic bonds through 
the rejuvenation of the Bilderberg Meetings. It was also in this moment that his prior efforts, 
the many ‘face-lifts’ he had executed – e.g. by attracting younger participants – gained in 
relevance, since the connections he had nurtured during the preceding years had paved the 
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way for this transition since they had helped to provide the human infrastructure that 
facilitated this transfer of Bilderberg to a new generation. Indeed, as the Turkish Bilderberg 
Steering Committee member Selahattin Beyazit pointed out, Ernst Van der Beugel had been 
“very much instrumental in creating an attachment to the concept of Bilderberg among its 
younger members.”127 Consequently, to use Shepard Stone’s terminology: since Van der 
Beugel had been “actively working on the new crop” he could now harvest the results. As a 
consequence, the “Atlantic mindset”; the “belief system represented by the Atlantic alliance” 
could live on at least a little longer among this section of the transatlantic elite. “All I can say 
here and now,” Halberstadt said as he took over Bilderberg’s management, “is that I’ll try to 
succeed Ernst as Secretary-General in the fashion we all agree on: to spread the word from 
generation to generation so that peace and friendship will come much closer than they are 
today.”128   
“NATO-Professor”  
While Bilderberg was “without doubt” an essential part of Ernst van der Beugel’s life, it was 
not his Bilderberg-work that he missed the most as he retired, but his professorship in Leiden 
which had offered him another prominent stage from which he could convey his ideas about 
and experience of post-war Atlantic cooperation to the next generation.129    
Ernst van der Beugel worked as professor of Western Cooperation after the Second 
World War at Leiden University from 1966 until 1984. It was an honorary position for which 
he received only 2.500 guilders a year, but which he thoroughly enjoyed.130 “I found it 
extraordinary enjoyable to convey my opinion or my story or my analysis to younger people,” 
Van der Beugel recalled. “I enjoyed dealing with these young people, because (…) I could be 
helpful in their career choice.”131  Van der Beugel taught an elective course on Western 
Cooperation after the Second World War to students in the history and law departments. 
Attendance for this course grew from about a dozen students during the first year to 70-100 
students in later years, including many future diplomats.132 One of these students was the 
later NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, who studied in Leiden between 1967 
and 1973. After he took Van der Beugel’s course he also graduated under Van der Beugel’s 
supervision with a thesis on the American Military Presence in Europe. “His classes were 
fascinating”, De Hoop Scheffer recalled. “He was a transatlanticist pur sang, but also the first 
man whom I met as a young student who was able to put his story on transatlantic affairs in a 
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geopolitical context. I found that quite unique. There is not a whole lot of attention for that 
aspect in the Netherlands; we don’t really like that.”133   
Ernst van der Beugel’s emphasis on the geopolitical aspect as De Hoop Scheffer called it 
was in fact a very conscious effort by Van der Beugel to counter the Dutch preoccupation with 
more moralistic judicial approaches to foreign policy. Instead, Van der Beugel’s teaching was 
characterized by a strong anti-ideological and anti-emotional tone, which was also present in 
his general contributions to the public debate in the Netherlands. Above all, he tried to 
convey the importance of power in foreign affairs over the importance of international law 
and judicial aspects.134   After all, one of Van der Beugel’s main worries about the next 
generation was that many youngsters questioned or even principally opposed the use of 
power while even more of them “manifested a curious blindness for the essential question of 
the purpose of the use of power” as a result of which they contested the necessity of a strong 
Atlantic defense which Van der Beugel considered a sheer necessity for Western security. 135 
Ernst van der Beugel traced his own emphasis on the importance of power back to his 
memory of the appeasement at Munich in 1938 and tried to convey this experience and the 
lessons he took from this to a generation that had not lived through these experiences and 
tended to be at best skeptical towards the use of power.136  
Next to advocating a more realist political approach (as opposed to a moralist judicial 
approach), Van der Beugel tried to convey “the miracle of American foreign policy of 1945-
1955,”137 trying to keep the memory of America’s positive post-war role in Europe alive in the 
face the fresher yet more sour memories of the Vietnam War.  In this context, he did not hide 
the fact from his students that he detested the revisionist literature on America’s role in post-
war Europe, which he discarded as ‘fables’.138  “I have always tried to convey a very clear 
opinion”, Van der Beugel explained. If students wanted to understand the origins of the Cold 
War, for example, he would tell them that entire libraries could be filled with the literature on 
the subject, but “I recommend you to read these three books.139 Then you’ll know what you 
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need to know” while adding that “this is my opinion and I believe I am right. If you want to 
acquaint yourselves with an opposing opinion, then this is the literature you should 
consult.”140 This is also confirmed by his course syllabus and lecture notes of former students, 
as well as by the experience of Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, who remembered that Van der Beugel 
had a very clear opinion which he conveyed during his classes. “He was not a man who one 
could easily oppose. It was a different time, the 1960s and professors had an enormous 
amount of command and authority. He in particular. He took very clear positions. You could 
contest that, but you’d have to be very well-prepared. He was not somebody who said let’s 
listen carefully and then I will be prepared to adapt my opinion.”141  
Despite the fact van der Beugel tried to convey a very clear opinion, which was not 
always very popular, he never became a direct target of student protests during the 1960s. 
The closest student protests ever came to directly affecting Ernst van der Beugel seems to 
have been campus unrest not in Leiden but at Harvard, where he was a frequent guest ever 
since Henry Kissinger had invited him to conduct research for his PhD dissertation at 
Harvard’s Center for International Affairs in 1963.142 He would also frequently visit this Ivy 
League university to give guest lectures. Moreover, in 1967 van der Beugel had been the 
driving force behind the establishment of an Erasmus Lectureship in Dutch Civilization at 
Harvard “designed to bring to Harvard visiting lecturers from Holland and other countries who 
are distinguished specialists in various aspects of economics, history, and the art of the 
Netherlands.”143  
The establishment of the lectureship was above all meant as an expression of Dutch 
gratitude and a “symbol of friendship” between the Netherlands and the United States 
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commemorating Secretary Marshall’s commencement speech twenty years earlier in which 
he announced the European Recovery Program. Through his extensive social network Ernst 
van der Beugel raised  $200.000, ninety percent of which was collected through contributions 
by private individuals, companies and organizations in the Netherlands and from the Dutch 
community in the United States.144 Van der Beugel convinced the Dutch government to 
contribute the other 10 percent and to commit itself to finance travel and library expenses in 
the future.145 During a ceremony on June 7, 1967, the Lectureship was formally presented to 
Harvard University by Prince Bernhard. In his speech, which may very well have been written 
by Ernst van der Beugel146, he used the occasion to draw special attention to the challenges 
posed by a younger generation “prepared to test the solidity of the foundations that were laid 
in the post-war world, to X-ray the values we, their elders, used to cherish.” In this context,  it 
was crucial according to the Prince “to see to it that in spite of the changes that have taken 
place, some principles and objectives will survive this scrutiny”.147 The key principle he was 
referring to was the idea that Europe and the United States could not do without each other. 
The establishment of the Erasmus Lectureship was meant to strengthen this relationship and, 
as Prince Bernhard explained, to be taken as “a sign of urgency. The urgency to bring the 
peoples of our world closer together, not so much through improving their means of travel 
but particularly by extending their fields of communication.”148 If instigated by the Dutch 
government this would certainly have been labeled as an example of ‘cultural diplomacy’ by 
diplomatic historians. Orchestrated by a private individual, in the broader context of this 
research, it could as well be seen as an act of private cultural diplomacy. Ernst van der Beugel 
was subsequently appointed as the 1969 Erasmus lecturer and meant to give a series of 
lectures on “the Integration and Disintegration in Western Cooperation” and “American-
European relations from the Dutch point of view”. His lectures, which had been planned for 
the spring eventually had to be postponed to the fall due to student protests – unrelated to 
Van der Beugel’s visit – during which Harvard’s University Hall was seized and held for 
eighteen hours, when police were called in to remove the students, after which the university 
remained in a state of crisis, with a number of students in the College and other parts of the 
University going on strike.149  
In contrast, Leiden was not a hotbed of student protests. Even so, in a letter expressing 
his sympathy to his colleague H. Daudt of the University of Amsterdam – where student 
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unrest was much more intense – van der Beugel did mention that there were also signs of 
what he liked to call “the silent inquisition” at Leiden University. Van der Beugel himself 
attributed the fact that he had not fallen prey to this ‘inquisition’ himself to the fact that his 
course was an elective and that it was only chosen by students who did so deliberately 
because it appealed to them. Jaap de Hoop Scheffer recalled that there even was as small 
group of students – including himself – who were “deeply devoted” to the professor. The fact 
that Ernst van der Beugel could talk from personal experience and actually knew many of the 
key players of the history he taught gave a certain “sex appeal” to his course that some 
students thoroughly enjoyed.150  He also frequently interrupted his course schedule to discuss 
current events in foreign affairs as they unfolded. Van der Beugel conceded that this might 
undermine the academic depth of the course, but he considered it more important that his 
students would be better equipped to make sense of what they read in the newspapers.151  
Since the course was scheduled in the last year of their studies, combined with the fact 
that Van der Beugel also served as a thesis advisor, many students approached him for advice 
on their future. As a result of the fact that Van der Beugel also took his student’s oral exams 
at his home, it was a va-et-vient of boys and girls who wanted to discuss their work or desired 
advice on their future at the Van der Beugel home in The Hague. De Hoop Scheffer also 
extensively discussed his future with Professor Van der Beugel. After all, it was through his 
course that De Hoop Scheffer had become interested in peace and security studies. 152 “I 
come from a family where foreign policy played no major role – it was not in my genes”, De 
Hoop Scheffer explained, but “he introduced me to that entire field of policy and made me 
accustomed to it and from that my entire career has unfolded.” When De Hoop Scheffer 
inquired Van der Beugel about a career at the Foreign Service the professor discussed the 
pros and cons with him. He told him that the foreign service was certainly a possibility, but 
also warned a young De Hoop Scheffer for the limitations of the job, telling him that he 
should realize that as a foreign servant he would be “his master’s voice” and that he should 
not have the illusion that he could independently act upon his own ideas – limitations Van der 
Beugel had experienced himself before he left the government, a move that allowed him to 
give a more independent twist to his transatlantic activities. He also warned his student that 
life in the Foreign Service could be hard on one’s partner. “He always remained an all-things-
considered-man”, De Hoop Scheffer recalled. Once De Hoop Scheffer had determined what 
he wanted to do, Van der Beugel provided him with very concrete advice on how to pursue 
his ambition to become a diplomat. “He recommended me to pick international economic 
relations as an elective course – for which I am still thankful – and to write my thesis on a 
transatlantic subject”, De Hoop Scheffer recalled. “You could see that he did what he did with 
great pleasure and enthusiasm and by doing so he demonstrated ‘I take that generation 
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seriously and I try to educate them in my spirit.’”153 In his own acceptance speech as 
professor at Leiden University in 2010 De Hoop Scheffer would mention Ernst van der Beugel 
as his “great example and teacher.”154     
Jaap de Hoop Scheffer was far from the only Dutch diplomat to pass through van der 
Beugel’s class. According to van der Beugel, any Leiden student who had the ambition to join 
the Foreign Service followed his course.155 Consequently, he greatly contributed to the 
education of future diplomats  – not only in Leiden, but he was also closely involved in the 
formal education of future diplomats through his position as chairman of the “Leergang 
Buitenlandse Betrekkingen” of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where he helped to 
determine the content of the training course for new diplomats.156 Ernst van der Beugel also 
used his network to provide introductions and recommendations for those students he 
considered to be promising, preferably with a positive attitude towards NATO. 
Overall, the content of van der Beugel’s courses reflected his own views, personal 
experience and analyses as expressed in his other writings and speeches as well. There was a 
complete unity in his thinking that found expression through a diverse body of activities of 
which academia was just one component. During the late 1970s and early 1980s van der 
Beugel also agitated against the prevalent moral and ideological argumentation in the public 
debate which according to him fostered an anti-Americanism that found expression in 
concerns about human rights, cultural anti-Americanism and especially in the debate on 
nuclear weapons. The latter was especially clear in the protests ignited by the 1979 NATO 
decision to place American nuclear cruise missiles in Western Europe. With regard to all these 
elements on the “menu of anti-Americanism”  van der Beugel came to America’s defense in 
the Dutch public debate for which he was somewhat scornfully given the label of “NATO-
professor” by one journalist.157 In 1983, he enthusiastically participated in an offensive 
against the peace movement through a book publication with “Essays on War and Peace.”158 
His own contribution to this book focused on the America-image in the minds of the Dutch 
and the generational transition from an image of the United States as benefactor – 
determined by the “great acts of the post-war period” as he himself had experienced them – 
to a malefactor – an image that emerged especially after the experiences of Vietnam and 
Watergate, two major formative experiences of the post-war generation, which had helped to 
foster a negative image of the United States, which was further fed by such things as concerns 
about human rights abuses and the deployment of nuclear weapons on Dutch soil during the 
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1970s and early 1980s. It was above all this image of America as “benefactor” that he tried to 
convey to the next generation as well as the public at large.  
Ernst van der Beugel was convinced that the negative image of the United States was for 
a great part the result of a lack of proper knowledge of American society. In this regard he 
underlined the importance of bringing young people, but also other up-and-coming leaders 
who were bound to occupy influential positions in society, in touch with American society 
through exchange programs and visitor programs. He recommended students, friends and 
employees to spend time in the United States and was closely involved with such ventures the 
Columbia-Leyden exchange program and the Eisenhower Exchange Fellowship – an 
international leader exchange program set-up by a group of businessmen in honor of 
president Eisenhower.159 To illustrate, in 1980 Ernst van der Beugel and Victor Halberstadt 
discussed “the desirability” that the up-and-coming Dutch journalist Harry van Wijnen, who 
was a likely candidate to succeed Van der Beugel’s friend Herman Sandberg as editor in chief 
of the Dutch daily Het Parool, to “get a decent American experience.”  Van der Beugel had 
asked Halberstadt to see if it would be possible to station him for some time at the Council of 
Foreign Relations or a similar institution. “Even if he does not succeed Herman”, Van der 
Beugel wrote to Halberstadt, “I think it will be of great importance.”160   
Overall, Van der Beugels efforts to create meaningful encounters with American society 
or with the Atlantic elite for up-and-coming leaders like Schmelzer, Dankert, Benthem van 
den Bergh and Harry van Wijnen were very much in line with NATO’s and the U.S. State 
Department’s public diplomacy efforts to “‘socialize’ and ‘familiarize’ up and coming leaders 
(…) with the United States as part of their political education” through such programs as the 
Fulbright Program and the State Department’s Foreign Leaders Program or the NATO leader 
program.161   In the process, “transatlantic social and intellectual bridges were build and 
strengthened in situations where ideological divides could easily widen out of control.”162  In 
his private efforts, Van der Beugel focused on similar target groups as these programs, which 
is also underlined by the fact that Schmelzer, Dankert and Van Wijnen had also been grantees 
of these government directed programs.163  Ernst van der Beugel’s endeavors through 
Bilderberg –  Bill Bundy even called Van der Beugel a “talent-scout” in this context164 – and his 
involvement in exchange programs, supplemented by individual efforts through his social 
network, complemented and strengthened these more formal efforts, which Van der Beugel 
greatly valued. In fact, when during the 1960s the number of participants in the U.S. 
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Government sponsored “Leader Grant Program”, which had “been extremely successful in the 
past in encouraging prominent visitors from the Netherlands to learn at first-hand about the 
people and institutions of the U.S., and to help transmit their motives, thoughts, aspirations 
and accomplishments to the Netherlands” had been reduced from 8 in 1960 to 1 in 1969, Van 
der Beugel was deeply concerned about the consequences. So was the American ambassador 
to The Hague Bill Tyler. Once Van der Beugel became aware of this, he encouraged the 
American ambassador to compose a memorandum describing the importance of such 
programs for Dutch-American relations and negative consequences of an American cut back 
“of U.S. Government support to exchanges of persons programs”, which he offered to 
personally forward to Henry Kissinger.165 Both men considered the mentioned cuts 
“unacceptable”, especially – as the eventual memorandum also pointed out – during a time in 
which “American society is more than ever before under close scrutiny by the people of the 
Netherlands. Yet their curiosity for the most part can be satisfied only by the distortions that 
the superficial treatment of American events by modern mass communications presents to 
them.”166    
When Van der Beugel turned 65 in 1983 – retirement age in the Netherlands – his 
friends decided to arrange the perfect gift as a tribute to his efforts to foster and maintain the 
transatlantic relationship by establishing an Ernst van der Beugel fellowship at the Fletcher 
School of Law and diplomacy of Tufts University. This gift, which was meant to represent Van 
der Beugel’s influence behind the scenes, his Atlanticist principles and his “position on the 
impossible crossroads of academia, education, business, government, domestic and foreign 
affairs”, was awarded to Van der Beugel in the presence of a diverse group of politicians and 
former politicians as well as many prominent leaders from the worlds of business, finance, 
journalism, academia and the government.167 The fellowship allowed for the annual selection 
of one Dutch individual, preferably between 20 and 40 years of age, to study for three months 
in the United States at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.168 This gift was meant, 
Victor Halberstadt explained, to enable Ernst van der Beugel to “continue his activities as a 
private diplomat.”169 The funds for the fellowship were raised from corporations and other 
private entities and individuals in the Netherlands. The board of the foundation responsible 
for the selection of students consisted of Ernst van der Beugel, Victor Halberstadt, Max van 
der Stoel and Jelle Zijlstra.170 The first individual selected by the board was Ben Knapen, a 
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promising young journalist whose work Van der Beugel admired.171  Eventually, Knapen 
would move on to become the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2010.  
While Van der Beugel gradually retired from more and more of his activities – 
sometimes voluntarily as in Bilderberg and sometimes reluctantly as was the case with his 
retirement from Leiden university – the Dutch minister of Economic Affairs remarked that this 
would probably not deter many from consulting the wisdom of the Atlantic eminence grise in 
the future as well “if only because you may very well be the last 'private' diplomat for whom 
few doors in the Western world remain closed,” the minister remarked.172 Ernst van der 
Beugel probably only welcomed this as he had always done, since as he mentioned in his 
farewell speech from Bilderberg: “I was , I am and I will always be committed to the central 
purpose of Bilderberg: Fostering better understanding between the U.S., Canada and its 
Western European Friends”, because, he once more explained: “the destiny of those relations 
determines all our destinies.”173  Even so, it was now “up to the youngsters.”174  
Conclusion 
From the early 1960s onwards, Ernst van der Beugel manifested himself as one of the driving 
forces behind a constant effort to educate new generations and to rejuvenate the Atlantic 
elite. While he continued his role in the public debate explaining and defending the U.S. to 
Dutch audiences and the Dutch and European position to American audiences, trying to foster 
a conducive climate for close transatlantic cooperation, this chapter has emphasized his 
concern with the education and socialization of potential future leaders within the Atlantic 
Community in an effort to foster and sustain both the mindset and social fabric at the heart of 
the transatlantic relationship. While these activities pursued a very clear diplomatic goal, they 
were carried out in an unofficial capacity and on the basis of private initiative, operating 
independently from nation-stations. As such, these efforts might not capture the attention of 
traditional diplomatic historians despite the fact that they were part of one and the same 
transatlantic diplomatic process. New Diplomatic History, however, allows us to see how 
Ernst van der Beugel as an unofficial diplomat contributed to the transatlantic diplomatic 
landscape through his attempts to address the challenge of the successor generation. He did 
so in different roles and through different channels, for example as a consultant for the Ford 
Foundation, as Secretary-General of the Bilderberg Meetings, as a board member of the 
Atlantic Institute, through his involvement in exchange programs and training programs for 
future diplomats as well as through his professorship at Leiden University.   
Ernst van der Beugel’s work as a consultant for the Ford Foundation, one of the key 
funders of the Atlantic NGOs, offers a glimpse into the world of private foundations which 
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pulled a great part of the strings within the unofficial Atlantic Community based on their own 
private policy agendas, informed by the ideas solicited from consultants such as Ernst van der 
Beugel. They pursued their own goals, by their own means, but it is important to realize that 
they maintained close ties to the formal foreign policy establishments in Europe and the 
United States. Like Ernst van der Beugel, many individuals involved in these foundations once 
served as formal government officials themselves. In that sense, they are a typical product of 
the revolving door between government employment, academia, think tanks, law and 
consultancy firms, the financial world and foundations that so much characterizes the East 
Coast Establishment. Of their own accord they chose to support formal diplomatic goals that 
they agreed with, such as helping to “accelerate the development of the Atlantic partnership” 
through private activity with a focus on “activities which would be suspect or impaired if 
national government’s engaged in them.”175 As a consultant, Ernst van der Beugel helped to 
give direction to their private policy agenda, specifically emphasizing the need to address the 
challenge of successor generation, while also putting these ideas in practice through his direct 
role in private organizations pursuing these very goals. 
In the absence of “the opportunities for meeting and working together which were 
afforded emergent leaders in the immediate post-war era through the negotiations for new 
forms of international cooperation – the Marshall Plan, NATO, EEC, OECD and others” , Van 
der Beugel attached great value to the creation of similar formative experiences through 
visitor and exchange programs, in particular those focused at brining young Europeans into 
close contact with American society. 176 To this end, he was closely involved in and an avid 
supporter of such programs, including the Columbia-Leyden exchange program and the 
Eisenhower Exchange Fellowship and through individual efforts through his own social 
network, which he also used to help recently graduated students from Leiden to start their 
careers.  
At Leiden University he furthermore used his professorship as an extra platform to 
educate the next generation on the importance of the transatlantic relationship for which he 
was labelled a ‘NATO-professor’.  As such, he tried to keep the positive memory of the 
American role in the liberation, reconstruction and protection of Western Europe alive in the 
face of more recent memories of Vietnam and Watergate and a revisionist history that fed 
images of the U.S. as a belligerent, corrupt and imperialist nation.  He also tried to explain the 
importance of power relations to a generation that had only known peace and grew up 
amidst the popularity of moralism and the spread of Hollanditus fed by the idealism of the 
Netherlands as a guiding country, as the Jeanne D’ Arc of the world – a spirit he remembered 
very well from the days of the run–up to the Second World War, and which he associated 
with his memories of appeasement at Munich, which he had so bemoaned and detested.   
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As Secretary General Van der Beugel used the Bilderberg Meetings as an important 
instrument to engage and socialize promising young individuals from different fields into the 
Atlantic elite and to create a forum in which not only transatlantic tensions, but also 
generational friction could be mediated. Despite Van der Beugel’s efforts, and despite the fact 
that there was a certain understanding among those involved in Bilderberg that the 
organization should serve as a vehicle to sustain the transatlantic relationships and contacts 
that had originally developed during the Marshall Plan era by developing and maintaining the 
human infrastructure of an evolving Atlantic Community, the rejuvenation of the Bilderberg 
Meetings was no easy task.  Eventually it was pushed through the window of opportunity 
created by the existential crisis caused by the key role of Bilderberg chairman Prince Bernhard 
in the Lockheed scandal. This crisis, however, also demonstrated the value attached to 
Bilderberg in the context of transatlantic relations by those who had been involved in the 
meetings – including official government representatives and younger participants. Thus, 
Ernst van der Beugel manifested himself not just as a transatlantic mediator, but also as a 
mediator between generations.  
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Conclusion: a Call for a New Diplomatic History  
By studying Ernst van der Beugel through the lens of New Diplomatic History this study has 
offered an alternative perspective to traditional state-centered narratives of diplomatic 
history by putting the unofficial diplomat front and center. In doing so, it has not disregarded 
the key role that nation states still play in diplomacy. Rather, it has attempted to broaden and 
deepen our understanding of the diplomatic process by including the unofficial realm of 
diplomacy in the analysis and through a focus on the goals, modus operandi and “diplomatic 
role” of a private individual in transatlantic relations.  
To understand the continuation of Ernst van der Beugel’s role in transatlantic diplomacy 
as a private actor it was key to also reassess the period before he entered the diplomatic 
playing field as an unofficial diplomat. While it tends to be clear what a formal diplomat 
represents – namely his or her nation-state –  this is not as obvious in the case of unofficial 
diplomats.  As a result of their greater freedom to act upon their own ideas, the personal 
convictions that drive private actors become more important in attempts to understand their 
positions on the diplomatic playing field.  
One of the key facets of what makes these private individuals diplomatic actors is the 
nature of the goals they pursue.  The goals pursued by Ernst van der Beugel were clearly 
diplomatic in character, namely fostering and maintaining a tightly knit Atlantic Community. 
To understand what this meant and why he pursued these goals we had to go back to some 
key formative experiences that helped to shape his perspective on international relations. 
This included the experience of appeasement, war, liberation and reconstruction, which 
instilled in Van der Beugel an understanding of the fundamental primacy of power relations 
and a deep appreciation of the American role in these events. In the context of the Cold War 
this translated into the conviction that the security of Western Europe depended completely 
on the American security guarantee as formalized through NATO – and anything that 
threatened this, he opposed. 1 The development of Van der Beugel’s Atlanticism also 
provided insight into how and why he as a European came to be plus americain que les 
americains repeatedly inviting, encouraging and defending American hegemony on the 
European continent. 
 This Atlanticist perspective also determined his attitude towards European 
integration. Together with some of his closest friends he heartily welcomed the Schuman 
Plan, but he would never regard European integration as an end in itself, but always only as a 
means to strengthen the Atlantic Community in the context of the Cold War. Thus, his 
understanding of the role and preferred blueprints of European integration was tightly linked 
to his assessment of Cold War power relations. When he came to believe that the Gaullists 
rising to power in France intended to hijack the process of European integration for their own 
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nationalistic desire to re-establish French grandeur at the expense of American hegemony in 
Western Europe, he opposed any form of integration that he believed would play into the 
hand of the Gaullists. This did not mean, however that he was anti-European. He was just 
convinced that the Atlantic priority trumped everything. Based on his understanding of power 
relations the primacy of the Atlantic security interest enveloped the Dutch national interest as 
well as the security of Western Europe as a whole. 
While Van der Beugel’s ideas crystallized while he was still employed by the Dutch 
government, from 1959 onwards he was able to carve out a place for himself as a private 
actor on the transatlantic diplomatic playing field trying to foster and maintain an Atlantic 
Community based on his realist stream of Atlanticism.  The continuation of his diplomatic role 
in transatlantic relations was enabled by a combination of personal and external factors, 
which neatly tied into each other.  
The personal factors depended for a great part on his experience and track record as a 
formal government representative and can be classified in terms of social, intellectual and 
financial capital all of which in turn amplified each other. The continuation of Van der 
Beugel’s transatlantic activities was facilitated by social capital in the form of his extensive 
transatlantic network consisting of both government representatives and individuals from the 
private sector, which he had been able to build up during his work for the Marshall Plan and 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The fact that he had been a diplomat himself, an insider in a 
world that is hard to penetrate from the outside, was also fundamental in that it provided 
him access to formal decision making establishments in Europe and the United States. His 
social status and track record as a formal diplomat furthermore made that he was seen as a 
credible professional who could be trusted, for example to serve as an unofficial backchannel 
between the American and Dutch foreign policy establishments. His appointment as Honorary 
Secretary General of the Bilderberg Meetings, one of the key meeting places for the official 
and unofficial Atlantic elites helped to consolidate his unofficial diplomatic position among 
the Atlantic elite providing him with an extra kind of transnational social capital. It also helped 
him to expand his network even more across all the spheres from which Bilderberg drew its 
participants. At the same time his role as a spider in the transatlantic webs connecting the 
official and unofficial realms also provided Van der Beugel with a great deal of valuable 
information that official diplomats were eager to hear, thus making him an interlocateur 
valable in transatlantic diplomacy. This insider information, combined with the knowledge, 
experience and expertise derived from his career as an official diplomat in the field hence 
provided him with useful intellectual capital.  His appointment as professor of Western 
Cooperation at Leiden University further amplified his status as an expert and even helped to 
create an illusion of objectivity and academic detachment. This combination of social and 
intellectual capital made Ernst van der Beugel also an interesting candidate for consultancy 
positions and directorships in the private sector, which in turn provided the financial basis 
enabling his unofficial activities in transatlantic diplomacy. These personal factors facilitating 
the continuation of Van der Beugel’s diplomatic role coalesced with external factors of a more 
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structural nature, in particular the development of the post-war Atlantic elite and the rich 
constellation of policy forums, exchange programs, think tanks, and other private Atlantic 
organizations, initiatives and meeting places that provided the infrastructure of the unofficial 
realm of transatlantic diplomacy in which Ernst van der Beugel became very active.  
Already during his days as a formal diplomat, Van der Beugel had been confronted with 
the fact that there were more stakeholders invested in transatlantic diplomacy than nation 
states alone. He had experienced this, for example, during the Marshall Plan, a transatlantic 
venture that served as a key catalyst for public-private cooperation which was instrumental 
not just in the development of the post-war Atlantic elite, but also in weaving Van der Beugel 
himself into this elite. Moreover, as Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs he – as an official 
government representative –  had even felt restricted in his own pursuit of the Dutch national 
interest by the influence exercised by Jean Monnet’s private activities behind the scenes of 
transatlantic  diplomacy. As a private agent Monnet was able to mobilize not just European 
legislators, but also the American diplomatic machinery in service of a speedy European 
integration process along the lines he had set out. After all, as the process of European 
integration took shape, different blueprints appeared with regards to the desired form that 
this integration should take and about how it should relate to the broader Atlantic 
framework.  
During the 20th century processes of globalization in the fields of transportation and 
communication enabled advocates of these different visions from different nations, whether 
employed by a nation-state or not, to organize themselves in an unofficial capacity into a 
transnational force on the diplomatic playing field.  The result was the development of 
transnational groups advocating different European and transatlantic perspectives, including 
Jean Monnet’s brand of Atlantic partnership, Clarance Streit’s Atlantic federalism, but also 
those who, like Van der Beugel’, subscribed to a more realist stream of Atlanticism.  These 
transnational groups disregarded state lines not just in the sense that their members had 
different nationalities (although the Gaullist vision was obviously a very French vision closely 
tied to a desire to elevate the French nation state), but also because their members consisted 
of both government officials and private individuals. What united them, however, was a 
shared vision of the transatlantic relationship. The debates about the shape of the 
transatlantic relationship were thus not only debates between nation states and their 
representatives. Instead they both transcended and pierced straight through the nation state 
– as illustrated by the debates at the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where Van der 
Beugel’s vision of European integration and the transatlantic relationship differed for example 
from the blueprints envisioned by Kohnstamm and Patijn, and where he also had to deal with 
the transnational influence exercised by Monnet. In this context, the Bilderberg Meetings 
filled up a void left open by the formal diplomatic machinery by offering a forum for the 
transnational mediation of rivaling blueprints of the transatlantic relationship, while its 




The Bilderberg meetings also served as an important instrument in Ernst van der 
Beugel’s private efforts to manage, mediate and strengthen the transatlantic relationship. 
After Charles de Gaulle challenged the Atlantic Community in his famous 1963 press 
conference, for example, Van der Beugel used the Bilderberg Meetings as an instrument not 
just to mediate these different views, but also to contribute to the management of the 
transatlantic relationship. On the one hand Bilderberg offered a podium for a freer exchange 
of thoughts than formal diplomatic meetings, also allowing the Gaullists a podium to express 
their views. Thus Van der Beugel made sure to keep the French engaged in the transatlantic 
conversation. At the same time, however, fearing an American retreat into isolationism as a 
result of what might be perceived as anti-American Gaullist rhetoric, he used the Bilderberg 
Meetings to demonstrate to the American Foreign policy elite that de Gaulle did not speak for 
all of Europe – a message Foreign Secretary Luns, for example, also decided to transmit 
through formal diplomatic channels after taking note of Gaullist exposition at Bilderberg. 
During the subsequent Bilderberg conference in Williamsburg, Virginia Van der Beugel made 
sure that the meeting could be used by the U.S. State Department to foster elite support for 
the MLF.  While Bilderberg could be useful in the context of processes concerning the 
creation of transatlantic policy, he also very consciously used the Bilderberg Meetings to 
socialize new, and preferably younger, members into the Atlantic elite in efforts to preserve 
the mindset and social fabric at the heart of the Atlantic Community for the long run. 
Preserving the Atlantic mindset was crucial, because, as Van der Beugel understood, the 
Atlantic alliance could only exist and function properly as long as the Atlantic Community as a 
community of shared values and interests remained alive in the minds not just of the elite, 
but also in the mind of the ‘average man’ in the form of an imagined community. This became 
even more important in the context of the democratization of foreign policy. In this context, 
‘those in the know’, to which Van der Beugel counted himself, had an obligation to explain 
and transmit the Atlantic mindset undergirding the Atlantic alliance to the public at large. To 
this end, Van der Beugel engaged in private efforts at transatlantic public diplomacy and 
psychological warfare by fighting European anti-Americanism while keeping the enemy image 
of the Soviet Union alive. He did so through his own massive contribution to the public debate 
in the form of speeches, publications and interviews, but also tried to foster a conducive 
atmosphere for close transatlantic relations behind the scenes, for example by socializing 
journalists into the Atlantic elite. He also arranged introductions to prominent Americans for 
journalists from whom he expected sympathetic reports on the United States while he kept 
these gates closed for more critical voices. In the meantime, he also tried to explain the Dutch 
and broader European position to the American foreign policy elite. After all, during this 
entire period, he also remained active through the more traditional diplomatic channels 
connecting the formal diplomatic establishments behind the scenes.  
In fact, all these activities were part of one big concerted and continues effort to foster 
and maintain an Atlantic Community, thus contributing to the multidimensional management 
of the Cold War transatlantic relationship by nation states and transnational actors, through 
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official and unofficial channels. As the preceding chapters have demonstrated, the official and 
unofficial spheres of transatlantic diplomacy did not exist in isolation from each other. 
Instead, they were intimately connected through social networks and meeting places where 
the official and unofficial elites mingled and interacted. At the same time, it is important to 
point out that many of the private Atlantic organizations, like the Bilderberg Meetings and the 
Atlantic Institute and many other Atlantic NGO’s, were grass-root initiatives. They were not 
set up, instigated or orchestrated by nation states, although government representatives did 
acknowledge and at times encourage their roles in the diplomatic process. They happily 
cooperated when in pursuit of shared diplomatic goals. At times officials believed private 
diplomats and organizations could do things even more effectively than formal 
representatives of NATO or a nation states. As private actors they could speak more freely, for 
example, and come across as more credible in the context of public diplomacy and 
psychological warfare efforts, which when executed by a government representative might 
start to reek of propaganda. At the same time the Bilderberg meetings, for example, in turn 
offered a place where officials could also speak more freely and where relationships of trust 
as well as a consensus could be fostered between diverse transatlantic influentials that 
endured beyond changes in governments.  Thus, at times the official and unofficial realms of 
transatlantic diplomacy neatly complemented each other. At other times they also challenged 
each other.  
The same can be said of Ernst van der Beugel’s relationship to the nation state as a 
private actor. As an unofficial diplomat he was not a mere extension of the Dutch government 
nor a puppet of the Americans. To the contrary, as he mentioned himself during his 1961 
speech at the Chamber of Commerce in London, being a free agent was a liberating 
experience. It allowed him to speak his mind and pursue his own diplomatic goals more 
purely based on his own convictions, without having to follow ‘his master’s voice’ as he had to 
when he was a government official. Thus, he cooperated for example with Dutch government 
officials in their struggle to gain American landing rights for KLM, but he also did not shy away 
from using his American connections to put pressure on the Dutch government, for example 
to raise the defense budget. He also gladly cooperated with the State Department’s 
theologians in their efforts to foster transatlantic elite consensus concerning the multilateral 
force through Bilderberg. At the same time he did not shy away from criticizing the American 
role in the process of European integration or their lack of strong Atlanticist leadership. From 
Van der Beugel’s perspective, these efforts did not only serve the Dutch or American national 
interest but above all a shared Atlantic interest. The landing rights issue, for example, fed 
anti-Americanism in the Netherlands. While in this specific case he believed these anti-
American sentiments to be justified they were also detrimental to the cohesion of the Atlantic 
Community. Interesting in this context is also Henry Kissinger’s remark that “he was equally 
comfortable in Europe as in the United States (…) we did not really look at Ernst van der 
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Beugel as a foreigner,”2 suggesting that Van der Beugel was not seen as a national agent. 
While Kissinger and Van der Beugel did not share the same nationality they did share a deep 
appreciation for the Atlantic Community to which they both belonged. Thus, as a private actor 
tightly integrated in the web of formal and informal transatlantic structures Ernst van der 
Beugel manifested himself not as a national, but as an independent transnational actor, more 
specially as an unofficial ambassador for an Atlantic Community.  
As the preceding chapters have demonstrated, Ernst van der Beugel as well as other 
non-state actors involved in the unofficial dimension of transatlantic relations were an 
integral part of the diplomatic process in which relationships are fostered and maintained, 
differences explained, tensions mediated and frustrations alleviated; where policy is shaped, 
consensus generated and ideas transmitted. In this context, Ernst van der Beugel as well as 
his Bilderberg companions also understood their own role to be ‘diplomatic’ in nature 
speaking of themselves in terms of “private diplomats” engaged in “unofficial international 
relations”.  
Ernst van der Beugel was an independent diplomat who acted upon his own instigation 
and upon his own convictions – as did many other private actors that appear in this narrative. 
From a traditional state-centered perspective many of these unofficial activities would remain 
under the radar and only sporadically pop up when Ernst van der Beugel or another private 
actor entered the official diplomatic realm. Consequently, traditional state-centered 
approaches can only offer a very limited appreciation of Ernst van der Beugel’s diplomatic 
role, which cannot not do justice to his contributions to the diplomatic process – nor to this 
diplomatic process itself. However, by reassessing his role through the lens of New Diplomatic 
History by putting the unofficial diplomat, instead of the nation state, front and central, 
combined with a focus on the diplomatic process and its machinery and the (un)official 
diplomat’s modus operandi, it becomes clear that his private diplomatic activities were not 
just sporadic incidents, but part of a continues and concerted effort contributing to the 
multidimensional management of transatlantic diplomacy in which more stakeholders were 
involved than nation states alone. This could only be revealed, however, by changing the 
framework of diplomatic history on the basis of the idea that being a ‘diplomat’ does not 
depend on one’s official status as a government representative, but is rather determined by 
an actor’s role in the diplomatic process serving “a set of interests, a cause or collective unit 
above and beyond themselves, and which in some way involves the crossing of borders and 
the inter-relationship of political entities.”3 In doing so, this study did not only attempt to do 
better justice to Ernst van der Beugel’s role in and contributions to the diplomatic process. It 
also constitutes a call to reconsider the way in which we study diplomatic history and above 
all to pay more attention to the unofficial realm of diplomacy.  
This does certainly not mean that diplomatic historians should disregard the nation 
state. Also in this study nation states still played a key role. They were however, not the only 
                                                            
2 Henry A. Kissinger, interview with the author, 4 January 2012. 
3 Weisbrode, “The Task Ahead”. 
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stakeholders in the diplomatic process that has been described. By looking at Cold War 
transatlantic diplomacy from the perspective of New Diplomatic History, it becomes clear that 
formal transatlantic diplomacy during this period did not take place in a vacuum, but was 
closely entangled with unofficial individuals, networks and ventures. To recognize these links 
also helps us understand formal diplomacy better. However, from the perspective of New 
Diplomatic History it is crucial to recognize that these unofficial actors were not only part of 
the diplomatic process when they were directly linked to a nation state, but also acted 
independently and on their own instigation. They had their own agency. Thus, while the 
distinction between state and non-state actors has proven to be a valuable distinction, as it 
indicates how these actors operate from different positions in different capacities, this should 
not lead to the idea that only those linked to nation states can be diplomatic agents. The fact 
that Ernst van der Beugel as a private agent was still such an integral part of transatlantic 
diplomacy demonstrates that a narrow focus on nation states and their representatives limits 
our understanding of the actual diplomatic process. Instead, we can do better justice to the 
diplomatic process if we identify “the diplomat” not so much on the basis of his or her 
relationship to the nation state, but by focusing on how actors relate to the diplomatic 
process by focusing on their diplomatic role: what they do and why and how they do this. 
Since both state and non-state actors were part of the same diplomatic process they deserve 
to be recognized as such. To this end, it is not only useful to add a transnational layer to our 
investigations of the diplomatic process, but also to speak of “unofficial” or “private 
diplomats” on the one hand and of “formal” or “official” diplomats on the other hand – both 
of them worthy subjects of study by diplomatic historians in their own right. Such an 
approach would not only offer a more holistic understanding of the diplomatic process, but 
also opens up new venues for further research.  
By following Ernst van der Beugel behind the scenes of transatlantic diplomacy the 
preceding chapters have offered a window upon the broader unofficial dimension of the 
Atlantic Community. In doing so, they provided not more than a glimpse of the other 
individuals and organizations active in this realm, many of them requiring further exploration. 
While a group of historians has started to describe the role of organizations like the 
Bilderberg Meetings and the Atlantic Institute in transatlantic diplomacy, other Atlantic NGO’s 
like the London based International Institute for Strategic Studies, have barely received any 
attention. In addition, more studies analyzing the roles of private individuals or groups of 
individuals on the diplomatic playing field can provide more general insight not only into their 
diplomatic roles, but also into the factors that enabled these actors to play such a role. Ernst 
van der Beugel’s track record as a formal diplomat, for example, helped to facilitate his role as 
a private diplomat. Studies focusing on other individuals may identify other factors and 
qualities and may even demonstrate that also prior government experience is no prerequisite 
for a diplomatic role. A bigger reservoir of studies on 20th century unofficial diplomats may 
also enable the development of a greater body of theory on this topic with regards to the 
qualities and characteristics shared by private diplomatic actors during this period, 
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comparable to the work done by historians of New Diplomatic History focusing on the Middle 
Ages and the Early Modern period.4  
Finally, the remarks by Victor Halberstadt and Minister van Aardenne describing Ernst 
van der Beugel as “the Netherlands’ only private diplomat” who “may very well be the last 
'private' diplomat for whom few doors in the Western world remain closed”,5 seem to 
indicate that Van der Beugel belonged to a rare and almost extinct breed. The diversity, 
breadth and scope of spheres in which Ernst van der Beugel was active is indeed uncommon – 
at least in the Dutch context. In this sense, Ernst van der Beugel was especially a rather ‘un-
Dutch’ phenomenon, as Ben Knapen has also pointed out; more representative of the 
American East Coast Establishment with its revolving door between public and private 
spheres.6  While there was only one Ernst van der Beugel, this dissertation has demonstrated 
that there were many more unofficial stakeholders involved in Cold War transatlantic 
diplomacy – and that processes of globalization have enabled them to proliferate in ever 
greater numbers. Their stories not only deserve to be told, but by including them in our 
narratives we will be able to do better justice to the complexity of the diplomatic process, 
particularly in a globalizing world.  
                                                            
4 The greater proliferation of studies focusing on private individuals participating in the diplomatic process during the 
Middle Ages and the Early Modern period has led to a greater body of theory about the characteristics of these 
individuals, for which researchers of those periods use the term ‘agents’. See for example: Marika Keblusek and 
Badeloch Vera Noldus, eds., Double Agents: Cultural and Political Brokerage in Early Modern Europe (Leiden and 
Boston: Brill, 2014).  
5 Victor Halberstadt, “Opmerkingen bij aanbieding Ernst H. van der Beugel Fellowship, 2 februari 1983”, Scrapbook 
XVIII, AHB; G.M.V. van Aardenne, “Toespraak Z.E. Drs. G.M.V. van Aardenne, Minister van Economsiche Zaken”, 
Srapbook XVIIII, AHB. 
6 Ben Knapen, interview with the author, 4 February 2013; Ben Knapen, “Woord vooraf” in: “For Ernst Only” (Liber 
Amicorum), 1997, AHB; Busby and Monten, “Without Heirs: Assessing the Decline of Establishment Internationalism 
in U.S. Foreign Policy,” Perspectives on Politics 6:3 (2008), 454.  
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Appendix A – Directorships E.H. van der Beugel1 
1959 -   Algemene Bank Nederland N.V. 
1977 -   Badger B.V. 
1967 -   Berenschot N.V.  
1969 -   Brill N.V. (Chairman of the Supervisory Board). 
1975 - 1980  Cincinnati Milacron, Ohio. 
1965 -   Cincinnati Milacron, Vlaardingen. 
1970 - 1973  Diebold Group International. 
1967 -   D. Drukken & Zn. N.V. (Chairman of the Supervisory Board). 
1972 - 1983  Estel N.V. (since 1976 Chairman of the Supervisory Board). 
1972 - 1976  Eurometaal N.V. 
1966 - 1970  FAS International Inc. 
1974 -   Ferro B.V. 
1979 -   Fina N.V. + Mafina (Chairman of the Supervisory Board). 
1972 - 1979  General Electric Company, London. 
1955 - 1972  Geveke N.V. 
1960 -    Hoogovens B.V. (since 1976 Chairman of the Supervisory Board) 
1960 -   Kon. Hoogovens en Staalfabrieken N.V. (Since 1976 Chairman of the  
   Supervisory Board).  
1973 -   Internatio Müller N.V.  
1977-   Bank Brussel Lambert, Brussel. 
1975 -   Bank Mees/Hope N.V. (Chairman of the Supervisory Board). 
1967 -   Merck, Sharp & Dome N.V. Netherlands. 
1959 - Nationale Nederlanden N.V. (since 1980 Chairman of the 
Supervisory Board). 
1978 -   Rank Xerox Limited, London. 
1959 - 1972 Reineveld Machinefabriek N.V. (Since 1967 Chairman of the 
Supervisory Board). 
1976 -   Sigma Coatings B.V. Int. (Chairman of the Supervisory Board). 
1971 -   VMF/Stork N.V.  
                                                            
1 Ernst Hans van der Beugel, Ernst Hans van der Beugel: 65 Jaar (Leiden: Brill, 1983), 10. 
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1964 - 1976  S.G. Warburg & Co. Ltd. London. 
1975 -    S.G. Warburg & Co. International Holdings Ltd., London. 
1973 -    Xerox Corporations U.S.A. 
1963 - 1972  Zeeuwsche Confectie Fabrieken N.V. Middelburg.  
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Appendix B - Other Positions E.H. van der Beugel1 
1938 - 1939  Ab Actis Senaat Amsterdams Studenten Corps. 
1965 - 1968 Adviescommissie uit het Bedrijfsleven voor het Department van 
Buitenlandse Zaken (Business Advisory Council of the Dutch 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, member). 
1968 -    ANWB balanscommissie (member).  
1975 - 1979  Atlantic Institute (governor). 
1960 -  Van den Berch van Heemstede Stichting (foundation, member of 
the board). 
1960 - 1980  Bilderberg Meetings (Honorary Secretary-General for Europe). 
1975-   Carnegie Foundation (member of the board). 
1965- 1968 Cie Economische Ontwikkeling Amsterdam (advisory committee, 
chairman). 
1971 - 1972 Cie van Rijckevorsel (Government Advisory Council Civil and 
Military Experts, member).  
1974-1975 Cie Spierenburg (Government Advisory Council European Union, 
member). 
1978 -    Ditchley Foundation (member of the board). 
1979 -   Eisenhower Exchange Fellowship (member of the board). 
1959 -    Genootschap voor Internationale Zaken (member of the board). 
1981 -    Geri M. Joseph Lectureship (executive committee). 
1974 - 1981  Hugo de Groot Foundation (member of the selection committee). 
1969 - 1973 International Institute for Strategic Studies, London (council 
member)  
1973 – 1985 International Institute for Strategic Studies, London (chairman of 
the council).  
1967 - 1976 Beheerscommissie Leergang Buitenlandse Betrekkingen (chairman). 
1972 -  European Advisory Group of Merck & Co. Rahway U.S.A. (member) 
1970 -    Nederlands Kanker Instituut (Dutch Cancer Institute, chairman) 
1957 - 1972  Residentie Orkest (member of the board) 
                                                            
1 Ernst Hans van der Beugel, Ernst Hans van der Beugel: 65 Jaar (Leiden: Brill, 1983), 11. 
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1963 - 1967  Socialisme en Democratie (member of the editorial board) 
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In dit proefschrift wordt de diplomatieke rol van de Nederlandse Atlanticist Ernst van der 
Beugel in de transatlantische betrekkingen ten tijde van de Koude Oorlog geanalyseerd - als 
overheidsfunctionaris én als privépersoon. De nadruk ligt hierbij op de continuïteit van zijn 
diplomatieke rol. Na een carrière als overheidsvertegenwoordiger in de frontlinies van het 
Marshall Plan, de Europese integratie en de transatlantische politiek, vertrok Ernst van der 
Beugel in 1959 naar de private sector alwaar hij het leiderschap van de KLM op zich zou 
nemen. Deze overstap zou de indruk kunnen wekken dat dit het einde was van Ernst van der 
Beugels rol in de transatlantische diplomatie. Dit proefschrift laat echter zien dat dit niet het 
geval was, maar dat Ernst van der Beugel ook nadat hij de overheid verliet een rol van 
betekenis bleef spelen op het transatlantische diplomatieke speelveld.  
 Door de focus op de natiestaat en op de uitkomsten van het diplomatieke proces, en 
niet het proces zelf, waar traditionele benaderingen van de diplomatieke geschiedenis door 
worden gekenmerkt, blijft een groot deel van Ernst van der Beugels diplomatieke activiteiten 
– en die van vele andere niet statelijke actoren – onderbelicht. Onder de noemer ‘New 
Diplomatic History’ probeert een groep historici hier verandering in te brengen. Zij doen dit 
onder andere door meer aandacht te besteden aan de rol en identiteit van het individu in het 
diplomatieke proces en de modus operandi van de diplomaat. Zij trachten ook nieuwe 
onderzoekslagen aan de bestaande historiografie toe te voegen door aandacht te besteden 
aan de onofficiële dimensie van de diplomatie en de rol van niet-statelijke actoren - ook als zij 
los van een natiestaat opereren. Terwijl traditionele benaderingen van de diplomatieke 
geschiedenis het woord ‘diplomaat’ exclusief hanteren voor overheidsvertegenwoordigers, 
neemt dit proefschrift de diplomatieke rol van een actor als uitgangspunt voor haar definitie 
van het woord ‘diplomaat’. Daarbij wordt wel onderscheid gemaakt tussen ‘formele’ of 
‘officiële’ diplomaten – aangesteld door een natiestaat – en ‘informele’, ‘onofficiële’ of 
‘private’ diplomaten die in privécapaciteit een diplomatieke rol vervullen.  
Dit proefschrift erkent niet alleen de diplomatieke rol van niet-statelijke actoren zoals 
Ernst van der Beugel,  maar benadert het diplomatieke proces ook vanuit het perspectief van 
de onofficiële diplomaat. Hiermee biedt dit proefschrift dus een andere kijk op de 
transatlantsiche diplomatie dan traditionele studies die het diplomatieke proces benaderen 
vanuit het perspectief van de staat, veelal op basis van onderzoek in overheidsarchieven. 
Zonder de rol van natiestaten in het diplomatieke proces te negeren, laat dit proefschrift zien 
dat Ernst van der Beugel en andere leden van de onofficiële transatlantische elite ook los van 
de natiestaat diplomatieke activiteiten ontplooiden. Als gevolg hiervan zijn deze activiteiten 
vaak niet terug te vinden in overheidsarchieven. Het beeld van de rol van onofficiële 
diplomaten vanuit het perspectief van de natiestaat en haar vertegenwoordigers is dus 
beperkt.  Alleen als een onofficiële diplomaat het territorium van de natiestaat binnenstapt, 
verschijnt hij of zij op de radar van de traditionele diplomatieke geschiedenis. Hierdoor kan de 
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indruk ontstaan dat de diplomatieke activiteiten van een individu als Ernst van der Beugel 
slechts incidenteel waren, terwijl dit proefschrift laat zien dat ze onderdeel waren van een 
voortdurende inspanning en niet beperkt tot een enkel individu, maar van een grotere groep 
private actoren in een poging bij te dragen aan het beheer van de transatlantische 
betrekkingen. Dit wordt echter pas echt duidelijk als we deze activiteiten bestuderen vanuit 
het perspectief van de onofficiële actoren zelf.   
Dit perspectief vereist ook het gebruik van andere bronnen dan gebruikelijk in 
traditionele diplomatieke studies die veelal gebaseerd zijn op onderzoek in 
overheidsarchieven. Zonder de traditionele overheidsarchieven te negeren, is dit proefschrift 
dan ook voor een aanzienlijk deel gebaseerd op onderzoek in private archieven van 
prominente leden van de onofficiële Atlantische elite, archieven van private organisaties zoals 
de Bilderberg Meetings en archieven van de Amerikaanse filantropische instellingen die veel 
van deze private diplomatieke organisaties en activiteiten financieel ondersteunden, zoals de 
Ford Foundation. Door Ernst van der Beugel te volgen in de diverse sferen waarin hij actief 
was, biedt dit proefschrift een unieke blik achter de schermen van de transatlantische 
betrekkingen ten tijde van de Koude Oorlog met oog voor zowel de formele als de informele 
dimensie van de naoorlogse Atlantische gemeenschap. 
Aan de hand van een analyse van de continuïteit van de diplomatieke rol van Ernst van 
der Beugel in de transatlantische betrekkingen als overheidsfunctionaris én als privépersoon, 
laat dit proefschrift zodoende zien hoe New Diplomatic History voor een andere waardering 
van Ernst van der Beugel’s rol in het diplomatieke proces zorgt. Het kijkt daarbij naar wat deze 
rol inhield, welke factoren de continuïteit van deze rol in een privécapaciteit faciliteerden, 
wat de motivatie was die Ernst van der Beugel hierin dreef, maar ook welke belangen en 
ideeën hij als privédiplomaat vertegenwoordigde en hoe zijn onofficiële diplomatieke 
activiteiten zich verhielden tot de formele diplomatie. Om hier zicht op te krijgen is het echter 
ook van belang om vanuit dit perspectief aandacht te besteden aan de periode voor 1959, 
toen hij de overheid verliet, met name om beter zicht te krijgen op de ontwikkeling van zijn 
netwerk en ideeën die ook in zijn latere rol als privédiplomaat van fundamentele betekenis 
zouden zijn.  
Het eerste hoofdstuk van dit proefschrift gaat dan ook in op de jeugd en studententijd 
van Ernst van der Beugel en beschrijft het milieu waarin hij opgroeide alsmede het begin van 
zijn levenslange fascinatie voor de Verenigde Staten. Ernst van der Beugel werd in 1917 
geboren in een Joods gezien in Amsterdam en groeide op in de aanloop naar de Tweede 
Wereldoorlog. Oorspronkelijk was het plan geweest dat Ernst in de voetsporen van zijn vader 
– een voorname bankier met sociaal-democratische sympathieën – zou treden. Met dit 
vooruitzicht in gedachten studeerde Ernst van der Beugel economie aan de Universiteit van 
Amsterdam. Hier werd hij lid van het Amterdamsch Studenten Corps, alwaar hij bevriend 
raakte met mensen als Max Kohnstamm, Pieter Blaisse, Emile van Lennep, Hans de Koster, 




Als student was Ernst van der Beugel reeds opmerkelijk internationaal en politiek 
geëngageerd. Samen met een aantal dispuutsgenoten raakte hij zeer onder de indruk van de 
Amerikaanse New Deal politiek van president Roosevelt. Anderzijds maakten zij zich grote 
zorgen over de opkomst van Adolf Hitler in Duitsland en het ‘demonische karakter’ van het 
Nationaal Socialisme. Ernst van der Beugel was reeds in een vroeg stadium bewust van de 
existentiële dreiging die hier van uitging. De appeasementpolitiek die in 1938 in München 
werd gevoerd, waarbij Engeland en Frankrijk toegaven aan Hitlers eisen in de hoop zo een 
oorlog te voorkomen, zou hij zich voor altijd blijven herinneren als ‘de grote fout van het 
Westen’. Hij verweet Engeland en Frankrijk te hebben gehandeld vanuit een positie van 
zwakte - met desastreuse gevolgen. Deze ervaring zou een blijvende indruk op Ernst van der 
Beugel achterlaten die bepalend zou zijn voor zijn houding ten opzichte van de Sovjet-Unie 
ten tijde van de Koude Oorlog. Machtsverhoudingen zouden bij hem centraal staan. Iedere 
nieuwe autoritaire dreiging, of deze nu van links of van rechts kwam, moest tegemoet 
worden getreden vanuit een positie van (militaire) kracht. Tegenover de afwachtende 
houding van de Europese landen die in 1938 hadden gefaald om Hitler tegen te houden, 
stond voor van der Beugel de actieve houding van de Amerikanen. Hij ontwikkelde grote 
bewondering voor de Verenigde Staten als bevrijder, maar ook voor de Amerikaanse rol in de 
naoorlogse wederopbouw van West-Europa. 
Na de oorlog ternauwernood te hebben overleefd, besloot Ernst van der Beugel niet in 
de voetsporen van zijn vader te treden, maar voor een carrière bij de overheid te kiezen 
teneinde aldaar mee te werken aan de wederopbouw van Nederland. Het tweede hoofdstuk 
beschrijft het begin van zijn carrière bij de overheid en zijn rol in het Marshall Plan. Deze rol 
begon toen hij in de zomer van 1947 werd aangesteld als Secretaris van de Nederlandse 
delegatie op de conferentie over het Marshall Plan in Parijs. Het beschrijft ook zijn allereerste 
reis naar de Verenigde Staten in het najaar van 1947 en zijn rol aan het hoofd van het 
Marshall Plan Bureau van Regeringscommissaris Hans Max Hirschfeld, die hem de kneepjes 
van de internationale politiek leerde op het snijvlak van de internationale betrekkingen, 
economisch beleid en veiligheidsvraagstukken. Deze periode zou het begin vormen van Ernst 
van der Beugels niet aflatende betrokkenheid in de na-oorlogse transatlantische 
betrekkingen. 
Het tweede hoofdstuk laat ook zien hoe het organisatorische karakter van het Marshall 
Plan, dat heel bewust was opgezet als een joint venture tussen de publieke en de private 
sector - samen met de aan de Marhsall hulp verbonden eis tot Europese samenwerking - 
heeft bijgedragen aan de totstandkoming van een onofficiële na-oorlogse transatlantische 
elite die niet alleen bestond uit overheidsfunctionarissen, maar ook  uit mensen uit het 
bedrijfsleven en de financiële wereld, het defensieapparaat, vertegenwoordigers van 
vakbonden, wetenschappers en andere experts. In de context van deze nauwe samenwerking 
in het kader van de wederopbouw werden vele nieuwe transnationale vriendschappen 
gesmeed die de nucleus zouden vormen van een sociaal netwerk -verbonden door gedeelde 
ervaringen, collectieve waarden en gemeenschappelijke doelen -  dat zowel over Europese 
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landsgrenzen als over de Atlantische oceaan zou reiken. Ernst van der Beugel raakte sterk in 
dit transatlantische web verweven.  Als hoofd van het Marshall Plan Bureau onderhield hij 
nauw contact met alle betrokken partijen in Nederland, in Europa en in de Verenigde Staten, 
zowel met overheidsfunctionarissen als met vertegenwoordigers uit de private sector, 
waardoor hij in staat was een indrukwekkend divers netwerk op te bouwen. De Marshall Plan- 
periode was dus niet alleen een belangrijke formatieve periode voor Ernst van der Beugel en 
zijn Atlanticistische sympathieën, maar ook voor zijn netwerk en voor de ontwikkeling van 
een na-oorlogse Atlantische elite in het algemeen.  
Het derde hoofdstuk gaat vervolgens vooral in op de ontwikkeling van de politieke 
ideeën van Ernst van der Beugel tijdens zijn carrière bij de overheid, met name ten opzichte 
van de Europese integratie en de transatlantische betrekkingen – eerst als topambtenaar op 
het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken en tussen januari 1957 en december 1958 als 
Staatssecretaris van Buitenlandse Zaken.  Terwijl Van der Beugels herinnering aan de 
appeasementpolitiek in de aanloop naar de Tweede Wereldoorlog leidde tot een grote 
waardering van machtsdenken, leidde de Amerikaanse rol in de bevrijding en de 
wederopbouw van Europa tot een diepe sympathie voor en identificatie met het Amerikaanse 
leiderschap in die periode. In de context van een nieuwe gepercipieerde dreiging uit het 
oosten in de vorm van de communistische Sovjet-Unie leidde dit bij Ernst van der Beugel tot 
de overtuiging dat de veiligheid van het Westen alleen gewaarborgd kon worden als West-
Europa en de Verenigde Staten, die samen een waardengemeenschap vormden, hun krachten 
zouden bundelen in een Atlantische gemeenschap onder Amerikaanse leiderschap. In de 
context van de Koude Oorlog, zo geloofde Ernst van der Beugel, was West-Europa voor haar 
veiligheid geheel afhankelijk van de Amerikaanse veiligheidsgarantie die in 1949 werd 
geformaliseerd door de ondertekening van het Noord Atlantisch Verdrag. Samenwerking in 
NAVO-verband zou dan ook de hoeksteen moeten vormen van het Nederlandse en Europese 
veiligheidsbeleid.  Samen met het economische belang van vrijhandel zou dit een centrale rol 
spelen in zijn begrip van het Nederlands nationale belang, waar andere zaken aan 
ondergeschikt waren. Hier behoorde ook het proces van Europese integratie toe. Dit diende 
volgens Van der Beugel niet als doel op zichzelf te staan, maar altijd ten dienste te staan van 
het versterkten van het Atlantische bondgenootschap in de context van de Koude Oorlog.  
Aangezien de Europese integratie nauw verweven was met het Marshall Plan, als gevolg 
van het feit dat de Amerikanen Europese samenwerking als een eis voor deelname aan het 
herstelprogramma hadden gesteld, kwam Ernst van der Beugel ook een centrale rol te spelen 
in de Nederlandse beleidskringen die zich met dit vraagstuk bezighielden. Begin jaren ’50 had 
hij als jong PvdA lid nog meegewerkt aan een poging met een groep gelijkgestemden, die 
zichzelf de Groep van Tien noemden, om de partijleiding aan te sporen tot een voortvarender 
Europabeleid. Naarmate hij de indruk kreeg dat de Europese integratie zich in een richting 
ontwikkelde die niet bevorderlijk, maar wellicht juist schadelijk zou kunnen zijn voor de 
Atlantische samenwerking, werd Ernst van der Beugel echter sceptischer over het proces van 
Europese integratie. Een centrale rol hierin speelde de groeiende macht van de Gaullisten in 
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Frankrijk. Ernst van der Beugel verdacht Charles de Gaulle en zijn sympathisanten ervan de 
Europese integratie te willen kapen teneinde de Franse grandeur te herstellen door van 
Europa een derde macht onder Frans leiderschap te maken die zich onafhankelijk zou 
opstellen van zowel de Sovjet Unie als de Verenigde Staten. Aangezien Ernst van der Beugel 
ervan overtuigd was dat West-Europa voor haar veiligheid geheel afhankelijk was van zo 
nauw mogelijke banden met de VS, beschouwde hij dit scenario als een groot gevaar. Dit 
leidde ertoe dat wanneer hij het idee had dat de Europese integratie een kant op dreigde te 
gaan die zijns inziens tot een verzwakking van de transatlantische banden zou kunnen leiden 
– of anderzijds het Nederlandse belang dreigde aan te tasten – hij direct op de rem trapte, tot 
grote frustratie van de voorstanders van een rappe integratie. Hiervoor werd onder andere 
gepleit door aanhangers van Jean Monnet, de architect van het Schuman Plan en de eerste 
president van de Hoge Autoriteit van de EGKS, waar een aantal van Ernst van der Beugel’s 
nauwste vrienden, waaronder Max Kohnstamm en Conny Patijn, toe behoorden. Hoewel 
Monnet ook een groot voorstander was van nauwe transatlantische betrekkingen, vond van 
der Beugel dat hij te weinig oog had voor de dreiging die uitging van toegeven aan de 
Gaullisten, waardoor Monnet volgens van der Beugel onbedoeld de transatlantsiche 
betrekkingen op het spel zette teneinde zijn Europese droom zo spoedig mogelijk te 
verwezenlijken. In 1955 richtte Monnet het Actiecomité voor de Verenigde Staten van Europa 
op, dat een hoogst effectieve pressiegroep voor Europese integratie bleek te zijn waarmee de 
Fransman als privépersoon achter de schermen van de Europese en transatlantische 
betrekkingen invloed wist uit te oefenen op het diplomatieke proces. Monnet wist enerzijds 
druk op de Europese regeringen uit te oefenen door een beleidslijn uit te zetten waar 
voorname parlementariërs in de Europese landen zich door lieten inspireren, maar ook door 
zijn toegang tot de hoogste kringen in de Amerikaanse regering die over de besluitvorming 
gingen en de laag die daar net onder zat: degenen die het Amerikaanse buitenlandse beleid in 
de dagelijkse praktijk vormgaven. Door de Amerikanen te overtuigen van zijn zienswijze kon 
hij via de Amerikanen ook weer druk uitoefenen op de Europese regeringen. De activiteiten 
van Monnet frustreerden Ernst van der Beugel, die zich – nota bene als formele 
overheidsfunctionaris – beperkt voelde in zijn handelen door de acties van deze private speler 
op het diplomatieke speelveld. Monnet’s activiteiten zouden Ernst van der Beugel echter ook 
inspireren. Onderdelen van de handelswijze van Monnet zouden namelijk ook voor meer 
Atlanticistische doeleinden ingezet kunnen worden, zo redeneerde van der Beugel. 
Van der Beugels zorgen over de richting waar de Europese integratie op afkoerste waren 
voor het eerst duidelijk naar boven gekomen tijdens de onderhandelingen over de Europese 
Defensiegemeenschap begin jaren ’50.  Zijn zorgen en frustraties verergerden echter tijdens 
de onderhandelingen die leidden tot de verdragen van Rome, waarin Frankrijk volgens van 
der Beugel vaak haar zin kreeg door zich steeds als de moeilijkste speler op te stellen, en 
leken een climax te bereiken met de benoeming van Charles de Gaulle tot president van 
Frankrijk. Toen Ernst van der Beugel vervolgens Staassecretaris van Buitenlandse Zaken werd, 
raakte hij nog verder gedesillusioneerd in het proces van Europese integratie met het 
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Frankrijk van de Gaulle.  Als voorstander van vrijhandel en een Atlantisch georiënteerd Europa 
achtte Ernst van der Beugel het van groot belang dat Groot-Brittannië zo nauw mogelijk bij 
het proces van Europese integratie werd betrokken. Wat dit betreft had hij zijn hoop 
gevestigd op de creatie van een Europese vrijhandelszone die de zes continentale landen van 
de EEG aan de overige OEES landen – en dus ook aan Groot Brittannië – zou koppelen. Deze 
onderhandelingen liepen echter al snel vast.  Het was in deze context dat Ernst van der 
Beugel in het voorjaar van 1959 voor het eerst werd uitgenodigd voor een speciale 
Bilderbergconferentie, alwaar de deelnemers – in privécapaciteit – veel vrijer met elkaar 
konden spreken dan Van der Beugel in formele diplomatieke contexten gewend was. Hier 
werden van der Beugels donkere vermoedens over het Frankrijk van De Gaulle bevestigt: 
Frankrijk streefde de Europese integratie slechts na teneinde het leiderschap van de zes 
landen van de EEG naar zich toe te trekken. De Europese vrijhandelszonde zou dit doel 
frustreren, dus zelfs als al haar eisen werden ingewilligd, zou Frankrijk nog niet bereid zijn een 
dergelijke vrijhandelszone te accepteren, zo concludeerde hij. 
Tegen de tijd dat van der Beugel deze Bilderbergconferentie bezocht, was hij echter al 
geen Staatssecretaris van Buitenlandse Zaken meer. Het vierde Kabinet Drees was in 
december 1958 gevallen, maar Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken Luns had Ernst van der 
Beugel een tijdelijke positie als buitengewoon en gevolmachtigd ambassadeur gegeven 
teneinde zijn rol in de onderhandelingen met betrekking tot de Vrijhandelszone voort te 
zetten terwijl hij zich op een volgende carrièrestap zou oriënteren.  In de zomer van 1959 
verliet Ernst van der Beugel het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken – als een overtuigd 
Atlanticist en gedesillusioneerd met het proces van Europese integratie zoals het zich 
ontvouwde – - teneinde president-directeur Aler van de KLM op te volgen, die in 1961 met 
pensioen zou gaan. Het vierde hoofdstuk gaat in op deze transitieperiode en de wijze waarop 
Ernst van der Beugel in staat bleek om ook als privépersoon een diplomatieke rol in de 
transatlantische betrekkingen te blijven spelen 
Ernst van der Beugel was geen onbekende van de KLM. De luchtvaartmaatschappij was 
één van de belangrijke ontvangers van Marshallhulp en als Staatssecretaris had Ernst van der 
Beugel namens Nederland onderhandelingen geleid over landingsrechten voor de KLM in de 
Verenigde Staten. Hoewel de KLM niet alle landingsrechten had gekregen waar de 
Nederlandse regering op uit was geweest, hetgeen de transatlantische betrekkingen geen 
goed had gedaan en nogal wat verontwaardiging onder de Nederlandse bevolking had 
opgeroepen, waren zowel de Nederlandse bevolking, de regering en de KLM-leiding vol lof 
over de wijze waarop Ernst van der Beugel deze onderhandelingen had gevoerd. 
Voor Van der Beugel was de keuze voor het KLM-leidershap een puur rationele keuze, 
gebaseerd op het verlangen zijn carrière uit te bouwen zonder verlies van status of financiële 
zekerheid. Zijn leiderschap van de KLM werd geen succes en zou slechts tot 1963 duren, 
waarna hij zich terugtrok om een proefschrift te schrijven over de Europese integratie als 
onderdeel van de naoorlogse Amerikaanse buitenlandse politiek. In 1966 werd hij vervolgens 
benoemd tot bijzonder hoogleraar aan de Universiteit Leiden met “Westelijke Samenwerking 
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na de Tweede Wereldoorlog” als leeropdracht. Ook vergaarde Van der Beugel een 
indrukwekkende verzameling commissariaten bij vooraanstaande bedrijven zowel in Europa 
als in de VS. Reeds tijdens zijn periode bij de KLM wist Ernst van der Beugel zich echter ook 
een weg te banen als privépersoon op het transatlantische diplomatieke speelveld en een 
centrale positie binnen de onofficiële transtatlantische elite te verwerven. De continuïteit van 
zijn diplomatieke rol in de transatlantische betrekkingen werd gefaciliteerd door een aantal 
persoonlijke en externe, meer structurele, factoren die niet alleen nauw met elkaar 
verbonden waren, maar elkaar ook versterkten. 
Tot de externe factoren behoorden de 20e-eeuwse globaliseringsprocessen, vooral op 
het gebied van transport en communicatie, die het met name na de Tweede Wereldoorlog 
makkelijker maakten voor privépersonen om deel te nemen aan het diplomatieke proces. 
Binnen de Atlantische gemeenschap ontwikkelden deze processen zich hand in hand met de 
proliferatie van een rijke constellatie aan private organisaties die zich inzetten voor het 
bevorderen van de transatlantische relaties, zoals de International Movement for Atlantic 
Union, de Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Atlantic Brücke, de Bilderberg Meetings, het 
International Institute for Strategic Studies in London en het Atlantic Institute in Parijs. Deze 
organisaties fungeerden op hun beurt ook weer als belangrijke ontmoetingsplaatsen van de 
na-oorlogse Atlantische elite, die was ontstaan uit de nauwe transatlantische samenwerking 
tijdens en na de Tweede Wereldoorlog, bijvoorbeeld in de context van het Marshall Plan, de 
Europese integratie en de ontwikkeling van de NAVO. Zoals eerder reeds aangegeven bestond 
deze elite niet alleen uit overheidsfunctionarissen, maar ook uit invloedrijke figuren uit het 
bedrijfsleven en de financiële wereld, de wetenschap, vakbondsleiders en journalisten – een 
bont gezelschap van invloedrijke personen die zich inzetten voor nauwe transatlantische 
betrekkingen. Het was in deze context, temidden van deze informele dimensie van de 
transatlantische betrekkingen, dat Ernst van der Beugel een voorname positie in zou nemen. 
Zo bekleedde hij posities in de besturen van particuliere organisaties die zich met 
internationale betrekkingen bezighielden, zoals de Ditchley Foundation, de Eisenhower 
Exchange Fellowship, het Atlantic Institute in Parijs, het Nederlandse Genootschap voor 
Internationale Zaken en het prestigieuze International Institute for Strategic Studies in 
London. Van bijzonder groot belang in deze context echter zijn benoeming tot Honorair 
Secretaris-Generaal voor Europa van de prestigieuze Bilderberg Meetings, één van de 
belangrijkste ontmoetingsplaatsen voor de formele en informele Atlantische elite 
De Bilderbergconferentie waren opgericht tijdens een periode van oplopende 
transatlantische spanningen begin jaren ’50. Het doel van de bijeenkomsten was om de 
Atlantische eenheid te bewaren door informele off the record bijeenkomsten te organiseren 
waar invloedrijke Amerikanen en Europeanen vrijuit konden spreken teneinde wederzijds 
begrip te bevorderen en onenigheden glad te strijken. Het was de bedoeling dat de 
conferenties op deze wijze bij zouden dragen aan het bevorderen van persoonlijke 
vertrouwensbanden, de informele uitwisseling van ideeën en het versterken van gedeelde 
waarden, terwijl er ook ruimte werd geboden voor het venten van frustraties en het 
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bespreken van meningsverschillen. De bijeenkomsten duurden drie dagen, waardoor er 
genoeg tijd overbleef om elkaar ook buiten de plenaire besprekingen om goed te leren 
kennen.  Twintig jaar lang – tussen 1960 en 1980 – zou Ernst van der Beugel de drijvende 
kracht achter deze conferenties zijn.  
Op persoonlijk niveau werd de continuïteit van Ernst van der Beugels diplomatieke rol 
gefaciliteerd door een combinatie van kenmerken die onderverdeeld kunnen worden in 
sociaal, intellectueel en financieel kapitaal. Op het gebied van sociaal kapitaal beschikte Ernst 
van der Beugel over een uitgebreid netwerk dat zich uitspande over de gehele Atlantische 
gemeenschap. Dit netwerk bestond uit invloedrijke figuren uit de publieke en de private 
sector: politici, ambtenaren, formele diplomaten, bankiers, vakbondsleiders, topmensen uit 
het bedrijfsleven, filantropen, academici en journalisten. Zijn positie als Secretaris-Generaal 
van de Bilderberg Meetings voorzag hem van extra transnationaal sociaal kapitaal en zorgde 
voor een vrijwel continue uitbreiding van dit netwerk in alle sferen die door de deelnemers 
aan deze conferenties werden vertegenwoordigd.  Dankzij zijn ervaring als een formele 
diplomaat was hij bekend met en had hij ook toegang tot de formele buitenlands politieke 
elite zowel in Europa als in de Verenigde Staten. Ook nadat hij de overheid had verlaten 
bleven zij hem erkennen als een serieuze speler op het diplomatieke toneel. 
 Van der Beugel had tijdens zijn carrière als overheidsfunctionaris niet alleen een groot 
netwerk opgebouwd, maar ook veel kennis en expertise vergaard - met name op het gebied 
van de transatlantische betrekkingen en de Europese integratie. Op dit intellectuele kapitaal 
werd ook nadat hij de overheid verliet veelvuldig een beroep op gedaan. Zijn benoeming tot 
bijzonder hoogleraar in de Westelijke Samenwerking bij de Universiteit Leiden versterkte zijn 
status als expert. Zijn sociale status en trackrecord als formele diplomaat, maakten hem tot 
een erkende, vertrouwde, professionele insider op het diplomatieke speelveld. Zijn steeds 
verder uitdijende netwerk en de toegang tot invloedrijke figuren aan beide kanten van de 
Atlantische Oceaan zorgden ervoor dat Ernst van der Beugel goed op te hoogte kon blijven 
van de laatste internationale ontwikkelingen en zorgde ervoor dat hij over waardevolle insider 
information beschikte, hetgeen hem weer tot een interessante gesprekspartner maakte – ook 
voor formele diplomaten. Dit bood vervolgens ook weer mogelijkheden om zijn netwerk 
verder uit te breiden. Zijn kennis en expertise maakten hem niet alleen een interessante 
gesprekspartner voor formele diplomaten en andere overheidsfunctionarissen, maar maakten 
hem ook tot een aantrekkelijke kandidaat voor commissariaten en consultancy posities in het 
bedrijfsleven en bij filantropische instellingen, zoals de Ford Foundation, die hielpen om een 
groot deel de private transatlantische organisaties, waaronder de Bilderberg Meetings, te 
financieren. Deze posities zorgden vervolgens weer voor het nodige financiële kapitaal dat 
Ernst van der Beugel hielp de levensstandaard te behouden waarmee hij zijn private 
diplomatieke activiteiten kon faciliteren.  De laatste drie hoofdstukken bestuderen meer 
specifiek de diplomatieke rol en modus operandi van Ernst van der Beugel als privépersoon 
aan de hand van drie case studies, die zich allemaal richten op de diplomatieke activiteiten 
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die Ernst van der Beugel ontplooide in de context van een door hem gepercipieerde 
bedreiging van de Atlantische samenwerking. 
Hoofdstuk vijf gaat in op de diplomatieke rol die Ernst van der Beugel vervulde in de 
context van het ‘Gaullistische gevaar’ tijdens de jaren ’60. Nadat Charles de Gaulle de 
Atlantische gemeenschap in 1963 in een crisis had gestort door zijn veto tegen het Britse EEG 
lidmaatschap uit te spreken, gebruikte Ernst van der Beugel de Bilderberg Meetings als een 
belangrijk instrument om sociale en intellectuele vervreemding binnen de Atlantische elite 
tegen te gaan door het verbeteren van de persoonlijke banden en wederzijds begrip, maar 
ook door de bijeenkomsten als een uitlaatklep voor transatlantische frustraties te laten 
dienen.  Van der Beugel was bovendien bang dat De Gaulle de Amerikanen door zijn anti-
Amerikaanse uitspraken van Europa zou vervreemden en dat dit zou leiden tot een 
terugtrekking van de Amerikaanse inzet op het Europese continent. Door middel van de 
Bilderbergconferenties kon hij aan de Amerikaanse elite laten zien dat De Gaulle niet voor 
heel Europa sprak, maar dat het overgrote deel van de Europese elite de Gaullisten niet 
steunde. Effecten van deze Bilderberg Meetings sijpelden ook door in het formele 
diplomatieke berichtenverkeer. Nadat de Nederlandse Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken 
Jospeh Luns een Gaullist vrijelijk zijn ideeën uiteen had horen zetten op een Bilderberg 
conferentie, probeerde hij via een speech van koningin Juliana op het Amerikaanse continent 
duidelijk te maken dat de Gaulle niet voor alle Europeanen sprak.  Op hetzelfde moment 
hielpen de Bilderbergconferenties om in gesprek te blijven met de Fransen; enerzijds om 
helderheid te krijgen over hun denkbeelden en anderzijds om ook hen – en daarbij ook de 
niet Gaullistische Fransen – geëngageerd te houden in de transatlantische conversatie. Dit 
hoofdstuk laat ook zien dat de Bilderberg Meetings uitermate serieus werden benaderd door 
formele diplomaten en dat ook Ernst van der Beugel, die tijdens deze periode nauw contact 
onderhield met vooraanstaande diplomaten en beleidsmakers in de VS en Europa, door het 
formele diplomatieke establishment als een serieuze speler op het diplomatieke toneel werd 
beschouwd. Hij wisselde regelmatig informatie met hen uit over ontwikkelingen aan de 
andere zijde van de Atlantische oceaan, bracht berichten tussen Amerikaanse en Europese 
overheidsfunctionarissen over en werkte op sommige momenten samen aan meer concrete 
gemeenschappelijke doelen. Zijn activiteiten werden dan ook goed in de gaten gehouden 
door de Amerikaanse ambassade in den Haag, waar van der Beugel zelf ook veelvuldig 
contact mee onderhield. Nadat Amerikaanse ambtenaren van het Ministerie van Buitenlandse 
Zaken hem overtuigden van het belang van de Multilateral Force, een transatlantisch 
samenwerkingsproject voor nucleair bewapende schepen waar van der Beugel oorspronkelijk 
weinig enthousiasme voor op kon brengen, zette Van der Beugel zich zowel voor als achter de 
schermen voor dit project in teneinde de plannen van Charles de Gaulle te frustreren en een 
positieve impuls te geven aan de transatlantische betrekkingen. Hij deed dit onder andere 
door voorstanders van dit beleid binnen het Amerikaanse State Department een podium te 
bieden op de Bilderberg conferentie in 1964 om deze ideeën uit te venten. Ondertussen wist 
hij in Nederland steun te bieden aan het onder druk staande Atlanticistische beleid van 
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Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken Luns door een groep van 38 Nederlandse prominenten te 
verzamelen die in een open brief in vooraanstaande Nederlandse kranten hun steun aan dit 
beleid betuigden.  
Terwijl het vijfde hoofdstuk vooral ging over de rol die Ernst van der Beugel achter de 
schermen van de transatlantische diplomatie speelde, gaat het zesde hoofdstuk in op een 
periode waarin hij zich steeds meer een rol in het publieke debat toe-eigende. Dit gebeurde 
tijdens de late jaren ’60 en het begin van de jaren ’70, een periode die enerzijds werd 
gekenmerkt door ontspanning tussen Oost en West en anderzijds door de democratisering 
van het buitenlands beleid. Van der Beugel zag dit als een grote bedreiging voor de 
Atlantische samenwerking en met name voor de Atlantische defensie-inspanning. Met de 
periode van ontspanning raakte het vijandsbeeld van de Sovjet-Unie namelijk op de 
achtergrond, waardoor een belangrijke legitimering voor de NAVO en de nationale defensie-
uitgaven onder druk kwam te staan. Terwijl de bevolking mondiger werd, groeide het anti-
Amerikanisme in Europa onder andere door de voortdurende Vietnamoorlog. De 
internationale betrekkingen werden hiermee uit het domein van de elite getrokken, die niet 
meer om de stem en mening van het ‘gewone volk’ heen kon. In deze context begon Ernst 
van der Beugel een voorname rol te spelen in het publieke debat, waarin hij het Amerikaanse 
beleid aan een Europees publiek probeerde uit te leggen en een sympathiek beeld van de 
Verenigde Staten probeerde neer te zetten door de herinnering aan de Amerikaanse rol in de 
bevrijding en het Marshall Plan in leven te houden. Op hetzelfde moment probeerde hij ook 
het vijandsbeeld van de Sovjetunie in leven te houden en waarschuwde hij voor het niet 
aflatende gevaar dat van deze communistische dreiging uitging. Van der Beugel werd in deze 
periode ook benoemd tot lid van de Commissie van Rijckevorsel, die de Nederlandse regering 
moest adviseren over haar defensiebeleid. In het debat dat zich over dit onderwerp in de 
Nederlandse maatschappij ontwikkelde, ontpopte Ernst van der Beugel zich als één van de 
voornaamste voorvechters voor een hoger defensiebudget. Zijn rol als ‘expert’ ook op dit 
gebied werd hierbij onderstreept door zijn benoeming tot voorzitter van het prestigieuze 
International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. Van der Beugel probeerde niet alleen 
door zijn eigen directe publieke optredens bij te dragen aan een klimaat dat bevorderlijk was 
voor de transatlantische betrekkingen, maar hielp ook Nederlandse journalisten waarvan hij 
dacht dat ze positief over de VS zouden schrijven, bijvoorbeeld door ze toegang te bieden tot 
voorname mensen uit zijn netwerk, of door of door ze uit te nodigen voor een 
Bilderbergconferentie of op één van de vele diners met allerhande prominenten bij hem 
thuis. Naast deze meer publiek-diplomatieke activiteiten bleef Van der Beugel ook een actieve 
rol spelen achter de schermen van de transatlantische diplomatie. In deze context staat 
vooral van der Beugels nauwe vriendschap met Henry Kissinger centraal. Deze vriendschap, 
die tot stand was gekomen toen Ernst van der Beugel nog voor de Nederlandse overheid 
werkte, voorzag Van de Beugel tijdens deze periode van een directe lijn naar het Witte Huis. 
Kissinger en Van der Beugel benaderden elkaar tijdens deze periode ook met diplomatieke 
kwesties. Zo belde Kissinger Ernst van der Beugel op om advies te vragen toen Minister van 
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Buitenlandse Zaken Luns boos en verontwaardigd reageerde op het feit dat President Nixon 
op zijn eerste Europese reis wel België en Italië aandeed, maar Nederland niet en hielp Van 
der Beugel Kissinger contact te leggen met het Actiecomité van Monnet nadat de relaties 
tussen dit Actiecommité en het Witte Huis met de overgang van president Johnson naar 
Nixon waren verwaterd. Andersom benaderde Ernst van der Beugel Kissinger bijvoorbeeld om 
druk uit te oefenen op de Nederlandse regering om het defensiebudget op te hogen, waar 
Kissinger eenmaal wel een eenmaal geen gehoor aan gaf. Ook schakelde van der Beugel 
Kissingers hulp in teneinde de Nederlandse regering te helpen in het verkrijgen van de lang 
begeerde landingsrechten voor de KLM – deze keer wel met succes. 
Het laatste hoofdstuk bespreekt de manieren waarop Ernst van der Beugel zich inzette 
om het Atlantische gedachtegoed over te dragen aan een nieuwe generatie leiders die de 
Tweede Wereldoorlog, noch de bevrijding of het Marshall Plan hadden meegemaakt. In plaats 
daarvan groeiden zij op tijdens een periode van ontspanning tussen Oost en West en 
associeerden zij de VS  met sociale onrust, de Vietnamoorlog en het Watergateschandaal. In 
deze context beschrijft dit hoofdstuk Ernst van der Beugels rol als consultant voor de Ford 
Foundation, zijn werk als bijzonder hoogleraar aan de Universiteit Leiden, waarvoor hij door 
een journalist het predicaat van “NAVO-professor” opgeplakt kreeg, en zijn ondersteuning 
van uitwisselingsprogramma’s. De grootste nadruk ligt echter op de wijze waarop Ernst van 
der Beugel trachtte om de Bilderberg Meetings te gebruiken om het Atlantische 
gedachtegoed over te brengen aan een nieuwe generatie leiders door deze in de Atlantische 
elite op te nemen en te betrekken in het gesprek over de toekomst van de Atlantische 
gemeenschap.  
Uit de voorgaande hoofdstukken blijkt dat Van der Beugel’s diplomatieke activiteiten 
geen incidenten waren, maar deel uitmaakten van aanhoudende en gecoördineerde pogingen 
van gelijkgestemde private actoren om deel te nemen in en bij te dragen aan het 
multidimensionale beheer van de transatlantische betrekkingen door natiestaten en private 
actoren, via formele en informele kanalen. De formele en informele dimensies van de 
Atlantische betrekkingen waren niet van elkaar geïsoleerd, maar waren nauw verbonden via 
sociale netwerken en ontmoetingsplaatsen, zoals de Bilderberg Meetings, die interactie 
tussen beide groepen faciliteerden.  Op hetzelfde moment is het van belang aan te geven dat 
veel van de private Atlanticistische organisaties grass roots initiatieven waren, die niet door 
een staat waren geïnitieerd, hoewel formele overheidsvertegenwoordigers hun rol in het 
diplomatieke proces erkenden en soms ook toejuichten. Soms werkten ze samen aan 
gemeenschappelijke diplomatieke doelen. Soms waren overheidsvertegenwoordigers er zelfs 
van overtuigd dat ze effectiever konden handelen dan overheidsvertegenwoordigers, of 
formele vertegenwoordigers van de NAVO bijvoorbeeld. Als private actoren konden ze 
bijvoorbeeld makkelijker vrijuit spreken en kwamen ze geloofwaardiger over wanneer ze 
publieksdiplomatie bedreven of bijdroegen aan de psychologische oorlogsvoering – zaken die 
wanneer uitgevoerd door formele overheidsvertegenwoordigers sneller zouden rieken naar 
propaganda. Op hetzelfde moment boden ontmoetingsplekken als de Bilderberg Meetings 
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ook overheidsvertegenwoordigers een plek waar ze vrijer konden spreken, hun collega’s 
beter konden leren kennen en gemakkelijker vertrouwensbanden konden smeden. Er waren 
dus momenten waarop de private actoren nauw samenwerkten met het formele 
diplomatieke establishment, maar er waren ook momenten waarop ze elkaar uitdaagden, of 
geheel los van elkaar opereerden. Ze waren niet zonder meer een verlengstuk van de formele 
diplomatie 
Hetzelfde kan worden gezegd van Ernst van der Beugel en zijn verhouding tot 
bijvoorbeeld Nederlandse en Amerikaanse overheidsvertegenwoordigers.  Als privédiplomaat 
kon hij niet gezien worden als de marionet van één van deze natiestaten. Als formeel 
overheidsvertegenwoordiger had hij zich beperkt gevoeld door de ambtelijke discipline van 
de Nederlandse staat – als privédiplomaat kon hij handelen op basis van zijn eigen 
overtuigingen en was hij vrij om zijn eigen koers bepalen. Zo werkte hij bijvoorbeeld samen 
met de Nederlandse regering om landingsrechten voor de KLM in de VS te verkrijgen, maar 
deinsde hij er ook niet voor terug om de Nederlandse regering via zijn Amerikaanse contacten 
onder druk te zetten om het defensiebudget op te hogen. Hij werkte enthousiast samen met 
de ambtenaren op het Amerikaanse State Department in hun poging steun onder de 
Atlantische elite te vergaren voor de Multilateral Force, maar uitte op hetzelfde moment 
sterke kritiek op de Amerikaanse rol in het proces van Europese integratie toen zij de Britse 
plannen voor een Europese Vrijhandelszone niet krachtig genoeg steunden of voor het gebrek 
aan leiderschap dat ze volgens hem toonden binnen de Atlantische gemeenschap.  Al met al 
manifesteerde Ernst van der Beugel zich op het diplomatieke toneel als een onafhankelijke 
transnationale actor die een realistische stroming binnen het Atlanticisme vertegenwoordigde 
die streefde naar maximale Atlantische cohesie onder sterk Amerikaanse leiderschap. De 
doelen die hij hierbij nastreefde hadden een duidelijk diplomatiek karakter, namelijk het 
versterken van de transatlantische betrekkingen op de lange en korte termijn 
Door Ernst van der Beugel te volgen door de formele en informele dimensies van de 
transatlantische diplomatie ten tijde van de Koude Oorlog heeft dit proefschrift laten zien hoe 
New Diplomatic History een alternatief perspectief biedt op de diplomatieke geschiedenis. 
Het beeld van het transatlantsiche diplomatieke proces dat in deze hoofstukken naar voren 
komt, is complexer en gelaagder dan veel traditionele studies doen vermoeden. Het laat zien 
hoe Ernst van der Beugel samen met diverse andere private spelers een integraal onderdeel 
vormde van het transatlantische diplomatieke proces ten tijde van de Koude Oorlog – en dat 
zij ook door formele diplomaten als dusdanig werden erkend. Om recht te doen aan de 
complexiteit van dit diplomatieke proces zullen we dus ook aandacht moeten besteden aan 
de informele dimensie van de diplomatie en de rol van niet-statelijke actoren zoals Ernst van 
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